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Summary 
Using the US-Japan alliance as its institutional setting and the political conflict over the 
relocation of Marines Air Base Futenma from Ginowan City to Nago, Okinawa as its case study, this 
research seeks to examine how alliances are discursively reproduced by analysing – through 
interviews, public speeches, and government publications – how they are publicly framed and 
deliberated not only by ‘elite’ actors (e.g. those in the US and Japanese governments) who seek to 
maintain the US-Japan alliance in its current form, but also by those within Okinawan local 
government and civil society who contest the alliance’s sustainability.  
This research sits in contrast to the prevailing arguments in the existing literature on alliance 
persistence, which tend to have a top-down focus and privilege the cooperative discourses of elite 
actors with direct access to the inner-workings of the alliance over the lived experience of ‘everyday’ 
actors excluded from the central policymaking process. Furthermore, these arguments tend to 
ignore the possibility of internal divisions amongst these 'elite' and 'everyday' actors, representing 
any debates within an alliance as taking place between the central governments of the member 
states rather than exploring the many divergences of opinion that exist within their central political 
parties, military bureaucracies, civil societies, and other groups concerned.  
By identifying a wide variety in the sites of discourse production both inside and outside of 
this institutionalised alliance, this research helps to bridge the disconnect between top-down and 
bottom-up analyses of alliance persistence, illustrate the processes by which discourses from 
seemingly irreconcilable sources may actually interact, influence, and shape each other in the realm 
of security policymaking, and broaden the conversation from one focused on 'persistence' to include 
an understanding of how an alliance is actively reproduced through discourse. 
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Introduction 
 
What is manifest from the quote of the MOD researcher above is that a security alliance is 
constituted not simply by ‘states’ per se, nor even the central governments within these ‘states’ 
which signed the original treaty creating it. Indeed, it cannot even be limited to the specific 
individuals within these governments, nor to the sites at which they originally negotiated the 
parameters of the institution and where they continue to do so. Rather, when considering how an 
alliance is created and maintained, the physical effects of its policies and related assets must be 
taken into account. Although previous literature on alliances has taken care to separate these two 
facets of their existence – the ‘elite’-level negotiations from the ‘everyday’’s reaction to them – it is 
practically impossible to do so when their institutionalisation involves explicit reaffirmation not only 
from government officials, but also from the general publics (upon which, in democratic systems at 
least, these officials’ continued election purportedly relies).  
 However, given the ‘very different motivations [and] very different ideas’ of officials, 
‘experts’, the public, and other actors, securing this approval is not always so straightforward a task 
as it has sometimes been portrayed. Rather, as a process of negotiation and argumentation, it has 
the potential to be convoluted, difficult, and even politically intractable to the point that the 
fundamental existence of the institution itself comes up for debate. This is further complicated by 
the idea that alliances are not simply political institutions or the products of interstate treaties, but 
also carriers of the collective memories, ideas, myths, narratives, and stories of those who support 
them—and of those who oppose their continuation. 
1. Alliances in international relations 
As outlined above, alliances exist not only through the treaties signed by their member 
states, but also in the form of the individuals and physical assets (such as arms provided by 
members) constituting them. Often, these treaties are not necessarily just formed on the basis of 
For local people [in Okinawa], the [US-Japan] alliance is a burden. Simply a burden. On 
the national level, it is a necessary asset and capability to share in order to have 
deterrence and defence. And for the strategic managers of the alliance, it’s the same: 
it’s a global asset, a military asset. Not only to East Asia but also to Afghanistan, or 
even to Filipinos for typhoons or earthquakes off the coast of Aceh. And the top layer 
thinks that Okinawa is best-located for providing logistics support to Afghanistan or 
even to some ally or the ASEAN region. What does this mean? It means that these 
three layers have very different motivations, very different ideas. And the bottom two, 
especially, are very different, very different. And we don’t see any specific, clear-cut 
solution to that situation. 
- A senior researcher for the Japanese Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
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vaguely-outlined shared interests or aims, but in order to join states’ military forces or defence 
policies against specific ‘threats’ to their national security. This is the case not only for many 
alliances of ages past, but also current ones, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
(created to defend against the ‘threat’ of the Soviet Union and international communism) and the 
United States (US)’s other bilateral and multilateral alliances (such as the US-South Korean and US-
Japan alliances).  
Where in the past alliances were often dissolved at war’s end or when the ‘threats’ against 
which they were formed had been neutralised or reduced, in the case of the US, its World War Two 
(WWII) and post-war era military or ‘security’ alliances have been maintained beyond anyone’s 
predictions of their demise. This phenomenon has been the subject of much scholarly research and 
debate in the field of international relations (IR) studies1, where it is referred to as alliance 
‘persistence’. In doing so, previous studies largely discuss the continuation of these partnerships in 
the context of an alliance’s ‘institutionalisation’ over a number of years or decades. According to this 
framework, given a high level of institutionalisation2, scholars find that governments involved in 
these US alliances – including the US itself – face challenges (if they care to do so, which they are 
often portrayed as not) in terminating the original treaty or agreement.  
What is often missing or underemphasised in this discussion, however, is not only a closer 
look at the specific groups or individuals within the member states of an alliance who are primarily 
responsible for sustaining it and lobbying on the policy level in favour of its continued existence, but 
also how an alliance has consequences for people beyond the level of government and military 
officials. Indeed, in even calling this phenomenon alliance ‘persistence’, scholars downplay the day-
to-day process behind the continuation of an alliance—it simply is and will continue to be, even 
without the active efforts of those supporting it.3 By using this terminology, they can therefore 
discuss an alliance or related policies purely with regard to abstract concepts like ‘ensuring security’ 
or specific military ones, like ‘increasing interoperability’ of joint forces—all without ever touching 
on the ways in which an alliance, both as a firmly-established political institution and a set of related 
policies, can be felt ‘all the way down’ to the level of ‘everyday’ people. 
2. A case in point: the US-Japan alliance and the relocation of Futenma 
In examining how an alliance’s impacts can be felt in this way, the conflict over the 
relocation of US Marine Corps (USMC) Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) within the US-Japan 
                                                          
1 See, for example: Celeste A. Wallander, ‘Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War’, 
International Organization, 54:4 [2000], pp. 705-735; Jae-Jung Suh, Power, interest, and identity in military 
alliances (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Robert B. McCalla, ‘NATO’s persistence after the cold 
war’, International Organization, 50:3 (1996), pp. 445-475. 
2 See Chapter 1, section 2.3 for more on the process of alliance ‘institutionalisation’. 
3 See section 3 of this Introduction for further details. 
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alliance (USJA) serves as a case in point. To begin with, it is important to have a basic historical 
understanding of the alliance itself. Forged in the aftermath of a global conflict which left much of 
Japan’s largest cities in ruins and over three million of its citizens dead, this unlikely partnership 
between former enemies has since gone on to become a staple of international relations to the 
point that it is commonly referred to by officials from both governments as the ‘cornerstone’ of 
peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.4 While both governments cooperate across a number 
of different policy fields, including economic, environmental, and technological, the oft-stated ‘pillar’ 
of their alliance has been and continues to be related to ensuring deterrence capabilities against 
perceived regional threats: namely (but not limited to) the build-up of the Chinese military and 
North Korea’s nuclear missile programme. They claim to ensure this deterrence primarily through 
the stationing of US armed forces in Japan – forces which have remained in Japan in some form or 
another since the end of WWII – and, more specifically, through the stationing of forces in Okinawa 
prefecture.  
Established on former Japanese imperial bases or constructed forcibly on residential areas 
seized in the aftermath of the bloody Battle of Okinawa (during which around a quarter of the 
prefecture’s civilian population perished), nearly 75% of all US military (USM) facilities in Japan and 
about 25,000 personnel and their dependents are concentrated in Okinawa.5 As it is located roughly 
400 miles south of the rest of mainland Japan and the same distance east of Taiwan, Okinawa has 
been called the ‘keystone of the Pacific’ for its strategic role in US foreign policy in Asia going back to 
WWII. In fact, US facilities in Okinawa have not only played an important role in the US’s forward 
presence in the region from the Korean and Vietnam wars all the way to recent conflicts in the 
Middle East, but have also served as a jumping-off point for humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) 
operations around East and Southeast Asia. 
However, with around 1.4 million residents and one of the highest population densities in 
the world, the proximity between US bases, their personnel, and the communities surrounding them 
– and the attendant problems arising from this proximity, including environmental pollution, sexual 
crimes, traffic incidents, and military accidents – has often been a cause of tension and a safety 
hazard to residents. Okinawa’s former status as a trustee of the USM from 1950 until its reversion to 
Japan in 1972, coupled with its bitter experiences during WWII as a major battleground (its 
socioeconomic recovery from which was far behind the rest of the country, as it remains the poorest 
prefecture in Japan), has enhanced the sense among many of its residents not only that they are 
                                                          
4 See Chapter 3, section 1 for further details. 
5 Hirokazu Nakaima, ‘The Futenma Relocation Issue’ in Akikazu Hashimoto, Mike Mochizuki and Kurayoshi 
Takara, eds, The Okinawa Question: Futenma, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Regional Security (Washington, DC: 
Sigur Center for Asian Studies, 2013), pp. 53-56, p. 53. 
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geographically separated from the Japanese mainland by distance, but also that they have been (and 
continue to be) politically and economically marginalised in favour of ensuring a ‘national’, 
‘regional’, or ‘global’ security framework from which they are excluded. 
This framework, insist officials in both governments and in the USM, relies so much on the 
heavy presence of US forces and facilities in Okinawa that the security ‘guarantee’ provided by the 
USJA could not be sustained without them. On the other hand, it is undeniable that this 
concentration of forces has made bilateral relations between the two countries tense on account of 
local protests against the USM. For example, the relocation of Futenma from the densely-populated 
Ginowan in south-central Okinawa to the more rural Henoko village in northern Okinawa has proven 
to be a persistent ‘thorn in the side’ of alliance relations for nearly twenty years. Originally agreed 
upon in 1996 by both governments, the relocation has only partially been carried out due to protests 
from Okinawans and their supporters from mainland Japan and internationally. This sustained anti-
relocation and wider anti-base movement (ABM) has, at times, not only worked to undermine the 
post-war ‘deterrence’ rationale provided by US and Japanese officials regarding Okinawan bases, but 
also called into question the purpose and sustainability of broader alliance policies that have gone 
without significant upheaval or investigation for decades. 
3. Studying ‘persistence’: gaps in the debate 
The case of Futenma highlights the meaningful ways in which those actors not traditionally 
associated with policymaking at the ‘alliance’ level can challenge those that are—not to mention 
challenge the latter’s arguments and present alternatives to it. However, as mentioned previously, in 
the debates around how alliances are formed, how related policies are decided, and why they 
‘persist’, these discussions largely take place in and around the central governments of member 
states (with these sites being reduced down to monolithic entities such as ‘Tokyo’ or ‘Washington’). 
On the USJA specifically, previous studies similarly privilege these sites when discussing why and 
how it has been maintained since the end of WWII. They all, therefore, share a tendency to 
downplay the significance of sites outside of government, concluding that these kinds of security 
alliances – with strong support from their member states, built-in survival mechanisms, and job 
security for those who manage them – are highly unlikely to face significant challenges to their 
existence in the long term.6  
However, given that the voices of the very citizens that security relationships are meant to 
protect can be obscured or go unheard in these debates, several important issues have been raised 
                                                          
6 See, for example: Kurt M. Campbell, ‘Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership’, The Washington 
Quarterly, 23:4 (2000), pp. 125-134; Brad Glosserman, ‘U.S.-Japan Relations: Staying the Course’, Comparative 
Connections, 6:1 (2004), pp. 19-27; Takafumi Ohtomo, ‘Bandwagoning to dampen suspicion: NATO and the 
US–Japan Alliance after the Cold War’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 3 (2003), pp. 29-55. 
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regarding the way in which alliances are currently studied. For example, can we realistically discuss 
the views of the ‘state’ or its representatives in isolation? Are the policies they promote truly based 
on ‘better’ or more ‘accurate’ knowledge purely on the basis of their access to more privileged 
information regarding domestic and regional security? And can these policies, which are supposed to 
ensure ‘national’, ‘regional’, or even ‘global’ security, be considered complete without including the 
lived experience of individuals and communities who are directly affected by them? These are the 
kinds of questions posed in studies of the ‘Okinawa base issue’ and of Futenma specifically.  
In these, many academics, activists, and other sympathetic supporters of the ABM often 
lionize Okinawans as the ‘Davids’ confronting the US and Japanese governments’ (USG and GOJ, 
respectively) ‘Goliath’. Attendant to this, the latter are portrayed in this literature as either 
purposefully victimising Okinawans through continuing to concentrate the majority of the USM 
presence in Okinawa, or as not knowing or caring enough about local concerns to alleviate the base 
‘burden’. In doing so, they also suggest that the alliance is perpetuated by these officials at the 
continued ‘sacrifice’ of the prefecture and its residents, often by drawing on historical parallels to 
the Battle of Okinawa and pre-reversion era of USM administration.7 
What is evident, then, is that across all three literatures – alliance ‘persistence’, the USJA’s 
‘persistence’, and the ‘Okinawa base problem’ – there has been a tendency to focus exclusively on 
one side or the other. The issue with this binary distinction is not only one of oversimplification 
through demonization/victimisation, but also that it leaves out actors with arguments that sit 
somewhere in-between (for example, central government officials in Tokyo and Washington who 
express empathy or solidarity with anti-base protesters). Given this paradigm, these studies largely 
do not capture the full range and complexity of an issue with as many layers of history, identity, and 
ongoing social interaction as that of US bases in Okinawa and their impact on the USJA. In addition, 
there is a noticeable lack of focus on the process by which alliances ‘persist’ and are challenged – the 
how – and too great of a focus on the why (both in explaining why they ‘persist’, and why certain 
policies are more successful than others). Along these lines, they often do not attempt to present a 
coherent theoretical or methodological framework for addressing these issues, with many studies 
resembling editorial pieces biased towards one side or the other without much interest in bridging 
the two (or more) perspectives.  
                                                          
7 See, for example: Kunitoshi Sakurai, ‘Okinawan Bases, the United States and Environmental Destruction’, The 
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 10 November 2008, available online at: http://japanfocus.org/-sakurai-
kunitoshi/2946/article.html; Gavan McCormack, ‘Hillary in Japan – The Enforcer’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 8:7 
(2009), available at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-McCormack/3059; George Feifer, ‘The Rape of 
Okinawa’, World Policy Journal, 17:3 (2000), pp. 33-40; Genevieve Souillac, ‘Peace on the Margins of 
Democracy: The Impact of Civic Activism, Identity, and Memory on Japan’s Security Policy in Okinawa’, 
Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, 25 (2009), pp. 1-19. 
Grinberg 18 
 
4. Central research questions and argument 
In order to broaden and deepen the terms of this debate, I change the focus of this thesis 
from one on explaining the ‘persistence’ of alliances to one that examines the process behind its 
active reproduction. I make this distinction because ‘persistence’ is a term which is traditionally 
associated with the literature on path dependence – which views institutions (such as alliances) as 
‘political legacies of concrete historical struggles’ and thus ‘inertial, rule-bound and resistant to 
change’ – and therefore robs individual actors of their agency in challenging or changing these 
rules.8 By contrast, ‘reproduction’ – with a salient presence in works of political sociology – is linked 
not only to the continuation of institutional structures (rules, assets), but also identities and norms.9 
In choosing to use this term, I do not take this continuation to be a ‘self-activating [process]’ reliant 
on even such informal concepts as ‘codes of appropriateness’ or other ‘collective scripts that 
regulate human behavior’10, but rather as one in which actors ‘can manipulate meaning to bring 
about disorder and breach of common identity’—and therefore suggest that ‘the reproduction of 
order [emphasis added] is [not] necessarily paramount in every interaction’.11 
This research therefore expands the number of actors whose arguments are considered to 
include not only ‘elites’ in the diplomatic and defence corps of an alliance (such as government 
officials in Tokyo and Washington), but also ‘everyday’ individuals whose ‘local knowledge’12 about 
how national security policies affect day-to-day life – and who do not necessarily want to reproduce 
the existing institutional ‘order’ – can serve as an indicator of the future sustainability of a political 
institution such as the USJA. Throughout, I take care not only to draw distinctions between these 
different groups of actors, but also to highlight the areas in which their oftentimes competing 
discourses about ‘security’, ‘threat’, and identity intersect and engage with one another—and how 
these interactions have shaped political discussions and processes in this arena. 
                                                          
8 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, ‘A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change’ in James Mahoney and 
Kathleen Thelen, eds, Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp. 1-37, pp. 6-7; Stephen Bell, ‘Do We Really Need a New “Constructivist 
Institutionalism” to Explain Institutional Change?’, British Journal of Political Science, 41 (2011), pp. 883-906, 
pp. 884-885.  
9 See, for example: Stewart Clegg, ‘Power and Authority, Resistance and Legitimacy’ in Henri Goverde et al, 
eds, Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2000), 
pp. 77-92; Roxanne Rimstead, ‘Subverting Poor Me: Negative Constructions of Identity in Poor and Working-
Class Women’s Autobiographies’ in Stephen Harold Riggins, ed, The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others 
in Discourse (London: SAGE Publications, 1997), pp. 249-280; Elizabeth S. Clemens and James M. Cook, ‘Politics 
and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change’, Annual Review of Sociology, 25:66 (1999), pp. 441-466; 
Teun A. van Dijk, ‘Political Discourse and Racism: Describing Others in Western Parliaments’ in Stephen Harold 
Riggins, ed, The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse (London: SAGE Publications, 1997), pp. 
31-64. 
10 Mahoney and Thelen 2010, p. 5. 
11 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 158. 
12 See Chapter 2, section 2.1 for a discussion of this term. 
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Specifically, I ask the following central questions to pursue these aims: 
1) What is the role of alliances in international relations? 
a) How do they function? 
2) How do competing discourses about the current conditions and future of a security alliance 
interact? How do they influence one another? 
a) What is the process that determines the prevalence of certain discourses over 
others? 
b) How do actors (both internal and external to the alliance) effect policy changes? 
c) What is the impact of analysing the issue of alliance reproduction from a top-down 
versus a bottom-up approach? 
 
These sorts of questions pose a challenge not only to the case of the USJA, but also clearly 
delineate the value of a research framework which analyses alliances as institutions and, therefore, 
as products of ongoing discursive negotiation and contestation between many different groups of 
actors across many different sites of interaction, from those in the ranks of the central governments 
of member states to the ‘everyday’. What is meant in this framework by the ‘everyday’ realm are the 
processes which constitute it, defined in the work of John Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke as ‘acts by 
those who are subordinate within a broader power relationship but, whether through negotiation, 
resistance or nonresistance, either incrementally or suddenly, shape, constitute and transform the 
political and economic environment around and beyond them’.13 Further to this, they identify (and 
this research identifies) ‘everyday’ actors who perform such actions, including: ‘a range of agents 
from individuals to meso-level groupings [e.g., peasants, migrant labourers, trade unions, small 
investors, low-income groups], and mega-scale aggregations [e.g., peripheral states and peoples]’.  
In this sense, the ‘everyday’ represents not only those individuals and groups normally 
excluded from traditional sites of political power (such as the central government), but also lower-
level, local government officials who similarly do not have access to the ‘expert’ knowledge upon 
which policymakers rely. Moreover, this term is fluid, not fixed: in encompassing not only different 
types of actors, but also acts in and of themselves, it is therefore possible to see an ‘everyday’ 
element, for example, within the policymaking process itself (which is, at its foundation, constituted 
by the personal experiences of the individual actors who contribute to it).14  
In the case of alliances, the number of people within government who actually deal with 
related policies on a day-to-day basis is even smaller—this leading to the phenomenon of alliance 
‘managers’ who sustain and shape the course of their countries’ bilateral relations, sometimes over 
                                                          
13 John M. Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke, ‘Everyday IPE: revealing everyday forms of change in the world 
economy’ in John M. Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke, eds, Everyday Politics of the World Economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1-23, pp. 15-16. 
14 Phillip Darby, ‘Security, Spaciality, and Social Suffering’, Alternatives, 31 (2006), pp. 453-473, pp. 461-462. 
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decades, across administrations of all political stripes.15 Given these circumstances, it is all the more 
important that in this research, alliances are not framed merely as the products of interstate 
treaties, but as political institutions managed by specific individuals whose efforts in reproducing 
them do not always take into consideration or actively dismiss the everyday ‘knowledge’ of citizens 
or local officials—though this lack of consideration on their part does not rule out the possibility of 
the latter intervening anyway (e.g. the protests over Futenma delaying its relocation).  
5. Theoretical framework 
This thesis therefore examines how security alliances have been discursively reproduced in 
the post-Cold War era by those actors who support their continuation. At the same time, it 
illustrates how these alliances are both interpreted and challenged not only by actors who support 
them, but by those who oppose them (such as anti-base protesters). Given that security alliances 
have traditionally been discussed by scholars including Stephen Walt, Kenneth Waltz, and John 
Mearsheimer as ‘status quo’, elite-led, and ‘managed’ institutions – as they are considered, with 
their ‘security’ components, to be ‘essential’ or ‘global assets’ – they have also been, in terms of the 
previous debates and policy literature on the topic, set apart from the vagaries of public deliberation 
and negotiation in a way that other issues (such as environmental policies) have not been.16  
Moreover, rather than relying on an understanding of interstate relations which assumes 
that there is an ‘objective knowledge of the world’, that there are value-free ‘facts’ within this world, 
and that, therefore, only ‘empirical validation or falsification […] is the hallmark of “real” enquiry’, I 
answer these questions via an interpretative, post-positivist theoretical framework.17 Calling into 
question this linear relationship between cause and effect and placing greater value on qualitative 
analysis of the creation of social meanings and practices, this framework draws on a number of ideas 
from literatures which have not often been consulted or cited heavily before in this field, but which 
can contribute to our understanding of how security policies are formulated, their consequences for 
the ‘everyday’, and how the ‘everyday’ interacts with these policies. These include: deliberative 
public policy as developed by Fischer, Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar, among others, which 
                                                          
15 These ‘managers’ within the context of the USJA, also sometimes called ‘Japan hands’, are a group of former 
officials including former Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs Joseph Nye, 
former Deputy SecState Richard Armitage, former senior adviser on Asia in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense Michael Green, and former Assistant SecState for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, all of 
whom are known to have a large influence on policymaking within the USJA. 
16 See, for example: Stephen M. Walt, ‘Why alliances endure or collapse’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 
39:1 (1997), pp. 156-179; Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 
25:1 (2000), pp. 5-41; John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, 
International Security, 15:1 (1990), pp. 5-56. 
17 Steve Smith, ‘Positivism and beyond’ in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds, International 
theory: positivism and beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 11-46, p. 16. 
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helps to bridge the gap between ‘policy experts’ and ordinary citizens18; discursive institutionalism 
(DI) as developed primarily by Vivien Schmidt, who broadens the scope of previous institutional 
theories to include social/discursive interaction between proactive institutional actors19; and gradual 
institutional change theory (GIC) as developed by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, which 
rejects the idea that institutions can only evolve as a result of exogenous shocks.20  
Specifically, the concepts drawn from these literatures for the purpose of my research are: 
active agency, wherein institutional change occurs when actors decide to use the institution 
differently and not simply as a product of deterministic path dependence; institutions as 
argumentative fields, wherein institutions act not only as structures constraining or enabling actors’ 
preferences, but as an arena within which actors’ discourses can be meaningfully interpreted and 
challenged; change and stability as inextricably linked, wherein institutions – representing the 
outcome of compromises and being subject to internal disagreements and shifts in public opinion – 
are naturally built with the capacity for dynamic change; and discourse, which, in my understanding 
of the term, constitutes the meanings upon which ideas are constructed, has a causal influence on 
political change, and encompasses not only texts, but also context, as this has a significant impact on 
what can be said meaningfully and with influence. 
6. Methodological framework 
I employ this framework using a discursive approach which recognises the power of 
language to independently impact upon not only socio-political actions, but also individual actors’ 
interpretations of concepts which constitute these actions. Specifically, I analyse the data presented 
in the thesis using social-interactive discourse analysis (SIDA) as developed by Fischer, a method 
which emphasises the ‘structure, style, and [socio-]historical context’ in which discourses are 
(re)produced.21 Within this, special attention is paid to the ways in which actors frame or represent 
knowledge and situations in order to both problematize certain issues while ignoring or excluding 
others.22 Moreover, these ‘frames’ sit within the larger discursive device of ‘narratives’, which 
enables actors across various sites of exchange to present their arguments in combination with any 
number of familiar cultural symbols or norms that would broaden the appeal and spread of a 
                                                          
18 Frank Fischer, Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003a) [online]. 
19 Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 11 (2008), pp. 303-326. 
20 Mahoney and Thelen 2010. 
21 Fischer 2003a. 
22 David Laws and Martin Rein, ‘Reframing practice’ in Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar, eds, Deliberative 
Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), pp. 172-208, p. 173. 
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discourse, and on the individual level of telling smaller, anecdotal ‘stories’.23 This approach, 
therefore, calls for an examination not only of historical and current policy texts and speeches from 
the central government, but a much wider variety of materials, including interviews with actors 
cutting across political groups and audio/visual material contributing to the discourses under study 
(including documentaries, anti-base posters, tourist pamphlets, and museum placards).  
In order to accomplish this, I carried out fieldwork from January to September 2014 in Japan 
(in Tokyo and in Okinawa) and the US (in Washington, DC), during which I conducted over 80 
interviews with: former and current central government officials from the US Departments of State 
and Defense (DOS and DOD, respectively) and the Japanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence 
(MOFA and MOD), including former Assistant Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for International 
Security Affairs under the Clinton administration Joseph Nye; local Okinawa Prefectural Government 
(OPG) officials including former governor Masahide Ota; USM officials, including former USMC 
Forces Pacific Commander Wallace Gregson; widely-cited USJA scholars such as Mike Mochizuki; and 
prominent activists, including Hideki Yoshikawa of the Save the Dugong Campaign. These interviews 
were conducted (and other data collected) at over 40 different sites, including not only government 
locations and military bases, but also those of historical or cultural importance within Okinawa (and 
which have often been raised by the ABM in their arguments against the USM presence), such as the 
Himeyuri Monument and Peace Museum.24  
Prior to collecting these materials, I identified two main discourses (the pro-USJA discourse 
and the anti-base discourse [ABD]) within the existing literature on this topic (see section 6.1 below); 
during fieldwork, I was able to identify the presence of these across three sites of exchange 
(diplomatic, defence, and the everyday; see section 6.2 below); and in collating the collected 
materials post-fieldwork, I was able to discover related narratives presented by actors within these 
discourses either across or ensconced within each site using four different analytical themes 
(historical memory and threat perception, defining and redefining security, institutional and cultural 
identities, and discursive intersections and divisions; see section 6.3 below).  
6.1. Discourses under study 
The pro-USJA discourse – which, although not always, usually overlaps with the pro-USM 
base discourse – has mainly been (re)produced by actors from the first two sites of exchange 
identified in this study (diplomatic and defence). Contained within it are a number of prevailing 
narratives which consistently identify the alliance as a ‘force for good’ or a ‘cornerstone’ of peace 
                                                          
23 Maarten Hajer, ‘A frame in the fields: policymaking and the reinvention of politics’ in Maarten Hajer and 
Hendrik Wagenaar, eds, Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 88-112, p. 104; Fischer 2003a. 
24 See Chapter 2, section 3 for a more detailed overview of the fieldwork programme. 
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and security in the region, emphasise the importance of US bases in Japan and especially in Okinawa 
for deterrence, are sceptical of the motives of the ABM, and express cynicism regarding the 
possibility of policy significantly changing for the foreseeable future. By contrast, the ABD – mainly 
(re)produced by actors from ‘everyday’ sites of exchange – revolves around narratives detailing the 
suffering of Okinawa during WWII, the discriminatory economic, military, and social policies 
promulgated by the US and Japanese central governments against it in the post-war era, the 
uniqueness of the Okinawan identity, and incredulity at the arguments of both governments 
regarding the ‘necessity’ of the USM presence in Okinawa.  
6.2. Sites of discursive exchange 
These discourses are communicated across three ‘sites of exchange’, defined by Hajer as 
locations which ‘have an influence on what can be said meaningfully and with influence’.25 While 
each site is distinct in terms of the actors or groups of actors identified within it, it is nonetheless 
evident, with each succeeding site discussed, that separating one layer from another is not always 
possible. For example, while the first site of exchange analysed in this thesis – the diplomatic (which 
includes the DOS and MOFA) – would seem to be fairly straightforward in its framing of the alliance 
in terms of the pro-alliance, pro-base discourse (henceforth PBD), it is also home to individuals and 
groups who work in both governments’ local offices in Okinawa. Being closer to the ‘situation’ with 
US bases, therefore, can confuse and muddy the communication of official narratives to local people 
and vice versa. This is even more the case among representatives in defence sites of exchange – 
including individuals not only from the central DOD and MOD, but also the US III Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF) in Okinawa and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) – whose work 
often involves them being asked to both carry out the ‘defence’ of both nations and to cooperate 
with and be sympathetic to the concerns of Okinawan residents to whom they live adjacent.  
The impact of both of these more ‘elite’ sites of exchange are deeply felt in the last – the 
everyday – as it is the site at which all of the governments’ narratives are directed and upon which 
they are moulded. This site, however, does not merely include the obvious actors within it, such as 
Okinawan anti-base protesters (including fisherman, farmers, retirees, academics, and other 
residents) and local officials from the OPG, but also incorporates many Japanese academics/activists 
and proponents of the ABD outside of the prefecture. These include actors ranging from academics 
and activists in mainland Japan/the US to international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). By 
juxtaposing each site against one another in this way, this thesis seeks to break down barriers put up 
by not only government officials, but also previous authors, to the possibility of interaction across 
and within groups outside of traditionally limited security policymaking circles. 
                                                          
25 Hajer 2003, p. 96; see Chapter 2, section 3.2 for full discussion. 
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6.3. Analytical themes 
I further break down each of these sites of exchange and the narratives and smaller stories 
(re)produced in and across them through four analytical themes based not only on observations 
from the ways in which these issues were analysed by previous scholars and on the salient concepts 
and ideas which emerged from the discourses themselves (sometimes displaying patterns in 
language across the sites, which is reflected in the subsections under each theme in each chapter), 
but also on the parameters set out by SIDA and its emphasis on bridging competing perspectives.26 I 
chose this structure also because the main concepts explored in each theme – whether it be 
historical memory, ‘security’ or identity – are ‘relevant concern[s] in all areas of the social body’ as 
well as ‘multi-scalar’27 in nature, and thus can be more fully explored in their individual facets when 
separated out in this manner.  
The themes I use to discuss the discourses identified in my research are, therefore, as 
follows:  
Theme 1: Historical memory and threat perception. Each chapter begins with an 
examination of the relevant historical background to not only the development of the USJA from the 
post-war period to today, but also the construction of the USM’s bases in Okinawa, and Okinawan 
pre-war and post-war history. Rather than simply providing a straightforward historical narrative of 
events, however, this theme delves into the prevailing narratives about what has been constituted 
as ‘threats’ to Okinawa, Japan, and the US—and how the actors themselves respond to these 
‘threats’. These contrasting perceptions of threat highlight how prominently the role of historical 
interpretation and memory has figured into the current political conflict over Futenma, and the 
conceptualisation of the USJA within it. 
Theme 2: Defining and redefining security. Following on from the first section, this theme 
focuses on the related notion of how ‘security’ has been and is currently defined by these groups. It 
emphasises the connection from the previous theme between historical and current constructions of 
what ‘security’ is, which underlines the idea of change and stability as being linked at various levels 
of discursive exchange. It also illustrates how the changing definition of ‘security’ over the course of 
several decades inherently makes institutions such as the USJA fields of public and private 
argumentation—not just limited to the purview of government officials and their chosen audiences.  
Theme 3: Institutional and cultural identities. Building on the discussions of ‘threat’ and 
‘security’ from the previous sections, this theme highlights the existence of a number of unique and 
overlapping identities asserted in both institutional (the GOJ, USG, military/SDF, and the alliance) 
                                                          
26 See Chapter 2, section 3.5.3 for more details on this. 
27 Nils Bubandt, ‘Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds’, Security 
Dialogue, 36:3 (2005), pp. 275-296, p. 279. 
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and cultural (Okinawan, Japanese, American) contexts among the groups under study, and how 
these identities have not only been actively shaped and evolved in the post-war era (partly through 
the shifting definitions of ‘threat’ and ‘security’), but also how they have impacted upon the conflict 
over the long-delayed relocation of Futenma.  
Theme 4: Discursive intersections and divisions. At the end of each chapter, I identify and 
analyse the various intersections and pervasive divisions found within the discourses and their 
attendant narratives. Where the previous themes mainly highlight distinctions between each of the 
groups and highlight their individual perceptions of ‘threat’, definitions of ‘security’, and unique 
institutional and cultural identities, this theme reveals areas of overlap between them in terms of 
the narratives they have (re)produced and how they have impacted each other (and the alliance) 
across what otherwise seem like rigid, unmovable ideological lines.  
7. Research contributions 
It is thus the aim of this research, using the case study of the USG’s and GOJ’s struggle to 
relocate Futenma within Okinawa prefecture in the midst of bitter protest, to examine how the USJA 
is reproduced in spite of this tension using a more holistic approach which includes the ‘local 
knowledge’ of Okinawan officials and residents alongside the more ‘accepted’ governmental and 
‘professional’ expertise. Divisions within both the various classes of political actors in both 
governments as well as in Okinawa will also be critically analysed, as it is important to uncover not 
only the origins of the prevailing and oppositional discourses about the alliance’s reproduction, but 
also how actors have historically promoted and continue to reproduce certain discourses over 
others. I chose this approach because it is useful in illuminating the crossovers in the discourses 
presented and how they have been communicated across and interpreted by the groups under 
study. Moreover, it shows how these groups have also communicated their ideas to audiences on an 
international level—and the impact that this international attention has had on the issue. 
In this context, having the USJA serve as the institutional framework of this case study is 
helpful because, as will be discussed in the next chapter, it highlights the fact that the alliance, being 
an ‘institutionalised’ one with specific self-representations which have been consistently 
reproduced, serves as a ‘preferred framework that policy makers and the public turn to in order to 
understand the world’.28 At the same time, however – if an alliance has become ‘institutionalised’ – 
then its institutionalisation ‘will involve considerable struggle, bargaining, and negotiation’ over 
                                                          
28 J.J. Suh, ‘Bound to last? the U.S.-Korea alliance and analytical eclecticism’ in J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein and 
Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking security in East Asia: identity, power, and efficiency (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), pp. 150-165, pp. 151-152. 
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these representations in the discourse across various sites of exchange.29 Therefore, in highlighting 
the effects that social interaction has – even on such high-profile, ‘elite-led’ issues as national 
security – this approach adds complexity back to a field (alliance studies in international relations) 
which has, too often, fallen prey to assumptions that it should remain exclusively within the realm of 
officials with more ‘knowledge’ and therefore ‘better’ judgement in making decisions which can 
make an impact on people’s daily lives. 
Furthermore, the range of materials which I have collected for this study – including open-
ended interviews, policy speeches, documentary features produced by anti-base activists, Wikileaks 
cables, and official policy documents from the USG and GOJ – examined through the four analytical 
themes identified above represents a departure from previous studies in their breadth, depth, and 
the complexity of views put on display. It therefore allows for the silences or missing pieces in both 
the prevailing and oppositional discourses on alliance policy to be investigated and brought to light, 
gives agency greater explanatory power in examining how institutions change, and allows us to ask 
how and why they have not been reproduced more widely. I therefore believe that contributing a 
piece of research which cuts across them makes a more significant contribution to the field of not 
only US-Japan studies, but also alliance studies in international relations more generally.  
Lastly and most importantly, it is the aim of this research to bring security policy back into 
the realm of deliberative democracy by examining its more sociological, everyday aspects. Both 
positivist and post-positivist studies on alliance ‘persistence’ have often remained limited to the 
institution under analysis and thus leave themselves open to criticism of the kind outlined above. 
Furthermore, in making their claims about the ‘institutionalisation’ of alliances, they do not then 
address who the audience is for this beyond the government and military officials and ‘security 
professionals’ who are assumed to hold the most sway (nor do they address, for that matter, if this 
audience is real or merely imagined). By contrast, an interpretative approach helps to weaken the 
perception that security policymaking can only be correctly understood by these political ‘elites’.  
By employing a social and interactive approach in the theoretical and methodological 
framework, this research therefore illustrates the processes by which discourses from seemingly 
irreconcilable sources may actually interact, influence, and shape each other in the realm of security 
policymaking, and broadens the conversation from one focused on ‘persistence’ to include an 
understanding of how an alliance is actively reproduced—and how this reproduction is resisted. 
                                                          
29 John L. Campbell, ‘Institutional Reproduction and Change’ in Glenn Morgan et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Institutional Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 88-109, p. 105. 
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8. Outline of the thesis 
The thesis proceeds in five chapters. Chapter 1 presents a review of previous literature, 
including: definitions and typologies of alliances in international relations (1.1); the ‘persistence’ of 
security alliances (breaking down explanatory variables behind ‘persistence’ by category: material, 
ideational, and hybrid) (1.2); and the literature on the USJA, including a brief historical backgrounder 
and a breakdown of the explanations provided by previous studies for its post-Cold War survival 
(along the same material, ideational, and hybrid lines as in the previous section) (1.3). This chapter 
therefore establishes the strengths, but also the gaps in the literatures on these subjects (as outlined 
above) which I set out to fill with my research.  
Following on from this, Chapter 2 details a research framework for the thesis, designed to 
address these gaps, which consists of: a theoretical framework relying on the deliberative public 
policy literature, DI, and GIC (2.1); a post-positivist, interpretative approach based on these theories 
that emphasises the importance of concepts including active agency, institutions as argumentative 
fields, change and stability as inextricably linked, and discourse (2.2); and a methodological 
framework revolving around SIDA, the full employment of which I discuss in my outline of the 
fieldwork programme (2.3). This chapter also addresses the unique contributions these make to the 
fields of international relations and security studies. 
After laying out the full background to the research and the means by which I address the 
central questions raised from it, the thesis proceeds in three main chapters (3, 4, and 5). The content 
of these is largely drawn from my fieldwork – including interviews, written observations, and print 
materials collected abroad – but also from primary (policy documents, speeches, Wikileaks-released 
diplomatic cables) and secondary (academic journals and news media) literature. Each chapter 
focuses on a specific site of discursive exchange, and the discursive strategies of the actors or groups 
of actors whom are actively reproducing the PBD or ABD within it.  
Chapter 3, for example, investigates the narratives (re)produced from sites of diplomatic 
exchange including the DOS, MOFA, and their related offices (such as MOFA’s local office and the US 
Consulate in Naha, Okinawa). Largely promulgating the PBD, the narratives outlined in this chapter 
not only provide the basic foundations of what the ‘managerial’ sites of exchange in the USJA look 
like and how actors within them communicate and interact amongst themselves, but also 
demonstrates the challenges these actors face in framing their narratives both to each other and to 
other audiences (such as those within defence and everyday sites of exchange).  
Chapter 4, focusing on defence sites of exchange, continues in its investigation of 
‘managerial’ sites as it traces the reproduction of narratives by actors from the DOD, MOD, SDF, and 
USM (in particular, the USMC). However, as mentioned earlier, the proximity of many actors from 
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these sites to the military bases and surrounding communities further complicates their ability to 
communicate the pro-alliance discourse ‘successfully’—that is, without being significantly affected in 
the process by the arguments of outside actors. It therefore serves as a kind of ‘middle ground’ 
between the diplomatic and everyday sites of exchange in terms of its physical distance from both 
the alliance (in the central governments) and the military bases (in Okinawa) while still illustrating its 
own, individual characteristics related to the unique history of the USM presence in Okinawa. 
Breaking away from these first two sites, Chapter 5, covering ‘everyday’ sites of exchange, 
includes actors ranging from Okinawan anti-base residents to sympathetic international 
organisations to OPG officials. While showing that these actors have consistently reproduced a 
strong narrative regarding the historical and current victimisation of Okinawans, this chapter also 
examines the diversity of discursive strategies employed by them. Whereas in Chapters 3 and 4 
there is less division, for example, between actors over the specifics of the Futenma case (in that 
they generally agree that it should be relocated within Okinawa, and preferably to the Nago area), in 
Chapter 5, while there is a general consensus about the unfairness of Okinawa’s base ‘burden’ and 
its ill-treatment by the USG and GOJ, it is less clear if ‘everyday’ actors agree on the role that US 
forces play in Japan, their future presence in Okinawa, and to what extent it could be reduced (or if 
it should be eliminated altogether). This is in large part due to the variety of actors present in these 
sites of everyday exchange, but is also evidence of their interaction with the pro-alliance discourse. 
Finally, the Conclusion aims to synthesise the overall findings of the thesis: first by analytical 
theme cutting across all three of the main fieldwork-based chapters, and then by answering the 
central research questions posed in this introduction. Where the findings in the first section (by 
theme) are focused more on those specific to the case of the USJA and Futenma, those in the second 
(by central questions) relate the case findings to the broader field of alliance studies in IR. Following 
these, the third section discusses the implications of these findings and their contributions to 
alliance studies broadly speaking, while also discussing the limitations of this research in this aspect. 
Finally, the fourth section concludes with suggestions for future research in this field. 
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Chapter 1. Literature review 
Introduction 
Security alliances are one of the oldest and most recognisable forms of interstate 
cooperation in international politics. Because of their prevalence into the present, they have also 
been the subject of countless studies not only on why and how they form and come to an end, but 
also on why and how some of them continue to be maintained (or, as will be argued later in this 
chapter, how they are actively reproduced). When discussing the latter (commonly referred to in the 
international relations and security studies literatures as persistence), authors usually mean to say 
that an alliance continues to exist even after the original threat against which it was formed has 
diminished or disappeared. This continued existence, moreover, is oftentimes accomplished through 
a ‘reinvention’ of an alliance’s purpose and objectives performed by its ‘managers’, such as the 
transformation of the USJA from a purely defensive alliance against Communism into a cooperative 
institution1 promoting democratic governance and human rights (see section 3 for full discussion). 
In the debates on alliance ‘persistence’, there is a tendency to analyse this phenomenon as 
the product of top-down policymaking decided upon by actors filed under the broad monikers of 
‘officials in Washington’ or, for example, ‘officials in Tokyo’ (or, vaguer yet, ‘Washington’/’the US’ 
and ‘Tokyo’/’Japan’). These exist as part of a ‘transnational institutional network’ of ‘security 
professionals’, says Jef Huysmans, which is responsible for the production of a kind of ‘professional 
security knowledge’ that is gained as ‘a direct result of their institutional position, which empowers 
them to produce credible technical knowledge’.2 Due to this knowledge, these professionals or 
‘experts’ can therefore generate a certain amount of trust within government of their judgement in 
determining what constitutes a ‘threat’ to national security.3 This emphasis on technocratic 
expertise often results in the exclusion of ‘local knowledge’ – or knowledge related to policy which is 
not accessed by ‘elite’ actors due to its nature as non-quantitative and based on lived experience – 
                                                          
1 An ‘institution’ being defined here as ‘the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating 
procedures that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity’ (Andrew P. Cortell 
and Susan Peterson, ‘Altered States: Explaining Domestic Institutional Change’, British Journal of Political 
Science, 29:1 [1999], pp. 177-203, p. 181); Elizabeth Clemens and James Cook add that institutions ‘exert 
patterned higher-order effects on the actions, indeed the constitution, of individuals and organizations 
without requiring repeated collective mobilization or authoritative intervention to achieve these regularities’ 
(Clemens and Cook 1999, pp. 444-445). 
2 Jef Huysmans, ‘Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing 
Security’, Alternatives, 27 (2002), pp. 41-62, p. 56. 
3 Lauren Martin, ‘Security’ in John A. Agnew et al, eds, The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Geography 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), pp. 100-113, pp. 103-104. 
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from the policy discussion, especially in the realm of national security.4 Moreover, as Luiza 
Bialasiewicz et al note, these individuals – and the organisation for/with whom they work – promote 
their views across various sites of discursive exchange: 
5 
Considering the fact, however, that an alliance is not created and maintained by the 
member states as a whole per se, but by specific groups and individuals within them (the ‘alliance 
managers’ and ‘security professionals’, for example), conflating these mischaracterises how an 
alliance is actually reproduced on a day-to-day basis. When the opposition is discussed – as in the 
case of the Democratic Party of Japan (see section 3 for details) – it is often in the context of its 
failure to significantly bring about any major policy changes. Even this focus on opposition parties 
only underlines the fact that analysis at the individual level is rarely observed in this literature. There 
is even less, if any, discussion of how the alliance is maintained or opposed within the USG, much 
less by related US organisations or industries that can be counted as stakeholders. 
 In addressing these issues, the following literature review is divided into three sections: 1) 
Alliances in international relations, an overview of definitions and typologies of security alliances; 2) 
The ‘persistence’ of security alliances, an overview of the conceptual debate between approaches 
emphasising material variables (realism/neorealism, liberalism/neoliberal institutionalism, largely 
positivist in nature) versus those emphasising ideational or hybrid variables (English School, 
constructivism, largely post-positivist) behind ‘persistence’; and 3) The US-Japan alliance, which 
includes an overview of the history of the alliance, the present situation, and the debate on its 
‘persistence’. Lastly, the conclusion discusses this research’s larger contributions to not only the field 
of US-Japan studies, but also the literature on alliance ‘persistence’.  
                                                          
4 Dvora Yanow, ‘Accessing local knowledge’ in Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar, eds, Deliberative Policy 
Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
pp. 228-246, p. 236. 
5 Luiza Bialasiewicz et al, ‘Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy’, Political 
Geography, 26 (2007), pp. 405-422, pp. 409-410. 
While not paid members of the administration, they have either occupied such 
positions in the past or were aspiring to them in the future. They do not, therefore, 
directly speak for the state (a position that grants them a veneer of “objectivity”), 
and they navigate in the interstices between academic and “policy-oriented” 
research: a location that, in turn, absolves them from the rigors of a scholarly 
discipline, including disciplinary critique […] While these individuals appear as 
impartial commentators-cum-advisers-cum-analysts, their access to policy circles is 
open, if not privileged. To the extent that their geographical imaginations are 
invoked by state power, they are also today’s consummate “intellectuals of 
statecraft”: those who “designate a world and ‘fill’ it with certain dramas, subjects, 
histories and dilemmas” (O´Tuathail & Agnew, 1992: 192). 
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1. Alliances in international relations 
Traditionally defined by most scholars as formal or informal written agreements committing 
two or more sovereign states to security policy cooperation in offensive as well as defensive realms, 
alliances have historically been important in times of military crisis. They have also allowed states to 
‘pick sides’, pool their resources and combat threats more effectively.6 Participation in a security 
alliance does not, however, signify that each member state has equal ability to exert influence over 
the other member states, and alliances are often differentiated by the symmetrical or asymmetrical 
distribution of capabilities between member states, these usually defined in vague terms (e.g. 
‘power’) or in material ones (e.g. military forces).7 Carlo Masala describes an alliance with this sort of 
‘capabilities imbalance’ as a ‘hierarchical alliance’, further separating out this category into 
hegemonic and imperial alliances (the former of which represents an alliance in which the more 
capable state leads smaller powers by consent and the latter through coercion).8 Alliances can 
additionally be distinguished by their level of institutionalisation9, function10, and inclusivity11, 
among a range of other factors.12 
Security alliances have also been differentiated from other types of collective security 
arrangements in this literature, including: coalitions, defined as ‘a grouping of like-minded states 
that agree on the need for joint action on a specific problem at a particular time with no 
commitment to a durable relationship’13; international society, defined as ‘: a group of states (or, 
more generally, a group of independent political communities) which [...] have established by 
                                                          
6 Carlo Masala, ‘Alliances’ in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, eds, The Routledge Handbook of Security 
Studies (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010), pp. 382-392; Walt 1997; Brett Ashley Leeds, ‘Do Alliances Deter 
Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes’, American 
Journal of Political Science, 47:3 (2003), pp. 427-439. 
7 Masala 2010, p. 383; Walt 1997, p. 157. 
8 Masala 2010, p. 383. 
9 According to Kurt Campbell, institutionalised alliances have ‘developed established procedures, habits of 
cooperation, codes of conduct, and expectations of behavior’ (Kurt M. Campbell, ‘The end of alliances? Not so 
fast’, The Washington Quarterly, 27:2 [2004], pp. 151-163, p. 156). 
10 For example, certain security alliances may, over time, come to adopt political functions that go beyond a 
simple collective security agreement, as can be observed in the case of NATO and its creation of the 
Partnership for Peace, a trust-building initiative whereby non-NATO member states can participate in activities 
with active members ranging from civil-military relations to disaster response and environmental issues 
(Wallander 2000, p. 721). 
11 Walt 1997, pp. 157-158. 
12 See, for example, Bruno Tertrais’s addition of formal and informal alliances, as well as strategic partnerships 
(‘The Changing Nature of Military Alliances’, The Washington Quarterly, 27:2 [2004], pp. 135-147); Thomas S. 
Wilkins’s virtual, hedging, and bottle-capping alliances (‘”Alignment”, not “alliance” – the shifting paradigm of 
international security cooperation: toward a conceptual taxonomy of alignment’, Review of International 
Studies, 38 [2012], pp. 53-76); and Campbell’s work on the US’s Cold War-era alliance typologies, including the 
‘nuclear family’ of allies (e.g. Japan, South Korea) versus ‘friends and acquaintances’ (e.g. Chile) (2004, pp. 156-
157). It is important to note that in the literature examined on alliances, authors have not distinguished any 
intrinsic properties of multilateral versus bilateral alliances. 
13 Wilkins 2012, p. 63. 
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dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize 
their common interest in maintaining these arrangements14; security complexes, defined as ‘a group 
of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national 
securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’15; and security communities, 
defined as ‘a particular social structure of international relations which [...] generates peaceful 
relations among the members’.16  
These arrangements appear to have more specific attributes (shared values and respect for 
rules and institutions) than the simple agreement determining the creation of a security alliance. 
Harald Müller separates out, for example, mature security communities from (presumably) 
immature ones by laying out several criteria for member states, including: ‘we-feeling/identity’; 
mutual trust; free movement among members; common threat definition; and ‘coordination against 
internal threats’.17 It is also apparent from this literature that a security alliance has the potential to 
evolve into one of these more ‘mature’ collective arrangements over time (as has been argued in the 
case of NATO; see section 2 for details).  
Given the historical and current prevalence of security alliances in international relations, 
the accompanying academic literature has subsequently sought to explain the origins18, functions, 
and purposes19 of these arrangements. While these studies are undoubtedly important and serve as 
the foreground for this research, the focus of this literature review hereafter rests largely on the 
equally broad field of investigation into why certain security alliances ‘persist’ after the original 
                                                          
14 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 166; see also Hedley Bull, 
The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics, 4th edition (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012). 
15 Buzan 1991, p. 190. 
16 Thomas Risse, ‘Beyond Iraq: The Crisis of the Transatlantic Security Community’ in David Held and Mathias 
Koenig-Archibugi, eds, American Power in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), available at: 
http://www.userpage.fu-berlin.de/~atasp/texte/030625_beyond%20iraq.pdf. 
17 Harald Müller, ‘A theory of decay of security communities with an application to the present state of the 
Atlantic Alliance’, Institute of European Studies, (2006), available at: 
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/95n4b4sp, p. 4. 
18 The literature on why states join security alliances is particularly broad, with approaches emphasising 
material explanations tending to suggest either that: a) states, driven by egoism, act in their own self-interest 
as a result of an anarchic international system being unable to guarantee an adequate level of security (this 
being associated with realism and neorealism); or that b) states ally with the intention of cooperation as a 
means to reduce future occurrence of military conflicts, and that this cooperation furthermore enhances the 
accountability of the alliance members’ actions (William C. Wohlforth, ‘Realism and security studies’ in Myriam 
Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, eds, The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies [Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 
2010], pp. 9-20; David L. Rousseau and Thomas C. Walker, ‘Liberalism’ in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor 
Mauer, eds, The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies [Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010], pp. 21-33). 
19 Other approaches emphasising ideational explanations behind alliance formation suggest, by contrast, that 
states ally as an extension of their social interaction in the international system, and their alliances therefore 
reflect a significant degree of congruence in the allied states’ political identities, beliefs, and values (Masala 
2010, p. 385; David Mutimer, ‘Critical security studies’ in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, eds, The 
Routledge Handbook of Security Studies [Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010], pp. 45-55). 
Grinberg 33 
 
‘threat’ or purpose around which they were created has either disappeared or been fulfilled. The 
reasons for focusing on this question of alliance ‘persistence’ arise not only from the nature of the 
case study of the USJA, but also from the vigorous debate that has taken place in the literature over 
the ‘persistence’ of other alliances that have existed for similar lengths of time. As Jae-Jung Suh 
notes, the ‘persistence’ of these alliances calls into question ‘both the internal consistency of the 
alliance’s conceptual structure and the historical consistency of that structure over the alliance’s 
lifespan’, and thus necessitates a re-examination of alliance theory as a whole.20 
2. The ‘persistence’ of security alliances 
The question of why alliances ‘persist’ is not only common in the academic literature, but 
also remains relevant in terms of current affairs. A brief scan of news articles, for example, reveals 
not only concerns over the management of long-lasting alliances (such as the one between the US 
and South Korea), but also public reaffirmations of their political and material value by high-ranking 
politicians (such as Japanese Prime Minister [PM] Shinzo Abe’s proclamation that ‘the [US-Japan] 
alliance [is] the pillar of Japan’s diplomacy’).21 This being the case, the following overview of the 
debate is critically important in informing us as to the procedural mechanisms, individuals, and 
organisations that play a role in the reproduction of security alliances into the present, and how 
these various elements or actors choose to promote or oppose this process.  
I have separated the explanatory variables behind ‘persistence’ into the categories of 
material, ideational, and hybrid on account of the fact that scholars of varying theoretical 
backgrounds will often posit hypotheses for ‘persistence’ that do not necessarily rigidly adhere to 
one school of thought. Aside from NATO, due to the US’s prominent role in international relations 
and its large number of bilateral and multilateral alliances, the following section draws heavily on 
these examples as a point of comparison for the literature on the USJA in Section 3. As pictured in 
Table 1 below, section 2.1 discusses the material explanatory variables cited in the literature on 
alliance ‘persistence’, covering such concepts as hegemonic leadership, asset specificity, threat 
persistence, and institutional inertia; section 2.2 provides an overview of ideational explanations, 
including a discussion of agency, alliance identities, shared values (such as democracy), and security 
communities; and section 2.3 details hybrid variables behind ‘persistence’, including domestic 
politics, a high level of institutionalisation, credibility, and flexibility. 
                                                          
20 Suh 2007, p. 8. 
21 Michael Raska, ‘South Korea’s Changing Security Paradigm’, Project Syndicate, 10 February 2013, available 
at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/online-commentary/south-korea-s-changing-security-paradigm-by-
michael-raska; Tetsushi Kajimoto, ‘Abe pledges economic recovery, stronger security in Diet policy speech’, 
Japan Today, 28 January 2013, available at: http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/abe-pledges-
economic-recovery-stronger-security-in-diet-policy-speech. 
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Table 1: Common explanatory variables in the literature on alliance ‘persistence’ 
MATERIAL IDEATIONAL HYBRID 
Hegemonic power Shared values Credibility  
Threat persistence Security community Domestic politics  
Asset specificity Alliance identity High level of institutionalisation 
Inertia 
 
Flexibility 
 
2.1 Material variables 
In the immediate post-Cold War period, given the sudden disappearance of the Soviet 
Union, scholars such as Kenneth Waltz predicted the demise or alteration of alliances such as NATO, 
since they would no longer serve their original purpose of providing greater security to member 
states from communist expansionism.22 While some alliances did collapse during this period, such as 
the Warsaw Pact, others, like NATO and the USJA, not only survived but continue to be maintained. 
While the survival and, indeed, resurgence of many alliances left some predictions moot, others like 
Walt have posited that the ‘persistence’ of security alliances may result from hegemonic leadership, 
whereby the ‘alliance leader’ – the stronger state – continues to offer inducements to weaker states 
in order to convince them to remain aligned.23 Citing the US-South Korea (ROK) alliance, Victor Cha 
explains that from the perspective of the ROK government, the USM presence on its territory 
discourages the rise of any competitor hegemon in the region and acts as ‘an embodiment of U.S. 
influence and commitment as a Pacific power’, thus preventing the possibility of a ‘dangerous power 
vacuum’ from forming.24 William T. Tow and Amitav Acharya, meanwhile, ascribe US efforts to 
enmesh itself within not only bilateral, but multilateral security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific 
region to Washington’s desire to ‘[sustain] American power and influence by preserving its 
asymmetrical system of regional security alliances [...] [without] acquiescing to power sharing 
arrangements with China or other regional actors’.25  
The continued existence of alliances as the result of hegemonic leadership is thus closely 
linked to the perception on the part of the ‘weaker’ allied states that there remain existential threats 
                                                          
22 Waltz 2000, p. 18; Masala 2010, p. 388. 
23 Walt 1997, p. 164. 
24 Victor D. Cha, ‘America’s Alliances in Asia: The Coming “Identity Crisis” with the Republic of Korea?’ in 
Donald W. Boose et. al, eds, Recalibrating the US-Republic of Korea Alliance (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2003), pp. 15-34, pp. 19-23. 
25 William T. Tow and Amitav Acharya, ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The US alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific’, 
Australia National University Department of International Relations Working Paper 2007/4, December 2007, 
available at: www.amitavacharya.com/sites/.../Obstinate%20or%20Obsolete.pdf, p. 36. 
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to their security. In the case of US-ROK relations, this ‘threat’ has undoubtedly been North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons programme. In recent years, however, it has also come to encompass the ‘strategic 
uncertainty’ accompanying the rapid increase in China’s defence-related expenditures. For example, 
India’s ‘concern[s] about China’s development of naval facilities along the Indian Ocean rimland’ are 
cited as a factor behind its increased participation in joint exercises with US forces in the Pacific.26 
Aside from China, Kei Koga argues that other ongoing ‘threats’ in the Asia-Pacific region, such as 
terrorism, piracy, and natural disasters also provide a continued incentive for the US to remain 
involved as a ‘pivotal security player in maintaining peace and stability’.27 
On the other hand, as Celeste Wallander notes, alliances may ‘persist’ not only due to the 
existence of a hegemonic leader, but also to the continued utility of the alliance’s ‘specific assets for 
mounting credible defense and deterrence’ to its member states.28 She cites as an example of these 
assets the network of USM bases in the Asia-Pacific, which may remain an ‘effective, low-cost 
strategy’ for the US to retain its military predominance in the region.29 This idea of ‘asset specificity’ 
is also heavily cited by Suh, who comments that these assets – ranging from military equipment to 
doctrinal process to team configurations to infrastructure – all contribute to alliance ‘persistence’ by 
‘generating an “alliance constituency” that benefits from the status quo and would suffer losses in 
case of an alliance termination’.30 Similarly, Mark Smith expresses his doubt that, when the UK ‘[is] 
asked to participate more fully in the American missile defence system [...] it is difficult to imagine 
the answer being “No”’, citing the influence of the pro-US defence industry lobby in London.31 
Others, however, suggest that security alliances can ‘persist’ for lack of any proposed 
alternative to the traditional paradigm—that even without an existential threat, security 
cooperation is likely to continue as a result of institutional inertia.32 The idea of ‘persistence’ via 
inertia assumes that institutions shape actors’ preferences through the very rules, commitments and 
standards that the actors themselves created—and thus, even when an alliance seems to have 
outlived its usefulness, its institutional ‘stickiness’ guarantees its ‘persistence’.33 Suh notes that 
                                                          
26 Michael J. Green and Daniel Twining, ‘Democracy and American Grand Strategy in Asia: The Realist Principles 
Behind an Enduring Idealism’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30:1 (2008), pp. 1-28, pp. 8-9; ‘India, US, Japan 
kick off naval drills likely to annoy China’, CNBC, 12 October 2015, available online at: 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/12/india-us-japan-hold-naval-drills-in-bay-of-bengal-china-concerned.html.  
27 Kei Koga, ‘The US and East Asian Regional Security Architecture: Building a Regional Security Nexus on Hub-
and-Spoke’, Asian Perspective, 35 (2011), pp. 1-36, p. 2. 
28 Wallander 2000, p. 710. 
29 Wallander 2000, p. 708. 
30 Suh 2007, p. 104. 
31 Mark Smith, ‘Britain: Balancing “Instinctive Atlanticism”’, Contemporary Security Policy, 26:3 (2005), pp. 447-
469, pp. 465-466. 
32 Masala 2010, p. 388. 
33 The term ‘institutional stickiness’ was coined by John Ikenberry with regards to the way in which 
international security institutions, such as NATO, have ‘sunk their roots ever more deeply into the political and 
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evidence of such inertia in democratic states can be found where there is ‘no observable bargaining 
or debate’ when the issue of alliance renewal comes up, as this signifies that there exists a 
‘consensus among social actors, including those disadvantaged by alliance practices and specificities, 
that the alliance is in everybody’s interest’.34  
Although these approaches have been the dominant voice in the debate over alliance 
‘persistence’ thus far, they are not immune to criticism. Tim Dunne points out a conceptual ‘flaw’ in 
what he calls ‘strategic thinking’ in the alliance literature, noting that defining an immutable end – 
such as that of eventual institutional inertia – limits the debate on alliance ‘persistence’ to the 
means which brought that end about, and thus ‘implies a positivist view of knowledge in which 
“reality” is produced by a set of identifiable antecedent conditions’.35 By treating states as ‘billiard 
balls’ that remain essentially unchanged through social interaction with others versus ‘sticky 
molecules’ that bond with and take on new properties through interaction, these studies tend to 
ignore or underemphasise this social component and/or measure change largely as a result of 
external shocks.36 Moreover, these approaches pay little attention to the ‘internal dynamics of states 
comprising alliances’, such as how policymakers differ in their levels of threat perception and how 
institutional structure contributes to its continuation—and thus do not capture the full complexity of 
the policymaking process.37 
2.2 Ideational variables 
By contrast, ideational, social constructivist-based explanations of alliance ‘persistence’ do 
not commit to determinism, emphasising instead the notion that – rather than a common threat – 
member states remain allied because they perceive for themselves a common destiny or otherwise 
demonstrate ideological solidarity whereby member states will prefer to continue an alliance built 
on ‘common political values and objectives’.38 Giving more explanatory power to agency, these 
approaches assume that states also share a perception that they continue to hold the same or 
similar norms and values important, but they do not take for granted that alliances must be ‘stable’ 
in order that they ‘persist’. As Anand Menon and Jennifer Welsh note, ‘conflict is central to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
economic structures of the states that participate within the order’ (Anand Menon and Jennifer Welsh, 
‘Understanding NATO’s Sustainability: The Limits of Institutionalist Theory’, Global Governance, 17 [2011], pp. 
81-94, p. 83).  
34 Suh 2007, p. 110; by ‘renewal’, I mean the process by which an alliance is formally maintained through the 
re-signing of the security treaty or pact by which it was originally formed between its member states. 
35 Tim Dunne, ‘”When the shooting starts”: Atlanticism in British security strategy’, International Affairs, 80:5 
(2004), pp. 893-909, p. 896. 
36 Suh 2007, p. 186; Buzan 1991, pp. 213-217. 
37 McCalla 1996, pp. 455-456. 
38 Masala 2010, p. 388; Walt 1997, pp. 164-170. 
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nature and development of institutions’, and thus the role of agency in accounting for stability and 
change is ‘crucial’.39  
By this account, an alliance is not merely the aggregate sum of its member states’ material 
capabilities and assets, but also embodies their collective ideas and narratives used to ‘explain, 
deliberate or legitimize political action’.40 Koga argues that the US’s relationships with its allies are 
built partly on this basis, as ‘the United States aims not only to strengthen democratic bilateral 
security relations but also to expand its democratic networks between allies’.41 NATO’s contentious 
process of enlargement serves as a case in point. Through it, NATO sought to reinvent itself as a 
democratic security community that could serve as an important ‘symbolic marker [...] through 
which the threat of fragmentation and the return of the past might be countered’.42  This argument 
was advanced at every opportunity by NATO officials during enlargement, since they perceived the 
process as ‘related to the potential for spreading democracy’ and, in turn, democracy as essentially 
linked to the preservation of security between East and West and the unique organisational ‘culture’ 
within NATO.43  
An alliance ‘identity’ built on the basis of these ideas and narratives may also play a part in 
its ‘persistence’. Cha, for example, raises the possibility that over time, this ‘identity’ based not only 
on ‘similarities in regime type, religion, or ethnicity’, but also on ‘a wide range of economic and 
social interactions, development of elite networks, and high levels of communication’, may 
develop.44 Adding to this argument is Suh, who remarks on how a security alliance can even become 
‘a political practice central to state identity’: 
                                                          
39 Menon and Welsh 2011, p. 85. 
40 Vivien Lowndes, ‘The Institutional Approach’ in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds, Theory and Methods in 
Political Science (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 60-79, p. 77. 
41 Koga 2011, p. 13. 
42 Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann, ‘From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the 
Power of Identity’, Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 29:2 (2000), pp. 357-387, pp. 365-366. 
43 Helene Sjursen, ‘On the identity of NATO’, International Affairs, 80:4 (2004), pp. 687-703. P. 691. 
44 Victor D. Cha, ‘Shaping Change and Cultivating Ideas in the US-ROK Alliance’ in Michael H. Armacost and 
Daniel I. Okimoto, eds., The future of America's alliances in northeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Asia-Pacific Research 
Center, 2004), pp. 121-139, p. 129. 
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45 
When member states closely link their own identities to their participation in a particular institution 
like a security alliance, this thus makes them likelier to ‘work in favor of organizational effectiveness’ 
and support its continuation.46 This may also be evident in the internal socialisation undertaken by 
NATO in the Czech Republic and Romania, which included reaching out to academics through the 
Partnership for Peace Consortium, to parliamentarians through NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, and 
public education efforts.47  
Nevertheless, these ideational arguments have also been taken to task. Walt, for example, 
argues that regardless of how strong the sense of community/identity might be between states, 
these bonds are ‘far weaker than the ties of nationalism’ and are subject to the whims of politicians 
who ‘still owe their careers to how well they satisfy their own electorates’.48 Relatedly, although 
member states might publicly state that their alliances are built upon shared values such as 
democracy and human rights, this may not be the case in practice. Tow and Acharya, citing New 
Zealand’s reluctance to participate in many USM and intelligence operations since the mid-1980s in 
spite of their shared cultural backgrounds, further note that ‘there is no guarantee that a period of 
socialisation through an alliance will necessarily lead to shared identity’.49 This point is buffeted by 
the accession of several Central and East European states to NATO whose own democracies were 
not yet consolidated, such as Albania and Romania, giving fuel to the argument that NATO’s primary 
objective ‘was never to maintain free-market democracies’.50  
Suh also warns against the possibility that a certain identity might actually produce further 
insecurity by its particular attributes (the ‘identity effect’), citing the US and ROK’s contentious 
                                                          
45 Suh 2004, pp. 151-152. 
46 Menon and Welsh 2011, p. 88. 
47 Alexandra Gheciu, ‘Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the “New Europe”’, 
International Organization, 59 (2005), pp. 973-1012, pp. 990-996. 
48 Walt 1997, p. 169. 
49 Tow and Acharya 2007, p. 11. 
50 Zoltan D. Barany, ‘NATO’s Peaceful Advance’, Journal of Democracy, 15:1 (2004), pp. 63-76, p. 66. 
[...] a significant portion of an alliance's activities consists of discursive practices that 
help constitute social reality. Allied officials and officers, for example, issue a number 
of statements, findings, directives, announcements, and so on, that “identify” threats 
and define security. The representations they produce then become a primary source 
for reporters, civilian analysts, scholars, and politicians, who proliferate these 
representations in different forms [...] Because the institution of alliance is considered 
authoritative in security matters, the discourse it spawns is privileged over other 
discourses, becoming a preferred framework that policy makers and the public turn to 
in order to understand the world [...] As a result of discursive practices, the alliance 
discourse can achieve a hegemonic status, establishing the alliance as the natural order 
of things [emphasis added]. Within the hegemonic alliance discourse, the ally is seen as 
the natural, permanent partner [emphasis added], parting company with whom is 
unthinkable. 
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relationship with North Korea as evidence of a ‘security dilemma [...] which began as a codification in 
a [mutual security] treaty or a declaration, [which] [...] deepen[s] and widen[s] both amity and 
enmity as an intersubjective reality’.51 In securing themselves against a North Korean ‘threat’, 
therefore, the US and ROK governments are simultaneously defining the former as an adversary with 
whom there are limited means of interaction and conflict resolution, which can lead to the creation 
of ‘intricate webs of abiding violence and harm – webs that are sticky and resilient, ensnaring both 
people’s bodies and their political imagination’.52  
2.3 Hybrid variables 
The third category of explanations behind ‘persistence’ combines elements from approaches 
emphasising both material and ideational variables. Walt provides a succinct explanation of some of 
these possible hybrid variables: preserving credibility, whereby alliances ‘persist’ ‘if they have 
become symbols of credibility or resolve’53; domestic politics, whereby alliances ‘persist’ as a result 
of domestic groups within member states perpetuating alliance policy for personal gain and/or out 
of genuine commitment; a high degree of institutionalisation, whereby the level of 
institutionalisation – or ‘the presence of formal organisations charged with performing specific intra-
alliance tasks (such as military planning, weapons procurement and crisis management), and the 
development of formal or informal rules governing how alliance members reach collective decisions’ 
– is high enough to guarantee alliance ‘persistence’; and flexibility, wherein the alliance is preserved 
through the reinterpretation or reformulation of its founding principles.54  
Speaking to the first point, Smith notes that key to the UK’s ‘self-understanding’ of its role 
within the US-UK alliance is that for it to remain ‘a global strategic actor even in the absence of a 
global strategic presence’, it must rely upon its American connection.55 Likewise, the USG strives to 
illustrate the credibility of its commitment to its allies in the Asia-Pacific by increasing its 
involvement in regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
deepening cooperation in areas of non-traditional security (such as disaster management), and 
maintaining its deterrent force on the Korean Peninsula—but not involved to the point that it limits 
the US’s autonomy and flexibility in its foreign policy options.56  
                                                          
51 Suh 2007, p. 20.  
52 Maria Stern, ‘“We” the Subject: The Power and Failure of (In)Security’, Security Dialogue, 37:2 (2006), pp. 
187-205, pp. 187-188. 
53 Walt defines ‘credibility’ here as a combination of ‘the material capabilities to deter or defeat their 
opponents’ and a genuine commitment to providing assistance to allies (1997, p. 160). 
54 Walt 1997, pp. 164-170. 
55 Smith 2005, p. 449. 
56 Koga 2011, p. 15. 
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On the impact of domestic politics, echoing Huysmans, Walt attributes NATO’s continued 
existence largely to the ‘elaborate transatlantic network of former NATO officials, defence 
intellectuals, military officers, journalists and policy analysts’ whose professional lives have been in 
service to the continuation and expansion of the institution.57 Ikenberry emphasises this, 
commenting that NATO ‘provide[s] mechanisms for “doing business” across the Atlantic’ by keeping 
leaders in Europe ‘engaged and connected to America’.58 Ciuta further reminds enlargement critics 
that the ‘essential factor’ behind the process was not that the US was hegemonically promoting it, 
but that ‘states which are usually ignored by great-power politics wanted to join NATO—a desire 
whose meaning and consequences were continuously transformed by the process of joining’.59  
Speaking to the existence of a high level of institutionalisation, Suh claims that the US-ROK 
alliance actually ‘draws its strengths from the institutionalization of identities’, referencing, among 
several factors, Korean leaders repeatedly reaffirming ‘the United States’ identity as a benevolent, 
security-enhancing ally’, and the education of the majority of Korea’s top academics as well as key 
government officials in the US.60 Bialasiewicz et al note that these kinds of initiatives and efforts are 
evidence of institutionalisation being driven by the US with its alliances through a process of 
‘incorporation’, especially during the Bush administration: ‘It is telling that Bush’s claim of “either 
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” relies not on a straightforward binary […] For 
although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global scenario, 
its “right” and the right of its moral-political “mission” of spreading “freedom and justice” relies on 
its amplification and support by allies’.61 
This suggested link between institutionalisation of identities, organisational flexibility, and 
alliance sustainability or ‘persistence’ is not, however, without problems. For example, while Sjursen 
observes that the very fact that NATO is not a democratic security community may, in fact, be linked 
to its future survival and ability to attract new members beyond the current alliance of democratic 
states, this ‘constant process of legitimation vis-à-vis both its own members and external audiences’ 
may in fact reveal that ‘[a]n ability to adapt in the face of changing circumstances can [...] indicate a 
diminished potential for effectiveness, which in turn could affect the long-term sustainability of the 
organization’.62 Zoltan Barany adds that NATO has ‘seemingly become a “political honor society”’ 
that acts as a stepping-stone to eventual EU membership, concluding that NATO’s inclusion of these 
                                                          
57 Walt 1997, p. 166. 
58 John Ikenberry, ‘The Security Trap’, DemocracyJournal.Org, 2 (2006), available at: 
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‘unqualified states’ – and its attendant lack of any enforcement mechanisms or sanctions with which 
to punish them – ‘presage[s] the Alliance’s likely demise as an effective military organization’.63 
3. The US-Japan alliance 
 Although the USJA has likewise sparked much scholarly interest due to its unlikely origins in 
WWII and its endurance in spite of worldwide political and economic transformation, the discussion 
of its ‘persistence’ has largely been relegated under the purview of ‘area studies’, analysed primarily 
by long-time US and Japan specialists, and been problem-driven in nature. This relegation is curious 
given the fact that the USJA is frequently cited as a ‘cornerstone’ of not only East Asian, but also 
global, peace and security by officials and academics alike (see Chapter 3 for details). Divided 
between the general camps of historical/neoclassical realists and social constructivists, studies of 
this alliance thus often appear to talk past each other on completely separate issues – realists being 
concerned with foreign policy politicking by ‘elite’ actors and regional security dilemmas, and 
constructivists with domestic Japanese politics and Japan’s antimilitarist heritage – rather than 
engaging in a conversation.  
 Its exclusion from the wider debate on alliances in international relations has furthermore 
meant that the literature on its ‘persistence’ has been not only theoretically and methodologically 
inconsistent, but has also largely been driven in reaction to external crises (e.g. any number of North 
Korean missile crises) rather than internal processes. The problem with this focus on external events 
driving ‘persistence’ is – as stated in the Introduction – that it undercuts the agency of the actors 
involved in this process because it is assumed that they are merely reacting to structural factors. 
McSweeney explains:  
64 
 Furthermore, these studies contain the same problematic tropes found in the larger debates 
on alliance ‘persistence’, including their overreliance on the technocratic expertise of actors in the 
administrative sphere of policymaking institutions.65 This is evidenced in the literature written by so-
called ‘alliance managers’, all of whose writings proliferate despite their well-known status-quo bias 
                                                          
63 Barany 2004, p. 73. 
64 McSweeney 1999, p. 142. 
65 Douglas Torgerson, ‘Democracy through policy discourse’ in Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar, eds, 
Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 113-138, pp. 125-126. 
Actors are knowledgeable and skilled performers, without necessarily being able to 
give an account of what they are knowledgeable and skilled about. They know how 
things are done, how to get along, how to manage or “do” complex tasks of sociability 
without […] being able to discourse on, the extent or basis of their competence. 
Everyday life for individuals and bureaucracies would be impossible if it depended on 
conscious recovery of the cognitive patterns which we call “structure”. 
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and emphasis on top-down examinations of policy.66 These individuals likewise share similar 
backgrounds working across various sites in government (the DOD, MOD, MOFA and DOS), the 
military (USMC, US Navy, SDF), and often, following postings in those two sites, have experience 
working for the same influential NGOs or ‘think tanks’ (such as the Council on Foreign Relations, 
CSIS, the Tokyo Foundation, and the Canon Institute for Global Studies), and were educated at 
and/or later taught at many of the same universities in D.C. and Tokyo (including Georgetown, 
George Washington University, Johns Hopkins, Keio, and Tokyo University).  
 The same can be said of many of the academics cited throughout this chapter, as their 
associations with research centres like the Stimson Center, the East-West Center, the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, and Harvard's Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies have brought 
them into frequent and close contact with the ‘managers’ who not only played a large part in 
shaping alliance policies in the past, but continue to do so. This interaction has likewise led to the 
dissemination of the views of these already influential political players within academia, 
policymaking circles, and to the American and Japanese publics. 
 The following section (3.1) proceeds with a brief overview of the alliance’s history dating 
back to its founding, focusing specifically on developments relating to security as opposed to the 
economic and social aspects of US-Japanese (USJ) bilateral relations. Sections 3.2 - 3.4 then proceed 
with a discussion on how different authors in the academic literature have approached the question 
of alliance ‘persistence’ along the lines of the various categories of material, ideational, and hybrid 
explanations as previously outlined.  
Table 2: Common explanatory variables in the literature on the US-Japan alliance’s ‘persistence 
VARIABLES AS THEY APPEAR IN THE LITERATURE 
Hegemonic power (M) The ‘patron-client’ relationship between the US and Japan 
Threat persistence (M) Unstable Asia-Pacific region (China, North Korea) 
Asset specificity (M) Increasing military interoperability; ballistic missile defence system 
(BMD) 
Transnational networks (I) The ‘alliance managers’; inter-military-industrial links 
Shared values (I) Common norms and values shared by the US and Japan 
                                                          
66 See, for example: Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, ‘The U.S. Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in 
Asia’, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), A Report of the CSIS Japan Chair, August 2012, 
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Alliance identity (I) Japan’s pacifism rests upon the continued existence of the alliance; 
resurgence of Japanese nationalism 
Domestic politics (H) Conservatism and the Liberal Democratic Party’s political 
dominance 
Credibility (H) Japan as a ‘normalised’ international state 
Flexibility (H) Japanese constitutional revisionism 
Institutionalisation (H) The alliance as the ‘cornerstone’ of peace and security in East Asia 
(M) = material variable; (I) = ideational variable; (H) = hybrid variable 
3.1. Historical overview and current situation 
The unique historical context within which the USJ security relationship is situated has 
undoubtedly contributed to its present-day trajectory. Forged in Japan’s defeat in WWII, the ties 
between the two countries initially arose from the American Occupation willing them into existence. 
This began with the signing of the 1951 Mutual Security Treaty (henceforth USJ-ST) and 1954 Mutual 
Defense Agreement, both of which ensured American protection of Japan. Japan, in return, allowed 
its territory to be used in the housing of permanent USM bases. This included the relinquishment of 
Okinawa prefecture in its entirety to USM trusteeship under Article 3 of the 1951 Treaty of San 
Francisco.67 US protection was sought as a result of the nature of Japan’s post-war Constitution and 
its famous Article 9 (stipulating that ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will 
never be maintained’), and was defended by the GOJ even after the US Occupation of mainland 
Japan was formally concluded in 1952. For example, during the controversial ratification of the USJ-
ST in 1960, Japanese PM Nobusuke Kishi called in police forces to remove opponents both within the 
Diet (such as members of the Japanese Socialist Party [JSP]) and thousands of student protesters.68  
In spite of this controversy, the GOJ served as a reliable ally to the US during the Cold War, 
when, for example, USM bases on mainland Japan and Okinawa served as a springboard for US 
forces during the Vietnam War, handling ‘about three-quarters of the 400,000 tons of goods that 
American forces consumed [...] each month’.69 This period nonetheless also contains some 
important periods of tension, such as US accusations of Japanese ‘free-riding’ on the security 
guarantee while flooding US markets with cheap automobile exports.70 This criticism spurred the 
expansion of the original 1960 Treaty between the two states in 1978 and again in 1981, these years 
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Foreign Affairs, 89:2 (2010), available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66150/george-r-packard/the-
united-states-japan-security-treaty-at-50. 
69 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, ‘Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies’, 
International Security, 17:4 (1993), pp. 84-118, p. 111. 
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marking the signing of new agreements which saw the GOJ both acquire enhanced defensive 
weapons and ‘upgrade its maritime operations to 1,000 nautical miles from its shores’ in order to 
‘provide rearguard support for regional US operations’.71 In the post-Cold War era, the GOJ’s failure 
to provide physical troops to the first Gulf War similarly prompted US derision. Unlike the 
incremental reforms to defence policy in the past, however, this crisis of trust in the GOJ’s 
commitment to the alliance resulted in several years of sweeping policy changes which allowed for 
the SDF to engage in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) overseas, use weapons in self-defence, and 
provide greater logistical support to the US during joint exercises.72 
Following 9/11, this trend continued as then-Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi (of the Liberal 
Democratic Party [LDP]), along with his successors, reaffirmed their commitment to a strong alliance 
with the US by stewarding the passage of anti-terrorism laws allowing Marine SDF ships to refuel 
their American counterparts in the Indian Ocean and allowing Ground and Air SDF troops to directly 
participate in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.73 Christopher Preble notes that 
Japanese officials sought to prevent the same embarrassment they felt during the first Gulf War by 
making explicit their support for the US in its controversial expansion of the ‘War on Terror’ into 
Iraq.74 In addition, Christopher Hughes argues that Tokyo’s support of the George W. Bush 
administration’s counterterrorism policies arose largely from a resurgence in political conservatism 
in Japan and the US. This movement used the US’s ‘unipolar moment’75 as an opportunity to make 
Japan a ‘normal’, remilitarised state.76 This is evident from Japan’s participation, for example, in the 
US’s ballistic missile defence system and its continued lobbying for arms embargoes against China.77 
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75 This expression was originally coined by conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer in his 1991 essay with 
the same name. In it, he claims that in the post-Cold War world, the ‘centre of world power is the 
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Unipolar Moment’, Foreign Affairs, 1 February 1991, available online at: 
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This long push for ‘normalisation’ appeared to have stalled in 2009 with the election of the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which ousted the long-reigning LDP with promises of increasing 
Japanese autonomy, ‘counterbalancing the US alliance with UN-centrism and Asia-focused 
diplomacy, and proactive pacifism’ in its platform.78 DPJ leaders, including former PM Yukio 
Hatoyama, were likewise ‘more explicit in indicating that the travails of the United States in 
Afghanistan and Iraq are manifestations of a deeper and long-term malaise in U.S. power’ than their 
LDP counterparts.79 The DPJ initially pushed for several changes to the alliance framework which 
caused consternation among some of the more senior ‘alliance managers’ in Washington, including: 
a revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)80 with regards to military basing and holding the 
USG accountable for environmental damage caused by its facilities; a larger commitment to 
multilateral East Asian initiatives and forums; and drawing down Japanese commitments to the US’s 
operations in the Middle East (such as concluding the Marine SDF’s refuelling mission in the Indian 
Ocean).81 However, as a result of the Hatoyama administration’s failed attempts to renegotiate prior 
agreements with the US on the relocation of Futenma in Okinawa82 and a perceived naiveté on their 
part regarding China’s military intentions, the party’s promise of a more equal relationship with 
America was left unfulfilled.83 
On the back of public disappointment with the Hatoyama administration’s handling of 
Futenma, the following DPJ administrations under PMs Naoto Kan and Yoshihiko Noda strove to 
maintain the previous status-quo relationship with the US. As Hughes notes, in the wake of the 
Futenma controversy, the Kan administration agreed to provide the same level of host nation 
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support (HNS) funds supporting the USM presence in Japan from 2011 to 2015, relaxed demands 
that the US abandon its ‘neither confirm nor deny’ policy on the deployment of nuclear weapons 
within the country, moved forward with agreements on expanded exchanges of military 
information, and diminished previous efforts to build an ‘East Asian Community’ as promulgated by 
Hatoyama (especially in the wake of the 2010 incident during which a Chinese fishing boat collided 
with a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in the disputed waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands).84 
Furthermore, during the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami, US and Japanese forces were 
brought closer together through Operation Tomodachi (“friend” in Japanese), a US-led assistance 
operation providing disaster relief to affected residents.  With over 20,000 troops mobilised, 
Tomodachi was the largest US-led bilateral humanitarian mission ever conducted in Japan and was 
received in an overwhelmingly positive manner by the Japanese public, with over 82% reported to 
have ‘friendly feelings’ towards the US in a December 2011 poll conducted by the GOJ (the highest it 
had been since 1976).85  
While USJ relations may have improved following Tomodachi, support for the DPJ withered 
even further due to the party’s handling of the post-Tohoku Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant 
disaster, and the LDP were re-elected as the majority party in the Diet under the leadership of PM 
Abe in the December 2012 elections. Since these elections, Abe has successfully spearheaded 
legislation in the Diet which, while not outright revising the language of Article 9 in the Constitution, 
‘reinterprets’ it to allow Japanese forces to engage in collective self-defence (CSD).86 He has also 
supported recent revisions of the USJ Security Guidelines in 2015. These include: the creation of an 
Alliance Coordination Mechanism, which ‘will strengthen policy and operational coordination related 
to activities conducted by the [SDF] and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from 
peacetime to contingencies’; a Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which ‘will conduct bilateral planning 
in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan's peace and security’, including ‘assign[ing] SDF 
personnel as liaisons to U.S. military units and vice-versa’; a joint increase in ‘early warning 
capabilities, including expanding network coverage of potential threats’; and a kind of ‘mutual 
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limited circumstances—such as in the cases of shooting down a North Korean missile fired at the US, ‘providing 
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http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34287362).  
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defense’ whereby ‘[t]he [SDF] and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of 
each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in 
a cooperative manner’ (the exact definition of ‘assets’, however, is unclear).87  
In addition, the Abe administration took several steps in quick succession (starting in 
December 2013) towards increasing the prominence of national security issues on the government’s 
agenda, including: the creation of the National Security Council, ‘a forum which will undertake 
strategic discussions under the Prime Minister on a regular basis and as necessary on various 
national security issues and exercising a strong political leadership’; the adoption of a National 
Security Strategy by the Cabinet which ‘sets the basic orientation of diplomatic and defense policies 
related to national security’ and is modelled around Abe’s call for Japan to have a ‘proactive 
contribution to peace’ (also known as ‘proactive pacifism’); and the adoption of ‘The Three Principles 
on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology’, a new set of rules set out in accordance with 
the NSS in April 2014 replacing the prior ‘Three Principles on Arms Exports and Their Related Policy 
Guidelines’88 in order to ease Japan’s aforementioned ‘proactive’ contribution to ‘securing peace, 
stability and prosperity of the international community’.89  
These policy changes, while earning the praise of the US under the Barack Obama 
administration and several media outlets90, have not, however, been met with universal acclaim. A 
June 2014 Asahi Shimbun nationwide telephone survey of Japanese voters, for example, found that 
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to be involved in international conflicts’. This was amended in 1976 to include the clause that ‘the Government 
of Japan shall not promote "arms" exports, regardless of the destinations’ (MOFA, ‘Japan's Policies on the 
Control of Arms Exports’, 2014a, available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/). 
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Shimbun, 14 May 2014a, available at: http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201405140028. 
90 Marine Lt. Col. Jeff Pool, a Pentagon spokesman, remarked that the amendment of the Japanese 
Constitution in order to allow for CSD ‘would allow the U.S. and Japan to do more together to continue to 
advance prosperity and security in the region’ (Yuki Hayashi, ‘Abe's Military Push May Please U.S. but Rattle 
Neighbors’, The Wall Street Journal, 22 April 2014, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304049904579516803544613502). Several 
prominent American and Japanese media outlets have also encouraged Abe’s moves in this direction; for 
more, see: The Wall Street Journal 2014; ‘Limited use of collective self-defense right essential for nation’s 
existence’, The Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 May 2014c, available at: http://the-japan-
news.com/news/article/0001285194; ‘More flexiblility for Japan’s military?’, The Washington Post, 18 May 
2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/more-flexiblility-for-japans-
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‘only 9 percent of voters feel the Abe administration has conducted sufficient debate on drastically 
changing Japan’s postwar security policy’, with 56% opposed overall to the idea of Japan exercising 
the right of CSD.91 One year later in another Asahi poll, support for the Abe Cabinet overall had 
dropped to 37%, and 57% of voters answered ‘No’ when asked if they agreed with a number of 
security bills presented to the Diet ‘which allow for the use of [CSD], and expand SDF activities 
abroad’.92 Along with the lack of public debate over changing policy, some other explanations for 
this drop in support include concerns that the Abe administration is trying to bypass the formal 
process of constitutional amendment entirely, that Japan will antagonise its neighbours in northeast 
Asia by doing so, and that bolstering defence spending may entangle Japan in future American 
conflicts.93  
3.2. Material variables 
In spite of his oft-rocky relationship with public opinion, consistent support for the Abe 
administration’s security-related policy changes from the US has been cited as evidence of the 
alliance’s ‘persistence’: mainly, the unequal relationship between the US and Japan (sometimes 
referred to as a ‘patron-client’ relationship).94 Curtis Martin describes this relationship in terms of 
the Japanese concept of amae, or ‘trustful dependence’, in which ‘the more powerful ally is obliged 
to take decisions in consideration of and on behalf of the dependent partner’s interests and rights, 
and to take responsibility for ensuring them’.95 Key to the nature of this relationship is not only 
Japan’s reliance on, for example, US weapons and technology (e.g. the BMD system), but also its 
acceptance of its role as a ‘junior’ partner in the alliance and of the US’s role as the ‘leader’. (This 
may be observed, for example, in Japan’s ‘humiliation’ by the international community for its late 
response to the first Gulf War, the effect of which was that the GOJ took great pains to increase its 
military flexibility along the lines of what the US had been pushing for decades.96)  
This argument, along with the others that follow in this section, is derived at least implicitly 
from neorealist or neoliberal institutionalist perspectives. These tend to take place at the system 
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94 Preble 2006; Campbell 2000, pp. 125-134. 
95 Martin 2004, p. 290. 
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level and generally discuss the evolution of the GOJ’s foreign policymaking process, the US’s 
hegemonic influence on this process, and regional implications of the ‘persistence’ of the alliance in 
terms of ‘interests’ and material capabilities. The push for the ‘normalisation’ of Japan, for example, 
is seen as evidence of the US’s influence on Japan’s foreign policy options, since the US has 
enthusiastically backed many measures by a string of conservative LDP governments to rearm, 
including: the construction of the BMD system; Japanese participation in regional military exercises; 
and increasing Japan’s defence expenditure to ‘take account of rising defence budgets elsewhere in 
East Asia’.97 Nick Bisley goes so far as to say that the ‘normalisation’ of Japan ‘sends an unambiguous 
signal that Washington intends to be the predominant military power in East Asia and that it feels 
that this best serves its regional and global interests’.98 This is further evidenced, says Hughes, by 
Japan’s efforts in ‘blocking regionalism’, whereby the GOJ was ‘deliberately overproliferating 
regional cooperation frameworks as a means to dilute and check China’s concentration of power in 
any one regional forum’ rather than genuinely pursuing multilateral diplomacy outside of its 
relationship with the US.99  
Others, meanwhile, have said that, on a more basic level, the Cold War is still going in East 
Asia – where China looms as a significant military and economic force and North Korea’s nuclear 
arsenal weigh heavily in the minds of Japanese leadership – and thus the original ‘threats’ that the 
alliance was formed in response to remain just as relevant and dangerous as ever.100 This is 
especially the case with regards to the territorial disputes with China over ownership of the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, as US officials like former Secretary of State (SecState) Hillary Clinton and 
former Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Chuck Hagel have reaffirmed that the islands are covered 
under the USJ-ST and thus make clear both countries’ commitment to ‘apply[ing] the brakes to what 
they see as China’s thrust for a hegemonic position in the region’.101 The heightened instability of 
this region due to these various conflicts has therefore, according to this perspective, pushed the US 
and Japan closer together, even when (as under the DPJ’s leadership) the GOJ has openly declared 
its desire for greater independence.102  
The use of essentialist language in the literature, however – such as the ‘patron-client’ 
relationship, among others outlined above – removes complexity from the nature of USJ relations. 
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Authors using this term specifically often stress Japan’s dependence or servitude to the US 
‘hegemon’ at the expense of discussing how the GOJ has, over the years, actively held onto its role 
as the ‘junior’ partner in the alliance in order to maintain a constant level of USM support and 
reduce the costs of providing for its own national defence. Again, however, this undermines the 
agency of the GOJ and its leadership in their well-demonstrated efforts to purposely keep Japan’s 
foreign policy options limited—this being easier than considering other means by which the 
government might extricate itself from the tight bounds of the US ‘hub and spoke’ alliance system.103   
3.3. Ideational variables 
 Therefore, where the approaches emphasising material explanations have tended to analyse 
alliance ‘persistence’ at the system level and focus on the foreign and security policymaking 
processes as seen through the lenses of ‘managers’ with a demonstrated incentive in maintaining 
the alliance, those emphasising ideational ones have built on the notion of ‘persistence’ as based on 
common norms and values through a largely state level-examination of particular aspects of 
Japanese domestic politics and public opinion. Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein have, in the 
past, advocated for an understanding of the USJA as ‘[not] merely the product of a pluralistic 
bargaining process between interest groups concerned with maximizing their share of societal 
resources’, but as part and parcel of the debate over Japanese ‘national identity [...] [and] the 
definition of the national interest’.104 In this understanding, the GOJ has thus continuously sought to 
take on more security responsibilities over time – even if it means re-litigating the Constitution – in 
order to fits its ongoing reimagining of Japan’s ‘alliance identity’.105  
 Martin characterises this divide in the debate over the ‘new’ Japanese identity as being one 
between ‘preservationists’ in favour of the current alliance structure and ‘revisionists’ in favour of 
overturning or significantly modifying it in order to give Japan a more equal role.106 In the former 
camp, Michael Green107 and Daniel Twining108 point to the repeated public promotion of the US and 
                                                          
103 This term is often used to describe the system of ‘discrete, exclusive alliances with the Republic of Korea, 
the Republic of China, and Japan’ put in place by the US after WWII in order to leverage control (as the ‘hub’) 
over its allies (the ‘spokes’) (Victor D. Cha, ‘Powerplay Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia’, International 
Security, 34:3 [2009/10], pp. 158-196). 
104 Berger 1996. 
105 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, ‘Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies’, 
International Security, 17:4 (1993), pp. 84-118, p. 113. 
106 Martin 2004, p. 299. 
107 Green, a prominent figure in the USJA literature and a well-known ‘alliance manager’ or ‘Japan hand’ in 
Washington, has formerly served as a staffer in the Japanese Diet, a senior adviser on Asia in the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, director of the Foreign Policy Institute, and a member of staff of the National Security 
Council from 2001 through 2005 as director for Asian affairs and ‘then as special assistant to the president for 
national security affairs and senior director for Asia, with responsibility for East Asia and South Asia’. Currently 
he serves as the senior vice president for Asia and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, a prominent ‘centrist’ think tank in D.C. (ranked first for security and international affairs in 2013) and 
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Japan’s ‘shared values’ such as rule of law, democracy, and good governance by Bush, Koizumi, and 
later Japanese PMs during the War on Terror as evidence of this ideational renegotiation of the 
nature of the alliance in order to effect change in the ‘strategic landscape’ of both the Middle East 
and East Asia.109 During his first term in office from 2006-7, PM Abe reaffirmed this belief in his call 
for the establishment of an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ consisting of Japan, India, the US, and 
Australia which promoted a ‘more assertive and values-oriented foreign policy based on the so-
called “universal” values of freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law and the market 
economy’.110 More recently, the USG and GOJ released a joint statement which explicitly references 
these ‘universal’ values: ‘The relationship between the United States of America and Japan is 
founded on mutual trust, a common vision for a rules-based international order, a shared 
commitment to upholding democratic values and promoting open markets, and deep cultural and 
people-to-people ties’.111 
 On the other hand, this reshaping of Japanese identity – and, subsequently, the ‘alliance 
identity’ – has also coincided with a resurgence of Japanese nationalism. Gavan McCormack, for 
example, discusses Abe’s first term as a period of ‘radicalism’ in Japanese politics, interpreting his 
oft-repeated desire during this time for Japan to ‘set the post-war behind it’ as a rejection of 
‘American-style democracy’ based on his promotion of historical revisionism on the issue of comfort 
women112 and of the creation of new ‘strategic dialogues’ in Asia excluding the Chinese.113 Thus, 
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while promoting close USJ cooperation on these ideational terms, the GOJ has also striven to achieve 
greater agency through its ‘proactive pacifism’ policy by not simply ‘following the orders’ of the US, 
but rather actively contributing ‘to the military-strategic affairs of the international community’ in its 
own right.114 
 On the same subject of identity, other scholars, such as Akitoshi Miyashita, have focused 
more on the ‘one-nation pacifism’ unique to Japanese politics. He notes that Japan’s civil tradition of 
antimilitarism rests upon the ‘material and structural basis [...] of the alliance with the [US]’, as 
Japan has relied comfortably on the US security umbrella in the post-Cold War era.115 Because of this 
long tradition, Berger posits that only a ‘dramatic shift from the core principles of [the alliance’s] 
political-military culture’ is likely to cause a significant transformation in the current alliance 
configuration, this ‘shift’ requiring ‘the emergence of a major new security threat’.116 Even then, says 
Mochizuki, there are significant hurdles to overcome in revising the post-war Constitution and in 
particular Article 9, as this would require not only a two-thirds parliamentary majority, but also 
public acquiescence and regional acceptance of a rearmed Japan.117 Given the well-documented 
collapse of the leftist opposition within Japan118 and the equally well-documented rise of the pro-
normalisation ‘elites’ (these cutting across the preservationist/revisionist divide), however, Richard 
Samuels remarks that pacifism can be ‘ruled out’ as a basis for future Japanese security policy.119 
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3.4 Hybrid variables 
The push for ‘normalisation’ and the discussion around revising the Constitution in order to 
allow for the exercise of CSD is evidence of a belief that the GOJ’s international credibility hinges on 
the continued existence of the USJA, and thus it must keep its foreign policy options flexible into the 
immediate future. For example, several scholars posit that the GOJ’s involvement in the War on 
Terror arose not only from its desire for the USG to support its efforts to hold the North Korean 
government accountable for its abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, but also for 
the USG’s backing in its bid for a UN Security Council seat.120 Furthermore, as stated earlier, Japan 
has given priority to the alliance with the US at every opportunity over other bilateral or multilateral 
options (such as the UN or ASEAN). This is apparent from a speech given by Koizumi in 2004 in which 
he commented: ‘If you consider the case of aggression carried out against Japan, will the UN protect 
us? Of course not. Japan cannot maintain peace and security for the nation all by itself, so we have 
signed the US–Japan Security Treaty’.121 Waltz therefore sees Japan as having ‘skillfully used the 
protection the [US] has afforded and adroitly adopted the means of maintaining its security to its 
regional environment’.122  
 Differing slightly from both these approaches is the one taken by Glenn Hook in his 1996 
monograph Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan. He asserts that previous 
studies (and, by extension, many current ones) tend to ‘accept or even encourage the increase in the 
Japanese military presence in the world’ by focusing ‘exclusively on the role of the state and its 
agencies [...] in the formulation of policy’, and thus neglect ‘the link between the state and society, 
especially the way that ideas, attitudes and the political use of language help to shape state 
policies’.123 On the political use of language, he focuses on the euphemisms and metaphors 
employed by Japanese PMs and other politicians in security policy (which, ironically, appears to reify 
his own observation about the literature’s top-down focus).  
 He points out, for instance, that the first appearance of the word ‘alliance’ as a descriptor for 
the USJ security relationship was only in 1981 in a joint communique issued after a meeting between 
US President Ronald Reagan and PM Zenko Suzuki.124 Its appearance generated a media maelstrom, 
as the ‘patent military associations’ with the word forced then-Foreign Minister (FM) Sunao Sonoda 
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to resign.125 During this same period, PM Yasuhiro Nakasone stirred controversy in 1983 by referring 
to Japan as the US’s ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ in an interview with The Washington Post, thus 
implying that ‘Japan should become a forward-attack platform against the Soviet Union’.126 Hook 
notes that in spite of the rebukes he received upon his return to the Diet for the metaphor, 
Nakasone’s ‘choice of the [US] as venue for his comment can be seen as an attempt to blunt US 
criticism of Japan as a “free-rider”’ on the alliance’s security guarantee—and this, again, with the 
intention of increasing the GOJ’s credibility as a reliable ally.127 
Conclusion 
 Taking inspiration from Hook’s work, the decision to focus on language and discourse for the 
purposes of this research is a consequence of not only these gaps in the existing debates on alliance 
‘persistence’, but is also a reflection of the thesis’ adherence to a social constructivist, interpretative 
framework. On the former, one salient gap – on the conceptual as well as the case study levels – is 
that previous analyses have largely taken place at the system and state levels of analysis and observe 
the alliance policymaking process purely as a top-down exercise in state power. These studies rarely, 
if ever, account for the policy impact of security alliances on the individual level, nor discuss the 
possibility of actors outside the existing alliance structure effecting change. As such, while there are 
countless opinions on whether or not alliances ‘persist’ as a result of material versus ideational 
impetuses on the part of the member states, few discuss the material and/or ideational bases for 
supporting the alliance’s continuation within the domestic populations of these states (nor, for that 
matter, within and among the specific groups and individuals whom are actually responsible for an 
alliance’s day-to-day maintenance).  
Given these issues, it is no surprise that in response to the highly exclusive world of 
policymaking within the USJA (and, indeed, in most alliances of a similar nature) wherein decisions 
are often made without much, if any, public deliberation or input, that the role of the individual 
actor in shaping policy is very often ex post facto of any agreements or plans being signed by the two 
governments.128 The roles of individual actors, however, are critical to consider within the 
framework of this research, which – following Jonathan Potter – takes the ‘terms and forms by 
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which we achieve understanding of the world and ourselves [as] social artifacts, products of 
historically and culturally situated interchanges among people’, sees the maintenance of ‘given 
account[s] of the world or self’ as dependent on ‘the vicissitudes of social process’, and portrays 
language as ‘deriv[ing] its significance in human affairs from the way in which it functions within 
patterns of relationship’.129  
It follows from this that the concept of discourse – defined here (following Schmidt) as a 
term ‘that encompasses not only the substantive content of ideas but also the interactive processes 
by which ideas are conveyed’ – can thus serve, in an institutional setting (such as that within an 
alliance130), to both reinforce and challenge existing sites of power.131 ‘Discourse’ in this sense thus 
not only refers to structure (‘what is said, or where and how’), but to agency as well (‘who said what 
to whom’).132 By incorporating both, this research is able to highlight not just how ideas are 
represented explicitly, but also how these ideas are generated in the first place through ongoing 
interaction. This focus on discursive interaction is crucial to the interpretative approach employed by 
this dissertation, which, rather than relying on technocratic expertise, places greater value on 
qualitative analysis of the creation of social meanings and practices and how these, in turn, influence 
politics and the policymaking process.133  
Using SIDA, which examines the discourses of those in support of maintaining the alliance 
and those in opposition, this research thus separates itself from many of its predecessors by 
acknowledging not only the socio-historical context of prevailing and oppositional discourses, but 
also the importance of the process by which actors actively engage with and shape each other’s 
ideas across the traditional boundaries of ‘elites’ versus ‘non-elites’.134 In emphasising process, this 
research edges away from defining ‘power’ only in coercive terms as ‘the combined capability of a 
state’135, or only as access to social resources and/or physical control over others.136 Instead, it is 
more of a two-way street, ‘jointly produced’ through consent from those who govern – and those 
who are governed – to discourses ‘which construct subjectivity and position individual or 
                                                          
129 Jonathan Potter, ‘Discourse Analysis and Constructionist Approaches: Theoretical Background’ in John T.E. 
Richardson, ed, Handbook of qualitative research methods for psychology and the social sciences (Leicester: 
BPS Books, 1996), pp. 1-30, p. 3. 
130 See section 2.3 for more on alliance institutionalisation. 
131 Schmidt 2008, p. 305. 
132 Schmidt 2008, p. 305. 
133 Frank Fischer, ‘Beyond empiricism: policy analysis as deliberative practice’ in Maarten Hajer and Hendrik 
Wagenaar, eds, Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003b), pp. 209-227, p. 215. 
134 Fischer 2003a. 
135 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Realist thought and neorealist theory’, Journal of International Affairs, 44:1 (1990), pp. 
21-37, p. 36. 
136 Teun A. van Dijk, ‘Principles of critical discourse analysis’, Discourse & Society, 4:2 (1993), pp. 249-283, pp. 
254-256; Paul Simpson and Andrea Mayr, Language and Power: A resource book for students (Oxon, UK: 
Routledge, 2010), p. 2. 
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institutional actors in the socio-political field’, and thus delimit to some extent the range of options 
which actors perceive are available to them in taking political actions.137 
 
  
                                                          
137 Herbert Gottweis, ‘Theoretical strategies of poststructuralist policy analysis: towards an analytics of 
government’ in Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar, eds, Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding 
Governance in the Network Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 247-265, p. 254. 
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Chapter 2. Theory and methods 
Introduction 
 In examining how security alliances are ‘reproduced’ versus simply ‘persisting’, then, it is 
necessary to look closely into how not only the actors who support them, but also those who oppose 
them, deliberate their ideas and frame them in order to either reaffirm their existing positions or to 
make them more widely-known in the public sphere. These ideas and the ways in which they are 
framed are constituted by established discourses about an alliance—these not only including the 
well-covered ‘pro-alliance’ discourse of ‘elite’ actors, but also those of others who, while not 
necessarily ‘anti-alliance’ per se, nonetheless present another set of ideas and evidence that may 
undermine the rationale behind an alliance’s reproduction. It is important to recognise this 
opposition as part and parcel of the process by which an alliance ‘survives’, as an alliance – like any 
other institution – represents the final outcome of ‘considerable struggle, bargaining, and 
negotiation’.  
 When reading the previous literature on the USJA, it would appear that whatever conflicts or 
disagreements both governments have run into over the years have been settled relatively quickly. 
The stability of the relationship is always highlighted first and foremost in spite of any challenges it 
has faced, rather than in part due to these. This approach, however, underemphasises the role that 
conflict plays in institutional reproduction. Therefore, using the USJA as its institutional framework 
and the conflict over the relocation of MCAS Futenma within Okinawa as the challenge to its 
continuation, this research seeks to understand the process of reproduction through the discursive 
strategies actors employ to both maintain the USJA in its current form (the ‘pro-alliance’ and/or 
‘pro-base discourse’ [PBD]) and to contest its necessity via the debate over Futenma (broadly 
speaking, the ‘anti-base discourse’ [ABD]).  
Rather than relying solely on the technocratic expertise contained within the realm of ‘elite’ 
actors, this research takes a post-positivist perspective and is primarily interested in analysing the 
creation of social meanings and practices—and how these, in turn, influence politics and the 
policymaking process. The theoretical framework for this research thus highlights a number of ideas 
drawn from the literatures on deliberative public policy, DI, and GIC. Although these literatures are 
not normally associated with the study of international relations, much less security alliances, if we 
treat an alliance as an institution – with ‘formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard 
operating procedures that structure the relationship between individuals’1 – then these literatures 
                                                          
1 Cortell and Peterson 1999, p. 181. 
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each have something conceptually important to offer in discussing alliance reproduction and how 
reproduction is challenged (see section 2 for more details). 
Following on from the concept of discourse, the methodological framework for this research 
centres around social-interactive discourse analysis (SIDA), which acknowledges not only the socio-
historical context of the prevailing and oppositional discourses in this case study, but also the 
importance of the on-going political struggle in which actors interact and shape each other’s ideas 
through the medium of primary and secondary texts (including interviews, public speeches, policy 
documents, and other historical materials) as well as visual media (e.g. anti-base protest signs and 
museum placards). Fieldwork conducted abroad in various locations within the US and Japan plays 
an important role in illustrating, on a practical level, the proliferation of the PBD and ABD, 
respectively—and how they have been and are currently interpreted. 
The following chapter thus proceeds in three parts: section 1 outlines in detail the 
theoretical framework of this research with a full discussion of the three literatures (deliberative 
public policy, DI, and GIC) from which the key concepts outlined above are drawn; section 2 provides 
an overview of these concepts as part of an overall interpretative approach; and section 3 outlines 
the methodological framework of this research, with particular emphasis on the benefits of SIDA vis-
à-vis previous methods, how this was employed in the fieldwork programme, and how the data 
collected from fieldwork was analysed using the parameters set out by this same method. Finally, 
the chapter’s conclusion discusses the contributions of this research. 
1. Theoretical framework 
Where the literature review provided in Chapter 1 showcases an array of possible 
explanations for alliance ‘persistence’, many of these arguably subscribe to positivism, or the 
assumption that the world ‘comprises objects whose existence is independent of ideas and beliefs 
about them’, and thus it is the purpose of the analyst to merely ‘identify those self-evident things 
and material causes so that actors can accommodate themselves to the realm of necessity’ that they 
themselves have created.2 Bill McSweeney likens positivism to physics in that it ‘takes the world as it 
finds it and works within ceteris paribus assumptions to construct law-like generalizations’3; Fischer 
adds that positivist inquiry ‘has to be empirically objective and value-free, as the laws or 
generalizations exist independently of social and historical context’.4 Going hand-in-hand with this is 
the belief in an anarchic international system of sovereign, rational, self-interested states with little 
                                                          
2 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 4. 
3 McSweeney 1999, p. 111. 
4 Fischer 2003b, p. 3. 
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to no room for trust between them, as a state ‘may be unable to recover if its trust is betrayed’.5 If 
there is any kind of ‘stability’ within this system at all, it only exists ‘to the degree that the relations 
of authority within it are sustained by the underlying distribution of power’ (e.g. the ‘hegemonic 
stability’ offered by the US).6 
This view of states and the international system has, however, been taken to task by several 
scholars. McSweeney argues that because states are cast by realists ‘in a uniform mould as 
undifferentiated entities responding to the stimulus of their external environment’, they are thus 
pegged with specific, unchangeable identities whose actions merely reflects shifting strategies.7 If 
this is the case, he says, then ‘insecurity is an environmental constant and the condition of peace 
must be the eternal vigilance of military autarky’.8 While this has not been the case with all of the 
studies cited earlier – since many of the authors do situate their comments in a socio-historical 
context, especially those dealing with particular alliances – there is, nonetheless, a tendency towards 
simplification that is apparent in their emphasis on the why (specific mechanisms) as opposed to the 
how (ongoing processes). If not explicitly positivist, then, many of these studies are at least biased 
towards a more technocratic approach in which ‘[an] expert establishes some distance from reality, 
analyses it into component parts, devises means for resolving difficulties in the most efficient way, 
and then dictates the strategy or policy’.9 This is evident from the presence of alliance ‘managers’ in 
the USJ literature, many of whom posit specific policy recommendations and ‘antidotes’ to complex 
problems (like the basing issue). However, as Torgerson notes, the reliance on this ‘expert 
knowledge’ only further serves to separate ‘policy discourse’ from a ‘public discourse’ in which 
‘emotionalism and irrationality can be tolerated and discounted because they do not intrude into 
the rational domain of the policy analyst’.10  
Furthermore, this labelling of ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ actors ignores a range of individuals who 
may fall somewhere in-between, but who can still have a significant impact on policy decisions. For 
example, is it likely that both an official from MOFA and one from the Okinawa Prefectural 
Government (OPG) have access to more privileged national security-related information than an 
Okinawan resident or member of civil society (and may thus be considered ‘elite’ in this sense), but 
it is also likely that the OPG official has access to a far narrower range of information than the one 
from MOFA (and that [s]he commands far less respect from the central government, in part due to 
this). Given this case, to what degree can we consider the local official an ‘elite’, or, furthermore – 
                                                          
5 Buzan 1991, p. 21; Mearsheimer 1990, p. 12. 
6 Wohlforth 2010, p. 16. 
7 McSweeney 1999, p. 200. 
8 McSweeney 1999, p. 5. 
9 Fischer 2003a. 
10 Torgerson 2003, p. 121. 
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when considering the example of, say, a MOFA official’s position within the ministry itself – to what 
degree are they actually involved in high-level national security discussions, much less on a bilateral 
basis? (The term ‘non-elite’ is equally non-descriptive, capturing little of what separates the world of 
the ‘everyday’ from that of the government or military aside from access to ‘privileged’ information.)   
1.1. Deliberative public policy 
In not making clear such distinctions, previous studies have thus tended to ignore ‘collective 
action problems, the limited information and attention of agents [at the sub-state level] and the 
indeterminacy of outcomes’, not to mention neglect ‘the social forces behind political action’, as 
these studies tend to characterise ‘politics’ and ‘international relations’ as taking place ‘in a 
stratospheric, rarefied realm high above, abstracted from society’.11 Moreover, questions of culture 
and history are treated as ‘essentially symbolic sideshows’, as ‘[t]he overheated passions that are 
stoked by fights over history tend to be viewed as either ephemeral – with little lasting impact on 
political affairs – or epiphenomenal – the by-products of disputes over other, more important 
issues’.12 
The point on ‘limited information’ relates to Buzan’s observation that ‘policy-makers are 
only partially informed, do not fully understand other actors or the system (or themselves), are 
capable of only limited rationality and are highly constrained in what they can do’.13 He continues 
that the information received by policymakers ‘changes and expands constantly’, and much of it, 
including ‘the depth of political allegiance (a perennial topic in alliances) […] [and] the stability of 
governments and the motives of leaders, is inherently unknowable with any accuracy’.14 Like 
policymakers – and also, in large part, due to their purposeful obfuscation or classification of 
security-related information – ‘everyday’ actors also suffer from a lack of ‘full information’ when 
both forming their own ideas and arguments and when making electoral decisions.15 For actors of all 
stripes, then, when ‘individuals lack the opportunities, incentives, and necessities to test, articulate, 
defend, and ultimately act on their judgements, they will also be lacking in empathy for others, poor 
                                                          
11 David Marsh, ’Keeping Ideas in their Place: In Praise of Thin Constructivism’, Australian Journal of Political 
Science, 44:4 (2009), pp. 679-696, p. 682; Michael S. Drake, Political Sociology for a Globalizing World 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), p. 8. 
12 Thomas U. Berger, War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), pp. 10-11. 
13 Buzan 1991, p. 329. 
14 Buzan 1991, p. 344. 
15 James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin, ‘The quest for deliberative democracy’ in Michael Saward, ed, 
Democratic Innovation: Deliberation, representation and association (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 17-28, pp. 
18-19. 
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in information, and unlikely to have the critical skills necessary to articulate, defend, and revise their 
views’.16 
Furthermore, policymakers socialise with like-minded individuals (including the 
aforementioned ‘security professionals’ and academics), all of whom are ‘organized in significant 
part around their own internal power structures, interests, and status claims’, and thus the 
information they receive, produce, and repeat will be influenced by these internal dynamics.17 
Moreover, due to the nature of this interaction, officials and ‘experts’ ‘have an incentive to retain 
credibility among their peers in the transnational policy community, and ensure that they have both 
future work and esteem’—and part of this credibility stems from ‘mak[ing] sure they are not 
dismissed as extremists’ and ‘blocking access to certain tasks through “jurisdictional” battles to 
ensure that other professions and professionals are not permitted to work on the problem at 
hand’.18 However, notes Graham Smith, it is important to remember that for both officials and 
‘everyday’ actors alike, ‘[n]o group of citizens can accurately mirror all the standpoints and views 
present within the wider community and there is a danger of creating false essentialisms – citizens 
who share similar socio-demographic characteristics do not necessarily share the same views and 
attitudes’.19 
If many policymakers and the ‘experts’ they socialise with are so concerned with their 
professional credibility and retaining the appearance of pragmatism, then it is important to 
recognise the role of language and meaning not as ‘an ornament of social behaviour’, but as ‘internal 
to the very social systems we seek to research’—and that they are never a ‘fixed or closed set of 
rules’ but rather are ‘[a]lways based on the interpretations of both those who speak it and those 
who receive it’.20 It is upon this point that the literature on deliberative public policy as written by 
Fischer, Hajer, and Wagenaar, among others, is based. Although their work is directly concerned 
with making public policy practice more deliberative and democratic, their emphasis on bridging the 
gap between the oftentimes insulated, technocratic policy ‘experts’ and ‘everyday’ actors is 
something which can and should be applied to other fields of political study.  
They in particular differentiate their conceptualisation of knowledge and power from that of 
‘traditional’ policy analysis, which, they say, ‘has sought to translate inherently normative political 
and social issues into technically defined ends to be pursued through administrative means’.21 In 
                                                          
16 Graham Smith, ‘Toward deliberative institutions’ in Michael Saward, ed, Democratic Innovation: 
Deliberation, representation and association (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 29-39, p. 32. 
17 Fischer 2003a. 
18 Leonard Seabrooke and Eleni Tsingou, ‘Distinctions, affiliations, and professional knowledge in financial 
reform expert groups’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21:3 (2014), pp. 389-407, pp. 393-400. 
19 Smith 2000, p. 34. 
20 Fischer 2003a. 
21 Fischer 2003b, p. 212. 
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comparison, their work views social knowledge as ‘the outcome of a negotiation between those with 
more “expert knowledge” and the actors in the everyday world, including the experts themselves’.22  
Taking the example of policymakers desiring to avoid being ‘dismissed as extremists’, it is clear, from 
this conceptualisation of knowledge, that how political ‘extremism’ is defined by these individuals 
relies not just on some ‘expert’ idea of what constitutes that position, but also on their 
understanding of it as derived from their interaction with ‘everyday’ actors.23 On the other side, 
‘everyday’ actors – who understand, based on their interaction with officials, that their ideas are 
considered too ‘extreme’ to translate into policy – sometimes frame their arguments with 
consideration for this perception and with an awareness of their limited access to and influence over 
public opinion in comparison to that of the central government.24 
Following on from this, the key concepts to be discussed below of active agency (2.1), 
institutions as argumentative fields (2.2), and discourse (2.4) were drawn in large part from this 
literature, as well as the methodological framework based around a social-interactive discourse 
analysis (3.2). 
1.2. Discursive institutionalism 
As the literature on deliberative public policy steps in to fill the gaps between ‘experts’ and 
the ‘everyday’, so does the second body of theory influencing this research complement this aim in 
its effort to bring complexity back to the question of how institutions change and/or are reproduced. 
Prior to the advent of DI, the first institution-centred studies were mainly of a functionalist variety—
that is, institutions were regarded merely as ‘the manifestations of the functions of political life or 
“necessary for a democracy”’.25 In this sense, an institution would persist as a function of an 
‘increasing returns’ process by which ‘the probability of further steps along the same path increases 
with each move down that path [...] because the relative benefits of the current activity compared 
with other possible options increase over time’.26  
Pierson points out, however, that this argument is flawed in that increasing returns ‘may 
have locked in a particular option even though it originated by accident, or the factors that gave it an 
original advantage may have long since passed away’, and thus it is necessary to examine the socio-
historical circumstances which gave rise to the institution in the first place.27 In fact, the weaknesses 
                                                          
22 Fischer 2003a. 
23 Huysmans 2002; John Morrissey, ‘Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the 
Scripting of US National Security’, Antipode, 43:2 (2011), pp. 435-470. 
24 Hobson and Seabrooke 2007; Martin 2015. 
25 Lowndes 2010, p. 62. 
26 Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political Science 
Review, 94:2 (2000a), pp. 251-267, p. 264. 
27 Pierson 2000a, p. 264. 
Grinberg 63 
 
of the functionalist argument gave rise to a plethora of ‘New Institutionalisms’ (NIs)28 whose 
principal claims were that ‘historically embedded institutional arrangements constituted a 
framework with which to explain comparative patterns of state-society and state-economy relations 
and cross-national variations in policy outcomes’, and thus institutions themselves assumed a 
‘certain rigidity’ over time.29  
Nonetheless, the NIs have also come under criticism for their ‘latent structuralism’ in that 
they do not always afford individual actors a ‘proper role in change or persistence’, instead 
‘doom[ing them] to keep re-enacting their past legacies’.30 The relatively static nature of agents in 
the NIs thus leaves a vacuum which DI seeks to fill by focusing on the discursive foundation of 
institutions. Within DI, discourse ‘is the principal means by which organizational members create a 
coherent social reality that frames their sense of who they are’, and institutions (and, as a 
consequence, states themselves) are ‘product[s] of discourse both in the sense that they are 
consciously constructed through formal constitutions and legal systems and also in the sense that 
informal conventions define and become embedded in their practices’.31 The latter thus also serve as 
‘codified systems of ideas’ which ‘shape behaviour through the frames of meaning they embody—
the ideas and narratives that are used to explain, deliberate or legitimize political action’.32  
Institutions are not, then, simply ‘neutral structures of incentives or (worse) immutable 
products of culture that lead to inescapable “social traps”’ but, rather, can be considered carriers of 
‘collective memories’, including ones of trust and mistrust.33 In creating and maintaining them, 
agents are able to ‘think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to 
deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another to change 
those institutions or to maintain them’.34 What is appealing about DI theory, therefore, is not only its 
insight into the process by which agents may effect institutional change, but also how they maintain 
the status quo. Mat Hope and Ringa Raudla explain: 
                                                          
28 Lowndes summarises each of the NIs mentioned above in turn: normative institutionalism ‘argues that 
political institutions influence actors' behaviour by shaping their “values, norms, interests, identities and 
beliefs”’; rational choice institutionalism ‘denies that institutional factors “produce behaviour” or shape 
individuals' preferences, which they see as endogenously determined and relatively stable (favouring utility 
maximization)’; historical institutionalism ‘look[s] at how choices made about the institutional design of 
government systems influence the future decision-making of individuals’; and feminist institutionalism ‘studies 
how gender norms operate within institutions and how institutional processes construct and maintain 
gendered power dynamics’ (2010, pp. 64-65). 
29 B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre and Desmond S. King, ‘The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in 
Historical Institutionalism’, The Journal of Politics, 67:4 (2005), pp. 1275-1300, p. 1280. 
30 Bell 2011, p. 885. 
31 Simpson and Mayr 2010, p. 7; Henri Goverde et al, ‘General introduction: Power in contemporary politics’ in 
Henri Goverde et al, eds, Power in Contemporary Politics: Theories, Practices, Globalizations (London: Sage 
Publications Ltd, 2000), pp. 1-34, p. 14. 
32 Lowndes 2010, p. 77. 
33 Schmidt 2008, p. 318. 
34 Schmidt 2008, p. 314. 
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35 
While DI does emphasise actors already working within institutions, it still provides a 
compelling theoretical framework that complements the ideas of deliberative public policy in the 
latter’s focus on those disadvantaged by ‘dominant’ discourses. The key concepts to be discussed 
below of active agency (2.1) and discourse (2.4) were drawn in large part from DI studies. 
1.3. Gradual institutional change theory 
Although the framework for this research would primarily align itself with the social 
constructivist-based theories outlined by deliberative public policy and DI, there remains, 
nonetheless, something important to be gained from another: gradual institutional change theory 
(GIC), created by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen. While this theory is associated more with the 
NIs, GIC is a valuable third literature to draw upon for its insight into the gradual process of change. 
In this approach, institutions 
36 
This complements the perspective offered by deliberative public policy as well as DI of the power 
relations inherent within institutional structures, as the power of one dominant group ‘may be so 
great that dominant actors are able to design institutions that closely correspond to their well-
defined institutional preferences’.37 In spite of this, it is also a fact that institutional rules must be 
‘applied and enforced, often by actors other than the designers’, and this therefore ‘opens up space 
                                                          
35 Mat Hope and Ringa Raudla, ‘Discursive institutionalism and policy stasis in simple and compound polities: 
the cases of Estonian fiscal policy and United States climate change policy’, Policy Studies, 33:5 (2012), pp. 399-
418, pp. 402-403. 
36 Mahoney and Thelen 2010, pp. 7-8. 
37 Mahoney and Thelen 2010, p. 8. 
Simplified down for clarity, the discursive institutionalist model of policy change can 
be summarised as follows: where policy change is not in the immediate interest of 
actors, where cultural norms are obstructive to action, and where history has 
committed institutions to a particular course of action but change occurs anyway, 
discourse may be the causal factor which explains this change [...] From this, it 
follows that – theoretically at least – the inverse must also be possible: where action 
is in actors’ interest, where institutions are open to change, and where cultural 
norms are permissive to action, but there remains policy stasis, discourse may be 
the causal factor which explains this stasis. 
are fraught with tensions because they inevitably raise resource considerations and 
invariably have distributional consequences. Any given set of rules or expectations – 
formal or informal – that patterns action will have unequal implications for resource 
allocation, and clearly many formal institutions are specifically intended to distribute 
resources to particular kinds of actors and not to others [emphasis added]. 
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[...] for change to occur in a rule's implementation or enactment’.38 This contradicts the idea that 
only sudden, ‘exogenous’ events can cause institutional change (see full discussion in section 2.3).39 
As may be inferred from the content of this section, the key concept of change and stability 
as inextricably linked (2.3) is drawn from GIC theory. 
2. The interpretative approach 
As outlined above, academics such as Fischer, Hajer and Wagenaar, Lene Hansen, and others 
have suggested an alternative, interpretative approach. It relies on a post-positivist epistemology 
which calls into question the notion that there is a linear relationship between cause and effect and 
places greater value on qualitative analysis of the creation of social meanings and practices.40 These 
scholars argue that by taking the ‘monological ideal of administrative rationality’41 for granted, 
studies in the positivist tradition merely reinforce the legitimacy of existing hierarchies of power 
while not accounting for all the possible sources of knowledge outside of them.42 Furthermore, as 
Hajer notes, policymaking is traditionally conceived of as a ‘result of politics’; however, given an 
increasing level of citizen activism worldwide, he posits that politics is increasingly the product of 
policymaking:  
43 
This concept of politics as the product of policymaking can be extended to national security issues, 
including ones related to security alliances, and is evident in the case of anti-base protests in 
Okinawa (see Chapter 5). 
                                                          
38 Mahoney and Thelen 2010, pp. 13-14. 
39 Other specific models of gradual change under GIC include: displacement, whereby ‘existing rules are 
replaced by new ones[, sometimes abruptly] [...]  and it may entail the radical shift that is often featured in 
leading institutional theories’; layering, whereby ‘new rules are attached to existing ones, thereby changing 
the ways in which the original rules structure behavior’; drift, whereby ‘rules remain formally the same but 
their impact changes as a result of shifts in external conditions’; and conversion, whereby ‘rules remain 
formally the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, pp. 16-18). 
40 Fisher 2003b, p. 215. 
41 Torgerson explains that the ‘monological ideal of administrative rationality’ is a concept which rests on a 
neglect of complexity, a ‘systematic filtering of communication through official channels and technical 
vocabularies’ (simplification), and rationalism (whereby ‘conventional policy discourse projects an implicit 
image of itself as necessary and normal, something all right-thinking people - i.e. all but the weak minded and 
emotional - will take for granted’) (2003, pp. 125-128). 
42 Campbell 1998, pp. 221-222; Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war 
(London: Routledge, 2006), p. 10. 
43 Hajer 2003, p. 88. 
In many cases it is a public policy initiative that triggers people to reflect on what they 
really value, and that motivates them to voice their concerns or wishes and become 
politically active themselves. Public policy, in other words, often creates a public 
domain, as a space in which people of various origins deliberate on their future as well 
as on their mutual interrelationships and their relationship to the government. 
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The interpretative approach can therefore be seen as desiring to return complexity to policy 
problems by giving agency to those views excluded not only from within institutions—but also from 
outside of them. Patsy Healey et al summarise the interpretative method as departing from these 
conventional approaches:  
44 
Critical to understanding this mobilisation of resources is the concept of performativity. ‘Anyone 
who has witnessed a U.S. presidential inauguration, or “question time” in the British Parliament, or a 
Japanese candidate holding forth from the top of a campaign bus in downtown Tokyo understands 
that politics is largely about performance’, comments David Leheny. Beyond this surface 
‘performance’, however, is how it is received and interpreted by an audience (including the one at 
whom it was directed, as well as its unintended listeners).45 This aspect of performativity is not, 
therefore, contained only within the individual politician or ‘everyday’ actor ‘performing’ politics, 
but also in the language and media they use and the meanings they construct or reproduce in 
practice. The same may be said of any political phrase or motto that is repeated often and usually 
taken as trite and hollow, but whose meaning is actually dependent upon the interpretation of 
whomever is speaking/receiving it and their backgrounds (see, for example, the discussion of the 
USJA as the ‘cornerstone’ for peace and security in East Asia in Chapter 3).  
The following sections discuss four key concepts falling under the umbrella of this overall 
interpretative approach, including active agency (2.1), institutions as argumentative fields (2.2), 
change and stability as inextricably linked (2.3), and discourse (2.4). 
2.1. Active agency 
If actors are able to understand and interpret ideas and arguments that are ‘performed’ 
both for them and with their implicit cooperation, then it follows that they exercise active agency. In 
this understanding of agency, individuals are taken ‘as agents who interpret and perceive their 
situation, consisting of institutions, rooted in socio-cultural values, forming valuations (aspirations, 
preferences) that they act on’, not simply passive receptors of existing institutional norms or 
                                                          
44 Patsy Healey et al, ‘Place, identity and local politics: analysing initiatives in deliberative governance’ in 
Maarten Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar, eds, Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the 
Network Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 60-87, p. 64. 
45 David Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence, and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan (London: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), p. 7; Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, ‘Vernacular Securities and Their Study: A Qualitative 
Analysis and Research Agenda’, International Relations, 27:2 (2012), pp. 158-179, p. 161. 
[...] we are therefore interested in the way knowledge resources and relational 
resources are mobilized, and how this affects the frames of reference or discourses 
through which meanings are arrived at and mobilized, the processes by which 
meanings are disseminated, and the relation between such discourses and the 
practices through which material actions are accomplished. 
Grinberg 67 
 
constraints.46 In this context, institutional change occurs when actors decide to use institutions 
differently; conversely, if there is no change, it is still the result of actors consciously deciding not to 
pursue alternatives to the current institutional dynamic.47 This sits in contrast to previous studies 
which emphasise a more passive agency whereby ‘individual humans can be treated as 
epiphenomenal—institutions both create them and determine their behavior’.48 A symptom of the 
structuralism inherent in these studies is that ‘the state’ is assigned ‘independent causal weight[, 
which] typically leads [analysts] to anthropomorphize it’ and thus ‘assume homogeneity within 
[it]’.49 William Roberts Clark explains: 
50 
But why is agency important, and why should it have a greater role in explaining 
reproduction and change than the constraining or enabling features of the institutions themselves? 
Referring to the previous discussion on institutions as carriers of ideas or ‘collective memories’, 
Stephen Bell suggests that agents ‘interpret and construct the experience of their institutional 
situation using subjective and inter-subjective cognitive and normative frameworks and discursive 
processes’ with the knowledge that the institutions are ‘inherited sets of rules and duties that need 
to be navigated and negotiated’.51 Excluding human agency from a model of institutional 
reproduction or change thus ‘escape[s] the task of investigating growth and security in all their 
complex, value-laden respects as concepts which have meaning only in relation to people and their 
needs’.52  
However, as scholars on this subject makes apparent, not all agencies are created equal. 
Specifically, ‘elite’ agency is separated out from ‘non-elite’ agency: the former is drawn from elite 
theory, which identifies ‘elites’ as ‘an emergent transnational social fraction which, by virtue of their 
close imbrication with the steering offices and institutions of global capital, effectively determines 
                                                          
46 Wilfred Dolfsma and Rudi Verburg, ‘Structure, Agency and the Role of Values in Processes of Institutional 
Change’, Journal of Economic Issues, 13:4 (2008), pp. 1031-1054, p. 1042. 
47 Schmidt 2008, p. 316; Hope and Raudla 2012, pp. 402-403. 
48 William Roberts Clark, ‘Agents and Structures: Two Views of Preferences, Two Views of Institutions’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 42 (1998), pp. 245-270, p. 248. 
49 Clark 1998, p. 248; Peter, Pierre and King 2005, p. 1285. 
50 Clark 1998, p. 248. 
51 Bell 2011, p. 891. 
52 McSweeney 1999, p. 86. 
if one maintains the assumption of a state interest, one is prohibited from speaking 
about the behavior of actors within the state. To explain the behavior of actors within 
the state, we must disaggregate the state, and look at organizations within it, the 
individuals who inhabit them, and the institutional framework that structures their 
behavior. This task cannot be completed if “institutions” and the “state” or even “state 
actors” are confounded. 
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the framework of options for national political actors’.53 Furthermore, mass political parties, 
populated by these same ‘elites’, ‘reproduce the same structure of elite domination and circulation 
internally, but can also function as a mechanism through which elites reproduce themselves, 
recruiting and elevating the more ambitious, able and politically active members from the wider 
passive society’.54 Nonetheless, while these ‘elites’ have easier access to controlling the ‘dominant 
consensus’ on any number of policy issues, their insulation from the public makes their access to 
‘truly popular opinion [...] marginal or at best indirect’, even when they ‘claim to express the 
concerns of the population at large’.55  
As mentioned earlier, however, the groupings of ‘elites’ and ‘non-elites’ is problematic, 
especially within the parameters of this research. Furthermore, going by the logic of the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 1, it is only the USG and GOJ – and certain individuals within those governments 
– who are the primary agents whose utterances and actions have a visible impact on changing or 
maintaining the structure of the current alliance. Obviously, this approach underestimates the 
degree to which ‘everyday’ actors interpret the ‘objective’ assessments of experts within their own 
lived experience. Dvora Yanow comments that this ‘local knowledge’ is not accessed by policy ‘elites’ 
due to its nature as non-quantitative and based on lived experience.56  
Generally speaking, recognising the impact of this ‘local knowledge’ is crucial when we 
consider the fact that ‘many problems are simply too complicated, too contested and too unstable 
to allow for schematic, centralized regulation’.57 The concept of ‘social knowledge’ itself, says 
Fischer, is ‘a product of negotiations between those with technical expert knowledge and the 
participants in the everyday world’, and thus it should be acknowledged that it can take many forms, 
from ‘empirical analysis to expressive statements in words, sounds, and pictures’.58 By expanding the 
field of study out to include this ‘everyday’ agency and knowledge, citizens are thus able to acquire a 
role in the institutional process of politics beyond that of the ‘“target” of policy missiles’ and actually 
‘open up the possibility of new ways of seeing and act[ing]’.59 
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2.2. Institutions as argumentative fields 
When these possibilities of ‘new ways of seeing and acting’ are opened up, then, it follows 
that citizens – counted among the ‘everyday’ – may choose to challenge existing institutional rules 
and structures. In adopting an interpretative framework, it becomes possible to see institutions not 
just as structures that constrain or enable actors’ preferences, but as ‘argumentative fields’ wherein 
actors’ discursive constructions ‘can be meaningfully stated and understood’ and their practices can 
help put into motion actual policy changes.60 Drawing on Jürgen Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action, Fischer argues that what is missing from the traditional models of self-
interested agents working within immovable institutions is the recognition that ‘power is more than 
either the ability to achieve objectives through the mobilization of resources or the domination of 
the other participants through physical or manipulative means’—it is also the ‘positive or productive 
ability of communicative power to organize and coordinate action through consensual 
communication’.61  By focusing on the positive dimension of power, the process of discursive 
interpretation thus ‘shifts from the scientific community to the practical-world audience. In the 
transition, the final outcome of evaluative inquiry is determined by the giving of reasons and the 
assessment of practical arguments rather than scientific demonstration and verification’.62 
These arguments, says Thomas Risse, are used by actors ‘to persuade or convince others 
that they should change their views of the world, their normative beliefs, their preferences, and 
even their identities’, and in cases of ‘successful arguing’, the individual agent’s material bargaining 
power ‘becomes less relevant’ when compared to the force of their argument.63 The benefit of this is 
that there is ‘a competition of ideas and viewpoints, rather than reliance on analyses and 
recommendations from advisers who share the perspectives of the policymakers’, and this 
competition, in turn, produces better policy.64 To be clear, ‘arguments’ in this sense does not merely 
refer to linguistics or ‘sale talk’, but to ‘practical accomplishments themselves, forged in the day-to-
day struggle of policymakers, planners and administrators with concrete, ambiguous, tenacious, 
practical problems’ (and, naturally, in the struggles of ‘everyday’ actors as well).65 In taking on this 
added element of performativity, then, arguments ‘do more than merely describe a given reality 
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and, as such, cannot be judged as false or true. Instead, these utterances realize a specific action; 
they do things [emphasis added]’.66 
2.3. Change and stability as inextricably linked 
Just as ‘arguments’ in the interpretative approach represent the living, breathing 
embodiment of ideas, so do institutions represent ‘compromises and are subject to shifts in public 
opinion’ and ‘internal disagreements’, with continuity requiring ‘the ongoing mobilization of political 
support’.67 Thus, even during periods of apparent stasis in policy, ‘there is nothing automatic, self-
perpetuating, or self-reinforcing about institutional arrangements’.68 Traditionally, institutionalist 
literatures have tended to emphasise the ‘stickiness’ of existing arrangements. This belief is 
generally encapsulated in the term institutionalisation, which Jens Beckert defines as ‘the process of 
social interaction through which actors realize that their expectations in the behaviour of others will 
not be disappointed’.69 In order not to disappoint expectations, in fact, organisations may ‘re-
embed’ themselves ‘[w]hen the environmental context of institutional influence is highly uncertain 
and unpredictable’.70 During such times, policies may persist ‘primarily because of the persistence of 
the shared policy beliefs that undergird them’, as actors are ‘reluctant to dismiss their core beliefs’.71 
Following from this, Pierson argues that because ‘even mistaken understandings of the political 
world are often self-reinforcing rather than corrective’, formal political institutions – such as security 
alliances – are ‘usually change-resistant’.72 This ‘path dependence’ of institutions is further achieved 
through a system of ‘nested rules’, or ‘rules at each successive level in the hierarchy [which are] 
increasingly costly to change’.73 
Given this framework of path dependence, there appear to be few opportunities for 
institutional change outside of exogenous events creating extraordinary circumstances in which this 
can occur.74 What the literature on path dependence and its attendant concepts neglects, however, 
is the ‘dissensus that may exist beneath the surface of a program, or organizational field’, since ‘the 
political pressure to undertake social reform combined with the market in ideas has given expertise 
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a greater potential influence than this assumption of institutional durability appreciates’.75 Peters, 
Pierre and King further note that even when policy changes appear incremental and, thus, trivial if 
observed on a year-to-year basis, ‘taken together they [can] amount to a significant reorientation of 
the program’.76 Adding to this point, Robert Lieberman states that even broad, ‘programmatic’ or 
‘core’ beliefs, such as those in ‘liberty’ or ‘equality’, may be interpreted and framed in a number of 
different ways over time to the point that such concepts ‘might be invoked to support very different 
practices in different contexts by people who all the while believe themselves to be upholding a 
timeless and unchanging political tradition’.77  
If, then, institutions are not bound to the limitations of path dependence, how might agents 
go about effecting actual changes in policy? Some authors have posited that because institutional 
rules are not entirely coherent – in fact, ‘they are very often in conflict with each other, or are even 
contradictory’ – they do not necessarily provide ‘unanimous answers as to how agents should act’.78 
Therefore, although institutions ‘reflect, refract, restrain and enable human behaviour’ to some 
extent, in the end ‘it is the behaviour of agents that reproduces or transforms institutions over 
time’.79 Agents may also take part in strategic learning, by which is meant that they  
80 
Actors may also effect change by taking advantage of ‘windows of opportunity’ created by significant 
exogenous or endogenous policy events to advance their goals, though ‘[t]he type and scope of the 
environmental trigger determines whether and how widely a window opens and, therefore, the 
extent of the opportunity for change’.81  
2.4. Discourse 
At a more foundational level, it is crucial to investigate – given the fact that institutional 
rules and norms are as much up for interpretation as the ideas and policies they (re)produce – the 
discursive means by which different actors interpret and react to ideas and arguments. To reiterate, 
‘discourse’ is defined in this framework, following Schmidt, as a term ‘that encompasses not only the 
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revise their perceptions of what is feasible, possible and indeed desirable in the light 
of their assessments of their own ability to realise prior goals (and that of others), as 
they assimilate new “information” (from whatever external source), and as they 
reorient future strategies in the light of such “empirical” and mediated knowledge of 
the context as a structured terrain of opportunity and constraint. 
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substantive content of ideas but also the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed’.82 It is 
thus used here as a dynamic concept which produces subjects, objects, and the rules that govern 
their interactions.83 Given this ‘complex multilayeredness of discourse and its consequent capacity to 
bear a wide variety of interpretations of its meaning’, says Hayden White, it is not simply the content 
of a discourse that is important to examine, but also the form that it takes (for example, the 
narrative form; see section 3.1 for details).84 Thus, we might call the consensus that exists around 
the necessity of the USJA in the American and Japanese security establishments the prevailing 
discourse in both countries’ policymaking processes, while some Okinawans’ argument that the 
alliance creates more insecurity than security might be termed collectively as an ‘oppositional 
political discourse’.85  
It is important to note, however, that discourses ‘do not faithfully reflect reality like 
mirrors’—rather, they are ‘artifacts of language through which the very reality they purport to 
reflect is constructed’.86 Furthermore, as mentioned previously, discourses are in part ‘contingent 
and historical constructions’ and are therefore ‘always vulnerable to those political forces excluded 
[emphasis added] in their production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond their 
control’.87 Discourses also ‘connote to those participating in them what is ostensibly real or unreal, 
what is therefore true or false, and therefore also what is good or bad’.88 Because they have the 
ability to communicate these basic values, it is thus critical to identify some basic properties of 
discourse or elements contained within them prior to their analysis. These include: local meaning 
and coherence (implications, vagueness, indirectness); style (syntax, lexicon); euphemisms; genre 
(policy documents, media editorials, academic articles); and chains of connotation (e.g. linking 
‘unemployment’ to ‘welfare state’).89 
Within discourses, many authors also point to specific frames, or ‘normative and sometimes 
cognitive ideas that are located in the foreground of policy debates’.90 These are, traditionally, 
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described as being strategically crafted by political ‘elites’ in order to ‘legitimize their policies to the 
public and each other’.91 In this sense, a frame is used to ‘[enhance] a certain interpretation or 
evaluation of reality’ and can even provide ‘a specific understanding of the world’.92 Fischer adds 
that as ‘an organizing principle that transforms fragmentary information into a structured and 
meaningful whole’, frames therefore show ‘which elements become more meaningful and 
consequently . . . can more easily be noticed by the audience’ through their connections to ‘familiar 
cultural symbols, both material and discursive’.93 In the interpretative framework outlined here, 
frames may be viewed as one of several strategies employed in an overall discursive approach. 
3. Methodological framework 
3.1. Traditional versus discursive approaches 
Traditionally, the role of ideas and discourse is limited in policy analysis by rational-choice 
theorists. This is because they ‘try to integrate ideas and beliefs held by individuals or groups 
without giving up or modifying their basic contention that human beings behave rationally in the 
effort to achieve their self-interested ends’.94 Ideas and discourse in the rational-choice 
conceptualisation thus ‘assist agents in instrumentally following their own preferences in a complex 
world’ rather than having any influence on the initial creation of the interests themselves.95 This 
being the case, methodologies based on rationalism or liberalism such as content analysis (CA) also 
adopt the assumption that sovereign, self-interested individuals will act upon ‘perfect intentionality’, 
or ‘[choose] precisely what they want to say, as if what they want to say is not a social product itself 
recoverable in discourse’.96 The emphasis in CA, then, is on textual patterns in documents, 
identifying ‘content units’ (e.g. ‘words, themes, stories’) and their ‘clustering’—for example, focusing 
on several ‘keywords’ which reappear in multiple sources, such as ‘cornerstone of peace’ in 
reference to the USJA.97  
Merely identifying the repetition of textual patterns, however, is not enough to understand 
‘the discursive structures that make certain kinds of representations and practices possible and – for 
many – plausible’.98 These official communications, Torgerson further says, are based in an 
‘antiseptic terminology’ in which a ‘stable, objective world [...] can be codified and controlled 
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through a neutral language’.99 This approach thus naturally excludes the role of emotionality during 
policy formulation in favour of ‘scientism’, or ‘the extra-scientific doctrine which holds that science is 
the sole source of legitimate knowledge’.100 As a result of this ‘politics of expertise’, policymakers 
seek out accepted purveyors of ‘legitimate knowledge’ for difficult problems, enlisting policy 
analysts embedded within government and bureaucracy to come up with palatable solutions. 
Moreover, the more basic assumption that agents are ‘self-interested utility maximisers’ also means 
that subjects are ‘without a history, which means that key questions pertaining to the identities of 
agents, as well as their agency in relation to social structures, are not addressed and analysed’.101 
A discursive approach of the kind promoted by Fischer and others102, by contrast, sees ‘the 
very terrain of social and political action [as] constructed and understood in terms of the languages 
used to portray and talk about [a] political phenomenon’.103 It is impossible to understand the 
textual representation of ideas in text, he says, without initially recognising that ‘the distorting 
influences of power, ideology, manipulatory rhetoric, or authoritarian forces are basic features of 
political life’; thus, while actors can make independent choices and take sovereign actions, they 
nonetheless take place ‘in the context of ongoing stories about social and political phenomena’.104 
These ‘stories’, in turn, each supply ‘a different way of experiencing the world, which in turn is 
organized through a specific way of speaking [...] [within which is] [i]mplicit [...] an elaborate set of 
understandings – both stated and tacit – that tell the story of a particular social situation, including 
who the good guys are and who is responsible for the social disadvantages’.105 
3.2. In favour of social-interactive discourse analysis 
Following an overall discursive approach, discourse analysis (DA) generally assumes 
discourse to be the ‘underlying logic of the social and political organization of a particular arena’, 
and that its discovery enables the analyst to recognise that this logic is ‘not natural, but socially 
constructed’—contrary to the predetermined world imagined in a technocratic approach.106 This is 
not to presume, however, that no material, objective world exists independently of social 
constructs. Rather, as Karin Fierke comments, the discourse analyst ‘presuppose[s] that this material 
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world has been dramatically altered by human interaction with it’, this alteration including the new 
meanings or values we attach to certain material objects.107 Key to understanding how these 
meanings are created is the analysis of discursive practices, focusing on the way in which certain 
discourses are privileged and others excluded by policymakers in the processes of text production 
and interpretation.108 Naturally, the settings where discourses are produced or repeated also have a 
large impact on their acceptance. Hajer explains: ‘[t]hese “sites” of discursive exchange have an 
influence on what can be said meaningfully and with influence. A discussion in the back room of the 
local pub is not the same as a meeting at the Town Hall’.109 Teun A. van Dijk adds that an additional 
barrier to influencing the direction of a discourse is the control wielded by certain actors over ‘the 
occasion, time, place, setting and the presence or absence of participants in such events’.110 
The latter concern – that ‘elite’ actors might restrict access to the discourse and thus tamp 
down on any opposition to them – is a prominent feature of critical discourse analysis (CDA), which 
emphasises the role of power relations as existing ‘prior to language’ in the sense that ‘the very 
constitution of society itself — its infrastructure, its stability, its mechanisms of continuity and 
adaptation, its culture — depends first and foremost on the supposed fact [...] that some people are 
dominated systematically by others’.111 The goal of CDA is thus to expose these existing power 
asymmetries in language by ‘provid[ing] a detailed description, explanation, and critique of the 
textual strategies writers use to “naturalize” discourses, that is, to make discourses appear to be 
common sense, apolitical statements’.112 
Although the specific type of DA employed in this research - what Fischer calls social-
interactive discourse analysis (SIDA) – ‘is designed to identify and bring in the neglected political 
voices’ and primarily expresses concerns ‘about the current state of discursive deliberation in a 
democracy rampant with social injustices’ (effectively situating it within CDA), it is also clear from his 
writings that the analyst, using this method, is meant to act as ‘an interpretive mediator operating 
between the available analytical frameworks of social science and competing local perspectives’.113 
Thus, while highlighting ‘the political implications and consequences of using professional policy 
analysis as a method for informing and making policy decisions for the larger public’, SIDA 
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nonetheless also seeks to reduce the distance between ‘experts’ and citizens so that their roles may 
be ‘redefined’ rather than attempting to demonise or victimise either group (for example: ‘the 
citizen can take on the role of the “popular scientist”, [while] the analyst becomes a “specialized 
citizen”’).114 CDA is also primarily concerned with the production, distribution, and consumption of 
texts, which, while important to this research, must be coupled with an examination of other types 
of data, including images (e.g. protest signs), videos (e.g. documentaries, news clips), and physical 
spaces (e.g. museums, military bases), as these can also powerfully communicate a discourse.  
The inclusion of these types of multimedia thus not only expands the scope of our 
imagination in terms of how a discourse may be generated and performed, but also in helping us to 
understand how ‘everyday’ actors engage (or not) with these discourses and interpret them. SIDA 
addresses this point directly, as it takes actors to be ‘actively engaged in choosing and adapting 
thoughts, shaping and fashioning them, in an ongoing struggle for argumentative triumph over rival 
positions’.115 By examining the ‘structure, style, and [socio-]historical context’ in which discourses 
are produced, the analyst thus also gains insight into how existing configurations of power have 
been effectively legitimised in spite of any ideological ‘contradictions or paradoxes’ which may exist 
therein.116 SIDA also necessitates an investigation into the ways in which framing – or ‘a particular 
way of representing knowledge [...] [relying on] interpretative schemas that bound and order a 
chaotic situation, facilitate interpretation and provide a guide for doing and acting’ – is used by 
actors (both on the level of policymakers, ‘experts’, and the ‘everyday’) to problematize certain 
issues while taking others out of the deliberative process altogether.117  
In this context, framing is used in the service of larger narratives that ‘allow actors to draw 
upon various discursive categories [...] to condense large amounts of factual information intermixed 
with the normative assumptions and value orientations that assign meaning to them’.118 Fischer 
states that this is because politics often plays out as ‘a struggle for power [...] through arguments 
about the “best story”’.119 With a plot, protagonists and antagonists, structural coherence and 
symbolic ambiguity, narratives can thus serve as sophisticated devices within a discourse by which 
actors communicate their beliefs and values using elements that are familiar to a larger audience.120 
They may also serve as a means by which actors ‘sustain an account of a self which is already in the 
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public domain and can therefore make sense to others’—or, to put it in simpler terms, creating and 
maintaining narratives are really about preserving an actor’s own identity.121  
Should a narrative acquire a certain level of public acceptance, it may even turn into a myth, 
or a hegemonic discourse that creates a ‘new objectivity’ or ‘new space of representation’ that 
brings coherence by ‘narrating a foundational event’.122 Within a narrative or myth, individual actors 
engage in storytelling in order to convey their personal experiences to an audience. While their 
stories may appear narrow and autobiographical in scope in comparison to a broader narrative that 
cuts across actors of various backgrounds, they still serve as ‘generative statements that bring 
together previously unrelated elements of reality [… which] help people to fit their bit of knowledge, 
experience or expertise into the larger jigsaw of a policy debate’.123   
In the practical application of SIDA to this research, it is therefore important to acknowledge 
that I, as the researcher, am aware that I am building my own narratives based on the ones under 
study and also those which I have purposely left out or excluded. While making no ‘universalistic 
claims about rationality’124 in this thesis, it is undeniable that under conditions of reflexivity, I am 
helping to shape the environment around this debate on alliance ‘persistence’ through determining 
which actors, settings, and textual or other materials are relevant to it—and which/whom are not.125 
Moreover, by ‘locating “policy” in the everyday world of concrete practical judgment’ on the part of 
individual actors, I am actively contributing to a view of reality which is ‘ambiguous, open-ended, 
and mutually constructed’.126 I am furthermore influenced by previous theorists in picking the case 
study of the USM presence in Okinawa while at the same time acknowledging that this kind of ‘social 
problem’ is not the ‘direct [outcome] of readily identifiable, visible objective social conditions’, but 
rather is ‘the [product] of activities of political or social groups making claims about putative 
conditions to public officials and agencies’—and therefore that the future impact or relevance of this 
research is likewise subject to the continued ‘recognition of the grievance’ under question.127  
3.3. SIDA in practice (1): interviewing 
In acknowledging these assumptions and their impact on my research, I sought to gather 
data from a wide variety of sources: not only official USG and GOJ policy-related publications, press 
releases, and public speeches, but also academic texts analysing these, media interviews with 
officials and anti-base activists (and their affiliates), and audio-visual materials (including 
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documentaries and data collected on trips to sites of interest). Primarily, however, I conducted in-
person interviews in the US and Japan, as these are cited as one of the primary means by which data 
is collected under interpretive policy analysis as outlined by Fischer. In conducting them, he says, 
‘the analyst seeks to test his or her assumptions about the boundaries of the interpretive 
communities, the significance of particular artefacts, and the meaning of stories that community 
residents share with one another’.128 In speaking to policymakers specifically, an interview can help 
‘determine how they interpret the policy consequences of policy-relevant events’ (for example, an 
accident occurring near a military base involving US forces).129 In doing so, again, the point of 
conducting an interview with any actor – policymaker or not – is not to access a more ‘truthful’ 
account of the circumstances under study or which attitudes and beliefs are ‘correct’, but to create a 
space ‘for identifying and exploring participants’ interpretative practices’.130 
By identifying these ‘communities of meaning’, relevant discourses, and points of conflict, 
the analyst can thus ‘teas[e] out of everyday “sensemaking” the puzzles and tensions which have 
presented themselves through actions and events that contradict the analyst's knowledge and 
expectations at the time’.131 Hajer likewise recommends conducting interviews in order to ‘enable 
the researcher to construct the interviewee discourses and the shifts in recognition of alternative 
perspectives’.132 Practically speaking, open-ended interviews of the kind I conducted in my own 
research – wherein they are guided by general topics and themes, giving the interviewee the 
freedom to decide to what level of detail they would like to discuss their experiences and make their 
arguments – allow for a higher degree of control over the material collected from participants than 
does natural interaction or observation, though this same control may have the effect of ‘obscur[ing] 
just how much the participants’ “responses” are a product of various activities (some very subtle) on 
the part of the interviewer’.133  
Nevertheless, the original interviews I conducted and materials collected in both Japan and 
the US gave me access to firsthand sources of knowledge about how the USJA functions not only on 
a day-to-day basis internally, but also how these functions are felt by ‘everyday’ actors outside of the 
institution. These interviews also aided my understanding and interpretation of the sometimes 
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opaque language found in public speeches and written statements from politicians and activists 
alike, as the more conversational style I employed in speaking with participants allowed for them to 
use ‘their own vocabularies and cultural repertoires of knowledge’.134 I did this by, as often as 
possible, posing questions which invited interpretative responses. Examples include: what does 
‘security’ mean to you? What do you consider to be a ‘threat’ to your security, and to the country’s 
security? To what extent can the USJA be considered an ‘institution’?  
I also asked more specific questions – including about the recent US ‘rebalance’ policy to 
Asia, or on the reactions of officials from both countries to the policies of the Hatoyama 
administration (see Appendix 3 for full list) – and with these, my aim was to put into sharper focus 
the processes behind decision-making for policymakers and, for activists and other ‘everyday’ actors, 
how they conceptualise their role within the USJA. Generally speaking, these questions fell under 
three broad categories related to the case study of this research: 1) the USJA; 2) Okinawa; and 3) 
MCAS Futenma Air Station. Individual questions under these categories were formulated based on 
the literature(s) reviewed in Chapter 1.135 Depending on each individual interviewee, his/her 
background, and his/her preferred style of speech, questions would not necessarily be posed in the 
order outlined above—or the interviewee would respond to multiple questions in a single, longer 
answer. The duration of each interview, therefore, ranged from 15 minutes to 3 hours.  
Furthermore, where many activists and ‘experts’ employed at think tanks were comfortable 
having their comments ‘on the record’, many current and former government officials preferred 
being quoted anonymously (if at all). While it is true, as Leheny comments, that many of these 
officials ‘relied on relatively safe political rhetoric’136 while on the record, others – especially those 
unrelated to government – were more frank in their assessments. Where some analysts might see 
little value in including quotes from an interview which repeats ‘talking points’ from government 
policies, however, it is this exact dynamic that is of interest to my research. This is because, as White 
noted, it is not just the content of a discourse that matters, but the form—and when government 
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officials, ‘experts’, academics, and activists alike are repeating narratives in similar styles using 
similar symbols and referring to the same overarching myths, it clearly shows the successes and 
failures in the (re)production of a discourse cutting across socioeconomic and professional 
backgrounds. There need not be some great ‘uncovering’, as Jonathan Potter says, of the ‘real’ 
motivations behind certain government policies or activist activities via the interview process; 
rather, its purpose is to provide further support to the idea that ‘the very act of taking part in 
debates around national security [can be] disruptive of what they [participants] considered to be 
politically possible’.137  
3.4. SIDA in practice (2): fieldwork programme 
 With this aim of examining the ‘disruptive’ power of interpretation, I interviewed a wide 
variety of individuals (over 80 in total) whom I had previously identified from the literature reviewed 
in Chapter 1 as having some direct experience working on alliance-related issues or on Futenma 
specifically. These interviews were conducted in English over the course of nine months from 
January to September 2014 in sites across the UK (1 week), US (3 months), and Japan (5 months 
total; about two and a half in Tokyo and Okinawa each). Interviewees included former and current 
government and military officials (e.g. former governor of Okinawa Masahide Ota, former 
Commander of USMC Forces Pacific Wallace Gregson, and Joseph Nye); ‘experts’ on the USJA at 
well-known think tanks (e.g. James Schoff at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and 
Doug Bandow at the Cato Institute); academics specialising in this bilateral relationship or affiliated 
with the ABM in Okinawa (e.g. Gavan McCormack, Mike Mochizuki, and Hideki Yoshikawa); and 
other activists associated with the ABM (e.g. Satoko Norimatsu at the Peace Philosophy Center).  
These interviews were conducted at over 40 sites, including: government locations (e.g. 
MOFA, MOD, OPG, Okinawa Defense Bureau [ODB], US House of Representatives); military bases 
(e.g. Futenma, USMC Camp Foster, the US Naval Base at Yokosuka outside Tokyo); think tanks (e.g. 
Canon Institute for Global Studies, the Heritage Foundation); and sites of historical or cultural 
importance (e.g. the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, Himeyuri Monument and Peace 
Museum). At government sites, many officials I spoke with are or had been employed by the same 
divisions and offices, including: the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and International Policy 
Divisions of the Defense Policy Bureau (MOD); the National Institute for Defense Studies (MOD); the 
Status of US Forces Agreement and Japan-US Security Treaty Divisions of the North American Affairs 
Bureau (MOFA); the National Security Council (US); the Office of the Secretary of State (DOS); the 
Institute for Defense Analyses (DOD); and the US Consul-General in Okinawa (DOS). As mentioned 
previously, there was also a confluence in the professional and research backgrounds of the 
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academics and other ‘experts’ with whom I spoke; likewise, many of the activists and their affiliates 
had had their arguments informed by visiting the same sites of interest as the ones I had surveyed 
(e.g. Futenma, former battlegrounds in Okinawa, Camp Schwab) and in their interaction with other 
individuals and groups within the ABM (e.g. Save the Dugong Campaign Center, journalist Jon 
Mitchell).  
Other materials (nearly all in English) collected at these sites and through internet-based 
research in support of this thesis generally span the period from the mid-1990s Special Action 
Committee on Okinawa agreement to the end of 2014, which also marked the end of my fieldwork. 
These include: public speeches of, statements from, or interviews with relevant current and former 
government officials, military officers, and civil society representatives; official government policy 
documents, such as Defence White Papers (WP) (Japan), Diplomatic Bluebooks (Japan), Joint 
Statements, Defence Reviews (US), and Diplomacy and Defence Reviews (US); articles from print and 
online news outlets; previously classified diplomatic cables available from Wikileaks138; local English-
language tourist pamphlets in Okinawa; anti- and/or pro-base artwork, including posters hung on 
the fences of US bases in Okinawa and on other edifices; and text placards containing poetry or 
historical content from museum exhibits related to Okinawan history, WWII, the alliance, and USJA 
relations. Other materials produced in particular by the ABM, including documentaries publicly 
available on YouTube or previously broadcast on Japanese television, were also examined in order to 
capture the full extent of their public outreach efforts.  
3.5. SIDA in practice (3): data analysis 
3.5.1. Discourses 
 Prior to undertaking this fieldwork programme, I identified, based on previous studies, the 
presence of two prevailing discourses at play over the Futenma relocation issue: the pro-alliance, 
pro-base discourse (PBD) and the anti-base discourse (ABD). The former – which, although not 
always, usually overlaps with the pro-USM base discourse – has mainly been (re)produced by actors 
from the first two sites of exchange identified for this study (diplomatic and defence; see section 
3.5.2 for more details). Contained within it are a number of narratives which consistently identify the 
alliance as a ‘force for good’ or a ‘cornerstone’ of peace and security in the region, emphasise the 
importance of US bases in Japan and especially in Okinawa for deterrence, are sceptical of the 
motives of the ABM, and express cynicism regarding the possibility of alliance policy significantly 
changing in the base arena for the foreseeable future.  
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By contrast, the ABD – mainly (re)produced by actors from ‘everyday’ sites of exchange – 
revolves around narratives detailing the suffering of Okinawa prefecture during WWII, the 
discriminatory policies promulgated by the US and Japanese central governments against it in the 
post-war era, the uniqueness of the Okinawan identity as apart from mainland Japan, and incredulity 
at the arguments of both governments regarding the ‘necessity’ of the US military presence in 
Okinawa. Although some of the individuals promulgating these narratives (as well as their 
counterparts in the literature on Okinawa/Futenma) also expressed scepticism at the necessity of 
the USJA or questioned its current purpose, for the most part they were primarily concerned with 
the presence of US forces in Okinawa specifically. Thus, while the arguments conveyed by each 
individual interviewee with whom I spoke obviously do not always fit neatly under one discourse or 
the other, outlining these discourses gave me a foundation upon which to identify the repeated 
narratives and smaller stories within them through the face-to-face interviews. 
3.5.2. Sites of discursive exchange 
These discourses are communicated across three sites of exchange: diplomatic (MOFA, 
DOS), defence (MOD, DOD, and related institutions), and the ‘everyday’ (civil society organisations, 
universities, and public attractions either explicitly or implicitly affiliated with the ABM). These were 
identified not only on the basis of the fact that each of these sites is home to actors with (more or 
less) distinct roles, backgrounds, and whom interact with other individuals of a similar nature within 
these circles, but also because each site – as Hajer points out – is not created equal in terms of what 
can be said ‘meaningfully and with influence’. For example, anti-base activists in Henoko, the 
planned relocation site for Futenma and part of the ‘everyday’ site of exchange, have less access to 
supposedly important security-related information available to those actors from ‘diplomatic’ or 
‘defence’ sites—and thus their arguments or ‘local knowledge’ may not be taken as seriously or 
heard at all by the latter, much less enacted in policy.139  
The more ‘elite’ sites – ‘diplomatic’ and ‘defence’ – are also kept separate in spite of the fact 
that many individuals or groups within them frequently overlap or work together (e.g. Joseph Nye’s 
involvement in both the DOS and DOD as an adviser on their policy boards). I keep this distinction in 
place, however, due to the fact that diplomats and defence officials may have very different 
experiences of the same issue. For example, where a US Consul-General (in a ‘diplomatic’ site) will 
have dealt with Futenma primarily on the basis of conveying, reaffirming, and defending the central 
USG’s relocation policy, a USMC official (in a ‘defence’ site) may have been involved in the 
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formulation of the original policy itself and have much better working knowledge of the operational 
details related to the existing base, its potential relocation, and of the hazards related to both.  
Nonetheless, with each succeeding site discussed in this thesis, it becomes evident that 
separating one layer from another is not always possible. For example, while the first site of 
exchange analysed in this thesis – the diplomatic (including DOS and MOFA) – would seem to be 
fairly straightforward in its framing of the alliance in terms of the PBD, it is also home to individuals 
and groups who work in both governments’ local offices in Okinawa. Living in closer proximity to US 
bases, therefore, can confuse and muddy the communication of the PBD to Okinawan residents and 
vice versa. This is even more the case among representatives in defence sites of exchange – 
including individuals not only from the DOD and MOD, but also the US III Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF) in Okinawa and the SDF – whose work often involves them being asked to both carry out the 
‘defence’ of both nations and to cooperate with and be sympathetic to the concerns of Okinawan 
residents to whom they live adjacent.  
Lastly, the impact of both of these more ‘elite’ sites of exchange are deeply felt in the last – 
the ‘everyday’ – as it is the site at which both governments’ narratives are directed and upon which 
they are moulded. This site, however, does not merely include the obvious actors within it, such as 
Okinawan anti-base protesters (including fisherman, farmers, retirees, academics, and other 
residents) and local officials from the OPG, but also incorporates their proponents from outside of 
the prefecture. These include actors ranging from academics and activists in mainland Japan to 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  
By juxtaposing each site against one another in this way, this thesis seeks to break down 
barriers put up by not only government officials, but also by the previous literature, to the possibility 
of interaction across and within groups outside of traditionally limited security policymaking circles. 
Furthermore, says Jennifer Milliken,  
140 
At the same time, she continues, this method allows for ‘alternative accounts’ to be explored to the 
same depth as ‘official’ ones—including how local knowledge can both ‘create conditions for 
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by juxtaposing the “truth” about a situation constructed within a particular discourse 
to events and issues that this “truth” fails to acknowledge or address, and also by 
pairing dominant representations with contemporaneous accounts that do not use 
the same definitions of what has happened and that articulate subjects and their 
relationships in different ways. The point of this [...] is not to establish the “right 
story” but to render ambiguous predominant interpretations of state practices and to 
demonstrate the inherently political nature of official discourses. 
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resistance to a dominating discourse’ and, intentionally or not, enable the reproduction of these 
same official discourses.141 
3.5.3. Analytical themes 
I further employ juxtaposition across each of these sites of exchange and the narratives and 
smaller stories they have (re)produced about the USJA, Okinawa, and the Futenma issue through the 
use of four analytical themes: 1) historical memory and threat perception; 2) defining and redefining 
security; 3) institutional and cultural identities; and 4) discursive intersections and divisions. I chose 
these themes based not only on my own observations from the ways in which this case was analysed 
in the previous literature, but also on the tasks set out by SIDA: that in order to understand the 
evolution of a discourse, we must: ‘examine the structure, style, and historical context of an 
argument to determine why some modes of argumentation serve to effectively justify specific 
actions in particular situations and others fail’; we should ‘investigate how a particular framing of an 
issue can bestow the appearance of problematic on some features of a discussion while others seem 
proper and fixed’; and we can ‘open and exploit […] ideological tensions and contradictions by 
showing how they function to hide or conceal other realities’.142  
Cutting across each of these themes are patterns in the language used by actors from all 
three sites of exchange; for example, where those located in diplomatic sites have called the USJA 
and/or the bases in Okinawa as a ‘cornerstone’ for peace and security, their defence counterparts 
have described it Okinawa as a military ‘keystone’ in the US’s Pacific basing structure, and ‘everyday’ 
actors invert this same language, referring to Okinawa either as a ‘keystone’ for peace or, on the 
other hand, as a ‘sacrificial stone’ passed between the GOJ and USG for their own purposes. Each of 
the themes outlined below thus organises the narratives identified in each chapter by actors from 
the three sites of exchange outlined in the previous section according to those analytic parameters, 
and the subsections of each of these themes in each chapter are roughly structured so that they are 
juxtaposed against one another across all three sites of exchange in both titles and periods of time 
covered.  
The first theme – historical memory and threat perception – begins each of the three main 
chapters based on the fieldwork. Its purpose is not only to provide the relevant historical context for 
each of the three sites discussed (including the development of the USJA from the post-war period 
to today, the construction of the USM’s bases in Okinawa, and Okinawan pre-war and post-war 
history), but also, based on the different actors’ interpretations of this context, to examine the 
construction of the prevailing narratives about what has been constituted as ‘threats’ to Okinawa, 
Japan, and the US, and how actors from the three sites have responded to these ‘threats’. This 
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theme therefore highlights the development of ‘shared memories’ – or their 'commingled beliefs, 
practices, and symbolic representations’ – in terms of how the USJA is conceptualised and how 
Futenma has been addressed by the parties under study both within and across the three sites of 
exchange.143 
Following on from the first section, the second theme – defining and redefining security – 
focuses on the related notion of how ‘security’ has been and is currently defined and publicly framed 
by these groups. As this approach views actors as active agents in institutional change, so does it 
concur that ‘security is what agents make of it’; though, as Huysmans notes and as this research 
emphasises, the focus of this theme is not on definitions of security as dependent ‘on cognitive 
processes of an agent resulting in a correct or incorrect perception of a threat’, but rather upon ‘the 
creation of a security problem as a social phenomenon’.144 This theme thus illustrates the 
connection between historical and current constructions of ‘security’, and therefore that the term 
itself – which ‘can refer to a feeling, an ontological state of being, a field of policymaking, a technical 
project, or a source of political legitimacy’ – is ‘a floating signifier […] through which actors seek to 
create certain kinds of political possibilities’.145  This conceptualisation underlines the idea of change 
and stability as being linked at various levels of discursive exchange and illustrates how the unstable 
definition of ‘security’ over the course of several decades inherently makes institutions such as the 
USJA fields of public and private argumentation—not just ones limited to the purview of ‘elites’ and 
their chosen audiences.  
Building on this discussion, the third theme of each chapter – institutional and cultural 
identities – highlights the existence of a number of unique and overlapping identities asserted in 
both institutional (the GOJ, USG, military/SDF and the alliance) and cultural (Japanese, American, 
and Okinawan) contexts among the groups under study, and how these identities have not only 
been actively shaped in the post-war era, but also how they have impacted the framing and 
unfolding of the Futenma conflict. The formation and reproduction of these identities relates directly 
to the conceptualisations of ‘threat’ and ‘security’ examined in themes 1 and 2, as  
146 
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[a]ttempts to secure a notion of “who we are” invite violence when these notions are 
not shared by members of the community in question, when “who we are” must be 
forcibly instilled through disciplinary tactics, when “who we are” also depends on 
belligerently defining and even killing “who we are not”. 
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These same attempts and the discursive processes behind them can be extended to the level of 
national policymaking (including alliance politics), since, in constructing ‘who we are’ and ‘who we 
are not’, say Huysmans and Anastassia Tsoukala, certain actors have ‘the legitimizing basis for the 
implementation of an increasing control apparatus that covers delinquent, deviant, and even 
ordinary behaviour’.147 In identifying this apparatus here in the form of the PBD, this theme thus 
elucidates how certain narratives (re)produced by central government sites maintain their 
prevalence ‘by discursive means rather than by direct force, mobilizing consent by inclining us 
towards particular identifications’—and how these same narratives are challenged or rejected.148 
At the end of each chapter, I identify and analyse the prevailing discursive intersections and 
divisions found within the two overarching discourses and their related narratives. Where the 
previous themes mainly highlight distinctions between each of the groups – including their 
perceptions of ‘threat’, definitions of ‘security’, and unique institutional and cultural identities – this 
theme reveals areas of overlap between them in terms of the narratives they have (re)produced and 
how they have impacted each other (and the alliance, as a political institution) across what 
otherwise seem like rigid, unmovable ideological lines. It is critical that each chapter end with this 
theme not only because the discursive strategies and interpretations of ‘everyday’ actors 
promulgating the ABD are ‘powerfully conditioned’ by the narratives presented by those in central 
government espousing the PBD, but also because these same ‘everyday’ actors, with their 
‘insurgent’ narratives, ‘have real political effects that political leaders can ignore only at their own 
peril’.149 Berger elaborates: 
150 
This theme, therefore, serves the purpose of exposing the ‘ideological tensions and contradictions’ 
present in each discourse, and how these ‘function to hide or conceal other realities’ in order to 
maintain specific constructions of ‘threat’, ‘security’, and identity.  
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Time and again, groups representing the victims of historical injustice, as well as 
groups who for their own reasons promote a historical narrative different from the 
existing official one, have been able to place their own concerns on the political 
agenda in ways that greatly complicate the efforts of political leaders to promote 
what they see as national interest. 
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Conclusion 
The impact of this research thus primarily relates to its goal of broadening and deepening 
the ontology of security alliances at their most basic level: the discursive processes and actors 
constituting them, and how these, in turn, drive institutional stasis, change, and reproduction 
through social interaction. Furthermore, through the case study of the USJA and the conflict over 
Futenma, this research extends the notion that ‘everyday’ actors – such as members of Okinawan 
civil society organisations demanding the relocation of Futenma, as well as those protesting against 
its relocation to the northern city of Nago in Okinawa – have played and continue to play a 
significant role in explaining the policy changes that the alliance leadership in the USG and GOJ have 
been forced to commit to in this matter. Combined with a deeper examination of the traditional 
alliance ‘managers’ and the narratives they convey, this research thus allows for an understanding of 
institutional change that goes beyond attributing it solely to exogenous shocks – like the ongoing 
Futenma protests – to include the notion that these ‘exogenous shocks’ can also be ‘precipitated by 
factors that are endogenous to the institutional system’.151  
One consequence of revealing this fundamental discursive exchange between the groups 
under study is that this research promotes the role of the individual in the policymaking process as 
more productive and effective than is usually imagined by policymakers and academics alike. This 
emphasis draws on the influence of the DI and public policy literatures, which similarly highlight the 
importance of individual actors in their abilities to communicate a discourse effectively and, on the 
other hand, to be influenced by their interaction with other individuals from other sites of exchange. 
This research, then, in mobilizing the theoretical vocabularies of these literatures for the study of 
alliances, also benefits from their focus on identifying the basic elements of alliances rather than 
skipping ahead to pin down X, Y, or Z explanatory variables behind their ‘persistence’. 
In summary, SIDA within a larger, interpretative approach therefore represents an 
innovative break from mainstream studies of security alliances following the positivist tradition for 
the following reasons: 
It gives agency greater explanatory power in explaining institutional change. The 
institutional determinism of previous studies on security alliances afforded actors both within and 
external to alliances little agency in determining institutional transformation, as their preferences 
and actions are predetermined to be constrained by these same institutions. The interpretative 
approach returns agency to the actors responsible not only for the creation of these alliances, but 
also to those for whom the alliances were created to protect. 
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It recognises the role of the social sciences in reifying or challenging prevailing discourses. 
By being largely uncritical of the ‘monological ideal of administrative rationality’, the positivist-
leaning literature on alliance formation and ‘persistence’ appears to endorse or otherwise implicitly 
condone the continued knowledge dependence of government officials on a limited circle of 
expertise which does not include local knowledge and accepts the framing of these officials and 
‘experts’ that their perspectives are more akin to ‘scientific demonstration and verification’ as 
opposed to ‘the giving of reasons and the assessment of practical arguments’152 which are portrayed 
as characteristic of ‘everyday’ actors’ discursive strategies. In contrast, the interpretative approach 
stresses the importance of reflexivity on the part of analysts and the need to question the wholesale 
acceptance of this kind of framing strategy.153 
It traces the sources of discourse production, and how certain discourses are (re)produced. 
As with agency, the focus on central government-based sites of institutional power and their 
affiliated actors by positivist studies tends to exclude other possible sites of discursive exchange 
from the discussion of institutional change. They also tend not to mention other possible discourses, 
frames, and narratives that could be produced but, for any number of reasons, are deliberately left 
out. The interpretative approach allows for the silences in the prevailing and oppositional discourses 
on alliance policy to be investigated and brought to light, and it allows the analyst to ask how these 
views were not accepted or reproduced more widely. 
It brings security policy back into the realm of deliberative democracy. Lastly, while 
positivist studies often remain within the confines of the institution under analysis, the 
interpretative approach can help to weaken the perception that security policymaking can only be 
correctly understood within the realm of political ‘elites’. By using a social-interactive methodology, 
this research thus brings security alliances back into the deliberative democratic process and gives 
equal footing to prevailing and oppositional discourses in the discussion on institutional change 
while simultaneously studying how these discourses interact, influence and shape each other. 
                                                          
152 Fischer 2003b, p. 7. 
153 Milliken 1999, p. 237. 
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The alliance rewrites itself – it is continually reinvigorated – and not always necessarily as a 
result of a change in the internal dynamics, but more as a reaction to external events. 
- William Brooks, former head of the US Embassy in Tokyo 
 
Chapter 3. Sites of diplomatic exchange: ‘The alliance rewrites itself’ 
Introduction 
 In describing the USJA as ‘continually reinvigorated’ and ‘rewriting’ itself while attributing 
this change to ‘external events’, Brooks strikes a curious intersection between an interpretative 
reading of the alliance – one which perceives its development as the product of active discursive 
reproduction – and a path-dependent one stressing change as the result of exogenous shocks. 
Similarly, other individuals at all levels of the diplomatic corps with whom I spoke (or whose 
testimony has been previously recorded) portray the alliance as institutionalised to the point that 
there are no significant threats posed to its continued existence – including the protests in Okinawa 
over Futenma – while at the same time often conceding that Futenma can pose a ‘threat’ through 
enflaming local feelings against the alliance should there be any military accidents or incidents 
around it. Therefore, while many actors located in diplomatic sites of exchange publicly promote a 
PBD which frames the future of the alliance as ‘smooth sailing’, this obfuscates the oftentimes-rocky 
historical and current representations of USJ relations and USM bases in Japan. 
 On the surface, their arguments revolve around who has the ‘best story’ about the disputed 
relocation of MCAS Futenma, and why their audience – in this case, largely the mainland Japanese 
public – should believe their narratives over that of their opponents’. Appealing to a broader 
audience with familiar elements like a plot, identifiable protagonists and antagonists, and strong 
coherence throughout1, the PBD relates the narrative that the USJA is the ‘cornerstone’ or ‘linchpin’ 
of not only Japan’s foreign policy and diplomacy, but also of security in the larger Asia-Pacific region. 
Given this assumption, it would therefore be unthinkable, within this logic, to oppose current and 
past alliance-related policies, including those concerning the presence of USM forces in mainland 
Japan or specifically in Okinawa. In this narrative, actors including central government officials from 
MOFA, the DOS, and ‘experts’ affiliated with them frame ‘security’ in a largely military sense and 
defines the main ‘threats’ to Japan as being China, North Korea, and, more generally, ‘instability’ in 
the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. In defining ‘security’ and ‘threats’ in this manner, the alliance 
and, consequently, the bases in Okinawa are therefore framed by these actors as vital and necessary 
                                                          
1 Riggins 1997; McSweeney 1999; Fischer 2003a; Hall 2006. 
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Sometimes Japanese people want to hear [from the word] “alliance” what they will when 
something happens, like, for example, over the Senkaku Islands, a missile launch from North 
Korea, or any kind of possible instability or confrontation scenarios in Northeast Asia. That’s 
when they want to hear the word “alliance”. But not always, I think. During [peace time], we 
don’t need that word. 
- a current adviser to the Japanese Diet on US-Japan relations 
 
to the ‘security’ of not only Japan, but the entire Asia-Pacific region. By doing so, they actively 
devalue the discourse of their opponents not only by questioning the validity of anti-base protesters’ 
‘lived knowledge’ versus that of the classified intelligence which officials have exclusive access to, but 
also through presenting this knowledge as mere ‘opinion’ as opposed to the legitimate, fact-based 
(and therefore value-free) arguments upon which they rely to make their case.  
 The reproduction of the PBD and, in turn, the alliance therefore appears to be predicated on 
the idea that these ‘threats’ – and the bases themselves – are not simply ‘threats’ to the identity or 
existence of the alliance, but exist as a ‘condition of [its] possibility’.2 Thus, although many of these 
‘threats’ are portrayed by these actors as being ones that have existed since the Cold War period – 
and, indeed, that the USJA itself is still ‘stuck’ in that period – it is also apparent that they must be 
‘continually reinvigorated’, since, as Campbell notes, ‘[f]or a state to end its practices of 
representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death’.3 
While I do not confound ‘the state’ in this research with the specific actors located in diplomatic sites 
of exchange, it is still a relevant point that the PBD has not simply ‘survived’ on account of some 
inherent ‘truth’ which these actors claim it contains, but that it has been and continues to be actively 
performed in order to be accepted and thus reproduced.  
 
1. Historical memory and threat perception 
The uncertainty that has fed into current interpretations of the Futenma issue is not specific 
to it—in fact, as I argue, it has many historical antecedents, particularly in the ways in which USJ 
relations have been transformed into an ‘alliance’ and how ‘threats’, ‘security’, and Japan’s own 
defensive identity have been defined in light of these developments. The Abe administration’s 
assertion of Japan’s right to exercise CSD in July 2014, for example, has, in the words of many 
commentators in the US and Japanese press4, seemed to bring a definitive end to the post-war 
                                                          
2 Campbell 1998, pp. 12-13. 
3 Campbell 1998, p. 12. 
4 The decision, which allows Japan to come to the aid of an ally (such as the US) under attack for the first time 
in the post-war era, has been described as: ‘a landmark shift in the postwar defense posture’; ‘a major turning 
point for the country’s security policy’; an ‘ease’ of restrictions on the military; a ‘military shift to thwart 
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project of demilitarising the country while also shedding the GOJ of its past image as evading its 
security responsibilities.5 At the very least, the CSD decision – not to mention the now-frequent 
characterisation of the USJA as a ‘cornerstone’ for peace and security in the region, and the equally 
frequent calls for increased Japanese involvement in conflicts outside of the Asia-Pacific – seems far 
removed from the hesitation which once accompanied the very mention of the word ‘alliance’. 
(Considering the gradual ‘normalisation’ of Japanese defence policy since the 1970s as discussed in 
Chapter 1, however, the acceptance of the language and policies related to CSD and other recent 
developments under Abe should not necessarily come as a surprise.)  
 Academic observers have noted over the past decade the GOJ’s push towards becoming a 
‘normal’ country without reviving images of pre-war militarism by placing emphasis on the 
possibility of greater Japanese contributions to international security through PKO and HADR 
operations.6 Nonetheless, recent legal rulings7 within Japan leading up to the CSD decision under 
Abe built the foundations upon which the central government has been able to pursue 
‘normalisation’ and make its case to the Japanese public in favour of expanding the scope of defining 
what/who constitute ‘threats’ to Japan and how to respond to them. Moreover, the recent US 
‘rebalance’ or ‘pivot’ strategy to Asia, involving the realignment of tens of thousands of USM forces 
has, in many ways, cemented not only the importance of the USJA to the USG’s regional security 
framework (and therefore the importance of the bases), but also raised the USG’s expectations for 
the GOJ to continue this process of ‘normalisation’ at an accelerated pace in support of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
China’; a ‘landmark military change’; and a policy that ‘will leave the pacifist principles of the Constitution 
totally eviscerated and the nation’s public opinion bitter divided’ (each quote is from, respectively: Ayako Mie, 
‘Abe wins battle to broaden defense policy’, The Japan Times, 1 July 2014, available online at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/01/national/coalition-agrees-on-scrapping-pacifist-postwar-
defense-policy/#.U8C3IPldWg0; ‘New defense era for Japan / Collective right OK’d in severe security 
environment’, The Yomiuri Shimbun, 1 July 2014b; Alexander Martin and Toko Sekiguchi, ‘Japan Policy Shift to 
Ease Restrictions on Military’, The Wall Street Journal, 1 July 2014, available online at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-policy-shift-to-ease-restrictions-on-military-1404211813; Martin Fackler 
and David E. Sanger, ‘Japan Announces a Military Shift to Thwart China’, The New York Times, 1 July 2014, 
available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/02/world/asia/japan-moves-to-permit-greater-use-of-
its-military.html?_r=0; ‘Japan cabinet approves landmark military change’, BBC News, 1 July 2014, available 
online at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28086002; ‘EDITORIAL: Abe’s defense policy initiative 
represents gross constitutional shenanigans’, The Asahi Shimbun, 28 June 2014c, available online at: 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/editorial/AJ201406280022). 
5 For example, acting like a ‘hedgehog’ as opposed to the American ‘eagle’ or acting as the ‘shield’ to the US’s 
‘spear’ (Kersten 2011; Hook 1996; Berger 1996; Aloysius M. O’Neill, ‘Interview with Aloysius M. O'Neill’, Library 
of Congress, 19 August 2008, available online at: 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2010/2010one01/2010one01.pdf). 
6 Mochizuki 2004; Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japan’s Re-Emergence as a Normal Military Power’, The Adelphi 
Papers, 44 (2004), pp. 9-19. 
7 The Araki Report, released under Koizumi, states that Japan’s success ‘was “built upon global 
interdependence”, and the eruption of threats far afield had the potential to ‘have a substantial effect on 
these worldwide activities of Japan and its citizens’. The Yanai Report reinforced this message by arguing that 
‘the diffuse, global nature of threats, and the trend towards multilateral coordinated responses to meet those 
threats, required a new legal framework for security policy in Japan’ (Kersten 2011, pp. 11-12). 
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‘rebalance’—including speeding up any base relocations or returns currently underway (such as 
Futenma). 
1.1. The evolution of the ‘alliance’ and Japan’s defensive identity 
  Interviews with several current and former MOFA officials in Tokyo confirm that with 
increasing acceptance of a ‘normal’ Japan has come an acceptance of the alliance in its traditional 
(military security) as well as non-traditional (HADR) purposes. According to one current MOFA 
official: ‘Japan is trying to become a “normal” country, right? So we don’t have to hesitate about 
using the word “military” too much, and we sometimes call or use the term “military alliance” these 
days, so I think we’ve been getting used to using [those] kind[s] of words’.8 However, citing such 
events as unexpected missile launches near the Sea of Japan by North Korea in 2005 and 2007 and 
the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1996, not to mention internal crises such as the sarin gas attack on the 
Tokyo subway system by the group Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, an adviser to the Diet posits that the 
Japanese public has gradually lost confidence in the GOJ’s ability to provide for national security, and 
have therefore became more comfortable with the idea of the USJ relationship being characterised 
as a ‘military alliance’.9 The first official in MOFA with whom I spoke reaffirmed this perspective, 
commenting on the continued pacifist stance of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP):  
10 
The suggestion of the ‘death’ of Japan’s pacifist defensive identity, however, does not mean 
that the diplomatic establishment within the GOJ (and related individuals) are in agreement over the 
current and future defensive priorities of the two countries. ‘Japanese people are under the illusion 
that US forces are there only for the defence of Japan’, says Andrew Oros.11 Nicholas Szechenyi 
                                                          
8 Anonymous, personal interview, 6 January 2014a, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. One current adviser to 
the Diet whom I spoke with offered a slightly more nuanced take on the usage of ‘alliance’, explaining that the 
word itself in Japanese – doumei – is mainly used by lawmakers within Japan during ‘special occasions’ such as 
the annual 2+2 Japan-US Joint Security Consultative Committees attended by the US Secretaries of State and 
Defence and the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence. The rest of the time, the preferred term is 
simply nichibei kankei, or ‘US-Japan relations’. The reason for this, the adviser says, is that doumei is the same 
term used during WWII to describe the Axis alliance between Japan, Italy and Germany—and thus ‘it has too 
[many] implications [about] the military aspects of our [US-Japan] relations’ (Anonymous, personal interview, 
4 February 2014b, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan). 
9 Anonymous 2014b. 
10 Anonymous 2014a. 
11 Andrew Oros, personal interview, 4 September 2014, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA. 
Their basic thought is: if we don’t have any forces and we show our goodwill by having 
no forces, then no one will attack us. And so ... they go down a line that we shouldn’t 
even have a Self-Defense Force, we shouldn’t have US forces, we should be ... without 
any arms. And by doing that, no one will attack us. Now ... that’s very noble, and I 
wish that were really true, but in reality, I think that’s probably not true—that you do 
have to have a force to deter people from attacking you. 
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concurs that ‘the US-Japan alliance is a global one outside of defence issues’.12 A representative for 
US Congressman Randy Forbes (R-VA) further adds: ‘the current norms are a hindrance to the 
functionality of the alliance. We want to move towards a RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific Exercise]-style13 
interoperability within the alliance’.14 
 The adviser to the Diet, however, comments that while the alliance’s functions may be 
expanding to include greater cooperation on weapons development and joint drills between the 
USM and SDF, the scope of the alliance has been narrowing over the past few years on account of 
tensions with neighbours in Northeast Asia.15 The idea of a ‘narrowing’ agenda plays into a narrative 
often told by US and Japanese diplomats that ‘the structure of the Cold War remains in the Asia-
Pacific region’, or even that ‘it’s not the Cold War that’s still going in East Asia—it’s more like it’s still 
stuck in World War II’.16 The antagonists in this story are, thus, familiar: China and North Korea. Two 
former MOFA officials described the two countries as ‘threats’ or ‘potential enemies’.17  
In examining a number of public opinion polls taken over the last decade in Japan, the 
adviser’s remarks appear to be buffeted: between 2009 and 2012, for example, a Cabinet poll found 
that the percentage share of the public who chose the ‘situation in the Korean peninsula’ and the 
‘modernization and/or maritime activities of Chinese military forces’ as ‘points of interest 
concerning the peace and safety of Japan’ rose from 56.8 to 64.9 and 30.4 to 46, respectively.18 
Similar results were found in other polls, such as the 2009 Yomiuri-Gallup Japan-U.S. Joint Opinion 
Poll in which 64% of Japanese and 54% of American respondents identified China as a country which 
‘will become a threat militarily to Japan’, with 81 and 75% saying the same of North Korea.19 
Moreover, in a 2010 Asahi Shimbun-Harris Joint Opinion Poll, 68% of Japanese respondents 
answered that it is ‘more important to have a relationship with the US’ than with China.20  
By the same token, these polls reveal the productive ability of the diplomatic corps’ 
communicative power to coordinate public opinion in mainland Japan regarding defence policy 
                                                          
12 Nicholas Szechenyi, personal interview, 12 & 19 September 2014, CSIS, Washington, DC, USA 
13 RIMPAC is a ‘multinational maritime exercise’ held every two years by the US Pacific Fleet in and around the 
Hawaiian Islands in which over 29 countries and ‘49 surface ships, 6 submarines, more than 200 aircraft and 
25,000 personnel’ participate (US Navy, ‘RIMPAC 2015’, US Navy, 2015, available online at: 
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/2014/). 
14 Randy Forbes, personal interview, 7 July 2014, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC, USA 
15 Anonymous 2014b. 
16 Anonymous, personal interview, 19 March 2014c, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan; Alfred Magleby, 
personal interview, 3 April 2014, US Consul General in Naha, Okinawa, Japan. 
17 Anonymous 2014a; Anonymous, personal interview, 8 January 2014d, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 
18 MOD, ‘Outline of “Public Opinion Survey on the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and Defense Issues”’, March 2012, 
available online at: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/others/pdf/public_opinion.pdf.  
19 ‘Yomiuri Shimbun - Gallup, Inc. December 2009 Japan-U.S. Joint Public Opinion Poll’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 
November 2009, available online at: http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/polls/2009/poll-09-30.htm.  
20 ‘December 2010 Asahi Shimbun Interview Survey’, Asahi Shimbun, 4-5 December 2010, available online at: 
http://mansfieldfdn.org/program/research-education-and-communication/asian-opinion-poll-
database/december-2010-asahi-shimbun-interview-survey/.  
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reforms and in gaining approval for remilitarising moves in the face of these ‘threats’. The Cabinet 
poll, for example, found public interest in ‘SDF and Defense Issues’ increase from 64.7 to 69.8% 
between 2009 and 2012. Among these, those respondents characterising the USJ-ST as overall 
‘helpful’ rose from 76.4 to 81.2%, and those choosing the ‘current Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements 
and the SDF’ as the best ‘method for preserving the safety of Japan’ rose from 77.3 to 82.3%. While 
these increases are more than likely due in no small part to the success of Operation Tomodachi, it is 
important to note that, for that last question, only 10% of respondents overall chose the 
‘abolishment’ of the USJ-ST and the ‘reduction’ or ‘dissolution’ of the SDF. 
1.2. The alliance as the ‘cornerstone for peace’ 
 It is unsurprising, then, that in my interviews with US and Japanese officials, many of them 
regard the purpose of the USJA as an institution as still being primarily concerned with military 
deterrence against China and North Korea. They framed this ‘guarantee’ – being provided by US 
forces in Japan – as the ‘core aspect’, ‘main pillar’, and ‘main mission’ of the alliance.21 Bisley notes, 
in fact, that the forward deployment of US forces in Japan ‘is thought by many scholars and policy-
makers to be the key factor behind the region’s sustained stability over the past twenty years’.22 This 
message is prominent in the 17 April 1996 ‘Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration On Security - Alliance For 
The 21st Century’ in which Japanese PM Ryutaro Hashimoto and US President Bill Clinton agreed 
that the alliance ‘remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives’.23  
 Some variation on this theme has also appeared in nearly every major Japanese Diplomatic 
Bluebook, Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2) statement, and Japanese PM’s speech to 
the Diet since the Declaration. Whether framing the alliance as the ‘cornerstone’ or ‘foundation’ of 
Japan’s foreign policy, the ‘axis’, ‘pillar’, or ‘linchpin’ of Japan’s diplomacy, or urging the government 
to strengthen the ‘credibility’ of the alliance ‘for the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region 
and in order to overcome global challenges’, the GOJ has communicated a very clear narrative about 
the necessity of the alliance in the post-Cold War era.24 Paired with the old antagonists of North 
Korea and China, moreover, is a coherent representation of the Asia-Pacific region’s ‘instability’ or 
‘uncertainty’ as cause for the alliance’s continued existence. While at times manifesting itself more 
specifically into perceived ‘threats’ such as nuclear weapons or international terrorism, the instances 
in which ‘instability’ and ‘uncertainty’ occur by their lonesome in these documents are noteworthy 
                                                          
21 Anonymous 2014d; Anonymous, personal interview, 23 January 2014e, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 
22 Bisley 2008, p. 74. 
23 MOFA, ‘Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century’, 17 April 1996c, available 
online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html. 
24 This language occurs consistently across all the Diplomatic Bluebooks, 2+2 agreements, and Japanese prime 
ministers’ general policy speeches to the Diet surveyed in this study from 1996 to 2014; see references for a 
full listing and links to these documents. 
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in the way they are usually employed in tandem with calls for the alliance to ‘evolve to reflect the 
changing security environment’ and for it to ‘remain alert, flexible and responsive in the face of the 
full range of emerging twenty-first century threats and persistent regional and global challenges’ (in 
other words, for it to maintain its military aspects).25  
This narrative, however, is only one of several repeated by the USG and GOJ in their efforts 
over the years to raise public support for the alliance and ensure continued coherence in their 
external as well as internal messaging. Another which is commonly employed follows the 
governments’ emphasis on ‘shared values’ or ‘interests’ including ‘freedom, democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law’.26 These were highlighted especially during the Bush and Koizumi (and 
subsequent LDP) administrations in their cooperation over the War on Terror.27  Today, these shared 
‘values’ or ‘interests’ remain a focal point in the discussion of the importance of the alliance by 
officials as well as ‘experts’ in Tokyo and Washington. Former Counsellor to President Obama and 
former Deputy Chief of Staff during the Clinton administration John Podesta, for example, 
highlighted the cooperation between the USG and GOJ during Tomodachi as ‘proof of the strength 
and enduring commitment of our alliance’ and remarked that ‘there is little doubt that the ties 
between our two countries emerged from the crisis stronger than ever—and with a renewed 
determination in both the U.S. and Japan to work together to meet shared goals’.28 US Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for East Asia Abraham Denmark and DOD Senior Advisor for 
Asia Integration Daniel Kliman, in a policy brief entitled ‘Cornerstone: A Future Agenda for the U.S.-
Japan Alliance’ for the Center for a New American Security29, likewise reiterate that ‘shared interests 
and values’ are part of the ‘fundamentals’ of the alliance.30  
                                                          
25 MOD, ‘Security Consultative Committee Document U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for 
the Future’, 29 October 2005, available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html; MOFA, ‘Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative 
Committee Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security’, 19 January 2010b, available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/security/joint1001.html. 
26 MOD 2005; MOFA 2010b. 
27 Green and Twining note that the GOJ made especial efforts to promote these values even outside of the 
alliance in public speeches (such as Koizumi’s to the 50th anniversary of the Bandung Asia-Africa summit on 22 
April 2005 in which he stated ‘“[W]e should all play an active role … in disseminating universal values such as 
the rule of law, freedom, and democracy”’) and in the concept of the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ 
promulgated under Abe during his first tenure as PM from 2006-07, which consisted of ‘a series of speeches 
that emphasized Japan’s commitment to advancing democracy, human rights and rule of law from the Baltic 
states to Southeast Asia’ (2008, pp. 6-7). 
28 John Podesta, ‘U.S. Rebalance to Asia: Japan as the Key Partner’, speech at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 
13 April 2012, available online at: http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf/podesta_japan.pdf, p. 2. 
29 This Center being co-founded by Kurt Campbell, former Assistant SecState for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
under the Obama administration. 
30 Denmark and Kliman 2010, p. 2. 
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Officials in Tokyo and Washington likewise often cited public opinion polls indicating support 
for the alliance31 as a means of illustrating the positive ability of the central governments to 
communicate the PBD and its attendant narratives of ‘shared values’ and the threat of ‘uncertainty’ 
to the public. Kevin Maher, former US Consul General (CG) for Naha, Okinawa, for example, frames 
public support for the alliance as ‘becoming more realistic’.32 Rep. Forbes’s representative puts it 
more bluntly: ‘the alliance is very strong and is only questioned at the foundational level by the 
fringe’.33 Regardless of sustained public support, however, Weston Konishi comments: ‘the general 
publics, especially in the US, are not really informed about [the alliance]’.34 Mochizuki further 
comments that officials, especially those in Japan, will continue to reproduce these narratives ‘if for 
no other reason than Japan lacks an attractive strategic alternative [to the alliance]’.35  
1.3. Alliance management and its challenges 
 If, as Mochizuki and others have claimed, Japan’s best chance for retaining a positive 
identity among its neighbours while maintaining deterrence is to continue to support the alliance 
with the US and take on a greater share of the defence burden towards ‘normalisation’, then it is 
important to investigate the physical management of the alliance and the (re)production of a pro-
alliance discourse by those formerly or currently in the diplomatic corps. After all, as former CG in 
Naha Alfred Magleby told me, ‘alliances are all about domestic politics’.36 Within these domestic 
politics, however, the actual number of officials involved on the diplomatic side in alliance 
management in both countries tends to be rather low and ‘elite-led’ on the US side37, or equally low 
but with a higher rate of bureaucratic turnover on the Japanese side.  
Daniel Sneider, for example, remarks that Washington lacks a ‘genuine, proactive, positive 
policy toward the [Asia-Pacific] region’, pointing to the emphasis on ‘stability’ by ‘maintaining a basic 
                                                          
31 An April 2015 survey conducted by Pew Research, for example, finds that 36% of Japanese respondents 
named ‘the U.S.-Japan military alliance since World War II’ as the ‘most important’ event in ‘relations between 
the United States and Japan over the last 75 years’, beating out WWII and the 2011 tsunami. In 2011, following 
the tsunami, ‘feelings of friendship’ towards the US among Japanese respondents ran as high as 80%  
(‘Americans, Japanese: Mutual Respect 70 Years After the End of WWII: Neither Trusts China, Differ on Japan’s 
Security Role in Asia’, Pew Research Center, 7 April 2015, available online at: 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/04/07/americans-japanese-mutual-respect-70-years-after-the-end-of-wwii/; 
Grace Ruch, ‘Dawn of the “Tomodachi Generation?” Polls Show Historic Support for US-Japan Relationship’, 
East-West Center, 22 December 2011, available online at: http://www.asiamattersforamerica.org/japan/polls-
show-historic-support-for-us-japan-relationship).  
32 Kevin Maher, personal interview, 21 July 2014, NMV Consulting, Washington DC, USA. 
33 Forbes 2014. 
34 Weston S. Konishi, personal interview, 11 September 2014, The Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, USA. 
35 Mochizuki 2004, p. 129. 
36 Magleby 2014. 
37 When discussing these alliance ‘managers’, authors in the literature on the USJA, as well as officials and 
‘experts’ with whom I spoke, are usually referring to American officials who have worked on alliance-related 
issues within various administrations over the years including, but not limited to: Richard Armitage, Joseph 
Nye, Kurt Campbell, William Brooks, Rust Deming, Kevin Maher, Wallace Gregson, and Michael Green. 
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balance of power’.38 Denmark and Kliman observe that although ‘a handful of bureaucrats in Tokyo, 
plus a few politicians from the long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party, once served as the primary 
Japanese interlocutors for this vital alliance’, the ‘security challenges’ now confronting the alliance 
‘require cooperation across a broader spectrum of government agencies’39 as well as include 
‘members of all the major political parties in Japan and representatives from more than just the 
Defense and State Departments and their Japanese equivalents’.40 Oros notes, however, that under 
the leadership of the DPJ and specifically the Hatoyama administration from 2009-10, the number of 
individuals involved in alliance issues ‘increased by a lot on the Japanese side’41, and James Schoff 
claims that the management structure itself ‘has become more democratised, and thus more 
sustainable’.42 Nonetheless, Schoff adds that the alliance agenda, as a result of its previous, more 
exclusive management, ‘is catching up to years of rhetoric’.  
Konishi explores this dilemma in a report entitled ‘Beyond the Linchpin: Toward a New 
Strategic Communications Strategy for the U.S.-Japan Alliance’. Comparing the extensive public 
diplomacy efforts in the Asia-Pacific primarily undertaken by the US DOS’s Bureau of East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, which contain a ‘strategy heavy emphasis’, to those of Japan’s MOFA, which he 
frames as a ‘largely civilian-centric endeavor […] emphasizing such activities as people-to-people 
diplomacy, student and cultural exchanges, and the promotion of Japanese culture abroad’, Konishi 
finds that the coordination of the joint messaging on the alliance has, as a consequence, been more 
‘ad hoc’ than ‘sustained and consistent’, with joint statements aimed ‘more toward each other than 
toward any external audience—oftentimes serving to reinforce and reassure both allies of their 
strategic commitments to each other and/or outline steps forward on certain alliance agenda 
items’.43 Former Commander of USMC Forces Pacific Wallace ‘Chip’ Gregson, however, argues that 
‘no amount of reassurance is ever excessive’44 within the alliance, and Tow adds that ‘American 
influence [in the Asia Pacific] is still contingent on Washington persuading allies and rivals alike to 
                                                          
38 Daniel Sneider, ‘Sneider: “I don’t see strong evidence of a serious pivot toward Asia”’, Dispatch Japan, 13 
February 2012, available online at: www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2012/02/sneider-i-dont-see-strong-
evidence-of-a-serious-pivot-toward-asia.html. 
39 Denmark and Kliman specifically list the following agencies in their report: the United States Agency for 
International Development and Japan’s International Cooperation Agency, the U.S. Treasury Department and 
Japan’s Ministry of Finance, and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and Japan’s Council 
for Science and Technology Policy (2010, p. 3). 
40 Denmark and Kliman 2010, p. 3. 
41 Oros 2014. 
42 James Schoff, personal interview, 27 August 2014, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington, DC, USA. 
43 This may result from the fact that ‘there is no consistent linkage between the SC [strategic communications]-
related agencies in Washington and their counterpart agencies in Tokyo’ (Weston S. Konishi, ‘Beyond the 
Linchpin: Toward a New Strategic Communications Strategy for the U.S.-Japan Alliance’, a project report to the 
Sasakawa Peace Foundation, March 2013). 
44 Wallace Gregson, personal interview, 22 July 2014b, Washington, DC, USA. 
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work with the US rather than compelling them to accept the vagaries of American policy and 
power’.45 For this reason, says Paul Midford, the fact that there is only a ‘small cabal of people who 
are interested and focused on the relationship […] adds stability to the alliance’46 and, according to 
Konishi, may be ‘good’ in that then, ‘alliance policy isn’t subject to the political winds’.47 
1.4. The impact of the US ‘rebalance’ to Asia on the alliance 
 Given this demonstrated insulation of the policymaking process from the ‘political winds’ of 
public opinion and the inward-looking, reassurance-based nature of institutional messaging, it is not 
surprising that, aside from expanding some of the functions of the alliance into the field of HADR, 
the view within the diplomatic corps in Tokyo and Washington overwhelmingly still favours a 
substantial USM presence in the name of deterrence. In fact, notes Jennifer Lind, the central GOJ has 
shown a trend of responding to US force reductions ‘by substantially increasing its own military 
power’.48 Martin adds that although ‘revisionists’ such as Abe might increase Japanese defence 
capabilities, ‘the “preservationist” view continues to characterize the official Japanese position. 
Japan’s ruling elite remains more fearful of abandonment [by the US] than entrapment, and 
committed in varying degrees to both the alliance and Article 9’.49  
Thus, when former SecState Hillary Clinton announced the introduction of the USG’s foreign 
policy ‘pivoting’ away from the Middle East towards Asia in an article entitled ‘America’s Pacific 
Century’ for Foreign Policy, this was taken as another sign of reassurance within the alliance that the 
US would not be ‘abandoning’ its chief ally in the Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, she stated that, 
along with the US’s alliances with the ROK, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the USJA acts as 
50 
                                                          
45 William T. Tow, 'Post-Cold War US Foreign Policy in Asia', in Purnendra Jain, Felix Patrikeeff and Gerry Groot, 
eds, Asia-Pacific and a New International Order: Responses and Options (New York: Nova Science Publishers 
Inc., 2006), pp. 91-107, pp. 92-93. 
46 Paul Midford, personal interview, 16 January 2014, Tokyo, Japan. 
47 Konishi 2014. 
48 Lind 2004, p. 120. 
49 Martin 2004, p. 299. 
50 Hillary Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, 11 October 2011, available online at: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. In the effort to ‘update’ these alliances, she 
highlighted three ‘core principles’ including: maintaining ‘political consensus on the core objectives of our 
alliances’; ‘ensur[ing] that our alliances are nimble and adaptive so that they can successfully address new 
challenges and seize new opportunities’; and ‘guarantee[ing] that the defense capabilities and 
communications infrastructure of our alliances are operationally and materially capable of deterring 
provocation from the full spectrum of state and non-state actors’. 
the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific.  They have underwritten regional 
peace and security for more than half a century, shaping the environment for the 
region's remarkable economic ascent.  They leverage our regional presence and 
enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges.  As 
successful as these alliances have been, we can't afford simply to sustain them—we 
need to update [emphasis added] them for a changing world. 
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It is clear, from Clinton’s framing, that there is an awareness within the US central government 
regarding the necessity to actively reiterate justifications for these alliances’ existence beyond, 
arguably, a path-dependent ‘sustenance’. 
 This was reinforced by Obama in a speech in to the Australian Parliament a month after the 
publication of Clinton’s piece, during which he reassured not only Australian MPs, but also a wider, 
regional audience, that ‘reductions in U.S. defense spending will not – I repeat, will not – come at 
the expense of the Asia Pacific […] The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay’.51 
Podesta likewise identified Japan, as ‘America’s oldest ally in the region’, as being ‘central to that 
effort’.52 Among former or current alliance ‘managers’, the language of ‘pivot’ was also praised not 
only for reiterating reassurances internally to regional audiences about a continued US presence, but 
also for signalling internationally the importance of the region to US foreign and security policy. For 
example, Gregson notes that although the policy echoes previous joint statements issued by both 
governments, the term ‘pivot’ itself was beneficial to the USG in that it ‘made headlines and the 
parsing of the metaphor in many think tanks kept it in the public eye […] It served notice that we 
were a resident Pacific power, that we would remain engaged, and that we would protect our 
interests and those of our allies and friends’.53  
 Nonetheless, the policy – and its related story of ‘America’s Pacific Century’ – has also come 
under criticism, including from officials working on the alliance, as being one of containing China 
(again placing China in the role of the antagonist) rather than USM realignment and reassurance.54 
Evidence for this can be found in a 2012 report entitled ‘The U.S. Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability 
in Asia’ written by two well-known ‘Japan hands’ or ‘managers’ in Washington, Armitage and Nye. In 
                                                          
51 The White House, ‘Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament’, 17 November 2011, available 
online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-
parliament. 
52 Podesta 2012. 
53 Gregson 2014. 
54 ‘Containment’ in this case, according to Asahi Shimbun national security correspondent Yoichi Kato, refers to 
the ‘containment’ of a rising China: ‘The increasing U.S. rotational presence in the region serves Japanese 
interests in the sense that it could maintain the power balance between the United States and China, which is 
shifting toward China by every indication’ (Yoichi Kato, ‘The U.S. military presence in Japan in the context of 
the “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific’, Re-examining Japan in Global Context, Suntory Foundation, 6 June 2014, 
available online at: http://www.suntory.co.jp/sfnd/jgc/forum/006/pdf/006_kato.pdf, p. 4).  
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this report, they argue: 
55 
Considering, however, the historical precedent of defining China as a ‘threat’ over the past few 
decades, it is unsurprising that there would be more than a suggestion of this within the ‘pivot’. 
Nevertheless, conscious of these kinds of criticisms, the Obama administration transitioned to 
‘rebalance’ in mid-2012. This ‘rebalance’, explains Richard Weitz, consists of two processes: ‘the U.S. 
military is rebalancing its global assets from other regions to Asia, as well as rebalancing within the 
Asia-Pacific region, reducing the concentration of forces from northeast Asia to a more widely 
distributed focus throughout the entire region’.56 But does the ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ represent a 
significant change from past administrations, or has it simply been a shift in political framing? A 
former MOFA official tells me that ‘the pivot is more rhetorical than real—there is no change really 
in troop deployments in the region. The US never left the region’.57 Szechenyi concurs, but notes 
that ‘the commitment to the region is still strong. I see continuity in Asia policy as the norm, and the 
same goes for alliance policy’.58  
Still, says one current MOFA official, the policy is unlikely to be temporary ‘because the US 
sees the economic interest in Asia, [the] rising economic market in Southeast Asia, or [a] big market 
in China, so stability in Asia is the interest for the US’.59 Reinforcing this certainty of a continued USM 
presence, another former official frames the possibility of the GOJ ‘going independent in terms of 
protecting itself and getting rid of [the] US security treaty or alliance’ as an ‘unrealistic policy 
option’.60 More bluntly, Oros concludes: ‘I don’t see Japan as ever autonomously providing for its 
own defence outside of the alliance’.61  
                                                          
55 Armitage and Nye 2012, p. 11. 
56 Weitz 2012. 
57 Anonymous, personal interview, 6 February 2014l, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan. 
58 Szechenyi 2014. 
59 Anonymous 2014e. 
60 Anonymous 2014d. 
61 Oros 2014. 
The most immediate challenge is in Japan’s own neighborhood. China’s assertive 
claims to most of the East China Sea and virtually all of the South China Sea and the 
dramatic increase in the operational tempo of the PLA and other maritime services, 
including repeated circumnavigation of Japan, reveal Beijing’s intention to assert 
greater strategic influence throughout the “First Island Chain” (Japan-Taiwan-
Philippines) or what Beijing considers the “Near Sea”. 
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As [far as the] local governments not accepting the military relocation of Futenma, well, 
that’s a local issue. They have a very narrow agenda: pollution, noises, rapes, et cetera. But 
in Tokyo, we focus more on national issues like China, North Korea, or security ties. 
- a current researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies 
 
 
 
2. Defining and redefining security 
If, according to the story of the official in the previous section, it is ‘unrealistic’ to expect that 
the fundamentals of the alliance will be subject to any major changes in the immediate future 
(especially given the continued ‘threats’ posed by China and North Korea, among others), then how 
does the institution manage the current USM presence and the framing of its security value within 
Japan? More specifically, as a majority (up to 75%, according to some figures) of USM installations 
and major bases are located in one prefecture – Okinawa, the poorest in the country and 
documented to have a rocky relationship with the mainland over the base issue (see Chapter 5 for 
details) – how have these ‘alliance managers’ framed the USM’s purpose and utility both historically 
(especially from the mid-1990s) and currently (with regards to the Futenma relocation issue) in their 
effort to reproduce the narrative of the alliance as the ‘cornerstone for peace and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific region’? 
 The challenge these ‘managers’ face in this regard appears to be significant even when 
looking only at the present situation. As mentioned previously, the majority of USM installations in 
Japan are located in Okinawa prefecture and take up about 10% of its total land area.62 The scale and 
size of the USM presence in the prefecture, along with its proximity to residential areas, has 
unfortunately led to a number of criminal incidents and accidents, environmental and noise 
pollution, and other issues. ‘There’s a sense of frustration that these bases have been an obstacle for 
Okinawa to develop further economically, [and] that it is continuing to be occupied’, says one former 
MOFA official. ‘And when incidents or accidents happen, no matter how small the issue, it signifies 
this whole issue of US occupation, or [the] GOJ treating Okinawans unfairly’.63 Another former MOFA 
official adds: ‘I spent three years in the North American [Affairs] Bureau and three years in DC—and I 
never enjoyed working on this issue. Once you have one accident or incident, you get a series of 
them, and Futenma is a symbol of that’.64  
                                                          
62 This as opposed to 0.02% on the mainland. While this difference is fairly stark on its own, it is also important 
to note, says Hook, the fact that Okinawa constitutes only 0.6% of Japanese territory overall (Sakurai 2008; 
Hook 2010, p. 196). 
63 Anonymous 2014a. 
64 Anonymous 2014l. 
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 What the official is referring to is the prolonged political battle over the relocation of MCAS 
Futenma – the case study under examination in this thesis – from its current location within the 
densely-populated city of Ginowan in south central Okinawa (see Figure 1 below) to the more rural, 
less populated village of Henoko in Nago City to the north. Futenma currently serves as a 
‘transportation hub, taking the marines to war zones, as well as a practice hub for fighter scrambles 
and training in take-off and landing’ but which also generates significant noise pollution and carries 
with it the risk of aircraft accidents from training flights which circle directly overhead Ginowan’s 
hospitals, schools, and residential areas.65 The abduction and gang-rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by 
three US servicemen in September 1995 was the catalyst for its relocation, as it led to the creation of 
the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November of that same year. Under SACO, the 
USG and GOJ agreed to return 21% of the land from eleven USM installations back to the 
prefecture.66  
 
Figure 1: Futenma’s proximity to the surrounding Ginowan City as seen from Kakazu Heights Park 
Futenma was included on this list of installations to be returned within ‘five to seven years’ 
on the condition that ‘a sea-based [replacement] facility (SBF) was established off the Henoko 
peninsula near the Marine Corps Camp Schwab training complex on the northeastern coast of the 
main island of Okinawa’.67 A 1997 referendum in Nago, however, resulted in a majority of residents 
voting against the relocation plan, and in spite of numerous revisions to the layout of the Futenma 
                                                          
65 Hook 2010, p. 204. 
66 MOFA, ‘The SACO Final Report’, 2 December 1996c, available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/security/96saco1.html. 
67 Reiji Yoshida, ‘Special burden, special economic benefit’, The Japan Times, 7 July 2010, available online at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2010/07/07/national/special-burden-special-economic-benefit/. 
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Replacement Facility (FRF) in the succeeding years – including moving it further inshore and away 
from coral reefs in Henoko’s Oura Bay, creating a V-shaped dual runway for take-offs and landings68, 
and de-linking the FRF’s construction from existing plans to relocate over 8,000 Marines from 
Okinawa to Guam69 – the relocation has remained a controversial and sometimes politically 
intractable issue for alliance officials, and has challenged the PBD and the ‘accepted’ meanings of 
what ‘security’ is, and to whom it applies. 
2.1. The bases in Okinawa: a strategically important ‘burden’ 
  The stagnant pace of the relocation has, first and foremost, resulted in a tense relationship 
between the prefectural and central governments. Anni Baker notes that ‘the activists blamed the 
Japanese government rather than the Americans for the problem because the Japanese government 
had come up with the [relocation] plan in the first place’.70 Government officials whom I interviewed 
often expressed an awareness of this issue. ‘We spent lots of time consulting with the local people 
to end up at the V-shaped runway planned in Henoko’, recounts Maher71; another former MOFA 
official concurs that ‘we were paying attention to the number of residents around the FRF, and 
obviously we wanted to reduce the number of affected houses, as much as possible’.72 ‘The 
Okinawan government and the Japanese government have a common view that we want to try to 
minimise the burden on local residents of Okinawa’, continues a former MOFA official. ‘So moving it 
out of Futenma is lessening the burden of the people of Ginowan around Futenma. If that is moved 
to north Okinawa, we want to minimize the impact that’s going to have on the people of north 
Okinawa’.73 
 These officials’ narrative about their efforts to minimise the ‘impact’ or ‘burden’ of the bases 
on local communities in the prefecture plays into the symbolism of the bases – as an extension of 
the USM presence – as being at the ‘heart’ or ‘foundation’ of the alliance. A current adviser to the 
                                                          
68 The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee formed an ‘Expert Study Group’ in 2010 to evaluate the 
benefits of a V-shaped versus an I-shaped runway at the FRF and concluded that the V-shape was preferable 
because it ‘would enable takeoffs and landings mostly over water, so aircraft won't have to fly directly over 
nearby communities. That would reduce noise impact and wouldn't restrict local development’ (Gidget 
Fuentes, ‘Runway design debated for new Japan airbase’, Marine Corps Times, 12 September 2010, available 
online at: http://archive.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20100912/NEWS/9120305/Runway-design-debated-
new-Japan-airbase). 
69 Thom Shanker, ‘U.S. Agrees to Reduce Size of Force on Okinawa’, The New York Times, 26 April 2012, 
available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/world/asia/united-states-to-cut-number-of-
marines-on-okinawa.html?ref=japan. 
70 Anni Baker, American Soldiers Overseas: The Global Military Presence (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 
2004), p. 146. 
71 Maher 2014. 
72 Anonymous 2014d. 
73 Anonymous 2014a. 
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Diet justifies this framing: 
74 
The same adviser continues: 
 
A former official notes that it is, indeed, one of MOFA’s responsibilities that the base issue 
‘doesn’t go on its own, that it is very much the heart of the whole US-Japan alliance. And to put that 
into that context is something that we placed a huge importance on’.75 This is confirmed in the 
frequent mentions of Okinawa and the GOJ’s commitment to ‘minimising the impact’ of US bases on 
the prefecture in the annual Diplomatic Bluebooks and PM speeches to the Diet since the SACO was 
formed in 1995, usually in tandem with a vow to support the ‘economic revival’ or ‘promotion’ of 
Okinawa as a special trade and tourism zone.76 Particularly in the speeches of PMs past and present, 
they make sure to emphasise that they ‘recogniz[e] the vital importance of taking a sincere approach 
to coping with this issue’77, will ‘devote’ their ‘utmost efforts’78 to the base issue, or, as is the case in 
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75 Anonymous 2014a. 
76 MOFA, ‘Diplomatic Bluebook’, 1997, available online at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1997/index.html; Ryutaro Hashimoto, ‘Policy Speech by Prime 
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to the 141st Session of the National Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 29 
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available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1999/index.html; MOFA, ‘Diplomatic 
Bluebook 2000’, 2000a, available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2000/index.html; 
MOFA, ‘Diplomatic Bluebook 2001’, 2001, available online at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001/index.html; Naoto Kan, ‘Policy Speech by Prime Minister 
Naoto Kan at the 176th Extraordinary Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 1 October 2010b, 
available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201010/01syosin_e.html; Naoto Kan, ‘Policy 
Speech by Prime Minister Naoto Kan at the 177th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister and His Cabinet, 24 
January 2011, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201101/24siseihousin_e.html. 
77 MOFA, ‘Diplomatic Bluebook 2007’, 2007a, available online at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2007/html/index.html; Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Policy Speech by 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 154th Session of the Diet’, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 4 
February 2002, available online at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumispeech/2002/02/04sisei_e.html; Naoto 
Because … that [the bases] is one of the most important pillars of Japan-US security-
related negotiation, and how to … make the most of US Marine Corps is actually one of 
the most crucial functions of this alliance, because […] we really wanted to use them 
for any kind of crisis scenario. So without the settlement of the Futenma issue, this 
foundation of [the] US Marine Corps will be very unstable, so … we have to make 
progress. 
Some US officials worked in the government fifteen or eighteen years ago, but many 
people are new to the government. But in [the] Japanese system, if you are an alliance 
manager, you have to work for the alliance for ten years, twenty years, thirty years—that 
is our system. I mean, even career diplomats, if you are a security specialist […] you work 
for the alliance issue many times [during] your career.  So they know the problem very 
well [and] they always tend to very highly regard Okinawa and the relocation issue. 
Grinberg 105 
 
more recent years, will make ‘every effort’ on the USM’s realignment’s ‘steady progress’ by ‘listening 
to the voices from the heart of local communities including Okinawa’.79  
 In claiming that they are ‘sincerely’ aware of the problems stemming from US bases in local 
Okinawan communities – but at the same time that these bases are at the ‘heart’ of the alliance and 
its reproduction – these officials touch upon a significant challenge to the PBD. If the USM presence 
poses so many issues, then how do these officials maintain that it is still so critical to the future of 
the alliance, particularly in Okinawa? Brooks argues that although the alliance itself may be 
‘amorphous’, the US presence in Okinawa ‘remains the same due to its continued strategic 
importance’.80 Former US Ambassador to Papua New Guinea Richard Teare confirmed this belief in a 
1998 interview that Okinawa ‘represents the base position in case all hell breaks loose on the Korean 
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International Affairs, Washington, DC, USA. 
Grinberg 106 
 
Peninsula’.81 Former CG in Naha Aloysius O’Neill adds that several bases in Okinawa, including 
Futenma, form part of the ‘UN Command Rear’ which is linked to ROK contingency planning and the 
UN Command there, ‘so you had this factor as well, the concern about the availability of the bases in 
Okinawa for a Korean contingency. In fact, there's a 6,000 acre ammunition storage area adjacent to 
the 5,000 acre Kadena Air Base [in Okinawa], where a huge amount of ammunition for a Korean 
contingency was stored’.82  
In fact, as far back as 1965 – several years before Okinawa was ‘reverted’ from its post-war 
USM administration back to the central GOJ in Tokyo – this ‘strategic importance’ of Okinawa was 
emphasised in a speech by then-PM Eisaku Sato to the prefecture, the first by a post-war PM. 
According to The Yomiuri Shimbun: 
83 
While historical circumstances may have changed in the meantime, this discursive strategy of linking 
the USM presence in Okinawa to the ‘freedom of Asian countries’ or the ‘peace and stability’ of 
Japan and the region has not. ‘The best guarantee of U.S. extended deterrence over Japan remains 
the presence of U.S. troops’, Armitage and Nye wrote in their 2012 report84; a former MOFA official 
agrees, saying that ‘the core issue is security. And ... that will not change’.85  
Evidence for this perspective abounds in the recent Diplomatic Bluebooks, 2+2 statements, 
and PMs’ speeches as well. In instances where the documents emphasise the necessity of US forces 
in Okinawa prior to acknowledging the bases as a ‘burden’, the realignment plan and relocation of 
Futenma are highlighted as essential in ‘maintaining the deterrence of the USFJ [US Forces Japan]’ or 
in ‘maintaining the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan’.86 In instances where the 
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documents discuss the base ‘burden’ first, they usually still frame the realignment and relocation 
plans as ‘important issues for ensuring smooth implementation of the Japan-U.S. security 
arrangements’ or as ‘important to the stable presence of U.S. forces in Japan’.87 
2.2. Hatoyama and the alliance ‘crisis’ 
 In linking the ‘strategic importance’ of Okinawa (even with its ‘burdensome’ aspect) to the 
‘big picture’ of ensuring ‘security’ and ‘prosperity’ in the Asia-Pacific, these officials have thus 
created a chain of connotation in which it is impossible to question the presence of US forces in 
Japan – and especially those in Okinawa – lest the integrity and future of the alliance, as well as the 
economic and human security of the entire region itself is undermined. Given this strategy, it is 
unsurprising that the ascent of the DPJ into office in 2009 on the back of a manifesto which outlined 
such desired goals as revising the SOFA, ‘re-examining the realignment of the US military forces in 
Japan and the role of US military bases in Japan’, and counterbalancing the USJA with an enhanced 
focus on the UN and diplomacy with other Asian nations resulted in consternation and criticism from 
alliance managers within the USG and Japanese central bureaucracy.88  
Even before the beginning of the 2009 election campaign, ‘managers’ like Kurt Campbell 
warned in private meetings (such as one which took place in July 2009 between him, then the East 
Asia-Pacific Assistant SecState, and DPJ Secretary General Katsuya Okada), that   
89 
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support in the United States for a strong Alliance is bipartisan, and that the DPJ must 
take the steps necessary to ensure that it is not perceived as being anti-American. 
Such a perception would send the wrong message to China and North Korea, raise 
doubts about the bilateral relationship among our two peoples and would probably 
undermine popular support for the DPJ. 
Grinberg 108 
 
These warnings were issued following a similarly hard line delivered by Clinton after she signed the 
2009 Guam Treaty with then-FM Hirofumi Nakasone: ‘I think that a responsible nation follows the 
agreements that have been entered into, and the agreement that I signed today with FM Nakasone 
is one between our two nations, regardless of who's in power [emphasis added]’.90 This sentiment of 
was also echoed by Japanese officials prior to the DPJ’s election. For example, DPJ Policy Affairs 
Chief Kiyoshi Sugawa reassured, in a 27 July 2009 meeting with then-Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) 
at the US Embassy in Tokyo James Zumwalt: ‘because the party has been in opposition, it has not 
been privy to much of the detailed information related to strategic planning behind relocation. 
Regardless, the U.S. and Japan should proceed “step by step” to resolving differences over 
Futenma’.91 
  Once the campaign kicked off, however, the fairly vague promises in the manifesto about 
‘re-examining’ the realignment of US forces turned into a full-fledged promise by future PM 
Hatoyama to ‘[reopen] negotiations with the US over the base agreement and [move] Futenma 
completely off Okinawa’.92 This promise – and the subsequent reiteration of this goal once actually 
taking office in September 2009 – led to the ‘last serious crisis in the alliance’ and ‘a kind of mistrust 
between Japanese and US leaders’.93 Although the DPJ actually saw this policy change, according to 
Hughes, as ‘an effort to strengthen the long-term durability and fundamental basis of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance by seeking to remove once and for all the nagging thorn of Futenma in the side of the 
bilateral relationship’, officials in both Tokyo and Washington’s diplomatic corps did not necessarily 
share the same view.94  
US SecDef Robert Gates’s October 2009 meeting with Japanese FM Katsuya Okada on the 
Futenma issue, for example, was interpreted by the Japanese media as a ‘scolding’ session for 
considering any other option for the relocation but Okinawa; successive visits by President Obama 
and Hillary Clinton echoed Gates’s message that ‘the move should take place as planned and without 
negotiation’.95 This is not to say, however, that US officials alone were unhappy with the about-face 
on Futenma. In December 2009, for example, Hatoyama’s own FM Mitoji Yabunaka told then-
Ambassador John Roos in a private meeting that ‘it would be beneficial for the U.S. to go through 
the basic fundamentals of security issues with the Prime Minister’ and ‘that it was important to 
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impress upon Hatoyama that strong U.S.-Japan relations did not have an indefinite “shelf life” and 
that the Hatoyama administration could not simply set the alliance aside in favor of domestic politics 
without consequences. The alliance needs continued care and nurturing’.96  
In the same month, a bilateral working group that had been created to resolve this issue 
following Obama’s visit was suspended, thus ‘marking the end of any attempts by the United States 
to outwardly entertain discussion or renegotiation’.97 ‘Hatoyama toppled over the chabudai [a short 
table used in Japanese homes]’, comments a former MOFA official (notably using, here, an image 
from everyday Japanese life in order to make his analogy), continuing: ‘I thought the issue [of 
Futenma] was dead in January 2010, since you can’t put dirty dishes back on the table—you can’t 
put back everything exactly the same way as it was before’.98 Nye added in a January 2010 New York 
Times editorial ‘An Alliance Larger Than One Issue’ that the Futenma plan had been ‘thrown into 
jeopardy […] The new prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, leads a government that is inexperienced, 
divided and still in the thrall of campaign promises to move the base off the island or out of Japan 
completely’.99  
Frustration with this ‘inexperience’ or lack of clarity surrounding Hatoyama’s Futenma policy 
and how it could be carried out also extended to officials within the central GOJ. For example, three 
MOFA officials, including Permanent Mission to the UN Political Counsellor Yutaka Arima, Japan-U.S. 
SOFA Division Principal Deputy Director Takashi Ariyoshi, and Japan-U.S. SOFA Division Deputy 
Director Ryo Fukahori, all characterised in the leaked cable as ‘experienced “Alliance hands”’ – 
reportedly expressed their ‘displeasure’ with the ‘politicization’ of the FRF to Roos in December 
2009, complained that the issue ‘had essentially tied both governments’ hands’, and that ‘even the 
most senior government bureaucrats had been essentially cut out of the decision-making process 
and were unable to coordinate with the USG on public messaging to counter inaccurate depictions 
of both governments' positions and discussions’.100 
 ‘There seemed to be a tendency to regard the possibilities in an extremely binary manner’, 
says Mochizuki. ‘One view was that the DPJ basically was not much different from the LDP so it 
would be business as usual. The other view was that the DPJ would be very, very different. But in the 
final analysis, the prevailing opinion seemed to be that the DPJ-led government would support the 
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U.S-Japan alliance without substantial changes in policy’.101 Thus, even when the DPJ proved to have 
different policy priorities from its predecessors, officials in the Obama administration tended to be 
dismissive of them. Take, for example, a ‘scenesetter’ briefing for Obama’s November 2009 visit to 
Japan, in which Roos writes that Japanese voters had elected the DPJ due to its promise of 
‘fundamental “change” in the way Japan is governed, including giving more authority to elected 
leaders as opposed to the bureaucracy’—with the placing of ‘change’ in quotation marks, and thus 
questioning its authenticity.102 Such views were reconfirmed not only by LDP contacts, but also by 
those within the DPJ, like Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Kenji Yamaoka. In an 8 December 
meeting with DCM Zumwalt, he advised that ‘the best way to break through the current stalemate is 
for Washington to understand the current political situation in Japan and to tell Japan what it would 
like to do [emphasis added] in search of mutually acceptable “next best way”’.103  
This misunderstanding resulted not only in criticism from US officials and media outlets (who 
described the former PM as, by turns, ‘the biggest loser [among world leaders]’, ‘loopy’, and 
‘hapless’) but also from those at home.104 The visits by Gates, Obama, and Clinton, says Paul O’Shea, 
were ‘well covered’ by the domestic press in Japan, and they began to ‘mirror’ their US counterparts 
in their coverage of Hatoyama’s handling of the Futenma issue. For example, the Yomiuri Shimbun 
‘described Hatoyama’s “intention” to “separate Japan from the US” as “extremely dangerous”’ in a 
2010 editorial, while the Asahi Shimbun also ‘described the DPJ government as […] “ill-equipped” to 
adequately deal with foreign affairs’.105 In January 2010, prominent Japanese security analyst and 
then-informal adviser to Hatoyama Yukio Okamoto furthermore confided to the DCM that going 
forward with the established FRF plan ‘would require political courage’ and ‘questioned whether 
Hatoyama would be able show this kind of leadership in “ramming home” the FRF plan, as he is "too 
nice," and "wants to be liked”’.106 A current MOFA official adds that until Hatoyama and the DPJ 
promised to relocate Futenma out of Okinawa prefecture, Okinawans ‘couldn’t speak out because, 
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you know, they didn’t think that was feasible. But when the Prime Minister said [it was], they 
thought it could be an option. Then, of course, they preferred that option’.107  
What is evident from these negative characterisations of Hatoyama is that in spite of the 
acknowledged, growing challenge that ‘insurgent’ narratives can pose to those of the central 
governments (here in the form of the Futenma protests), acceptable forms of authoritative 
‘knowledge’ within the latter is still limited in scope to individual actors’ respective career statuses 
and ‘expertise’ gained by working with/on bureaucratic committees related to the alliance.108 It is 
this view of ‘knowledge’ that led former ‘managers’ like Nye, for example, to characterise the 
Hatoyama government as ‘inexperienced’ due to its being ‘in the thrall of campaign promises’ to the 
Japanese public (rather than in the ‘thrall’ of, say, previous USJ agreements on the FRF project). 
Moreover, the suggestion that Hatoyama was playing on public opinion in Okinawa to raise political 
support for his administration, and that there would otherwise have been no significant challenge 
from local communities to the FRF’s implementation, is indicative of two salient narratives within 
diplomatic sites of exchange: 1) that the DPJ did not provide a ‘feasible’ solution to the Futenma 
issue, as it involved relocating the base outside of the prefecture (a well-established non-starter) and 
thus never had a serious argument to present to the alliance ‘managers’ (let alone to the Japanese 
and American publics); and 2) that there is a lack of political will in Okinawa to attempt to effect 
policy changes without some kind of encouragement or direct guidance from central government 
officials (who are, in employing this strategy, not truly sympathising with Okinawans, but merely 
trying to win votes from them).  
The latter’s reproduction seemed to be affirmed in May 2010, when Hatoyama announced 
that his administration had been unable to find an alternative relocation site aside from Henoko. He 
explained: ‘in terms of the role of the Marine Corps in the totality of all US forces in Okinawa, the 
more I learned, the more I have come to realize their interoperability. I have come to believe that it 
was the [only] way to maintain deterrence’.109 He resigned only a month later as a result of not only 
the Futenma issue, but also due to financial scandals that had occurred involving himself and other 
top officials in his administration. In the aftermath of this, US media outlets such as The Wall Street 
Journal were quick to praise US diplomacy throughout the dispute, noting that ‘US officials 
considered the “past few months a process of educating Japan’s new leaders about the importance 
of the alliance”’.110  
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This language of ‘educating’ the party leadership or, as Yamaoka put it, ‘telling Japan what 
[the US] would like it to do’ appears in several cables. Okamoto, for example, ‘described himself as a 
blunt-speaking "tutor" to DPJ leaders on issues like the need for a U.S. Marine Corps presence in 
Japan, the strategic value of Okinawa, and the threat posed by a rising China’111, and Yabunaka 
remarked that ‘efforts to educate’ groups including ‘television commentators and politicians’ who 
‘did not have as strong a grasp of security issues’ would be ‘worthwhile’.112 Considering that these 
officials or ‘experts’ had drawn up numerous agreements with their US counterparts over the years 
on the Futenma issue, it is perhaps unsurprising that they were reticent to support Hatoyama in his 
efforts to find an alternative relocation site.113  
The DPJ, however, also evidently played a role in alienating the bureaucracy from the outset, 
as it ‘came to power promising that political leaders rather than elite bureaucrats would take charge 
[…] [without creating] a systematic process to mobilize bureaucratic expertise and to present the 
political leadership with coherent policy alternatives’.114 In pursuing a discursive strategy which 
frames Hatoyama and the DPJ as ‘naïve’ and ‘inexperienced’115, then, these officials reconfirm the 
inherent preferableness of the status quo policy on Futenma and the USM presence in Okinawa (as 
opposed to any unstable or experimental alternatives) and, thus, maintaining the status quo with 
regards to the alliance as a whole. 
2.3. Futenma as a ‘ticking clock’ 
 Nonetheless, as one of the major causes behind the collapse of the Hatoyama 
administration in June 2010, it stands to reason that Futenma might not merely be a ‘nagging thorn 
in the side’116 of the alliance and its continued reproduction. A current MOFA official acknowledges 
this, commenting that ‘whenever the prime ministers and the president of the US met each other, 
we had to talk about that issue, […] so in that sense that’s a very big issue for the whole Japan-US 
alliance’.117 Nevertheless, other officials and ‘experts’ with insights into alliance management 
continue to call Futenma a ‘headache’, ‘pain in the neck’, and a ‘roadblock’, among other 
descriptors.118 They particularly emphasise the manner in which the focus on Futenma, a ‘second-
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order issue’119, has taken attention away from ‘advancing the alliance on other fronts’ such as ‘the 
preparation for future denial of [Chinese] capabilities’, reducing the overall USM presence in 
Okinawa outside of just Ginowan, and ‘our [the US’s] long-term strategy for East Asia’.120 Sheila 
Smith plays up this sense of urgency, arguing that ‘the alliance cannot afford another decade-and-a-
half stalemate over relocating one base’.121 A current official in MOFA agrees, calling the process 
‘long overdue’: 
122 
This analogy suggests not only that progress must be made on the relocation plan as it 
currently stands without renegotiation of the kind attempted under Hatoyama, but also that, in the 
years since the original SACO agreement was concluded, an unacceptable level of inertia has 
developed around the issue. ‘Everybody knows that this has been a very difficult, protracted 
problem, and I think there’s a fatigue about this, and a sense of: “let’s just get this done and get it 
out of the way”’, comments Midford. ‘I think there’s a sense that if we reopen it, if we start from 
square one, we’ve wasted all this time and effort’.123 Schoff adds that ‘Japanese government 
officials’ fear of saying anything has been delaying progress on this, and [from the US’s perspective], 
sometimes you have to show leadership—you have to rip off the band-aid quickly and get it over 
with’.124 In this framing, the status quo is not, therefore, enacting the current relocation plan, but 
rather the political ‘stalemate’ which has not allowed this to happen. Hope and Raudla expand on 
this problem of policymaking: 
125 
 Thus behind this ‘ticking clock’ are the narratives that 1) the USG and GOJ have ‘exhausted’ 
all other options outside of Henoko, and therefore 2) any further delays to the relocation will only 
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And there is the clock, you know, ticking, and of course, there is a procedure going on, 
an environmental impact assessment, and so forth. So there’s a kind of arrival of a 
moment of truth. And we just don’t want to keep on postponing. 
In the same way that discourses can be formulated to drive progress on a policy issue, 
their very formulation can also be obstructive to action. In the same way that 
“interests” compete and cause gridlock, so can the discourse that informs and 
constructs them. In the same way that cultural norms can entrench a particular 
understanding and approach to a policy issue, so can the discourse of the status-quo 
provide a default which there must be a concerted effort by policy-makers to move 
away from.  
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continue to endanger the current residents of Ginowan. On the first point, two US officials in 
discussions with the OPG, Christopher Johnstone, Pentagon director for Northeast Asia, and Marc 
Knapper, director of the Office of Japanese Affairs at the DOS, reiterated that ‘the relocation plan 
remains the only feasible [emphasis added] solution that has been identified to date’.126 One former 
MOFA official I spoke with recounts how, in late 2009, although Osaka Governor Toru Hashimoto 
offered to host Futenma at Kansai International Airport, this plan was not pursued: 
127 
Along the same vein, other officials rely on the asset specificity argument, framing base 
facilities in Okinawa as ‘sunk costs’ or otherwise structurally impossible to move. A current MOFA 
official argues, for example, that ‘the relocation facility needs to be in Okinawa, because […] in 
Futenma there is a helicopter squadron and those squadrons cannot be so separate from other 
components. So in that sense, I don’t think there is any other prefecture that can be the site for 
relocation’.128 O’Neill concurs, adding: ‘when you have Marine infantry you've got to have Marine 
helicopters because the helicopters move the infantry in Marine Corps doctrine. You couldn't, for 
example, keep the infantry in Okinawa and move the helicopters to Hawaii or to the mainland of 
Japan. That would be one of the virtues of moving the helicopters to Camp Schwab where they 
would be co-located’.129 ‘I guess it’s [Henoko] not my personal preference’, one former MOFA official 
acknowledges. The official echoes Knapper, continuing: ‘it’s more of an examination of what’s 
feasible [emphasis added]. At the end of the day, the FRF needs to provide deterrence or rapid 
response capability. And if they can’t do the job, you know, it doesn’t make any sense’.130  
2.4. Abe and Nakaima 
 Current PM Abe, cognisant of the numerous delays to the FRF and the expectations from the 
USG regarding its ‘progress’, has made a concerted effort in ‘resolving’ it since the re-election of the 
LDP to office in December 2012. In a 2014 address to the Diet, he makes clear his commitment: 
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It sounded good on paper […] but immediately, you knew that wouldn’t work, because 
Osaka is close to the Korean Peninsula, but it’s much further away from the Taiwanese 
Straits […] If they’re [the bases] not close to the hotspots, then what’s the whole 
reason for having them there? […] And our role [within MOFA] is really to try to […] 
ensure that the US forces are in an effective location. So that’s not going to be Osaka. 
That’s going to have to be in Okinawa. But we also want to ensure that it’s in a place in 
which the least amount of people are going to be affected. So that’s why it’s Henoko—
Henoko is in the middle of nowhere. 
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131 
Abe echoes his American and Japanese predecessors in framing previous administrations (and, in 
particular, the DPJ and Hatoyama) as having ‘politicised’ Futenma or otherwise caused 
‘irresponsible’ delays to its relocation, and thus reproduces the narrative that it must be moved as a 
matter of ‘responsibility’ for local and national security (which are ‘above’ politics)—and that there 
are no alternatives to doing so.  
Prior to this address, he had concluded negotiations with former Okinawa Governor 
Hirokazu Nakaima in December 2013 which ended in an agreement to begin landfill work in 
preparation for constructing the FRF (according to the inshore relocation plan agreed upon some 
years earlier). In exchange, the Abe administration ‘pledged to secure a budget of the ¥300 billion 
level annually up until fiscal 2021’ for Okinawa to promote the prefectural economy (about $2.5 
million), the early return and halt of operations of Futenma within five years, the accelerated return 
of Camp Kinser in Urasoe, the addition of new articles to the existing SOFA on environmental issues, 
and the deployment of about twelve Osprey helicopters (see Figure 2 below) – aircrafts which had 
been highly controversial during their first deployment to Okinawa in late 2012 – outside of the 
prefecture.132 
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In the past, the people of Okinawa were at the mercy of politics that was no more 
than unsubstantiated words.  The reality of Futenma Air Station, which is surrounded 
by schools and residences and lies right in the heart of a built-up area, did not shift 
even a single millimeter during those three years and three months.  Such 
irresponsible politics must not be repeated [emphasis added]. The Abe Cabinet will be 
engaged in reducing the burden not through words but through bona fide actions. 
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Figure 2: A grounded Osprey helicopter inside Futenma 
The 2+2 agreement issued in October of the same year also reiterates that the FRF 
constitutes an ‘essential element’ of the realignment of US forces, naming the relocation of Futenma 
specifically to the Camp Schwab/Henoko area as ‘the only [emphasis added] solution that addresses 
operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of Marine Corps 
Air Station Futenma’ in its current location.133 Some of these concerns, says the same document, 
include: ‘North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and humanitarian concerns; coercive and 
destabilizing behaviors in the maritime domain; disruptive activities in space and cyberspace; 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and man-made and natural disasters’. In the face of 
these ‘diverse challenges amid the dramatically changing international situation’ and in a security 
environment that ‘has become more and more severe’, says the same year’s Diplomatic Bluebook, 
the alliance (and, by extension, the prompt relocation of Futenma) ‘is becoming even more 
important’.134 By framing the regional security situation in such dire terms, these texts thus 
reproduce an impression of limited foreign policy options available to the USJA in addressing them, 
especially with regards to basing policy. 
 This narrative – along with the one portraying ‘progress’ on Futenma as breaking the 
‘stalemate’ – influenced the language used in news coverage of the 2013 agreement concluded 
between Abe and Nakaima. The Yomiuri Shimbun’s editorial following the deal, titled ‘Nakaima’s 
approval on Henoko to reinforce Japan-U.S. alliance’, called it an ‘important advance’ and 
pronounced that ‘[r]esolving this difficult issue without nullifying the past laborious efforts will have 
the highly significant effect of making the bilateral alliance stronger and more sustainable at a time 
when Japan’s security environment has been worsening’. It further ‘praised’ Nakaima’s decision ‘as a 
                                                          
133 DOD, ‘Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee: Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater 
Shared Responsibilities’, 3 October 2013a, available online at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/U.S.-Japan-Joint-
Statement-of-the-Security-Consultative-Committee.pdf.  
134 MOFA 2013. 
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practical choice, giving top priority to steady reduction of the burden’.135 The Japan Times, while 
cautioning that ‘Tokyo needs to take concrete actions to ease Okinawa’s burden in meaningful ways 
[…] [as this] will be crucial in sustaining Japan’s security alliance with the United States and in 
maintaining a trustful relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa’, nonetheless called the agreement 
a ‘political breakthrough for Tokyo’ and titled the article ‘Progress on Futenma relocation’.136  
BBC News likewise referred to the agreement as a ‘breakthrough’ after ‘years of 
deadlock’137, and a New York Times editorial the following month entitled ‘Another Step Forward on 
Okinawa’, while warning that the USG and GOJ ‘must make a more compelling case to Okinawans for 
why the American presence is still needed’, still called Nakaima’s issuance of the landfill permit a 
‘significant breakthrough’ and stated that ‘America’s continued military presence in Japan is 
important to regional stability, a point driven home by North Korea’s warmongering and the 
increasing face-offs between China and its Asian neighbors, including Japan, over disputed islands in 
the South China and East China Seas’.138 
 Given Nakaima’s background as the previously preferred candidate of the USG and GOJ in 
local Okinawan politics going back several years due to his bureaucratic background139, the fact that 
he was the local official to strike the deal with Abe in the end is not entirely unexpected. 
Nonetheless, the language of ‘breakthrough’ and ‘progress’ is also used frequently by the officials I 
interviewed. ‘I would say it’s a breakthrough that they’ve [the GOJ and USG] been able to gain the 
agreement of the Okinawan government to this’, says one former MOFA official. ‘I think . . . that was 
a landmark decision for the governor to make. It’s huge progress’.140 ‘I have strong respect for him’, 
one current MOFA official says. ‘I think that was a very, very difficult decision, but he was very brave 
politician’.141  A former MOFA official concurs: ‘I think Governor Nakaima is taking his own – in my 
                                                          
135 ‘Nakaima’s approval on Henoko to reinforce Japan-U.S. alliance’, The Yomiuri Shimbun, 28 December 
2013d. 
136 ‘Progress on Futenma relocation’, The Japan Times, 27 December 2013a, available online at: 
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/12/27/editorials/progress-on-futenma-relocation/#.UsTn2vRdX23. 
137 ‘Japan Okinawa leader approves US airbase relocation’, BBC News, 27 December 2013, available online at: 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25524007. 
138 ‘Another Step Forward on Okinawa’, The New York Times, 5 January 2014, available online at: 
http://nyti.ms/1dGQc4Z. 
139 Graduating from Tokyo University, Nakaima went on to serve in the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry and as chairman of both the Okinawa Electric Power Company and Okinawa Chamber of Commerce. 
Maher wrote of his candidacy in the 2006 gubernatorial elections: ‘clearly he would be a better governor in 
terms of U.S. interests in Okinawa’ (Maher 2006a; Kevin Maher, ‘LDP Seeking Silver Lining In Pending 
Gubernatorial Race’, Wikileaks, Wikileaks cable:06NAHA213_a. 25 September 2006b. Available online at: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06NAHA213_a.html). 
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They [Okinawans] don’t want to be mainland Japanese, and they can’t be. They need an 
enemy to maintain their identity. 
- a former MOFA official 
 
personal viewpoint – courageous political kind of acceptance of what Prime Minister Abe has 
proposed and is trying to do’.142  
On Abe, however, there is less talk about ‘courage’ and more about practicality. ‘One reason 
[Abe pursued this policy] might be that he really wanted to see the development of US-Japan 
relationship as the most important pillar of his foreign and security strategy’, a current adviser to the 
Diet posits. ‘I don’t think he had any personal connection to or convictions about Okinawan issues, 
so maybe he regard[ed] – or he and his advisers – regarded this issue as crucial for the US-Japan 
alliance to make a difference from the DPJ’.143  
3. Institutional and cultural identities 
In clear contrast to the positive or even laudatory language used to describe the actions 
taken by Nakaima, Abe, and other officials towards ‘resolving’ the Futenma relocation issue is that 
which is used to describe those of protesters and/or their actions in Okinawa. Whether using such 
terms as ‘radical’ or ‘leftist’, the purpose of such language is not only to identify and separate these 
actors from those within the diplomatic (and defensive) sites of exchange by their intention and 
strategy, but also to question the value and seriousness of their arguments based on this 
identification. While these actors portray their self-identification as being within the ‘accepted’ 
circles of governmental expertise and knowledge, what they fail to see is that their status as a MOFA 
or DOS official is not merely a ‘neutral label’, but rather brings with it ‘a range of emotive, practical 
and moral connotations imputed to individuals assigned to that category’ and ‘produce [their] 
expectations of what [they] can achieve and of how [they] will be treated by others’.144  
This is especially true in the context of an institution like the USJA, where, regardless of 
political ideology or party affiliation, these actors display a commitment to its reproduction which 
increasingly binds them together to share a specific social identity.145 Furthermore, in order for this 
identity to survive, the reproduction of its constitutive narratives ‘cannot be given by just anybody, 
but only by those others that the self recognizes and respects as being kindred to itself’.146 
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146 Iver B. Neumann, ‘National security, culture and identity’ in Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Victor Mauer, eds, 
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‘Individuals adjust their interactions in order to reduce conﬂict and maximize exposure to actors 
more similar to themselves’, says Hanspeter Kriesi. ‘[B]ased on their value orientations, individuals 
selectively choose their information channels, which reinforce their value orientations and the links 
between these orientations and political choices on a diverse set of issues’.147  
Through their interactions with like-minded individuals within their communities, officials go 
on to form ‘programmatic beliefs’ – such as, for example, that the alliance acts as the ‘cornerstone’ 
for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region – which sit at the origin of policy ideas ‘because they 
deﬁne the problems to be solved by such policies; the issues to be considered; the goals to be 
achieved; the norms, methods, and instruments to be applied; and the ideals that frame the more 
immediate policy ideas proposed to solve any given problem’.148 Insulated from public opinion to a 
large degree, ‘administration, or bureaucracy, creates its own analytical framework for addressing 
the issues with which it is confronted, producing its own imperatives and dynamics’.149  
Nonetheless, it falls within the work of many diplomatic actors to convey such narratives 
outside of their accepted circles, and to ensure that there is a sufficient level of public acceptance of 
them for certain policies to be carried out. In the process, however, they are confronted by the 
arguments and interpretations of these same ‘outsiders’ whose socioeconomic backgrounds and 
sources of ‘knowledge’ about ‘security’ may be unfamiliar to them. While this confrontation can, on 
the one hand, be beneficial in terms of informing diplomatic actors on certain aspects of history or 
public feeling of which they may not have been aware, on the other it may have the effect of re-
entrenching their own core beliefs and stories about why they are ‘correct’—and thus reproduce 
identities which keep them distinct from others with ‘incorrect’ interpretations. 
3.1. Division of official responsibilities over the bases 
In discovering how these identities are shaped and reproduced, it is important to 
understand, first of all, the nature of diplomatic work generally speaking and specifically with 
regards to the style and form of communications between central government officials, Okinawan 
residents, and OPG officials. For example, former Vice President and US Ambassador to Japan (1993-
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96) Walter Mondale broke down his responsibilities in the following manner: 
150 
Officials from MOFA with whom I spoke, while perhaps not taking on such public roles as Mondale, 
were and/or are still involved in ensuring smooth communication between the USG and GOJ, the 
USM in Okinawa, and local Okinawan officials. ‘Our role at the Foreign Ministry was to help in the 
communication […] to really ensure that [it] was thorough, that both sides understood what was 
happening, and to try to make sure [the relocation] would go ahead as planned’, says one former 
official. The official adds that they accompanied the FM on trips to Okinawa during their tenure: 
151 
Another former official details their role at MOFA in terms of a first stage, second stage, and third 
stage of negotiations over the Futenma relocation (none of which, it should be noted, explicitly 
discuss a role for public deliberation):  
152 
The task of communicating with local officials or the public in Okinawa is largely left to 
MOFA’s liaison office in Naha, the prefectural capital. The role of this office, says a current official, is, 
in the event of an incident or accident related to the USM bases, to ‘control the damage as best as 
possible, so in the process of the work, [it] always communicates with them [the USM] on how to 
present the information to the public’.153 With the office in Okinawa, it therefore becomes less 
                                                          
150 Walter F. Mondale, ‘Interview with Ambassador Walter F. Mondale’, Association for Diplomatic Studies and 
Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, 27 April 2004, available online at: www.adst.org/wp-
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151 Anonymous 2014a. 
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Everything you do every day is part of this public. You go out and give speeches. You 
travel around the country. You meet with their leaders. You meet with various groups 
from Japan. You write articles for the newspaper. You hold news conferences. You go 
over and see the prime minister or the cabinet secretary or this person or that 
person. The idea is to create a public presence and the development of public issues 
in a way that strengthens the [US-Japan] relationship. 
Apart from going to the US, China, and the capitals, Washington, Beijing, going to 
Okinawa is also a very important priority for the Foreign Minister. So we would go 
with the Foreign Minister to see the Okinawan Governor, the Nago City mayor—which 
is actually unheard of in other parts of Japan. You would not have the Foreign 
Minister go and see the mayor of a prefecture or a small city in a prefecture, but 
because of the political importance of this, both the Foreign Minister and the Defense 
Minister would go and see these people. 
First, you know, we need to share strategic objectives between the United States and 
Japan, and then the second stage is a more of a kind of conceptual foundation of our 
roles and missions. And then, based on those first and second stages, we have arrived 
at the actual realignment of US forces. Of course, you know, it is very important to 
share objectives and to share common recognition about roles and missions. 
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urgent, according to these officials, to actually visit the prefecture and speak with their counterparts 
on the ground. A current Diet adviser remarks, for instance, that ‘Tokyo planners’ need not visit 
often, since ‘we have, you know, the first contacting agencies in Okinawa already’.154  
According to these officials, however, the head of the liaison office – the ‘Ambassador in 
charge of Okinawan Affairs’, effectively the Japanese counterpart to the US CG in Okinawa – does 
not have as much influence on the central government during such incidents or accidents as the 
local populace might think. Set up in the aftermath of the 1995 rape, the ambassador is essentially 
the spokesperson for MOFA in Okinawa and the go-between for the central government and local 
media. The position, though, has not come without its share of controversy. ‘It goes back to the 
issue of: why do you have a Japanese ambassador in Okinawa? Are you treating us as foreigners?’, 
says a former MOFA official, continuing:  
155  
A current official argues further: 
156 
If there is distance between Tokyo and Okinawa in the form of the liaison office, then an 
even greater one might exist between Tokyo and Washington in the general management of the 
base issue. ‘Futenma is over in DC; it’s not a problem compared to stuff like ISIS’ says Oros.157 A 
former MOFA official agrees: 
158 
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Which is not true, and what we try to explain is we have that ambassador because it is 
such an important issue. We need someone with ambassador rank to be able to talk 
to the top of USFJ, of the […] Marine Corps in Okinawa […] but we need someone 
who’s able to do that and who’s able to talk with the Governor of Okinawa and the 
[central] government as well. 
maybe some people might have too [many] expectations when they hear the title 
“ambassador” […] [because] some [anti-base] protesters often said the ambassador is 
not a representative of the prefecture, so the ambassador can’t send [a very] strong 
message to Tokyo. But they don’t really understand the difference between the 
Okinawan ambassador and our ambassador between Tokyo and Washington. The role 
is very different. 
There are so many things the US government doesn’t know; Futenma is one of them. 
They only pay attention when the budget is involved. The attitude of the US Congress 
is that Futenma is a done deal, so Japan just has to do it. Futenma is not a political 
problem on the Hill. It’s mainly dealt with by the [Senate] Armed Services Committee 
[SASC] in the US—it’s too detailed an issue for many people.  
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While not all diplomatic actors would agree with this assessment, they nonetheless frame the 
specific tasks related to carrying out the FRF project as the responsibility of the GOJ. A current MOFA 
official, for example, argues that the USG is ‘supportive’, but characterises the landfill permit request 
issued by the central government and the subsequent December 2013 negotiations as a ‘domestic 
procedure’, so ‘that’s what Japan has to do. The US was watching carefully, but, basically, they were 
expecting Japan to do what we should do [emphasis added]’ (echoing earlier comments that 
Japanese leaders must be ‘educated’ about the ‘importance of the alliance’).159  
Campbell said as much in a September 2009 meeting with then-DPJ Deputy PM Naoto Kan in 
which he ‘advised that while the DPJ worked to bring about such historic changes, it keep in mind 
some lessons from the recent past. One such lesson was to not only take bold actions, but also take 
responsibility for those actions’.160 Another current MOFA official, while concurring that ‘Washington 
understands the political importance [of Futenma]’, distinguishes ‘Washington’ from ‘people in 
Yokota’ – referring to the headquarters of the USFJ at Yokota Air Base in western Tokyo – in that the 
latter ‘[don’t] really understand the situation in Okinawa’.161 Still, the official continues, this 
discrepancy is ‘natural’, since the USFJ command at Yokota ‘is, you know, try to defend something—
the operation should be their first priority’. 
3.2. Okinawa as separate from mainland Japan 
 While the USFJ leadership at Yokota might not identify as strongly with Okinawan issues – or 
the Futenma issue – as local representatives from MOFA, this does not mean that the latter are able 
to fully appreciate not only the physical distance between Tokyo, Washington, and Okinawa, but 
also the distance between the ways in which the actors from each of these three sites self-identify. 
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Arriving in Okinawa prior to the 1995 rape, O’Neill observed that 
162 
Even in instances (like O’Neill’s) where officials express a more advanced awareness of the 
deep differences in identification, there are still others who frame the distance between Okinawans 
and mainland Japanese as not necessarily a product of historical discrimination against the 
prefecture, but as a manifestation of burgeoning Okinawan nationalism. ‘There’s this underlying 
theme – we call it the lava, the maguma [magma] of the Okinawan people – that there’s always 
something underneath that is boiling’, says a former MOFA official.163 ‘The base issue is 
predominantly the Okinawa issue’, continues another former MOFA official. ‘It is related to 
Okinawan nationalism, which is against the US and also against the central [Japanese] 
government’.164 This nationalism within the prefecture, however, argues the first former MOFA 
official, might pose a problem to the future of the FRF project, since ‘people who are working for the 
national government down in Okinawa are local people’.165 The official continues: ‘these were 
people who were born and bred in Okinawa, hired by the central government, but actually still 
working in Okinawa […] It’s not easy for them to be seen as sort of enforcing central rule in 
Okinawa’.  
 However, not all officials who have worked in this area express this kind of awareness. In an 
interview with Toshikazu Yamaguchi, formerly the minister in charge of Okinawan issues, Yamaguchi 
‘admitted he had “never heard of” Okinawan independence, and though it might warrant “study,” 
the government has no intention of ever calling a referendum’.166 Thus, while some of the officials I 
interviewed displayed an awareness or a degree of understanding regarding this independence 
movement, it is clear that others – including Yamaguchi, purportedly the ‘minister in charge of 
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166 Philip Brasor, ‘Scotland’s independence referendum inspires an Okinawan discussion’, The Japan Times, 27 
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the prejudice […] toward Okinawa was quite strong […] largely the mainlander view of 
Okinawa was just similar to what you mentioned: They're not exactly Japanese; they 
speak funny, and they have weird customs and all that. In their dialect, the Okinawans 
call the mainland Japanese Yamatunchu or Yamato people and themselves 
Uchinanchu. A lot of prejudices continued to linger particularly among the older 
generation of mainlanders. That awful crime [the 1995 rape] did generate a certain 
amount of sympathy and a recognition that there did have to be adjustments in the 
base situation. Part of the equation was the NIMBY syndrome, the "not in my 
backyard" syndrome: "We're so glad those bases are down in Okinawa because that's 
what Okinawans are for. We don't want Marines and airmen wandering around our 
neighborhoods and making noise nearby”’. 
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Okinawan issues’ – do not. This illustrates Buzan’s point, again, that policymakers ‘are only partially 
informed, do not fully understand other actors or the system (or themselves), are capable of only 
limited rationality and are highly constrained in what they can do’.167 
3.3. The ‘victim’ identity of Okinawans 
 Although officials such as Yamaguchi profess ignorance in some (admittedly important) 
areas of Japanese-Okinawan relations, there is still a general appreciation or acknowledgment of the 
divide in historical understanding between the prefecture and the mainland. Magleby refers to this 
divide using the term Ryukyu shobun, loosely translated as ‘Ryukyu disposal’168, which, he says, is 
how Okinawans ‘referred to their “disposal” by the Japanese government post-war’.169 A current 
MOFA official argues that the Battle of Okinawa during WWII – the only major battle to take place on 
Japanese soil, and one during which a third of the prefecture’s 475,000 residents were either killed 
or committed suicide (sometimes forcibly) – has resulted in Okinawans having a ‘pacifist attitude’: 
170  
Magleby also observes ‘lingering resentment’ over how the 1995 rape and the August 2004 crash of 
a US CH-53 military helicopter into the library of Okinawa International University (OIU)171 were 
handled, the university in the latter of these incidents being located nearby to Futenma.172  
 Regardless of these legitimate causes for concern with the USM presence, however, actors 
across diplomatic sites often frame protests as being driven by an inherent Okinawan sense of 
‘victimhood’ or non-Japanese-ness. A current MOFA official argues that even though the USG and 
GOJ have worked on improving communications with the public over these types of incidents and 
accidents, ‘creating regulations or frameworks doesn’t solve the problem, right? So what we can do 
is just to encourage the US side to obey the rules, but even if we say that to the local community, 
                                                          
167 Buzan 1991, p. 329. 
168 Ryukyu being the name not only of the independent kingdom which once ruled over Okinawa prior to its 
incorporation into the Japanese state in 1872, but also referring to the chain of islands southwest of mainland 
Japan including Okinawa, Ōsumi, Tokara, Amami, Yonaguni, and Sakishima. 
169 Magleby 2014. 
170 Anonymous 2014c. 
171 See Chapters 4 and 5 for further details related to this incident. 
172 Magleby 2014. 
some people treat very seriously the […] crimes caused by the US [service] members, 
even if there are so [many] more crimes caused by Okinawan people, they tend to 
specifically see the number of cases caused by US [service] members. I think it’s 
mainly because they [the bases] take up so much land here, and also the historical 
background. 
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they are not satisfied’.173 A former MOFA official expands: 
174 
 Acting as ‘professional victims’ (or some variation on this), say some officials, plays into what 
they argue is a cynical bid on the part of the OPG for subsidies from the central government. 
Remarks a current adviser to the Diet: 
175 
As the poorest prefecture in Japan, Okinawa has historically relied on subsidies following its 
reversion in 1972 as compensation for hosting a bulk of USM bases, with some towns like Kin, 
Ginowan, and Kadena – located close to major base facilities (Camp Hansen, Futenma, and Kadena 
Air Base, respectively) – sometimes collecting as much as 20% of their revenue from the bases and 
related industries.176 ‘The political pendulum swung back and forth depending on a lot of things, in 
no small part depending on what various Okinawan administrations were able to get out of the 
central government in terms of largesse because Tokyo spent a huge amount of money on Okinawa 
in big infrastructure projects and on noise abatement measures’, comments O’Neill.177  
In fact, the central government ‘gives subsidies to cover 90 percent to 95 percent of the 
costs for public works in Okinawa, while that ratio is usually around 50 percent for other 
prefectures’.178 Nago, the city within which the FRF is set to be constructed, received significant 
municipal grants following the local referendum in 1997, with the total share of central 
governmental subsidies ‘reaching almost 30% in 2001, endangering the municipality’s financial self-
sufficiency and threatening the quality of public services should central government subsidies be 
withdrawn’.179 Following the agreement between Nakaima and Abe, these subsidies are set to 
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Okinawa has enough reasons not to trust the central government or the Americans; it 
is understandable why they don’t. We didn’t treat them well, and neither did the 
Americans. They were victimised, and now victimisation is part of their identity. The 
relationship [with the US] could be slightly better, but then the Japanese would 
become their enemy […] A reduction in the number and area of US facilities could 
help – it would represent goodwill on the part of the US government – but it wouldn’t 
change the pacifist tendencies of Okinawans. They are “professional victims”. 
 
I don’t think communication can resolve a lot, because what Okinawa really wants to 
see, now, is not communication. The main factor is the subsidy from the central 
government to Okinawa. [After the December 2013 agreement], the Okinawan 
government [will] receive huge mon[ies] each year from the central government, so 
Nakaima decided to accept the relocation plan. 
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expand even further. The Japan Times reported a new subsidy programme ‘aimed at winning greater 
cooperation from base-hosting prefectural governments in efforts to reduce the burden on 
Okinawa’.180 The Yomiuri Shimbun, moreover, observed that the programme was being announced 
ahead of the November 2014 gubernatorial race in Okinawa, suggesting that it was created in an 
effort to support and maintain then-Governor Nakaima’s position against any potential anti-
relocation contenders.181 
3.4. Suspicion towards the anti-base movement 
 Knowledge of the reliance of these communities on central government subsidies has 
created some suspicion and doubt among officials in terms of not only the motives of the ABM, but 
also of how much it truly represents the views of the Okinawan population as a whole towards the 
USM and the alliance. Former CG in Naha Thomas Reich for example, in a 2006 cable, explains the 
confusion faced by USG and GOJ officials in defining who constitutes the ‘local’ in Okinawa: 
182 
A current MOFA official expresses similar views about the protesters, claiming that ‘Naha people, 
[on a] daily basis, they don’t think about the base issue’.183 ‘The base opposition doesn’t concern me 
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Nonetheless, the definition of who is "local" has become a hot topic, with those 
favoring Futenma relocation to Henoko satisfied to limit "local" to only Nago citizens, 
or even only ward residents near Henoko, while opponents insist all Okinawans are 
equal stakeholders in the issue. In early March, [then-Nago Mayor Yoshikazu] 
Shimabukuro helped the GOJ by publicly commenting that the "local communities 
who have a right to pass judgment on FRF" was limited to just three of Nago's 55 
wards, or about 5 percent of the Nago area population. Inamine told reporters on 
March 26 that "local" meant all Okinawans, not just Nago/Henoko residents. The 
same day on TV Asahi's "Sunday Project" (equivalent to "Meet the Press") Diet 
member Mikio Shimoji echoed the Governor's position, but was contradicted by 
former JDA Director General Shigeru Ishiba, who asserted that "local" means Nago 
residents only. The Okinawan media, of course, insist that all Okinawans need to pass 
judgment on the FRF plan and on March 30 both papers highlighted a planned rally by 
Nago's neighboring town of Ginoza as evidence of an expansion in "local concern." 
The papers gave prominent space to the rally against the shallow water project set for 
April 4 and the Higashi Village Chief statement that "More than just the fact that the 
flight route will pass over us, we want to make the 'appeal' that we also should be 
considered citizens of communities surrounding Henoko and, as such, should be 
consulted on the matter." 
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because the bases are a national security issue’, says Maher. ‘Some opponents are too ideological, 
and not practical; there’s no solution to be had with them’.184 
In framing the arguments of these protesters as ‘ideologically’ opposed to the US presence 
(as opposed to seeing its ‘logical’ necessity to national security), it thus follows that little can be 
done to appease their stated aims (especially, if going by the comments of Reich and others, when it 
is purportedly difficult to identify the ‘they’ whose demands should be addressed). A current adviser 
to the Diet, for instance, agrees with Maher: ‘I don’t deny the protests. But what worries me so 
much is that they [don’t] know US planning [well], so they should have a better strategy of 
negotiating [with the central government] […] But local activists are still mostly biased in their 
ideologies’.185 Yamaoka, in his discussion with Roos, likewise remarked that for Okinawans, ‘”[i]t's all 
about opposing for its own sake”’.186  
Another current MOFA official distinguishes between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ opinions of 
Okinawan activists and officials, airing the oft-repeated complaint that local news media in the 
prefecture (specifically, the two newspapers the Ryukyu Shimpo and the Okinawa Times) is also too 
‘ideological’ and unfair in its representation of central government policies: 
187 
This claim is not without basis: former Editor-in-Chief of the Shimpo, Takeshi Kakazu, previously 
remarked that ‘“[t]he ideal for Okinawa is to become a military-free island”’ and defended the 
editorial position of the paper as reflecting the sentiments of Okinawan residents.188 However, the 
same current official, along with others, notes that these newspapers have ‘a lot of impact’ in the 
prefecture and are influential in Tokyo. Former State Minister for Okinawa Seiji Maehara advised 
Campbell in an October 2009 meeting, for example, that ‘[t]he fact that Prime Minister Hatoyama's 
campaign pledge to favor out-of-Okinawa options for the FRF merited special editions of all local 
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So one person can […] say this on the newspaper, and in private it’s a totally different 
thing […] And they can drink, be very friendly, and this person can maybe have a 
brother or sisters working for the base—or for an organisation with the base. So it’s 
really hard for us, not originally from Okinawa, to understand the dynamics of 
Okinawan society, I think. I think that causes a kind of gap between Tokyo and 
Okinawa. 
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There is so much distance between Okinawa and Tokyo. So it’s very difficult for Tokyo 
people to really understand the situation in Okinawa. 
- a current MOFA official 
Okinawan newspapers should show the U.S. Government the depth of local feelings about 
realignment’.189  
 Outside of the activists and news media, officials in the central government also expressed 
to me how difficult it is to work with some local Okinawan officials, especially in terms of the FRF. 
Referring to the election of anti-base mayor Susumu Inamine in Nago in January 2014, Maher says 
‘Inamine is legally irrelevant, but he can deny landfill truck permits’.190 Addressing attempts by 
Inamine to delay the landfill process, a current adviser to the Diet argues that ‘his actual behaviour 
[causes] a lot of problems because the bureaucratic process shouldn’t be intervened [in] by the 
political whims of the mayor’.191 Like the protesters, then, these actors characterise the role of local 
Okinawan officials in base-related policymaking as either ‘irrelevant’ or their actions as being based 
on ‘political whims’ rather than on an objective ‘reality’ and whatever more specific, ‘scientific’ 
evidence is required by the central governments in making their assessments of suitable relocation 
sites. This framing is best summarised in a comment by the Diet adviser, who concludes: 
192 
4. Discursive intersections and divisions 
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details on the use of the dugong by the ABM, see Chapter 5, section 3. 
In the past, before Hatoyama, as you know, the local mayor [in Nago made] a very 
concrete request for the [FRF] plan, like, one hundred metres this way, right? That 
should be listened to carefully because that could be, you know, interwoven into the 
negotiation process. But if the protesters say, “we have to protect the dugong” and 
[the runway] shouldn’t make any V shape, what is the meaning of this? And so you 
need some other specific protesters’ explanation? Opinions, right? But the 
government doesn’t need to listen [to those] because they know the real meaning of 
the relocation plan and they know the [US] posture review doesn’t mean all [of the] 
Marine Corps could [leave] this country. So the local protesters told you [they could 
use] the US strategy for their own sake. They try to […] say, oh, “all US Marine Corps 
can go out”. That is not the plan at the alliance level, but they always protest that way. 
So this is something that the central government cannot listen to carefully, because 
they know that shouldn’t be the right interpretation of the plan. 
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 If the situation is framed in such a way that the GOJ and USG ‘cannot listen very carefully’ to 
anti-base protesters because it is ‘very difficult’ for ‘Tokyo people’ (and, following on from this, 
‘Washington people’) to ‘really understand the situation in Okinawa’, then it is unsurprising that 
officials and ‘experts’ within them often take greater interest in actively reassuring one another than 
the public about the health of the alliance (and regarding the public, therefore, as existing outside of 
the institutional context and irrelevant to its reproduction). As insulated as this site of exchange may 
appear, however, it is clear that the actions of ‘everyday’ actors in Okinawa over the Futenma 
conflict have affected the development of the PBD in terms of the specific language actors use (e.g. 
acknowledging the USM bases as a ‘burden’ on local people), the ways in which they attempt to 
relate to other sites of exchange (e.g. recognising the impact of USM facilities on Okinawan 
development), and the means by which they communicate the PBD (e.g. MOFA creating a special 
minister for Okinawan affairs). Politically speaking, this has opened up new ways of interpreting the 
impact of Futenma on the future of the alliance itself, as greater awareness of local feelings about 
the dangers posed by living near USM bases has led to the aforementioned, contradictory position 
which many of these actors now take: that the alliance’s future existence is without doubt, but that 
this same existence is threatened by the possibility of Futenma’s physical and political volatility. 
4.1. Intersection: understanding the base ‘burden’ 
 Although the preceding sections of this chapter detail narratives of difference and distance 
between officials in Tokyo, Washington, and Okinawa, there are still others that serve as intersection 
points between the PBD and the ABD. The first of these acknowledges the bases as a ‘burden’ on 
prefectural residents, describes an earnest interest in minimising the impact of this ‘burden’, and 
details means by which officials in the central governments can support the local economy to be less 
reliant on base-related revenues. Teare, for example, claims that the disapproval of the US presence 
‘did not have so much to do with troop behavior […] as with our continued heavy presence on 
Okinawa. Our use of land, our exercising, artillery fire over traveled highways, even marines jogging 
along the road as part of their training’.193 A former MOFA official continues: ‘It’s the “Not In My 
Backyard” syndrome of people, same as nuclear power […] [T]here’s an argument from the people of 
Okinawa who say “well, having the US bases here, doesn’t that actually make us a target?”’.194  
 Officials are also wary, given their understanding of these tensions and the central 
government’s role in maintaining the USM presence, of how the possible ramifications that any 
major accident or incident, especially involving Futenma, might be felt not only within the 
prefecture, but also within the alliance. ‘We have to go with the original plan or we will lose 
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everything’, says a former MOFA official. ‘Statistically, another major accident at Futenma is bound 
to happen, whether next year or ten years from now—and when it does, it might shut down 
Futenma and there would be no replacement facility for it’.195 Schoff also acknowledges that ‘a big, 
big accident could be a game-changer, especially if it involves US military negligence’.196 In fact, in a 
meeting between Roos, former SDP President Mizuho Fukushima and then-Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transportation Senior Vice Minister (VM) Kiyomi Tsujimoto in December 2009, 
Tsujimoto cautioned: ‘the FRF will be the "Achilles heel" of the Alliance and while the base may 
ultimately get built, it will be like "lighting a fire" of opposition to all of the other bases in 
Okinawa’.197 
 In the face of these local challenges to the PBD, the central government in Tokyo has 
recently taken very public steps towards not simply alleviating the ‘burden’ through expanding its 
subsidy programme, but also by increasing its investment into alternative industries. The 2012 and 
2013 Diplomatic Bluebooks both detail the creation of multiple-entry visas for Chinese tourists 
visiting Okinawa, of which there were over 25,000 in 2013 (out of nearly 300,000 total from across 
northeast and Southeast Asia).198 ‘We as a whole of Japan are now trying to increase the [number of] 
travellers from all over the world, and if Okinawa can be a kind of window, especially for Southeast 
Asia and other Asian areas’, says one current MOFA official, ‘that can be good for Okinawa’s 
economy’.199 In his first talks with Nakaima after being elected PM, Abe similarly expressed that 
‘"[i]nvestment in Okinawa is an investment in the future”’ and called Okinawan development ‘a 
matter of interest for the whole country’.200 Still, says one current Diet adviser, more should be done 
to aid those residents in the prefecture outside of the construction and tourism industries: ‘if you 
are just a farmer, you don’t have any reason to accept [the subsidy]. That will not affect your 
income’.201  
Just as officials acknowledge the language of ‘burden’ with regards to the day-to-day living 
situation alongside military bases, they recognise that the historical differences in identities between 
Okinawa and the mainland are sometimes significantly felt. ‘Before coming to Okinawa, I thought 
Okinawa is, of course, part of Japan, so Okinawan people [are], how to say—their minds [are] fully 
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Japanese’, says one current MOFA official. ‘But after coming here, I understand that the history and 
the culture [are] very different from the mainland, so their way of thinking is sometimes very 
different [as well]’.202 A former official concurs, remarking that this is because 
203 
It is not only war memory, however, that separates the Okinawan experience from that of 
mainland Japanese residents. Then-MOFA DG Chikao Kawai, for example, remarked to former US 
Navy (USN) Secretary Donald Winter in September 2006 that ‘progress’ on the FRF project ‘was 
more problematic […] given the prevailing sentiment among most residents of Okinawa that they 
had been sacrificed for the benefit of Japan's four main islands "for centuries”’.204 The former official 
further observes that following the handover of Okinawa to USM administration after WWII, ‘there’s 
a sense [of:] […] Why was Okinawa not allowed back into Japan when the rest of Japan had enjoyed 
independence and was growing […] as well? Why had it allowed Okinawa to become part of US 
control for so long?’ O’Neill adds: ‘We euphemistically referred to "U.S. administration" but, in fact, 
the senior U.S. official in Okinawa during that period was an Army lieutenant general, called the high 
commissioner for the Ryukyu Islands. A State Department officer was his political advisor […] but 
there was no doubt that the Army was in charge’.205  
4.2. Intersection: alternatives to the Futenma relocation 
 While there appears to therefore be a relatively high degree of cognisance regarding the 
complications surrounding the FRF and bases directly as a result of historical experience and the 
actions taken by previous Japanese and American administrations, the coherence in these actors’ 
narrative regarding the ‘necessity’ of relocating Futenma within Okinawa has also been strong. 
Nonetheless, alternatives to Henoko and Camp Schwab have been presented over the years.206 
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there is a feeling that, the fact that the only place in mainland Japan that was subject 
to ground warfare during WWII is Okinawa. So, we know about the Hiroshimas, the 
Nagasakis, the bombings of the big cities in Tokyo—these are all bombs flying from 
above. The only place where there was ground warfare in mainland Japan was 
Okinawa. And 100,000 people died. So there’s a sense among the Okinawan people, 
especially the elderly, that the Japanese central government and the military [were] 
treating them as second-class, therefore they allowed ground warfare to happen, and 
they allowed so many civilians to die. 
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Teare, for example, commented in 1998: 
207 
Maher, speaking to the same question, adds that ‘American politicians would close overseas bases 
before closing ones in their own districts’,208 thus revealing, in the chance that the US government 
were to find itself in domestic financial straits, a window of opportunity for overseas bases – 
including the ones in Japan – to be closed as a money-saving measure. Further to this, on the 
relocation of Futenma specifically, former US Senator Carl Levin, a long-time member of the SASC, 
‘denounced the relocation plan as “unrealistic, unworkable and unaffordable”’ in 2011.209  
On the argument that the FRF must remain within Okinawa for ‘deterrence’ value, 
Hatoyama, in an interview with the Ryukyu Shimpo in February 2011, expressed scepticism: 
210 
While not agreeing with Hatoyama’s view exactly, Brooks expresses his belief that ‘the Marines don’t 
like the relocation; they’d rather keep Futenma open forever, since it’s actually more irritating for 
them to move north’.211 A current adviser to the Diet also comments on the difficulty of 
implementing the relocation project within any of the timelines agreed upon by the two 
governments: ‘I don’t know what the government will do the next, but if they wanted to keep their 
word to governor of Okinawa, Governor Nakaima, the construction years are very limited, right? Five 
years? How [are they going to] make the new facility within that [time]? Actually, this is really very 
difficult’.212  
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Suppose that Korea is one day unified or at least that North Korea no longer 
represents a threat to the South and other neighbors, then what? And then you can 
imagine various scenarios but most of them would involve a very substantial 
reduction [in US forces]. Such a reduction would then be possible in our presence on 
Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan. 
When Tokunoshima Island (in Kagoshima Prefecture) refused to host an alternative 
facility, we had no choice but to move it to Henoko, so I had to come up with a 
rationale to justify it. I didn't think the presence of Marines in Okinawa would work 
directly as deterrence against war, but without the Marines, the US military would not 
be able to function fully in terms of interoperability, and that would affect deterrence. 
As for the deterrent effect of the Marines themselves, you all think they are not a 
deterrent, and that is also my understanding. If you say it was a pretext, then it was a 
pretext. But I thought I could still use the word ‘deterrence’ in a broader sense. 
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4.3. Division: perceptions of history and current threats 
In spite of these salient points of intersection, there are just as many important dividing 
points at which the PBD, ABD, and their attendant narratives appear to be at an impasse. One of 
these is how history is perceived and, say some officials, manipulated by Okinawans. ‘In terms of the 
history of war and colonization, that was a long time ago in Okinawa, so it’s not part of the current 
historical issues for Japan’, argues a former MOFA official, continuing: ‘post-World War II pacifists, 
the baby boomers, in Japan will never change their minds—they have an instinctive hatred towards 
any enhancement to the US-Japan Security Treaty and to Japan’s right to collective self-defense’.213 
O’Neill further contends that ‘it was the existence of these bases that put Okinawa on the map in 
terms of the central government in Tokyo. Had the bases not been there, I think Okinawa would 
have got a lot less attention because of the lingering prejudice toward Okinawans’.214  
Nonetheless, says Konishi, it is likely in his view that Japanese officials merely pay ‘lip 
service’ or give ‘the token “burden” speech’, but don’t actually care much for the base issue.215 
Yabunaka seems to confirm this when he ‘concurred fully with the Ambassador's assessment that 
the DPJ's election-period rhetoric ought not to be taken at face value, but that continuity in Japan's 
foreign policy and continued close cooperation between the United States and Japan remain 
critical’; he later also recommended that ‘any policy change based on political needs ought to be 
symbolic and not have significant impact on substantive issues’.216 The Diet adviser agrees: ‘I don’t 
think that policymakers in the government listen very carefully to what protesters say. Of course, if 
you make interviews with officials in MOFA, they say, “we closely watch [the developments in 
Okinawa]”. But I don’t think they have [any] reason to listen carefully’.217  
 Given that these same officials had previously framed actors promoting the ABD as 
‘protesting for protest’s sake’, that they have an ‘instinctive hatred’ towards the alliance, and that 
their arguments represent mere ‘sentiment’ or ‘opinions’ to the extreme, it thus follows that they 
would claim that central government officials pretend to listen, but in practice do what is best for 
the alliance’s continuity. Against this background, actors from diplomatic sites likewise view with 
suspicion Okinawa’s historical closeness (as a former tributary state under the Ryukyu Kingdom) with 
China. ‘Okinawan people [have] a tendency to request a diplomatic solution with China and North 
Korea’, says one current MOFA official. ‘I would say their concern is very limited, I think, […] to the 
main Okinawan islands. Most of them are interested only in this island. Not Miyagoshima, not 
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Ishigaki’.218 Another current official adds: ‘you know, we cannot imagine sometimes [that] we will 
face a war [because] Japan has been in a very secure and calm position for more than sixty years, […] 
so I don’t think people in Okinawa feel the threat of China or North Korea firsthand’.219  
This distance in ‘feeling the threat’ is also apparent in the level of importance assigned to the 
‘Okinawa issue’ and the attached ‘Futenma issue’ in comparison to other, ‘first-order’ security 
matters. For example, in an interview with Mochizuki conducted by the US Asia Pacific Council220, he 
was asked if the ‘preoccupation’ with the Futenma relocation ‘is distracting us from addressing other 
important issues?’221 Maher likewise remarks that ‘the idea that Okinawa is an “obstacle” to the 
continued existence of the alliance is an exaggerated one’, saying that even during the Hatoyama 
years, USJ relations remained ‘robust’.222  
4.4. Division: the bases as a necessary burden 
 What Maher and others suggest is that no matter the outcome of the FRF dispute – or even 
the ongoing challenges posed to the alliance as a whole by the ‘Okinawa issue’ – there remains 
enough support for the alliance to maintain it without significantly altering the USM presence. 
Officials and ‘experts’ inside the diplomatic corps in Washington and Tokyo have consistently linked 
the prosperity and security of the Asia-Pacific region to the alliance, and thus view the bases through 
this lens as a critical element of the alliance’s fundamental purpose—namely, military deterrence. In 
doing so, however, their narratives – while sometimes containing within them a certain degree of 
understanding or sympathy towards Okinawan residents regarding the bases as a ‘burden’ – 
nevertheless tend to emphasise the necessity of the bases for national and regional security and 
exclude, in large part, the actual ‘political subject of (in)security’ (and/or suggest that these 
‘subjects’ – Okinawan residents – do not understand or ‘see’ the ‘real threats’ to their safety and 
security).223  
For example, one current official told me: ‘from my standpoint, I am working at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs so I need to think about Japan’s security, but if I were just working at the Naha 
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office or working at a restaurant or something, I wouldn’t have to care about [national] security, 
right?’224 Even in 1970, finds Baker, a U.S. News and World Report saying that the US would pull out 
of Okinawa and Japan and relocate its forces to Guam or the Mariana Islands was met with 
immediate backlash from Japanese media: ‘[t]he story would “create perturbation among [U.S.] 
allies,” said one Japanese newspaper. A commentator in another national paper said that “it is 
obvious that an American withdrawal will create a big power vacuum in the defense setup in 
Southeast Asia and the Far East”’.225 More recently, Nye commented that the USG and GOJ ‘will miss 
a major opportunity if they let the base controversy lead to bitter feelings or the further reduction of 
American forces in Japan’, whom he called ‘[t]he best guarantee of security in a region where China 
remains a long-term challenge and a nuclear North Korea’.226  
‘Perhaps one day Okinawans will see the strategic importance of the US military forces’, says 
Szechenyi. ‘It is an unfair burden on Okinawa, but this must be considered against the need for 
deterrence in the region’.227 ‘The Japanese government wanted to come out where we did [on the 
Futenma relocation]’, recounts Mondale of the FRF negotiation process. ‘There was never any 
question. In the privacy of my discussions with their leaders […] they didn't want to kick us out of 
Okinawa. They wanted to get this thing back to some kind of stability’.228 Former Cabinet Secretary 
Yoshito Sengoku more candidly told a Tokyo press conference in 2010 that Okinawans would have to 
‘grin and bear’ the FRF; that December, when then-PM Kan visited the prefecture, he ‘expressed his 
“unbearable shame as a Japanese” at the way the prefecture had been treated, only to go on to say 
that relocation of the Futenma base to Henoko “may not be the best choice for the people of 
Okinawa but in practical terms it is the better choice”’.229 One current MOFA official counters this 
idea slightly, commenting: ‘I think maybe we should discuss it more, but we rarely talk about [the] 
kind of benefits [of the bases] for local people’.230 Even if the government did invest more effort into 
explaining these ‘benefits’, there is scepticism that it would make much of an impact in Okinawa—
this assumption based, again, on the notion that local residents are not interested in the ‘objective’ 
operational considerations for maintaining the USM presence. For example, Oros remarks: ‘The US 
Marine Corps and Japanese government don’t clearly articulate reasons why the Marines should be 
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in Okinawa. They don’t really explain the military technology aspect of it, but, even if they did—
would Okinawans really care? No’.231  
In terms of what these officials think Okinawans do care about, their predictions about the 
future of the USM presence in the prefecture is consistent with the previous discussion of the 
perception gap in terms of ‘threats’ to the region. ‘I’m not sure it [US force level in Japan] can be 
diminishing’, says a current MOFA official. ‘It can’t be zero’. A former official, echoing Nye and 
others, reiterates the ‘deterrence’ argument behind the importance of the USM presence, and why 
the Okinawans must continue to ‘grin and bear it’: 
232 
Framing the relocation, therefore, as something that is out of their hands or ability to 
change given the way they have constructed the ‘security’ narrative in terms of an ‘unstable’ Asia-
Pacific, these officials afford little agency to Okinawans in the policymaking process. For example, 
one former MOFA official says that although the central government has ‘been keenly aware of the 
concerns of the local residents [or] […] civil organizations’ and was ‘paying attention to, you know, 
those voices [that were] expressed […] at the end of the day those [base] shapes and structures and 
sizes, they need to be negotiated between the two governments’.233 A current official adds to this: 
234 
In remarking that the base presence cannot be reduced to ‘zero’, this official (and the other former 
MOFA official cited earlier) simplify the demands of the ABM, which is constituted by a variety of 
groups with a variety of strategies and arguments, down to what appears to be an unfeasible 
position – full withdrawal of all US forces from Okinawa (if not Japan) – and thus justifies their belief 
that these demands can and should be dismissed outright. 
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We [Japan] don’t have our own offensive capability. We have a lot of areas of 
instability around Japan, hence we need the US forces to provide the deterrence so 
that those areas of instability do not really become actual hotspots. So long as that is 
the case, it makes most sense to have the bases in the area that is closest to those 
hotspots and ... unfortunately for the Okinawan people, Okinawa is located there. 
Of course local communities have complained about the USFJ’s activities, like plane 
noises, and that kind of thing—I understand their opinions and their concerns, but as 
a government, what we have to ensure is Japan’s security. From that standpoint, you 
know, US forces always need to conduct day-to-day training. That creates noises, of 
course, but they, you know, the US Department of Defense and US government try to 
mitigate that kind of impact, but that’s, you know, that’s not gonna be zero. So what 
we always keep in mind is to secure the security, and ... to maintain and develop the 
Japan-US alliance. 
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Similarly, in the case of the FRF, officials frame protesters of the current relocation plan as 
also adhering to this ‘extreme’ position and, therefore, do not have to be considered seriously. For 
example, a current official says that ‘they [protesters] can delay the process, but I [don’t] think they 
[can] stop the process. So it can complicate the issue, but our main policy is not changed’.235 ‘What 
the protesters request is not a change, just [the] abolishment of the plan, right? So no compromise 
could be made between [them and the central government’, a current adviser to the Diet adds.236 A 
former MOFA official agrees: ‘when it comes to security issues, there is something that we cannot 
compromise. So ... of course, it’s a difficult choice, but at the end of the day we have to come up 
with the most ideal package without compromising the deterrence and the major objectives of the 
alliance’.237  On a more fundamental level which goes beyond the language of ‘security’ or ‘securing 
the security’ (at which point the word itself appears to truly be an empty signifier), the Diet adviser 
concludes that Futenma’s relocation to Henoko is ‘the most important [issue] to central government 
officials because ‘all agreements should be satisfied. If not, we will be scolded by the United States’. 
Conclusion 
 The ‘major objectives of the alliance’ – while on the one hand denoting those stated 
throughout this chapter by officials and ‘experts’ to include the alliance’s ability to provide 
deterrence, disaster relief efforts, and assist in PKOs – may, on the other, be considered part of the 
‘collective memories’ of the USJA as an institution, with these memories driving the reproduction of 
the various narratives subsumed under the PBD from one administration to the next. Arguing in 
favour of limiting the number of sites of discursive exchange in the policymaking process to those 
located within the central governments of the US and Japan, they thus frame the base issue as one 
that cannot fundamentally be altered or interfered with by local Okinawan residents and officials. 
Furthermore, by labelling the arguments of these actors as ‘opinions’ or ‘complaints’, they likewise 
reinforce the core belief that the base issue, like the alliance more generally, is one that can only be 
negotiated and handled properly in specific, ‘objective’ sites (Tokyo and Washington) lest it be 
manipulated for purely ‘political’ or ‘ideological’ purposes in others (Okinawa).  
The coherence of this discourse is nonetheless indicative of these same officials’ ‘limited 
information’ in (re)producing it, as the linguistic devices used within its narratives – whether using 
vague terms like ‘instability’ to describe the security situation in the Asia-Pacific and provide a 
rationale for the USM presence in Japan, or link through heavy implication Okinawan protesters with 
Chinese agitation – have not changed significantly in content or form in decades. Even if these 
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officials and ‘experts’ do not express serious concerns about the sustainability and continued 
reproduction of the alliance as an institution, however, this does not mean that their argument 
towards this aim is free from contradictions—nor that other issues outside of the bases and 
Futenma are not complicating this picture of a stable future.  
‘Given the potentially volatile security situation in East Asia and Japanese doubts concerning 
the U.S. commitment to Asian security, Japan may come to feel compelled to provide for its own 
defense’, wrote Berger in 1993.238 While circumstances have changed since Berger made these 
observations, serious concerns have been raised by Japanese officials in recent years about the 
assuredness of US commitments to the region, especially over the disputed Senkaku Islands with 
China. Furthermore, the rise of a more vocal, nationalist right wing in Japan, while not necessarily 
posing an immediate challenge to the alliance, may nonetheless prove difficult to resolve in the long 
term. Krauss further warns that the lack of ‘institutionalized, authoritative, coordinating 
organizations and mechanisms to handle relationships across and between [the US and Japanese] 
governments and between them and the public’ during the Hatoyama administration does not bode 
well in dealing with any potential future crises that the alliance might face.239  
Like Konishi’s observations about the lack of a coherent public diplomacy strategy of the 
alliance ‘risk[ing] the necessity of the alliance being questioned at a more fundamental level’, Krauss 
comments that ‘to a surprising extent the [Japanese] government still seems to rely on informal and 
ad hoc measures, relationships, and organizations to coordinate, communicate, and persuade other 
actors involved in the crisis. This of course is then subject to the individual personalities, self-
interests, and capabilities of the individuals involved’. In the case of the USJA, while the ‘individual 
personalities’ cited in this chapter claim to be interested in ‘making progress’ on Futenma in order to 
move onto ‘first-order’ issues, the discursive strategies they have employed in promoting this policy 
have, in fact, done very little in accomplishing it. Especially with regards to the tendency of Japanese 
officials to ‘pass the buck’ on Futenma from one administration to the next – and the tendency of US 
officials, in turn, to claim that relocations are ‘domestic’ Japanese procedures and they cannot, 
therefore, be held responsible for their lack of ‘progress’ – it is apparent that a lack of ‘decisive’ 
political action has been one factor behind policy stasis. It is not the only one, however.  
In addition, says O’Shea, by reproducing a narrative in which ‘the possibility of a Japan 
without the United States [is] unthinkable’, US and Japanese officials have thus linked together the 
USM presence with the survival of the alliance.240 A third factor, however, remains outside of this 
                                                          
238 Thomas U. Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism’, International 
Security, 17:4 (1993), pp. 119-151, pp. 124-125. 
239 Krauss 2013, p. 194. 
240 O’Shea 2014, pp. 441-442. 
Grinberg 139 
 
‘elite’ realm, as it involves the same ‘everyday’ actors who are so often dismissed by officials from 
diplomatic sites—but whose discursive strategies and physical activities have also created policy 
stasis on Futenma. On this point, Nye warned in 2010: 
 241 
 
 
  
                                                          
241 Nye 2010. 
Sometimes Japanese officials quietly welcome gaiatsu, or foreign pressure, to help 
resolve their own bureaucratic deadlocks. But that is not the case here: if the United 
States undercuts the new Japanese government and creates resentment among the 
Japanese public, then a victory on Futenma could prove Pyrrhic. 
Grinberg 140 
 
You know, someone once said: “if Okinawa wasn’t there, we’d have to build it”. Because it 
is very, very important for Korean contingencies, for Taiwanese contingencies, and even for 
contingencies in Southeast Asia. As the Marines on Oki will tell you, with its location, even 
with helicopters […] they can self-deploy from Okinawa, they can hop from island to island 
and get all the way down to the Philippines. You can’t do that from mainland [Japan]. 
- Bruce Klingner, former CIA Division Chief for Korea 
 
Chapter 4. Sites of defence exchange:  
‘If Okinawa wasn’t there, we’d have to build it’ 
Introduction 
 Although Nye spoke of the possibility of a ‘Pyrrhic’ victory on the FRF in 2010, the gravity of 
this warning, especially following the resignation of Hatoyama and the end of the ‘crisis’ in bilateral 
relations, appears to have lessened significantly. The Abe administration’s firm recommitment to the 
previous policy on the relocation, while not allaying all fears related to continued delays of its 
implementation, has nonetheless re-entrenched – as is evident from the previous chapter – the 
strength of the PBD across both diplomatic and defensive sites of exchange. Across the latter, while 
similar narratives are echoed to those in diplomatic sites – including that the USM serves as a 
‘deterrent’ force for ‘peace and security’ in the region, that Henoko remains the ‘only’ relocation 
option for the FRF, and that defence officials are interested in ‘national’ security, not just ‘local’ 
security – there is an added dimension of operational specificity due to the heightened presence of 
military officials in these circles (see Klingner’s quote above). These actors also bring with them a 
greater awareness of the historical role of the USM in Okinawa and its impact on the prefecture’s 
socioeconomic development since WWII—and this awareness helps broaden and deepen the 
sociohistorical context within which the PBD was created and has evolved to its current state. 
 Examining the narratives of actors in sites of exchange including the MOD, SDF, DOD, and 
the USM (in particular US Pacific Command [PACOM] and the USMC), this chapter therefore fills out 
further the PBD as established in Chapter 3 in order to determine not only how it has been 
successfully reproduced in government policies, but also how its proponents have influenced the 
ABD (and been influenced in return). As previously mentioned, many of the discursive strategies 
used by these actors reflect those of their colleagues in diplomatic sites: for example, the use of 
vague terminology – including ‘security’, ‘strategic importance’, and ‘uncertainty’ – and, like 
diplomatic actors, those in defence sites also tend to dismiss or ignore that these terms can carry a 
variety of meanings outside of their ‘accepted’ definitions. In many cases, however, the views 
expressed by defensive actors forego some of the more euphemistic language found amongst 
officials in the diplomatic corps (e.g. the bases as a ‘burden’ on the local populations in Okinawa) in 
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favour of establishing even blunter and graver chains of connotation between the USM presence in 
Okinawa/Japan, the strength of the USJA, and regional, if not global, peace.  
They choose this strategy not only as a means by which to re-entrench and increase popular 
acceptance of the PBD, but also as a way of publicly discrediting or undermining the narratives 
presented by proponents of the ABD both in Okinawa and further afield. At the same time, just as 
with the diplomatic corps, there is a determined discursive effort on the part of both individual 
members and groups within these organisations and institutions to separate the FRF debate from 
the other, more important ‘business’ of the alliance, as well as repeated declarations to the effect 
that Futenma is a local issue, not a national one (and certainly not a bilateral security issue). 
Again, however, due in large part to the historical proximity which defence officials, 
especially those from the military, have with US base facilities in Japan and in Okinawa, it follows 
that their professional socialisation and strategies will differ from those at diplomatic sites. Given 
their heightened awareness of the problems on the ground resulting from these facilities, they are 
therefore more familiar with the past and current grievances of the local populations on a person-to-
person basis. The result of this more regular, physical contact with the issue has been, as is discussed 
in sections 3 and 4, efforts to improve civil-military relations over the years, especially since the 1995 
rape. While these efforts have been met with varying success and the financial stability and 
institutional survival of the USM in Okinawa (and the alliance more broadly) often override concerns 
about improving relations, they still provide an important juxtaposition point against which the clear 
picture of institutional stability and continuity presented in favour of the PBD by actors in diplomatic 
sites can be challenged and questioned by their colleagues within defence sites. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that this chapter cites a number of speeches from the 
online, publicly-accessible archives of the DOD on US relations with Japan and the Okinawa base 
issue—although the availability and ‘accessibility’ of these materials is questionable. I argue this 
because, while this content is, indeed, available online for public consumption, this does not mean 
that it is widely known of, cited, or discussed in any depth in the previous literature on the USJA. 
While this is, in part, due to oversight by other analysts, it is also, I argue, because this genre of texts 
is representative of the insularity of the national security policymaking process (including alliance-
related policies), as many of them were given at invitation-only events or tailored to suit specific 
audiences who are assumed to already know and understand their context, who the speakers are, 
and why they are expressing the views that they do.  
When reading these same transcripts many years later – as a member of the ‘unintended’ 
audience – the implied or stated connections between the USJA, USM presence, Okinawan bases, 
Futenma, and regional ‘peace’ and ‘security’ do not necessarily come across as tidy ‘daisy chains’ of 
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meaning that are understood by everyone. In fact, in stringing together all of these disparate 
concepts, locations, and actors, the narratives presented across this chapter actually serve, at times, 
to confuse the discursive interactions between themselves and others—and, in turn, muddies the 
range of possibilities for interpretation by actors in diplomatic and ‘everyday’ sites of exchange.  
1. Historical memory and threat perception 
Veterans know Okinawa as ‘The Rock’. 
- Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former Commander of USMC Forces Pacific 
 
Known as the ‘Typhoon of Steel’, the Battle of Okinawa is often singled out amongst others 
from WWII as being not only the site of land-based combat between American and Japanese forces 
closest to mainland Japan, but also for its particularly brutal toll on civilians. Starting on 1 April 1945 
and ending on 22 June of that year, the battle involved over 170,000 US troops, 77,000 Japanese 
forces, 22,000 local militia, and hundreds of thousands of Okinawan civilians mobilised to fight and 
treat the wounded.1 In many cases documented during the battle, these same civilians were forced 
to commit mass suicide rather than surrender to American forces, were killed by retreating imperial 
Japanese forces, or died of starvation and diseases such as malaria.2 Former US SecDef William Perry 
recalled in several speeches his own experience of the devastation he witnessed following the battle 
as a young soldier: ‘Not a building was intact where this last great battle with the Pacific was fought. 
The southern half of the island was stripped bare of vegetation and livestock; 160,000 combatants 
and civilians had been killed, and many of the survivors were still living in caves’.3 
The USM’s victory over imperial Japanese forces in Okinawa constituted a breach of Japan’s 
innermost defences. Once taken, US forces quickly set about establishing bases there – both on 
existing Japanese facilities and by building new ones – in order to prepare for a full-out assault on 
the mainland. Okinawa’s inhabitants, meanwhile, were confined to concentration camps in the 
northern part of the main island.4 While this assault never took place, the bases remained following 
the unconditional surrender of the GOJ on 15 August 1945—and so did a sizeable portion of US 
                                                          
1 Martin Folly, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of The Second World War (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004). 
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forces, which formally occupied the prefecture under the USM Government of the Ryukyu Islands 
and, later, the US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) until the reversion of Okinawa 
to mainland Japan in 1972. 
Although this battle is deeply embedded in the ABD (more on this in Chapter 5), it has also 
haunted the institutional memory of the USMC, whose 1st, 2nd and 6th divisions constituted a 
significant portion of the amphibious assault on the island. Robert Eldridge, former deputy assistant 
chief of staff of government and external affairs for the USMC in Okinawa, explains that this is 
because ‘there were emotional attachments to the island following the great losses of American 
soldiers in taking Okinawa […] and thus the military strongly resisted its being returned to Japan’.5 
The III MEF, currently based in Okinawa, still boasts a force of nearly 19,000 Marines and sailors at 
full strength6, and this substantial presence underscores the success that the PBD has had on policy 
in the post-war period—not only in maintaining existing facilities, but also in reproducing the stories 
and broader narratives about the necessity of the US presence which has enabled it to become, over 
time, a ‘symbol of sustained U.S. commitment’ to Japan and the region.7 
In discussing the historical development of this symbol from the post-WWII period into the 
present, section 1 thus makes clear how the role of the USM in Okinawa – and, following on from 
this, their role in Japan and the role of the USJA itself – has been framed in such a way by its 
proponents in defence sites that its importance in the post-war era remains both paramount and, 
for the most part, indisputable. By using the symbolic value of the USMC in this manner and 
connecting this value to all US forces in Japan (and to the alliance), these actors demonstrate how 
the emotive power of discourse – playing here on historical memory – can help perpetuate a set of 
policies which have not been seriously evaluated in decades and whose efficacy might otherwise be 
more widely questioned. Beyond policy, however, what also becomes clear in this section is the 
power of a specific narrative to reach into the mundane ‘everyday’—and, in writing itself into the 
fabric of people’s lives, it becomes more easily reproducible.  
1.1. The US military in Okinawa 
How the USFJ came to acquire this potent symbolism both within the US defence 
establishment as well as in Tokyo is not as clear-cut a narrative as it may at first appear. Kimie Hara 
cites a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee document dated 24 June 1946 which specifically 
recommends that Okinawa not be placed under a USM trusteeship after the war, as that would be 
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‘contrary to its [the US’s] policy of opposing territorial expansion whether for itself or for other 
countries’ and ‘would in all probability require a considerable financial outlay by the [US] for the 
support and development of the islands and would involve the United States in the thankless task of 
governing three-quarters of a million people of totally alien culture and outlook’.8  
However, as regional tensions arose in the immediate post-war period involving Japan’s 
neighbours, pressure for the US to keep control over the prefecture mounted, lead in part by the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) Douglas MacArthur. A 1947 memorandum by him 
reads:  
9 
By this time, the quickly-established USM Government of Okinawa had set about not only providing 
provisions to the impoverished and, in many cases, displaced civilian population, but also 
maintaining the military facilities and their surrounding lands seized in the heat of the battle and its 
aftermath. As mentioned by Gregson at the start of this section, Okinawa became known as ‘the 
Rock’ by veterans for its near-total destruction during the war—but also as ‘the Junk Yard’, a 
dumping ground for used-up military hardware.10  
MacArthur’s views and his influence on then-diplomat George Kennan (known for his 
advocacy of the US’s ‘containment’ policy), combined with the measures taken by USCAR to retain 
the USM presence by building sturdier facilities, helped ensure that Okinawa ‘would be regarded as 
distinct from the Japanese home islands when the Occupation finally came to an end’.11 
Furthermore, the widely-read Civil Affairs Handbook published by the USM government played a 
hand in influencing American opinion within Okinawa, particularly with regard to historical racial 
discrimination by mainland Japanese against Ryukyu islanders which contained ‘potential seeds of 
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11 In fact, simply in order to withstand the tremendous typhoons which regularly hit the prefecture and make 
their facilities more cost-effective, US Army (USAR) officials recommended making the bases ‘sturdier’—a 
suggestion which was taken up more enthusiastically with the breakout of the Korean War in 1950 (L. Eve 
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Chizuru Saeki furthermore quotes a New York Times article from the era as calling Okinawa the ‘Pearl Harbor’ 
of the USAF in terms of its importance as a strategic bomber base (2012, p. 23). 
Control over this group must be vested in the United States as absolutely essential to 
the defense of our Western Pacific Frontier. It is not indigenous to Japan 
ethnologically, does not contribute to Japan's economic welfare, nor do the 
Japanese people expect to be permitted to retain it. It is basically strategic, and in 
my opinion, failure to secure it for control by the United States might prove militarily 
disastrous ... 
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dissension out of which political capital might be made’.12 This distinction passed into law under 
Article 3 of the Treaty of San Francisco, signed between the GOJ and the Allied Powers on 8 
September 1951, which formally placed Okinawa under US trusteeship.   
Following the official transfer of administration from the central government in Tokyo to 
USCAR, land acquisition for the purposes of expanding military facilities – sometimes taken using 
force or threat of force – continued, oftentimes without properly compensating local landowners.13 
GOJ involvement during this period was minimal save for its repeated declarations in joint 
communiques and statements from a succession of post-war PMs of ‘the strong desire of the 
Japanese people for the return of administrative control over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to 
Japan’14 and the attendant responses from American presidents to ‘make further efforts to enhance 
the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus’15—with the caveat that Okinawan 
reversion was conditional on ‘the day when the security interests of the free world in the Far East 
will permit the realization of this desire’.16 The executives in both governments, however, concurred 
with the narrative conveyed by USM officials such as MacArthur as to the ‘vital role’ played by the 
bases in Okinawa ‘in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East’.17 
Punctuating this, a secret agreement was signed between Japanese FM Aiichiro Fujiyama and 
MacArthur on 6 January 1960 which stated that ‘solely in the exceptional case of an emergency in 
Korea […] the USA could use bases without prior consultation in a state of emergency’.18 
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Nevertheless, the pro-reversion demonstrations which greeted President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s 1960 visit to Okinawa helped spur a loosening of the USM administration’s control 
over the islands, and his successor, John F. Kennedy, declared the prefecture in 1962 to be an 
‘integral’ part of Japan, allowing the GOJ to contribute financial aid to it.19 However, the heavy use of 
the bases from the mid- to late 1960s during the Vietnam War only enflamed the pro-reversion 
movement on the island and the anti-war movement throughout Japan. Although reluctant to hand 
back administration to Tokyo due to the importance of Okinawa as a base for B-52 aircrafts, then-
President Lyndon Johnson gave his promise – which was fulfilled by his successor, Richard Nixon, in 
1971 – that it would be done.20 By then, however, the utility of Okinawan bases for contingencies in 
East and Southeast Asia had become so well-broadcast that the DOD began referring to the 
prefecture as the ‘Keystone of the Pacific’—a slogan so widely used that it was engraved on USM 
license plates in Okinawa (an example of a security narrative reaching into the ‘everyday’).21 
The 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement not only changed the nature of daily life in the 
prefecture (such as converting currency from US dollars back to yen and changing the driving side of 
the road from right to left), but also placed Okinawa back under the USJ-ST, meaning that the US 
could no longer store nuclear weapons on the islands nor lease or own land therein.22 At the same 
time, a significant portion of land used by USM forces was returned back to the prefecture – nearly 
21% – though it took many more years to settle the claims of local landowners who had not been 
compensated for their losses.23 Furthermore, note Atsushi Toriyama and David Buist, the agreement 
– which was made on the ‘absolute condition’ that US facilities would be, for the most part, kept 
intact and maintained – served to actually strengthen the USMC presence ‘in order to accommodate 
the forces then being withdrawn from Vietnam’, and thus ‘[r]eturning administrative control to 
Japan became a necessity precisely in order to retain the functionality of the bases’.24  
1.2. US bases as the ‘keystone’ of the Pacific 
It is evident from the preceding historical account, then, that it has not only been through 
the actions of defence officials within the USG, but also those within the central GOJ, that the 
physical presence of the bases and their ‘functionality’ has been retained. The narrative they have 
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relied upon to do so, which stresses the ‘essential’ nature of Okinawa to the defence of Japan and 
the region, gathered strength to the point that, following reversion, when the DOD considered 
withdrawing the USMC from Okinawa, the GOJ intervened in order to stop this from ever happening. 
As former Okinawa Times editor Tomohiro Yara reports, during a July 1973 meeting of the Japan-US 
Security Treaty Consultative Group Committee, Kubo Takaya, head of Japan’s Defence Agency (later 
the MOD), argued: ‘Given the need for a mobile force in Asia, the US Marines should be retained’. In 
response, Thomas P. Shoesmith, chief minister at the US Embassy, reported back to Washington that 
his Japanese counterparts understood the USMC presence in Okinawa as ‘[the] most tangible 
evidence of US willingness to respond promptly to a direct threat against Japan’.25  
This intervention is not necessarily surprising, however, when placed in the context of the 
central GOJ’s prior ‘secret agreements’26 with the US following reversion. Included among these was 
an ‘Agreed Minute to the Joint Communique’ signed by Nixon and PM Eisaku Sato in 1969 which 
allowed for the US, ‘in time of great emergency’, the right to ‘require the re-entry of nuclear 
weapons and transit rights in Okinawa with prior consultation with the Government of Japan. The 
United States Government would anticipate a favorable response [emphasis added]’.27 Although this 
pact was concluded privately, publicly US presidents continued to frame the US as a ‘Pacific nation 
[which] maintains a strong interest in the Asian-Pacific region, and will continue to play an active and 
constructive role there’28; that the government’s intention was to ‘maintain an adequate level of 
deterrent forces in the region’29; and that ‘in coming years the United States will maintain and 
improve the quality of its present military capabilities in East Asia’.30 Japanese leaders echoed these 
                                                          
25 Tomohiro Yara, ‘Withdrawal of US Marines Blocked by Japan in the 1970s’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 47:4 
(2013), available online at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yara-
Tomohiro/4037?rand=1385390754&type=print&print=1. 
26 Known in Japanese as the mitsuyaku, these were concluded between the late 1960s to early 1970s and were 
released to the public on court orders after the DPJ filed a formal inquiry in 2009. The agreements mainly 
covered ‘Japanese covert cooperation in US nuclear war strategy on the one hand and the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japan’ on the other. For more, see: Gavan McCormack, ‘Deception and Diplomacy: The US, Japan, 
and Okinawa’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 9:21:1 (2011), available online at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Gavan-
McCormack/3532/article.html.  
27 Kitaoka 2010, pp. 20-21. This language, it should be noted here, sounds strikingly similar to that in the Diet 
adviser’s comment at the end of Chapter 3 that the GOJ would be ‘scolded’ by the USG if agreements were not 
‘satisfied’—and, given the tenor of the minute above, this comment does not appear to be unfounded. 
28 ‘United States-Japan Joint Communique of Prime Minister Fukuda and President Carter’, “The World and 
Japan” Database Project, Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations, Institute of Oriental 
Culture, University of Tokyo, 22 March 1977, available online at: http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19770322.D1E.html. 
29 ‘Joint Communique of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and U.S. President Nixon’, “The World and Japan” 
Database Project, Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations, Institute of Oriental Culture, 
University of Tokyo, 1 August 1973, available online at: http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19730801.D1E.html. 
30 ‘Joint Communique, Productive Partnership for the 1980's (Visit of Prime Minister Ohira of Japan)’, “The 
World and Japan” Database Project, Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations, Institute of 
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remarks, one example of this being PM Noboru Takeshita’s comments, following discussions with US 
President Reagan, that ‘Japan has also continued to increase its HNS [host nation support] for U.S. 
forces in Japan, whose stationing is an indispensable [emphasis added] part of the Japan-U.S. 
security system’.31 This characterisation of the USM presence as ‘indispensable’ or ‘essential’ for 
peace and stability in the region predates the language of ‘cornerstone’ by at least ten to fifteen 
years (though its meaning is more or less the same), appearing in joint statements between the two 
governments as early as 1960 and continuing into the present.32  
In the wake of the 1995 rape incident in Okinawa, however, official US reports on basing in 
the prefecture did not recommend significant reductions in force presence. In fact, they used the 
same framing and language employed in the arguments of presidents, PMs, and leading military 
officials since the end of WWII in favour of a continued presence. A 1998 US General Accounting 
Office (GAO) report entitled ‘Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. 
Military Presence on Okinawa’, for example, frames the US presence as not only a critical part of 
PACOM’s regional forward presence to ‘promote international security relationships in the region, 
and deter aggression and prevent conflict through a crisis response capability’, but also as providing 
‘a visible political commitment by the United States to peace and stability in the region’, the 
withdrawal of which, it says, ‘could be interpreted by countries in the region as a weakening of the 
U.S. commitment to peace and stability in Asia-Pacific and could undercut the deterrent value of the 
forward deployment’.33 Former US SecDef William Cohen stressed in the same year the importance 
of sustaining US forward deployment in Asia along similar lines, employing analogy in his argument: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo, 2 May 1979, available online at: http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19790502.D1E.html. 
31 ‘Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita of Japan’, “The World and Japan” 
Database Project, Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations, Institute of Oriental Culture, 
University of Tokyo, 13 January 1988, available online at: http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19880113.O1E.html. 
32 See, for example, the 1960 and 1977 Joint Communiques and the 1965, 1972, and 1975 Joint Statements in 
the Bibliography. 
33 Carol R. Schuster et al, 'Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military 
Presence on Okinawa', United States General Accounting Office, 2 March 1998, pp. 23-25. 
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34 
Cohen’s remarks followed on the heels of the 1995 East Asia Strategic Report (also known as 
the ‘Nye Report’ after its primary author) and the revision of the USJ Defense Guidelines (USJ-DG) in 
1997, both of which reaffirmed the centrality of a ‘credible’ US overseas presence to future US 
strategy in East Asia, ‘a region of growing importance for U.S. security and prosperity’.35 Nye put it 
more bluntly in a 1995 speech following the publication of this report: ‘Security is like oxygen: You 
do not tend to notice it until you begin to lose it. The American security presence has helped provide 
this "oxygen" for East Asian development’.36 Building on this analogy of the US presence as ‘oxygen’ 
for the region, President Bill Clinton, in a joint press conference with PM Ryutaro Hashimoto in 1996, 
stated that ‘everyone knows we have no ulterior motive. That is, we seek no advantage; we see to 
dominate no country; we seek to control no country; we seek to do nothing in any improper way 
with our military power. We are only here […] to serve as a source of security and stability to others 
throughout this region’.37 Hashimoto agreed: ‘We welcome [the] presence [of US forces], and we 
believe that it is serving the stability of Asia and the Pacific’. 
1.3. Managing a constant level of threat 
While these quotes are illustrative of, as Gregson put it, ‘no amount of reassurance [being] 
ever excessive’, mutual reassurance of the US ‘security umbrella’ over the course of decades – using, 
in many cases, the same exact language and framing over and over again – gives the appearance of 
                                                          
34 William S. Cohen, ‘U.S. Must Remain Active in Post­Cold War Foreign Affairs’, Edited remarks of Secretary of 
Defense William S. Cohen, The Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 2 April 1998c, available online at: 
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=685. 
35 The White House, ‘A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement’, US National Security 
Strategy Archive, 1 February 1995, available online at: http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1995.pdf, p. 28. 
36 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Strategy for East Asia and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance’, Remarks by S. Nye Jr., assistant 
secretary of defense for international security affairs, Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International 
Studies/Japanese Institute of International Affairs, 29 March 1995, available online at: 
http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=878. William Perry reused the ‘oxygen’ analogy a 
year later, stating that ‘the American military presence may be thought of as the oxygen which has fueled the 
dramatic economic growth in the Western Pacific in the last few decades’ (1996). 
37 MOFA, ‘Joint Press Conference’, 17 April 1996e, available online at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/archive/1996/akush.html. 
There's that wonderful little novelette that I read years ago, "Jonathan Livingston 
Seagull” […] a story about a seagull that keeps trying to go faster and faster and he 
comes from the heights and he speeds down to earth and gets completely out of 
control until a mythical seagull shows up and […] says, "Jonathan, you really don't 
understand. Perfect speed is not a matter of going faster and faster. Perfect speed is 
being there" [emphasis added]. Of course, this mythical seagull was talking in 
transcendental terms, but I've always used that notion of being there as a metaphor 
for our forces. There is no substitute for being there. Perfect speed is our being 
forward deployed in Asia Pacific. […] So forward deployed, shaping people's opinions 
-- not only our friends' about our reliability and our resources, but also shaping 
people's opinions who are our adversaries, that they really don't want to challenge 
us in any given situation. 
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limited policy options where there could be many. For example, officials and ‘experts’ in both 
countries’ support for the policy of maintaining the US presence is bound up in the old implication 
that a reduction of forces in Japan is tantamount to a display of political weakness in the region—a 
region which, according to a 2013 report issued by the Guam-US-Asia Security Alliance (GUASA), 
‘cannot help’ but remind both officials and civilians alike of the proverb: ‘the more things change, 
the more they stay the same’38. This framing of East Asia being ‘stuck’ in the past in terms of its 
security circumstances thus gives the impression of path dependence.  
Likewise, any person reading through US and Japanese strategic documents and speeches 
dating back from the post-war era could take away the same message. In these, the security 
situation of the region has consistently been described in such terms as ‘unstable and troubled’39; 
the ‘most militarized in the world’40; politically volatile and turbulent41; a ‘tinderbox’42; and ‘plagued’ 
by ‘long-standing issues of territorial rights and reunification’ dating back to the Cold War era.43 The 
Nye Report went so far as to say that ‘[w]e do not need to manufacture new threats to justify the 
alliance […] On the contrary, if the alliance did not already exist, we would have to create it now’.44 
This excerpt from the Report is clearly echoed in Klingner’s comment from the opening of this 
chapter – that ‘if Okinawa wasn’t there, we’d have to build it’ – and again reinforces the core belief 
not only in the inherent ‘volatility’ of the region, but also that the USM presence is the only force 
capable of bringing ‘stability’ to it. 
This same, well-worn caveat against removing US forces from Okinawa was voiced in many 
of my interviews. A former staffer in the US Senate tells me, for example, that ‘the South Koreans 
will think twice if we start to pull out of Okinawa’45; former commanding general of the Japan 
Ground SDF (JGSDF) Research and Development Command Noboru Yamaguchi similarly says that 
                                                          
38 GUASA, ‘U.S. Forward Deployed Forces and Asian Security: A Strategic View’, Final Report of a Roundtable 
Discussion at Tumon Bay, Guam, 5-6 September 2013, p. 4. This roundtable was attended by speakers 
including Wallace Gregson and former Senior Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at 
the National Defense University Patrick Cronin. 
39 Joint Statement 1965. 
40 Sandra I. Erwin, ‘Future of the Army in Asia: Less War, More Diplomacy’, National Defense Magazine, 26 
January 2014, available online at: 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1390. 
41 ‘The Report of the Bush Administration on the Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim’, “The World 
and Japan” Database Project, Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations, Institute of Oriental 
Culture, University of Tokyo, 19 April 1990, available online at: http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19900419.O1E.html. 
42 William S. Cohen, ‘America's Asia­Pacific Security Strategy’, Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense 
William S. Cohen, The Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, 15 January 1998a, available online 
at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=572. 
43 These including the territorial disputes over the Senkaku and Takeshima island chains between Japan and 
China and Japan and the ROK, respectively. See: MOD, ‘Defense of Japan 2007’, 2007a, available online at: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2007.html, p. 4. 
44 Nye 1995. 
45 Anonymous, personal interview, 25 July 2014k, Washington, DC, USA. 
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‘nobody wants to see less US commitment to the region’, citing the spectre of North Korean nuclear 
missile tests and China’s military build-up.46 Yara likewise comments that many Chinese officials still 
believe in the ‘bottle cap’ function of the USJA47 and thus would rather preserve the current USM 
presence in Okinawa.48 Former US SecDef Gates went further than this, warning in his 2011 remarks 
at Keio University that without the USJ-ST in place and the assurance of the US forward presence in 
the region, ‘North Korea’s military provocations could be even more outrageous -- or worse’, ‘China 
might behave more assertively towards its neighbors’, HADR missions would be difficult to carry out 
in a timely manner, it would be ‘more difficult and costly to conduct robust joint exercises’, and 
‘there would be less information sharing and coordination, and we would know less about regional 
threats and the military capabilities of our potential adversaries’.49 
Admiral Samuel J. Locklear, former commander of PACOM, listed among these threats in his 
testimony to the US House Armed Services Committee in 2013: climate change; ‘transnational non-
state threats’ (e.g. drug trafficking, piracy); challenges to freedom of action in shared domains, 
including cyberspace; energy competition; instability on the Korean peninsula; the rise of China; and 
the lack of a NATO-like security framework for the region.50 In place of this framework, says Locklear, 
is a ‘patch-work quilt’ of security relations founded on the forward presence of USM forces in the 
region.51 As is evident from his list, this ‘quilt’ covers a range of threats which are not exclusive to 
the Asia-Pacific, but which have nonetheless been described in similar terms as contributing to a 
larger ‘dynamic and uncertain security environment’ worldwide.52 While this is especially 
pronounced in documents dating from the immediate post-9/11 era with their frequent references 
                                                          
46 Noboru Yamaguchi, personal interview, 19 February 2014, The Tokyo Foundation, Tokyo, Japan. 
47 This term implying that the US presence in Japan acts as a kind of insurance, or ‘cap in the bottle’, as it was 
described by a USMC general in Japan to a Washington Post reporter in 1990, against a remilitarised Japan. For 
more details, see: Kenneth B. Pyle, ‘The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the 21st Century’, The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 13 November 2012, available online at: http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=296.  
48 Tomohiro Yara, personal interview, 16 April 2014, Naha, Okinawa. 
49 Robert M. Gates, ‘Keio University’, Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Keio 
University, Tokyo, Japan, 14 January 2011a, available online at: 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1529. 
50 Samuel J. Locklear III, ‘PACOM House Armed Services Committee Posture Statement’, Remarks by 
Commander, US Pacific Command, Adm. Samuel J. Locklear, III, US House of Representatives, Armed Services 
Committee, 5 March 2013c, available online at: 
http://www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/565163/pacom%C2%ADhouse%C2%AD
armed%C2%ADservices%C2%ADcommittee%C2%ADposture%C2%ADstatement.aspx.  
51 Samuel J. Locklear III, ‘A Combatant Commander’s View on the Asia­Pacific Rebalance: The Patch­Work 
Quilt’, Prepared remarks of Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Asia Society, 6 
December 2012, available online at: 
http://www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/565148/a-combatant-commanders-
view-on-the-asia-pacific-rebalance-the-patch-work-quilt.aspx.  
52 Allen Holmes, ‘Military Operations in the Post-Cold War Era’, Defense Issues, 12:34 (1997), available online 
at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=755.  
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to stateless terrorism and its destabilising potential across continents53, Jeremy Michael Boorda, 
former US Chief of Naval Operations, stated the gist of this story in even broader terms, expanding 
the definition of ‘threat’ to include even the inaction of the central governments: 
54 
Along this vein, in a cable released by Wikileaks from 18 November 2009, then-US 
ambassador to Japan John Roos recorded LDP Headquarters Director-General (DG) Hitoshi Motojuku 
as saying during a closed meeting: ‘the LDP needs to "educate" the Japanese electorate about […] 
the new international environment of crises, terrorism, and ethnic wars in which Japan must exist’.55 
In making this comment, Motojuku – like other defence officials in both governments – appears to 
seek only acceptance from the public of the ‘new international environment of crises’ so defined, 
whether real or imagined, in order so that his desired policies may be implemented and reproduced 
without scrutiny. 
1.4. The rebalance to Asia: enhancing a ‘credible’ US force presence 
As this narrative of the politically symbolic and strategically critical USM presence in Asia has 
been continuously reproduced throughout the post-war period – with little public pushback to it 
from domestic American and Japanese audiences – this is not to say that it has not gone without 
some tweaking along the way with regards to its physical size and geographic spread. The current 
realignment of forces serves as a case in point, though it does not represent the first time since the 
end of the Cold War that such policies have been carried out. The 2004 Global Posture Review under 
the Bush administration, for instance, recommended that in order for US forces to be able to 
                                                          
53 See, for example: Paul Wolfowitz, ‘U.S.-Japan Business Conference’, Remarks as Delivered by Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Washington, DC, 18 February 2002a, available online 
at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=191; JDA, ‘Defense of Japan 2005’, 2005, 
available online at: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2005.html; and Gordon R. England, ‘Japan 
Defense Society’, Remarks as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon R. England, Washington, DC, 
16 October 2006, available online at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1058. 
54 J.M. Boorda, ‘The Enemy Is Complacency’, Prepared remarks ADM J.M. Boorda, chief of naval operations, 
the Armed Forces Day luncheon hosted by Military Veterans Education Foundation, Columbus, Ohio, 19 May 
1995, available online at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=910. 
55 John Roos, ‘Liberal Democratic Party Leadership Discusses Party Direction with DCM’, Wikileaks, Wikileaks 
cable:09TOKYO2664. 18 November 2009e. Available online at: 
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09TOKYO2664_a.html.  
Yes, we don't have this huge enemy on the other side of the world, an ogre that 
forces us to spend higher and higher amounts of our tax dollars on military forces. 
But in its place is a new old risk for our country, one that I believe you in this 
audience appreciate better than most. The new risk is complacence [emphasis 
added]. So there has been this cycle throughout this century, a cycle of enormous 
and costly exertion followed by a false sense of relief. A delusion that we had done 
our part and that it was time to rest, to collect the dividends for our efforts. Well, 
this time around, we have to -- we must -- resist the dangerous embrace of 
complacence. 
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exercise greater flexibility and project their power ‘rapidly and at long ranges’, their numbers should 
generally be reduced ‘in host nations where those forces [are concentrated around] large, urban 
populations’, including in Okinawa.56 Similarly, the current realignment or ‘rebalance’ of forces, said 
Gates, is geared towards making the US defence posture in Asia ‘one that is more geographically 
distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable’.57  
Speaking to the last of these three aims, Locklear has stated that the rebalance is about 
‘collaboration, not containment’, and former DASD for Plans (including, under her purview, 
America’s global defence posture policy) Janine Davidson, in 2013 testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, likewise emphasised in her 
remarks that ‘[w]hile U.S. military planners must continue to plan for worst-case contingencies, 
these plans represent only a part of a larger strategy that integrates “partners” – not “host-nations” 
– and works in a measured, cooperative fashion to promote sustained peace and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific’.58 In a later speech, Locklear again emphasised the non-military aspects of the plan, 
stating that ‘the U.S. rebalance is not about establishing U.S. bases anywhere else in this theatre […] 
Our objective is to build on the relationships that we have created in peaceful, relatively peaceful 
Asia-Pacific [and] indo Pacific [in] the last 60 years’.59  
The military component of the rebalance plan, however, is not insignificant. ‘Looking purely 
at resources and level of effort, by 2020 the US Navy will have 60% of its fleet in the Pacific’, 
remarked James F. Amos, former Commandant of the USMC.60 The US Quadrennial Defense Review 
in 2014 likewise states that the US ‘will maintain a robust footprint in Northeast Asia while 
enhancing our presence in Oceania, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean’.61 These enhancements 
                                                          
56 Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century’, Center for a 
New American Security, June 2008, available online at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/6/military-
ohanlon/06_military_ohanlon.pdf, p. 27. 
57 Robert M. Gates, ‘International Institute For Strategic Studies (Shangri-La--Asia Security)’, Remarks as 
Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, 5 June 2010, available online 
at: http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1483. 
58 Janine Davidson, ‘Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs’, Center for a New American Security, 25 April 2013, available online at: 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Davidson%20Testimony%20042513_0.pdf. 
59 Samuel J. Locklear III, ‘ADM Locklear roundtable with East Asia Media Hub’, Remarks by Presenters: Admiral 
Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, East Asia and Pacific Media Hub, Tokyo, 21 February 
2013b, available online at: 
http://www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/565146/adm%C2%ADlocklear%C2%AD
roundtable%C2%ADwith%C2%ADeast%C2%ADasia%C2%ADmedia%C2%ADhub.aspx. 
60 James F. Amos, ‘General James F. Amos, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps: Remarks to RAND’, US 
Marine Corps, 28 January 2014, available online at: 
http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/140128%20--
%20CMC%20Comments%20at%20RAND%20(CMC%20Final%20Formatted%20for%20Posting).pdf. 
61 DOD, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review’, 4 March 2014, available online at: 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf, p. 36. 
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include not only the increased naval fleet in the Pacific62 and the relocation of units currently 
stationed in Okinawa to Guam and Australia63, but also the move of additional US Air Force (USAF) 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. A 2012 DOD strategy document, in making its 
case for the rebalance plan, explains: 
64 
What is evident in this strategy document, as well as in the quotes cited by other defence 
officials, is a curious mix of operational specifics related to the realignment and peppering of, again, 
euphemistic or vague language (e.g. ‘we cannot afford to fail’, though what constitutes ‘failure’ is 
left unexplained)—the meaning of which is assumed to be understood by all, rather than open to 
interpretation. Nonetheless, the military component of the realignment, combined with the 
rhetorical reassurances of the USG and military officials of their continued, ‘credible’ commitment to 
the region, has attracted the most interest from defence officials within Japan—this interest being, 
oftentimes, sceptical of the strategy. ‘It’s a very delicate balancing act by the White House: trying to 
have more engagement in these regions and trying to redress underbalancing in these regions’, one 
MOD researcher tells me.65 Another MOD researcher sees the rebalance not as a proactive measure 
on the part of the US (as it has oft been framed by American officials), but as rather a ‘reaction to 
the fact that the Asia-Pacific region is becoming more important for the United States […] So as a 
result of that, the United States needs to respond to that in order to safeguard its own interests’.66  
 
                                                          
62 Including ‘[littoral combat ships] rotated through Singapore, a greater number of destroyers and amphibious 
ships home-ported in the Pacific, and the deployment of surface vessels such as Joint High Speed Vessels to 
the region’ (DOD 2014, p. 36). 
63 Up to 8,000 Marines were originally to be sent to Guam by the early 2020s, though this number has been 
revised recently down to 4,000; the Australian contingent, meanwhile, ‘will grow with the goal of establishing 
a rotational presence of a 2,500 strong Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) over the coming years’ (DOD 
2014, p. 36). See also: Erik Slavin, ‘Officials update Okinawa, Guam realignment plans’, Stars and Stripes, 3 
October 2013, available online at: http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/officials-update-okinawa-guam-
realignment-plans-1.244813.  
64 DOD, ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, 2012, available online at: 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf, pp. 7-8. 
65 Anonymous, personal interview, 12 February 2014j, Ministry of Defense, Japan. 
66 Anonymous, personal interview, 10 January 2014f, Ministry of Defense, Japan. 
Third, we are determined to maintain a ready and capable force, even as we reduce 
our overall capacity. We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to 
retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas that, by necessity, 
were deemphasized over the past decade. An ill-prepared force will be vulnerable to 
corrosion in its morale, recruitment, and retention […] Conclusion: The United States 
faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military forces 
whose actions are harmonized with other elements of U.S. national power. Our 
global responsibilities are significant; we cannot afford to fail. 
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2. Defining and redefining security 
Bases are seen as the ‘necessary evil’.  
- a current official at the Japanese MOD 
 
While US allies may be reassured by the narratives and policies constituting the rebalance 
strategy, the same cannot be said within Okinawa itself. Although the construction of the FRF in 
Henoko was de-linked from the broader relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam in April 2012, 
the ongoing conflict over the FRF has caused some officials speaking on the subject of the rebalance 
to be more circumspect in their framing of the issue. ‘I think what we're doing in -- with the 
Okinawa, Guam and Korea situation is making sure that people in that region know we're not 
withdrawing from Northeast Asia’, said former US Senator James Webb (D-VA), ‘[but] we need to 
put it in a smarter way, so that the people in Okinawa can accommodate our presence, and we can 
reduce some of these tensions’.67 Japanese defence policy documents similarly stress, like their 
diplomatic counterparts, reducing the ‘excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place 
on local communities’68 and note that ‘special consideration must be paid to minimize the burdens 
on Okinawa’.69 The February 2014 issue of the MOD’s publication Japan Defense Focus, to this point, 
states that the MOD ‘will exert itself to the utmost to realize mitigating the impacts as much as 
possible so that the people of Okinawa can actually feel it’.70  
These statements, just like the ones cited in Chapter 3, always carry the attendant clause 
that burdens must be minimised while also ‘ensuring operational capability, including training 
capability, throughout the process’71, ‘keeping in mind the current international situation and the 
security perspective’72, and allowing the Marines to ‘become more politically sustainable on the 
island’.73 Combined, these two conditions for a ‘successful’ relocation effort constitute the primary 
components of the larger Okinawa basing strategy which has, in large part, defined the nature of the 
alliance’s narrative around ‘security’ and how it should be defined within the USG and GOJ for nearly 
                                                          
67 Jim Sciutto, ‘A Conversation with Senator Jim Webb’, Council on Foreign Relations, 13 June 2011a, available 
online at: http://www.cfr.org/world/conversation-senator-jim-webb/p35038. 
68 MOD, ‘Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005-2009)’, 2005, available online at: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/pdf/mid-term_defense_program.pdf. 
69 MOD, ‘Defense of Japan 2008’, 2008c, available online at: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2008.html, p. 216. 
70 MOD, Japan Defense Focus, 49 (February 2014b), available online at: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/pdf/jdf_no49.pdf, p. 4. 
71 DOD, ‘Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa’, April 2013c, available online at: 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Okinawa%20Consolidation%20Plan.pdf, p. 2. 
72 MOD, ‘Defense of Japan 2011’, 2011d, available online at: 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2011.html, p. 293. 
73 Bob Work, ‘A New Global Posture for a New Era’, Remarks as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob 
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two decades. Against this background is the increasingly prominent role of Japan within the alliance 
in providing for its own defence—a development which has not just been encouraged by the USG, 
but urged since the 1980s. As US forces have become involved in multiple global conflicts, pressure 
on the GOJ has intensified to engage in a ‘defense transformation’ which would involve increased 
defence spending, increased SDF contributions to PKOs and multilateral combat missions around the 
world, and increasing HNS for US forces.  
What these policies mean for the USM presence in Okinawa has been made clear: given the 
proximity of the prefecture to regional ‘hotspots’ and important sea lanes in comparison to other 
major US bases in Hawaii, Guam, and the continental US, it will continue to be framed as a critical 
component of the alliance’s security strategy.74 At the same time, the emphasis on the ‘political 
sustainability’ of the USM presence (and of the realignment broadly speaking) illustrates a desire not 
just to improve civil-military relations for their own sake, but to maintain the USM presence in some 
form or another for the foreseeable future—thus excluding the possibility of removing them 
altogether from the range of available policy options. In doing so, actors in defensive sites thus 
display an unwillingness to negotiate the fundamental narratives underpinning the PBD and the way 
they define its constitutive, core beliefs.  
2.1. Quality of life versus operational necessity 
This dichotomous narrative around ‘security’ – divided between ensuring a stable quality of 
life for local populations living near military bases, and ensuring a stable Asia-Pacific region for 
everyone else – appears to be inherently contradictory. Can central and local governments truly 
ensure ‘security’ at all sites when military bases pose a potential danger in and of themselves (either 
as targets of foreign militaries, or as the source of accidents and pollution)? This question has been 
at the heart of the Okinawan case for decades, but especially since the 1995 rape. In the aftermath, 
President Clinton himself apologised to the GOJ, the USG eased part of its extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction rules and gave ‘sympathetic consideration to any request for the transfer of custody 
prior to indictment of the accused which may be made by Japan in specific cases of heinous crimes 
of murder and rape’.75 Moreover, the SACO agreement, with its promise to close Futenma, was 
concluded. In spite of this, the civil activist group Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence 
has previously stated that ‘there were 4784 serious crimes committed by US service personnel that 
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were reported in Okinawa between 1972 and 1995’76, though only around 700 arrests of US 
servicemembers have been made.77 One researcher at the MOD acknowledges that the 1995 
incident ‘caused people to seriously question the US-Japan Security Treaty and demand it be revised 
or removed for the first time in many years’.78  
As part of this ‘serious questioning’ of the Treaty, residents and civil society groups began to 
more actively pursue litigation against other problems stemming from the bases, such as 
environmental and noise pollution. These problems are characterised by a current MOD official as 
‘more important’ to Okinawans than the alliance’s efforts in HADR-related missions in the region, 
and the earlier-cited 1998 GAO report likewise comments that civilians in Okinawa have ‘objected to 
artillery live-fire exercises conducted in the Central Training Area’ and the subsequent ‘destruction 
of vegetation on nearby mountains in the artillery range's impact area’.79 Government officials in 
both countries are especially aware of the environmental degradation caused by military facilities 
and have made various pledges over the years to alleviate this issue, including the pursuance of a 
‘Green Alliance’ approach which seeks to invest in a ‘green’ Okinawa to improve energy efficiency of 
US bases and review the current division of responsibilities, particularly over post-land return clean-
up efforts.80  
Another quality-of-life issue which has become a major sticking point in Okinawa is military-
related accidents, such as the one in August 2004 when a USMC CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopter on a 
routine training flight from Futenma crashed into the side of an administrative building of OIU while 
attempting to make an emergency landing. Although there were no injuries to local students or 
residents, the campus was damaged from the crash and ensuing fire—the first ‘of a Marine-piloted 
helicopter oﬀ-base into the local community’.81 The incident also contributed to protests on the 
island against the introduction of Ospreys to Futenma in 2012, the aircrafts being previously 
documented as having been involved in a number of malfunctions.82  
                                                          
76 Sasha Davis, ‘The US military base network and contemporary colonialism: Power projection, resistance and 
the quest for operational unilateralism’, Political Geography, 30 (2011), 215-224, p. 218. 
77 Hyun Lee and Christine Ahn, ‘Of Bases and Budgets’, Foreign Policy in Focus, 6 October 2011, available 
online at: http://fpif.org/of_bases_and_budgets/. 
78 Anonymous, personal interview, 17 January 2014i, Ministry of Defense, Japan. 
79 Schuster et al 1998, p. 18; the Central Training Area is housed within USMC Camp Hansen in Kin Town, 
Okinawa, and includes several live firing ranges. 
80 Patrick M. Cronin, Daniel M. Kliman and Abraham M. Denmark, ‘Renewal: Revitalizing the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance’, Center for a New American Security, October 2010, available online at: 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Renewal_CroninKlimanDenmark.pdf, pp. 6-7; see 
also MOD 2013i, p. 169. 
81 Robert D. Eldridge, ‘Anatomy of a Crash: Local Reactions and Official Responses to the 2004 Futenma 
Helicopter Accident and its Aftermath (1)’, International Public Policy Studies, 13:1 (2008-09), 135-145, p. 136. 
82 Paul Richardson, ‘Geopolitical Rivalry in the Asia-Pacific’, Russian International Affairs Council, 19 May 2013, 
available online at: http://russiancouncil.ru/en/blogs/dvfu/?id_4=483. 
Grinberg 158 
 
Nevertheless, the operational ‘necessity’ of keeping the bases in Okinawa has, for the most 
part, overridden these more daily security concerns from residents. In the aftermath of the 1995 
rape, for example, Perry remarked: 
83 
This conclusion drawn by Perry in the aftermath is not unique, and has been made by many US and 
Japanese officials alike: that while ‘the way of doing business in Okinawa’ should be changed, the 
importance of the alliance itself – and thus a continued USM presence in Okinawa in one form or 
another – remains unquestionable. Klingner adds:  
84 
He further goes on to say that the USMC ‘are the only rapidly deployable US ground force 
between Hawaii and India, Diego Garcia. So they are the 9/11 force for the US’; similarly, says US 
defence analyst David Axe, ‘the Pentagon has spent billions of dollars in the past decade 
modernizing forces and facilities on the island’, including ‘extensive new storage bunkers for bombs, 
missiles and spare parts’, and ‘Global Hawk long-range spy drones and F-22 Raptor stealth fighters’ 
at the USAF’s base in Kadena which ‘could also clear the way for air strikes on ground targets in 
China or North Korea’.85 Outside of its strategic value, the 1998 GAO report notes the prefecture’s 
‘well-established military infrastructure that is provided to the United States rent-free and that 
supports the III Marine Expeditionary Force (and other U.S. forces)’, including ‘warehouses hold[ing] 
war reserve supplies […] [and] port facilities capable of handling military sealift ships and amphibious 
ships are available at the Army's Naha Military Port and the Navy's White Beach’.86 The presence of 
this ‘well-established military infrastructure’ and the sunk costs of ‘billions of dollars’ thus, in this 
narrative of ‘security’, clearly takes precedence in alliance policymaking. 
                                                          
83 Perry 1996. 
84 Bruce Klingner, personal interview, 14 July 2014, Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, USA. 
85 David Axe, ‘Why Allies Need US Base’, The Diplomat, 28 June 2010, available online at: 
http://thediplomat.com/2010/06/why-allies-need-okinawa-base/. Kadena, one of the largest air bases in the 
world, is also home to the USAF’s 18th Wing, the largest of their combat wings. 
86 Schuster et al 1998, p. 25. 
In a sense, the tragic incident in Okinawa served as a wake-up call for both the 
United States and Japan. It cast in sharp relief issues that had been lurking in the 
background for security relations for years, and it caused a lot of soul searching in 
both countries. America looked inside its heart and saw that there was no reason 
why we couldn't change the way we did business in Okinawa. Japan looked inside its 
heart and saw more clearly the strategic basis for continuing the alliance [emphasis 
added]. 
In a way, every agreement has been driven solely by reaction to local constituent 
concern because really, all this series of unilateral compromises by the US have 
degraded US and alliance capabilities purely to respond to the Okinawans. So, you 
know, moving an airbase from one end of the island to the other was driven by the 
[1995] rape case. The rape and helicopters don’t interlink [emphasis added]. I mean, 
it was a public agreement to respond to public protests over an unrelated issue. 
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2.2. Increasing Japan’s defence burden 
Despite the insistence by officials on keeping the bases where they are and framing this 
within a larger concern for both regional peace and operational convenience, this is not to say that 
other arguments do not exist. ‘The current basing structure is not ideally located for any regional 
contingency whether it be peacekeeping, disaster relief, or war’, says the 2013 GUASA report. ‘All 
the bases […] are within range of Chinese conventional missiles […] The time of large permanent 
facilities located on foreign soil is a thing of the past. Smaller footprints are the order of the day’.87 
Yamaguchi agrees, adding that although, for example, the USM’s facilities at Naha Airport in 
Okinawa were fully occupied during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, they are ‘practically empty’ 
otherwise—this being in stark contrast to the congestion outside in the prefecture. ‘Only 30 to 40 
thousand US troops live in Okinawa’, he comments, ‘but they take up so much space’.88  
If, then, ‘smaller footprints are the order of the day’, asked Senator Webb in 2012, ‘[h]ow 
[do we] resolve the impasse in a fashion that is positive, rather than in a way that looks as if we are 
losing our critical presence in that part of the world?’89 One possible resolution that has been 
proposed for a number of years – and is already being implemented in a number of different ways – 
is increasing Japan’s defence ‘responsibilities’ on the whole. ‘Japan has the opportunity – and an 
obligation [emphasis added] – to take on a role that reflects its political, economic, and military 
capacity’, said Gates in a 2007 speech, ‘[a]nd that is why we hope – and expect [emphasis added] – 
Japan will choose to accept more global security responsibilities in the years ahead’.90 Former 
Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Tokyo James Zumwalt similarly advised, in a 2009 
scenesetter for US Under SecDef Michelle Flournoy prior to her visit to Tokyo: ‘In addition to 
encouraging greater defense spending, enhanced information security, and broader legal authority 
to the [SDF], we are encouraging Japan to focus on deepening operational capabilities in ways that 
will enhance our Alliance's deterrent value, including long-range lift, [BMD], sustainment, and 
maritime operations’.91  
Where the framing of this shift towards a more ‘equal’ partnership in terms of defence 
policies and spending by US officials has tended to use words like ‘responsibility’, ‘obligation’, and 
‘expectation’, it is curious to note that their Japanese counterparts – while echoing some of this 
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terminology – intermingle it with the familiar language of ‘burden’. ‘[I]t is also important to explain 
to the Japanese public that it is the time for Japan to reduce its dependence on the United States 
and try to assume a greater defense burden’, Yamaoka explained to Roos in their December 2009 
meeting92; likewise, former DPJ leader Ichiro Ozawa told a Congressional delegation comprising 
Senators John McCain (R-AZ), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) on a visit to Tokyo 
in April 2009 that ‘the DPJ, once in power, will be a more reliable partner to the United States than 
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in terms of sharing the burden on dealing with worldwide 
problems’.93 The distinction here is important: where ‘obligation’ and ‘responsibility’ both imply a 
sense of moral duty or even legally-bound commitment, ‘burden’ in and of itself is simply defined as 
‘a load’.94 Where the framing of the bases as a ‘burden’ on Okinawans abides by this definition when 
coupled with the consequences of living close to them, the characterisation of Japan’s 
‘normalisation’ in terms of ‘burden’-sharing, however, seems to strike a tone expressing discomfort 
with the ‘load’ of providing for its own defence. 
Indeed, once the DPJ took office, the USG’s interpretation of this language became more 
closely linked with the party’s attempts to improve relations with China and the ROK rather than its 
desire to maintain good alliance relations. ‘Abe is smarter than Hatoyama about the alliance by 
committing more strongly to the US’, says Mochizuki.95 Klingner agrees, remarking that ‘from a US 
viewpoint, if we look at Japan’s defence reforms under Abe, they’re very encouraging. He’s reversed 
the defence spending decline’.96 An MOD researcher, however, comments that Japan’s spending 
increase in defence is only a ‘tiny’ one97, and that ‘in domestic terms, it’s a very big issue, but no 
other country discusses this sort of issue, because the fact that a sovereign nation has a CSD right as 
well as an individual self-defence right—that’s just a natural thing’.98 Another MOD researcher 
points out that the SDF still lack any offensive capabilities ‘to dissuade or deter the adventures of, or 
the provocations of, wrongdoers’, and therefore ‘the US military presence will [continue to] 
compensate for our lack of capability. And, I should say, lack of political will [emphasis added]’.99 
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2.3. Henoko as the ‘best’ and ‘only’ option 
For lack of an advanced enough level of ‘defence transformation’ to pursue a more 
significant reduction in US forces – not to mention an apparent ‘lack of political will’ (echoing 
Okamoto’s comment about Hatoyama’s lack of ‘political courage’) – the USG and GOJ have often 
found themselves, in the case of the FRF, at a complete standstill. ‘Futenma is often said to be "a 
thorn (or bone) stuck in your throat for the US-Japan alliance’, says Yamaguchi. ‘The status quo at 
Futenma is preferable for some US Marines, but it’s not politically sustainable’.100 Given that 
‘political sustainability’ is one of the three main features of the US’s rebalance strategy and a key 
element of its discursive strategy in arguing for a continued USM presence in Asia, the FRF dispute’s 
‘thorny’ qualities have led to it being placed high on the agenda of every Japanese administration 
since 1995 (and especially after Hatoyama’s promise to relocate it outside of Okinawa). In 2007, 
Japanese Defense Minister (DefMin) Yuriko Koike, for example, placed ‘implementing base 
realignment’ as the top of her three priorities on her agenda.101 Later DefMin Toshimi Kitazawa also 
stated that ‘the relocation and return of Futenma Air Station should be achieved as soon as 
possible’.102 Abe’s decision to more aggressively pursue the negotiations which would eventually 
lead to the December 2013 deal with Governor Nakaima were therefore, says an MOD researcher, 
‘based on not only the strategic value of Futenma, but, more importantly, its symbolic value’.103 
The ‘strategic’ value of Futenma, says the 2006 Japanese WP, derives primarily from its 
three current functions: ‘1) transporting troops of ground units of the Marine Corps using 
helicopters and others, 2) operating the KC-130 aerial refueling plane and 3) base function that 
accommodates airplanes in the event of an emergency’.104 Specifically, this first function must be 
kept within the prefecture, argues the document, because ‘ground units and helicopter units in 
Okinawa should be always operated in cooperation with each other in regular exercises and drills for 
their expeditious deployment’. Given the political volatility surrounding the planned relocation of 
Futenma to Henoko, several alternatives were considered, including consolidating the air station 
with Kadena, moving it to the smaller island of Iejima or to Guam, or moving the facility to 
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somewhere in mainland Japan—though this latter option has generally been met with resistance 
from local governments unwilling to accept the US presence in their prefectures.105  
‘Everyone says, you know, let’s find a better location [for the FRF]’, says Klingner. Echoing 
Brooks (in Chapter 3, section 4.2), he adds: ‘when people ask, “why isn’t there a Plan B?” This is the 
Plan B. Plan A is staying at Futenma. It’s a better base. Plan B is moving it to Henoko’.106 USN Admiral 
and former PACOM Commander Timothy Keating similarly commented, in a meeting with then-
DefMin Fumio Kyuma, that ‘any reconsideration of the plan for the relocation of Futenma MCAS 
would not solve any problems and instead simply delay the project […] [T]he agreement […] was 
based on common strategic objectives and addressed both short and long term concerns. It is 
important [..] to hold on to what we have achieved’.107 Likewise, later DefMin Yoshimasa Hayashi, in 
a 2008 meeting with Roos, framed the existing relocation plan’s opponents – in this case, Okinawan 
officials – as ‘children’: ‘Children all learn the grammatical pattern “doing this will depend on doing 
that […] they (Okinawan leaders) need to understand the necessity of implementing all parts of the 
[relocation] package”’.108  
In characterising local officials as simply ‘Okinawan leaders’ or even ‘children’, Hayashi not 
only clearly sets them apart from the ‘manager’ tier (of which he and Roos are a part), but also 
assumes a lower base of knowledge and, therefore, agency with regards to the policymaking 
process. Moreover, in excluding or dismissing these actors and any broader arguments they may 
pose in favour of altering the FRF plan, let alone decreasing or removing the USM presence in 
Okinawa, these officials have instead found themselves entangled in disagreements amongst 
themselves about smaller details within the existing, ‘institutionalised’ plan. For example, in a 2007 
meeting between Maher and Kyuma in Naha, the two ‘spent quite a while studying the map of the 
FRF and going over each of those problems. For example, moving towards the ocean runs into the 
islands, moving to the left increases environmental impact on the sea grass, moving to the right puts 
it into deeper water and makes construction much more difficult’.109 LDP DG Motojuku dismissed 
such considerations in 2009, echoing Hayashi’s remark that the FRF is ‘a decision which is in Japan's 
national interest and needs to be implemented as is, even if the general population disagrees’.110  
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If, then, Futenma’s strategic value is tied to its political institutionalisation, then the 
‘symbolic’ value is tied to the political animus that has built up around it over the course of its long-
delayed relocation, and the risk that this animus poses to the future of the alliance. Hatoyama’s 
resignation appears, in this context, to have been driven in part by the widespread perception that 
‘the base relocation had become symbolic […] of his leadership’, according to a 2010 briefing written 
by US defence analyst Matt Gertken.111 Beyond the political survivability of a single prime minister or 
even his party, however, is Futenma as a symbol of potential harm. ‘Futenma is really dangerous’, 
remarks Yamaguchi, continuing: ‘if it’s not moved, there is an increased likelihood of another bad 
accident and not only the bases in Okinawa, but also the alliance, would be threatened’.112  
Mochizuki agrees that such an accident ‘would be an absolute disaster for the alliance’113, 
especially, adding an MOD researcher, because the GOJ ‘has [done] various work on [the relocation] 
[…] but in terms of the reality, nothing has changed’.114 Webb, after visiting the prefecture, observed 
that Futenma ‘is the most emotional issue on Okinawa’ but added that changing the FRF plan would 
be difficult ‘unless they have something concrete to move toward. And you know the old first rule of 
wing walking: You don't let go of what you have until you've got a firm grasp on where you're 
going’.115 Webb’s colleague who worked with him on the Futenma issue, however – former Senator 
Carl Levin (D-MI) – remarked in a 2011 interview that the relocation facility planned in Henoko, in his 
opinion, is:  
116 
2.4. An ever-expanding partnership 
While the FRF remains a politically ‘difficult’ issue over which the USG and GOJ have recently 
been in conflict, their approach to the alliance as a whole – specifically, its future functions and 
purpose – has been more united. ‘I believe the alliance is a lot stronger than one airstrip’, the former 
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unworkable, just simply too expensive. And we ought to be honest with each other. 
So this is for some reason difficult politically, and I'm not sure I understand why, either 
in Washington […] or in Japan; I don't know why it's difficult politically to say, you 
know, we've got a plan. We agreed on a plan. Hey, it's not working; let's change the 
plan. But there's a sensitivity. Who goes first? This is an ally. […] So I consider this -- 
number one, we should deal with it frankly, together, not unilaterally, and be honest 
about the impossibility and impracticability -- if that's a word -- of our current plan. 
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Senate staffer tells me117; likewise, in a 2006 interview, Nye remarked that ‘since 1996 the U.S.-
Japan relationship really has been stronger than the personalities of individual leaders […] If former 
Vice President Al Gore had been elected president in 2000 or Senator John Kerry in 2004 […] I do not 
think those developments would have altered the trajectory of bilateral relations very much’.118 The 
US is a ‘natural partner’, argues one MOD researcher. ‘We kept on saying that our cultures are so 
different and our histories are so different, languages are so different, the regions are so different, 
but my point is: I don’t care. I don’t care. What’s best about our relationship is that we are business-
oriented’.119  
This framing of the alliance’s ‘business-oriented’ nature and its need to move past the FRF in 
order to focus on ‘first-order’ issues – echoing Perry’s remarks in 1996 about the US changing the 
way it does ‘business’ in Okinawa – is common among actors in defence sites. It is especially visible 
in the cables released by Wikileaks: for example, in a scenesetter written by Roos for President 
Obama’s November 2010 state visit to Japan, he wrote: 
120 
This was echoed by Yamaoka in his 2009 meeting with Roos in which he said that it is ‘critical to 
discuss the future direction of the alliance and make the FRF/Henoko issue as but one of many issues 
in the alliance’.121 Then-MOD Parliamentary VM Akihisa Nagashima later also commented to former 
CG in Okinawa Raymond Greene: ‘we need to just get this FRF discussion over with and turn our 
attention to more positive-sum issues in the Alliance’.122  
Usually, what is included in this focus on the ‘positive-sum issues’ in the alliance has been 
the ‘shared values’ of the Japanese and American governments, including democracy, individual 
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In order to keep the focus of your visit firmly on the positive accomplishments of the 
alliance and highlight our plans for even closer cooperation in the future, we are 
working with the Japanese government to announce during your visit the 
establishment of a bilateral interagency team to resolve outstanding issues on an 
expeditious basis related to the Japanese Government’s review of the Futenma 
replacement facility and other key alliance issues. […] By putting contentious subjects 
into a separate channel, we hope to keep them off the agenda for your visit and 
remove them as a focus of media attention [emphasis added]. This approach would 
enable you to speak in more positive, future-oriented terms about the Alliance, to 
include the possibility of new initiatives to mark the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-
Japan Security Treaty in 2010. 
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liberty, rule of law, a market economy, and promoting international peace and cooperation.123 ‘I 
think it is important to remember those basic truths, indeed the wide, deep and rich array of values 
and interests that bind our two countries together – especially since news headlines about our 
alliance are often dominated by difficult issues [emphasis added] such as HNS, the Futenma 
relocation, and funding for Guam’, said Gates in 2011.124 Following this, a current MOD researcher 
tells me that the alliance ‘is also a community of values, an alliance of values, and so even without 
North Korea or even without China, I’m quite confident that this alliance continues because it is not 
just a military alliance, it is a community of values’.125  
Beyond this ‘community of values’, however, is also the tangible expansion of the alliance’s 
purposes since the end of the Cold War. Operation Tomodachi, for instance, ‘showcased the U.S. 
military’s “helpfulness,” legitimized its presence, and softened its image’ in mainland Japan—the 
evidence for this being that less than three weeks after the operation began, ‘Japan promised to 
increase its Host Nation Support from three to five years and to pay 188 million yen annually for U.S. 
military facilities in the country’.126 Ogawa, moreover, has suggested turning some US bases in 
Okinawa, including Kadena and Futenma, into ‘major bases of U.S. peacekeeping operations, and 
establish peacekeeping training centers and posts for a U.N. standby force similar to that of the 
Nordic countries’.127 USMC General James Amos, speaking to this point, praised US efforts following 
the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, crediting their success in large part due to their forward 
deployment in the region (or, to quote Cohen: ‘perfect speed is being there’). ‘Even before this 
storm hit land’, he said, ‘Marines and Sailors on Okinawa and mainland Japan were preparing to 
respond – because they were already there… forward deployed’.128  
Beyond what cooperation already exists, however, many officials have recommended that 
more coordination on a greater variety of issues between not only the two governments, but also 
the USM and the SDF, would be better still for the future of the alliance. Paul Lushenko, a US Army 
(USAR) intelligence officer, comments that ‘it is only a matter of time until a “normalizing” Japan 
receives more tactically-oriented intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms such as 
Predator drones to facilitate a common operating picture across its [SDF] and USARPAC [USAR 
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Pacific] units stationed in Alaska, Hawai‘i, and Korea’.129 Gregson, meanwhile, points to the 2013 
‘Dawn Blitz’ joint training exercise in southern California which, in his words, ‘showed the power of 
bilateral training and the potential of [SDF] operations that are integrated across the very different 
air, land and sea environments […] It was a great evolution for the alliance’.130 Nonetheless, a 
current MOD researcher warns that this ‘evolution’ may be more limited than it seems: ‘Its [the 
alliance’s] purpose has expanded beyond the defense of Japan—now it is more concerned also with 
regional and global security. In Okinawa, however, there is no consensus on the role of the US-Japan 
alliance, and that is part of the problem’.131 
3. Institutional and cultural identities 
Futenma shouldn’t be a political problem in the US, because it’s a local problem in Japan. 
- Noboru Yamaguchi 
 
The implication made by officials quoted in the preceding section that getting the FRF 
discussion ‘over with’ would enable the governments to ‘speak in more positive, future-oriented 
terms about the Alliance’ and focus on continuing to expand its repertoire of functions – and that 
Futenma is, therefore, just an ‘obstacle’ to be ‘overcome’ – would seem to contradict its prominent 
place in policy discussions between them for nearly twenty years. Moreover, simply saying that it 
should not be a ‘first-order’ issue or that it ‘shouldn’t be a political problem’ does not ‘resolve’ the 
‘problem’ as such. Indeed, the physical and discursive distance between actors in defence sites from 
those of the ‘everyday’ on not only the importance of Futenma, but also on the role of the alliance 
and what ‘security’ even means and to whom it applies, makes reconciliation between their policy 
stances difficult. This distance also colours the narratives from the defence establishment about the 
differences in respective actors’ institutional and cultural identities, and efforts to bridge the gap 
between them—or, conversely, the lack of such efforts, and the implications of this.  
What this section seeks to highlight, however, is not just these points of difference among 
the parties involved, but also those within the alliance itself. By doing so, it illustrates the panoply of 
interpretations which exist even among a ‘transnational institutional network’ of ‘security 
professionals’ who are often lumped together and portrayed as uniform in their ideas, beliefs, and 
rhetoric. For example, in his historical research on how previous CGs in Okinawa have dealt with the 
‘Okinawa problem’ in the 1950s, Eldridge finds that the military ‘disregarded’ many of the 
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observations made by the CGs – ranging from those warning that local residents ‘were protesting 
the fact that they were being asked to move to make room for the second half of an 18-hole golf 
course’ to those which cautioned that ‘military government cannot be a substitute for civil 
government over an extended period in times of peace’.132 Such differences have travelled across 
time to also encompass disagreements over the FRF specifically, as has been illustrated in Chapter 3 
and also in Levin’s comments from section 2.3. 
What is especially apparent from the disagreements over the best approach to tackling the 
debate over the bases is a difficulty in reconciling competing stories about whom, exactly, is 
receiving benefits from them. Defence officials argue in favour of the ‘strategic’ value of Okinawa 
and how the bases there are critical in the protection of Japan as well as the Asia-Pacific region. This 
is not to say, however, that some of these same officials, politicians, and ‘experts’ are not also the 
ones who have made the most strident cases in favour of the opposite argument: that the bases are 
not there for the defence of Japan and Okinawa, but rather to maintain the US’s foothold in the 
region; that maintaining the current force presence structure only deepens existing tensions and 
resentments between the USM and Okinawan residents; and that the current FRF plan is not the 
‘best’ or ‘only’ option, but rather, in Yamaguchi’s words, the ‘most executable’133—and thus is not 
immune to criticism.  
3.1. Relationships and rivalries in (and around) Okinawa 
In discussing how the FRF’s relocation site came to be Henoko, USM inter-service rivalries 
are often one source of blame cited by actors in defence sites. These rivalries are said to have made 
difficult such alternative plans as the merger of the FRF with Kadena (given that the two are 
operated by the USMC and USAF, respectively).134 However, in the case of the merger option, as 
Nagashima told Greene in 2009, it is not just these ‘turf battles’ between the different services that 
have made pursuing alternatives difficult, but also ‘Okinawan leaders, some of whom assailed him 
personally over his past support for collocating USAF and USMC aircraft at Kadena Air Base’.135  
This paints a broader picture of the stakes involved in the base issue, not to mention the 
variety of actors involved therein, than is sometimes acknowledged—especially by members of the 
defence corps themselves. ‘[DefMin Fukushiro] Nukaga responded that the GOJ and he himself will 
take responsibility for resolving the issue’, reported Roos in a 2006 cable from the embassy in Tokyo. 
‘The FRF is not a bilateral issue, but a domestic one, he said. Of course realignment is a bilateral 
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matter, but FRF to Camp Schwab must be resolved domestically […] Nukaga added that there is no 
intent to make the U.S. the villain to Okinawa’.136 Okamoto also frames the standstill over the FRF as 
‘Japan’s failure’, claiming that ‘as long as that situation remains unresolved, the region will not enjoy 
long-term stability’.137 
This insistence on keeping Futenma a ‘domestic’ or even a ‘local’ prefectural issue again 
begs the question: how can a USM base – obviously the product of a bilateral treaty between the 
two countries – be separated from the US? Even if simply going by Okamoto’s assessment of 
Futenma as ‘Japan’s failure’, his conclusion that the ‘standstill’ over its relocation could potentially 
lead to a worsening of regional relations, which would undoubtedly affect the US as a ‘Pacific nation 
[which] maintains a strong interest in the Asian-Pacific region, and will continue to play an active and 
constructive role there’, implies that it is not just a ‘Japanese’ problem. Given Okinawa’s historic 
importance as ‘absolutely essential to the defense of our [the US’s] Western Pacific Frontier’ and its 
current role in the US’s ‘rebalance’ to Asia, placing the ‘burden’ of ‘responsibility’ of the relocation’s 
implementation solely on the GOJ likewise appears inconsistent. 
It is this contradiction which has led to its being the subject of sometimes fierce debate 
between actors in the central GOJ over how to best implement the relocation plan. For example, 
former US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer, recounting an 8 March 2007 dinner hosted by 
independent Okinawan Diet Member Mikio Shimoji, reported that MOD Administrative VM 
Takemasa Moriya had ‘lashed out’ at DefMin Kyuma and accused him of ‘under-the-table financial 
dealings with local business interests’ as being the motivation behind him having ‘secretly promised 
Gov. Nakaima that he could deliver a bilateral agreement to move the FRF's "V-shape" runway off-
shore and is unwilling to back out of this commitment regardless of pressure from Washington or his 
own government’.138 In his final comments on this cable, Schieffer expresses surprise at the 
exchange, saying: ‘It is remarkable how freely Moriya shared his contempt for Kyuma […] Moriya's 
casual remark that "Kyuma never tells me anything" suggests that rumors of a breakdown in 
communications between the Defense Minister and his deputy are on the mark’.139  
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Alongside these internecine battles among Japanese defence officials are similarly tense 
discussions between US and Japanese officials. In 2008, for instance, MOD DG Nobushige 
Takamizawa argued ‘in an unusually heated outburst’ at US ASD for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs 
James Shinn that ‘U.S. government pressure to speed up on-land construction at the FRF threatens 
to undermine Tokyo's efforts to secure cooperation from Okinawa’. Specifically, he warned: ‘We 
may win some battles but will lose the war’, stressing that ‘[w]hile Japan would welcome specific 
ideas from the U.S. side, general expressions of concern about Japan's execution strategy are 
counter-productive’.140 Webb, speaking to the general logistics of the plan itself, called the proposed 
FRF at Henoko a ‘monstrosity’, endorsing the Kadena merger but also calling for a reduction in the 
size of the USAF at Kadena itself: ‘You can disperse them to, potentially, other bases in Japan and 
also to Anderson USAF Base, Guam, which is not even 50 percent utilized right now’.141  
Kiyoshi Sugawa, former special researcher at the Office of the PM, also argues that if no 
replacement facility is built, ‘large numbers of Marines cannot remain on Okinawa. And the reality is 
no other area of mainland Japan is prepared to house such a presence and the Okinawa public 
refuses to accept any other site for the FRF in the prefecture’.142 Finally, Ogawa recounts an 
encounter between himself and Maher after he suggested to Hatoyama the possibility of relocating 
Futenma to Camp Hansen: 
143 
Although many of these discussions took place behind the ‘closed doors’ of the US embassy in Tokyo 
or the general consulate in Naha and have only been revealed in recent years due to Wikileaks, they 
exemplify the fact that personal rivalries – a variable that is little-discussed in the literature on 
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Having listened to my explanation, Prime Minister Hatoyama authorized me in 
December 2009 to discuss the Futenma relocation issue with U.S. officials alongside 
Director General [of the International Department Yukihisa] Fujita. When I argued to 
the Americans that the land for an expedient helicopter base could be cleared in two 
days, Kevin Maher exclaimed "Dekinai!" ("Impossible!" in Japanese). I replied in a 
loud voice, "You may be an excellent diplomat, but you are not a military expert. I 
am. In wartime, helicopter bases are targets for attack. If a military formation cannot 
relocate a helicopter base in two days, then it will lose the war.” Subsequently, Mr. 
Maher has no longer raised this issue with me. 
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alliance ‘persistence’ – can and do have an impact, and this impact extends beyond ‘constraints’ that 
are imposed by institutional rules and norms on the negotiating and policymaking processes. 
3.2. The defence of all or the defence of some 
What has complicated this already complex debate over not only the specifics of the FRF, 
but also over whom bears responsibility for its implementation, is a more fundamental 
disagreement over how to convey the purpose of the USM presence in Okinawa. ‘You have to frame 
what’s going on in Okinawa against the context of what Tokyo believes to be in their best interest 
nationally around the region and around the world’, the Senate staffer tells me144; looking at 
previous internal discussions between officials in Tokyo, these duelling narratives about security are 
apparent. Moriya, meeting with Schieffer in 2006, stated: ‘We have a good plan for Futenma, and 
more importantly, it represents a promise made by the government of Japan to the government of 
the United States […] [we will] work with the Environment Ministry to secure permission for survey 
work at Camp Schwab if the next Okinawa Governor refused to sign required permits’.145 
Takamizawa expressed a similar willingness to go over the prefectural authority or democratic will in 
Okinawa if need be, telling Schieffer in 2008 that although the GOJ has a ‘desire to be seen by the 
Okinawan people as listening to their concerns’, he still asked ‘for the U.S. to "remain tough" on 
statements regarding realignment’.146  
In my interviews with current and former defence officials, however, another narrative 
emerged: that of many Okinawans actually being more ‘realistic’ about certain ‘threats’ to national 
security than their mainland Japanese counterparts.147 ‘When the North Korean missile flew over the 
Okinawan islands [in December 2012], and Okinawan people even insisted that for missile defence, 
like the PAC-3 – they [the GOJ] [should] pay for the third system to be located [in Okinawa] and it 
should protect Okinawan people’, says one MOD researcher. ‘So in these past two or three years, 
Okinawan people’s perceptions vis-a-vis missile defence or so-called “extended deterrence” has 
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changed dramatically’.148 Within this narrative, actors in defence sites distinguished between so-
called ‘realistic’ and ‘idealistic’ Okinawan residents depending on the degree to which their 
conceptualisations of ‘threat’ and ‘security’ align with those of their own. For example, another 
researcher comments: 
149 
In its attempt to extend this kind of ‘security awareness’ across the prefecture, the MOD has 
relied on the efforts of its local branch, the Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB), located in Kadena. The 
main roles of the bureau have historically been: to ‘tacitly’150 maintain support for a stable USM 
presence through coordination with local leaders in Okinawa; to negotiate with the USG, US armed 
forces, and anti-base Diet members; to interact with mass and local media; and to handle vaguely-
described ‘leftist opposition movements’.151 It has been responsible for addressing complaints from 
residents about noise pollution, with one MOD official telling me that the bureau, for example, 
‘measures the noise and gives out subsidies for soundproofing windows and air conditioning’ upon 
request.152 The ODB also looks after the paperwork for distributing rent to local landowners on 
behalf of the GOJ, oversees base relocations, closures, and land returns, though as one MOD 
researcher tells it: ‘they are not policymakers, they are just implementing government policy’.153  
However, even in carrying out orders from the top-down, says another MOD researcher, 
gaps remain in record-keeping: ‘many years ago, the two governments agreed to close that Naha 
Pier and move it somewhere else. But nothing has been done […] And when I went there, I asked the 
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… in one sense, you can say that their [Okinawans’] security awareness is very real 
and substantial. Because ... the Senkakus, actually, are part of Okinawa. And the fact 
that the Chinese fishing boats and Chinese law enforcement agencies’ vessels come 
into various islands of Okinawa—that’s a huge concern for Okinawa fishermen 
because, for obvious reasons, they don’t want to see Chinese competitors in their 
own waters […] So that’s why in the remote islands of Okinawa, some people are very, 
very, very supportive of more rigorous, assertive responses from the Japanese Coast 
Guard in dealing with those Chinese vessels, government and private vessels. So ... in 
that sense, yes, some Okinawans are very much aware of security problems […] But ... 
that is somewhat detached from broader strategic interests, as you can imagine. 
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MOD office […] how often does the US military use this port? And they didn’t have any idea. That 
shows something’.  
3.3. Civil-military relations: mistrust and miscommunication 
Given this sometimes incoherent messaging between the USG and GOJ, the USM, the ODB in 
Kadena, and Okinawan residents, it is not surprising that scepticism of the purpose of US forces in 
Okinawa is high in the prefecture. Remarks Yara: ‘The USMC doesn’t do enough to advertise its HADR 
role in Okinawa—people don’t know about it’.154 ‘They [the USMC] are not forces for the protection 
of Okinawa only, but also for deployment or redeployment’, an MOD researcher agrees.155 Klingner 
adds that bases such as Futenma are ‘critical to defending the Peninsula. We can’t defend Korea 
without Japan’.156 The Senate staffer echoes Klingner’s comments in a blunter fashion: ‘first of all, 
let’s be clear here, you know, the forces on Okinawa are not for the defence of Japan. They’re not. I 
mean, they’re for the forward protection of US national interests in that region’.157  
Long-time US correspondent for Weekly Toyo Keizai Peter Ennis, however, remarks that even 
these arguments contain numerous fallacies: 
158 
Criticisms like these are part of a larger problem of mistrust and miscommunication in civil-military 
relations dating back to the beginning of the USM’s occupation of the prefecture. The many 
controversies connected to the US’s extraterritorial jurisdiction over its forces, for example, has led 
to a situation in which the Japanese perception of, specifically, the custody arrangement is that 
‘servicemen in Okinawa know that if after committing a rape, a robbery, or an assault, they can make 
it back to the base before the [Japanese] police catch them, they will be free until indicted even 
though there is a Japanese arrest warrant out for their capture’.159  
Similarly, responsibility over environmental clean-up of land returned from former base sites 
has been a subject of contention. The 1998 GAO report cites the case of the land which had formerly 
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The Marines are not on Okinawa to defend Japan. The chances of a land invasion of 
Japan are less than remote. Even a Chinese move on the Senkaku islands could 
effectively be met by Japan’s Coast Guard and the Maritime Self Defense and Air Self 
Defense forces (not to mention the Ground Self Defense Forces). Similarly, the 
Marines are not on Okinawa to defend South Korea. The Republic of Korea’s ground 
forces are larger in number than the entire US Army and US Marine Corps combined 
worldwide, and they are capable of defeating North Korea, with backup of course 
from the combined air and naval forces of the US and the ROK itself. 
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been Onna Communications Site, on which the ODB found such toxic substances as mercury and 
polychlorinated biphenyls and could not return the land to its owners for reuse.160 Citing a similar 
situation in the US which ended up costing the government over $53 million to clean up, the report 
warned that if ‘an environmental baseline survey is conducted and contamination [onsite] is found, 
cleanup could prove expensive’.161  
It is problems like these, says Gregson, which explain why ‘SACO didn’t fully succeed’.162 He 
expands on this comment, listing three main reasons for this outcome: ‘One: mainland Japan didn’t 
really care. Two: once the agreement was signed, the US thought the heavy lifting was over. And 
three: neither side took local politics into account’. Yamaguchi agrees, adding: ‘the deeper problem 
is Honshu people’s unwillingness to accept responsibility for the bases’.163 One MOD researcher 
further critiques the management of base-related protests: ‘over the past thirty, forty, fifty years, 
the Japanese government’s solution was to pay subsidies to curb protest. It is not the perfect 
solution, but it is the best available solution to help win the hearts and minds of local Okinawans. But 
in the case of Futenma, we haven’t done that at a very good level’.164 Even over smaller, everyday 
issues, a palpable division exists, says an MOD official: ‘Under SOFA, US residents don’t pay local 
taxes, so local residents complain about the USM not sorting their garbage collection, dog waste, and 
their general manners. They feel that through SOFA, the USM is unfairly privileged’.165  
A more specific instance in which this miscommunication is particularly evident is the 2004 
OIU helicopter crash. The USM’s decision not to grant access to local law enforcement to the crash 
site immediately following the incident was perceived by many Okinawan residents as ‘an 
infringement on Japan’s sovereignty’; this was not aided when, after Okinawa Prefecture Assembly 
member Masaharu Kina asked a group of Marines what ‘authority’ they had over the site, they 
replied: ‘because it is dangerous’.166 The public affairs effort following this case was also lacking, says 
Eldridge, as press releases ‘lacked detail, regularity, and timeliness’, few were released in the month 
after it occurred (only six from USMC Japan’s Consolidated Public Aﬀairs Oﬃce and four from the 
USFJ), and ‘little attention or energy’ was put into providing the full details of the incident online, 
especially by ‘the respective organizations and agencies of the U.S. military and government, and 
that of the Japanese government such as the DFAA and MOFA’.167  
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In his comments following the crash to local newspaper the Ryukyu Shimpo, Yoichi Iha, then-
mayor of Ginowan (where the crash took place), also helped to frame the story around it as a stand-
off between the USM and prefectural authorities: ‘The purpose of the U.S. military investigation is 
diﬀerent [from that of the Japanese side]. For them, the most important thing is to preserve the 
helicopter’s body, and has nothing to do with the damage to residents and structures’.168 Following 
his comments and subsequent meetings with MOFA, the Japanese Defense Agency (precursor to the 
MOD), and the US Embassy, as many as 31 of 52 local communities around base sites in Okinawa 
‘passed resolutions calling for the re-examination of SACO and/or the decision to relocate the 
functions of Futenma to Henoko, as well as calls for Futenma’s early return or outright closure’.169 
3.4. Civil-military relations: bridging the gap 
It is impossible to cover, given the constraints of this research, every grievance and major 
incident that has cropped up in civil-military relations on Okinawa. Nonetheless, the pattern of long-
term mistrust over the handling of these cases – along with a failure to clearly convey arguments 
and beliefs on all sides involved, but especially on the part of the central USG and GOJ – is evident. 
‘We should have more communication’, asserts one MOD researcher, ‘but the issue is: how?’170 
Christopher Gibson and Don Snider have suggested that improvements in civil-military relations 
occur ‘over weeks, months, and years of working together with a repetitive array of security issues, 
generated from annual planning cycles as well as from random but recurring crisis situations’, and 
that working together, these informal and/or formal communications might eventually turn into 
‘issue networks’ both inside and outside the government, facilitating ‘the necessary exchange and 
critique of ideas requisite to consensus decisions’.171  
In the case of Okinawa, says Sasha Davis, such communications are critical: ‘The DOD’s 
aspiration for a globe-spanning network of forward bases from which they can enjoy operational 
unilateralism is impossible to attain without amiable towns and villages’.172 The way in which the 
GOJ has thus far tried to keep Okinawa ‘amiable’ has been, as previously mentioned, to offer 
economic incentives. Base-related income has been a significant contributor in the form of 
household incomes of base workers, rents to landowners, and subsidies to local officials.173 Gregson, 
however, calls this subsidy system ‘perverse’ and blames it, in part, for the continuing low level of 
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educational achievement in Okinawa compared to other prefectures in mainland Japan.174 ‘There are 
currently two choices in Okinawa: work in the tourist or construction industries’, he says. ‘The third 
option, of course, is to work on the bases. However, when I was in Okinawa, each on-base position 
got nearly 400 local applicants’.175 
However, this income as a percentage of the total Okinawan economy has shrunk since 
reversion176, and local governments have invested more in health services and ecological 
industries.177 ‘Okinawa has a lot of potential’, Yamaguchi observes. ‘It’s the only prefecture, until 
recently, with a growing population. I hope they can work with Taiwanese companies and give 
Okinawa a foothold in businesses on mainland China’.178 Gregson agrees, expressing his view that 
‘the key to resolving the issues is connecting to local ideas about education, the environment, and 
the professional workplace’; among these, he suggests improving English language education, 
connecting an Okinawa liquefied natural gas hub with North America, building up the prefecture’s 
medical tourism industry, and starting a public-private partnership to create more international 
schools.179  
Apart from these more ‘business-oriented’ prospects for increased cooperation, official 
documents from the US and Japan have also stressed the importance of good community relations 
between US service members and Okinawan residents. ‘U.S. forces and their spouses in Japan […] 
sponsor cultural and social events, contribute to environmental clean-up activities, maintain local 
parks, provide assistance to charitable institutions and contribute in a variety of other ways to 
improving their communities’, says the 1998 US Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region.180 
It further calls cooperation between not only base commanders and officials, but also ‘between 
every soldier, sailor, airman and Marine, and every local citizen’, as ‘a critical element of U.S. 
overseas presence’.181 The USMC Installations Pacific (MCIPAC)’s official guidebook, ‘A Force in 
Readiness’, further expounds on this point: ‘Marines, sailors, and their families are not only 
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deployed here to Japan—they live, work, and raise their children here as part of the community’.182 
The guidebook lists, among MCIPAC’s numerous efforts to reach out to their communities: hosting 
Japanese students for internships; promoting information-sharing with other prefectures ‘in order to 
strengthen mutual cooperation with each other’s capabilities in [HADR]’; and regularly hosting 
visitors who are ‘interested in learning about the U.S.-Japan relationship, the bilateral alliance, and 
the role of the Marine Corps’.183 
Cohen credited these community relations and outreach projects for the high level of public 
support in Japan for the alliance with the US—a consequence which has not gone unnoticed in later 
reports.184 The 2009 Japanese WP, for example, also emphasises that ‘[e]xchange events between 
USFJ personnel (military and civilian personnel and their dependents) and local residents contribute 
to deepening mutual understanding’185, while the 2013 Paper claims that ‘[f]or USFJ facilities and 
areas to fully exert their capabilities, it is vital to gain the cooperation and understanding of the local 
communities’.186 In order to ‘fully exert their capabilities’, in fact, the two governments have, over 
the years, agreed to several alleviating actions, including relocating artillery training and carrier 
landing practice and establishing ‘quiet hours’ for US air operations.187  
Nevertheless, gaps remain in what is hoped for in civil-military relations, and in what can be 
realistically achieved in the near term. One MOD researcher says, to this effect: 
188  
Similarly, calls to increase the dual use rate of USM facilities – such as those in Kadena – are ‘not on 
the agenda’, the researcher remarks. Still, Gregson asserts, ‘the US has a moral obligation and a 
responsibility to Okinawa—stockpiling military weapons and the bases are not enough for the basis 
of a prefectural economy. The bases as they are currently constructed are not sustainable; they must 
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The ideal design is to have capacity-building of local companies of contractors and 
[increased] networking [with] smaller businesses. But as to the credible and 
trustworthy big project of having an air runway which is not on land but over the sea, 
it is a very high-tech one. And can local Okinawan industry make one? No. Definitely 
not. […] That means the central government or even a foreign company will do that. 
That means local industry will receive very little profit through this business. 
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be changed to reflect the mature partnership between the US and Japan. We have to be more 
integrated’.189 
4. Discursive intersections and divisions 
Military base issues cannot be separated from the past—“the past” meaning the Battle of 
Okinawa.  
- A researcher currently working for the Japanese MOD 
 
If the US (and, by extension, the Japanese) government has a ‘moral obligation and a 
responsibility to Okinawa’, it would thus seem natural for officials, both political and military, to 
reach out to Okinawans not only on a person-to-person level, but also to acquire for themselves a 
deeper, fuller understanding of the historical context in which the base issue sits. Indeed, in some 
ways, the USM and local MOD bureau – being closer to the ‘Okinawa issue’ than those crafting the 
policies to ‘resolve’ it in Tokyo and Washington – have displayed a higher cultural and historical 
sensitivity to the concerns of residents. In the years since the reversion of the prefecture, in fact, 
increased coordination between not only the USG and GOJ over base policy, but also between them, 
prefectural officials, and US armed forces has led to this sensitivity becoming more widespread even 
among the top echelons of government. ‘Okinawa is a region which has nurtured a unique culture 
and a region of which Japan should be proud’, said former PM Kan in a speech to the Diet in 2010. 
‘On 23 June, the Memorial Ceremony to Commemorate the Fallen on the Sixty-fifth Anniversary of 
the End of the Battle of Okinawa will be held. I intend to begin my work for the future of Okinawa by 
taking part in this ceremony and recalling the tragedy that struck Okinawa’.190  
This heightened awareness and sensitivity does not mean, however, that the perspectives of 
anti-base residents and protesters are accepted as legitimate. On the one hand, there remains a 
deep cynicism towards the motivations of and arguments supported by these individuals and 
groups, with accusations from the defence establishment including that the ABM is funded by 
external actors  (e.g. the Chinese), that it is purely concerned with acquiring more economic 
subsidies from the central government in Tokyo for the prefecture, and/or that the protests over 
Futenma are only the beginnings of a larger movement yet to come that would demand the removal 
of all US forces from the prefecture. On the other hand, sometimes the divide keeping apart these 
individuals and institutions from seeing eye-to-eye – or even from seeing each other’s arguments as 
valid – is due to a combination of concern for the financial stability of, specifically, the USMC and 
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other services, and a determinedness to continue the narrative that the USM’s presence in Okinawa 
is a prerequisite for the alliance’s survival and reproduction. 
In discussing these intersections and divides, then, this section not only highlights the impact 
that ‘everyday’, ‘insurgent’ narratives about history, identity, and ‘security’ have had on those actors 
in defence sites, but also the extent to which the latter have absorbed the PBD into their own, 
personal interpretations of these concepts and their practical application—even when it is 
demonstrated to be inherently problematic. 
4.1. Intersection: understanding Okinawan history and identity 
Although Okinawa’s battle-scarred past is, by now, common knowledge among officials who 
have worked on base-related issues, it is not necessarily as well-known by domestic Japanese and 
American audiences—nor is it linked to other contentious issues related to WWII and the post-war 
period, such as Japanese relations with China and the ROK. When I asked Yamaguchi why this is, he 
replied: ‘Honshu people just don’t know that it’s part of the history issue like China and Korea, but 
Okinawans are very proud of their history’.191 Gregson goes further, saying that Okinawans ‘have 
never felt fully enfranchised in the nation of Japan’192; an MOD official likewise tells me that ‘the 
base issue is closely connected to the intense realisation of Okinawan identity, which is becoming 
stronger and stronger […] There is a word: sabetsu – segregation – that expresses a perception of 
negative discrimination which separates the Okinawan identity from the Japanese one’.193  
This distinct pride and historical memory, says one MOD researcher, is not simply the result 
of Okinawans maintaining a separate identity from mainland Japanese, but also because of their 
wartime experience. ‘Okinawa is the only battlefield in Japan and in the Pacific War which recorded 
a huge loss of life of local people. So that became a symbol of legacy of the non-commitment of the 
Imperial Army and Navy of the defence of Okinawa’.194 Furthermore, the researcher says, the legacy 
of the American Occupation has left its mark with regards to relations between Okinawans, the 
USM, and the central GOJ: 
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Within this framing of the disproportionate ‘burden’ on Okinawa, its historical suffering, and 
the general appearance of ‘unfairness’ with regards to the USM presence in Japan at large, Kiyomi 
Tsujimoto, in her 2009 meeting with Ambassador Roos, remarked that considering the 
‘environmental, social, and historical factors’ at play in Okinawa, ‘the previous [LDP] government's 
approach to [the] FRF […] did not convey to the United States how difficult the current plan would 
be to implement’.195 Several Japanese WPs also acknowledge, if in ambiguous terms, a ‘lack of 
progress’ in land returns due to these ‘historical developments and issues’, with a larger number of 
US facilities remaining in Okinawa in comparison to other prefectures in the post-war period.196  
4.2. Intersection: improving people-to-people contact 
Although an appreciation for Okinawan history and the identity issue is an important 
baseline for developing mutual respect among the actors involved, increasing contact between 
people on an individual basis may prove to be more essential—though towards different purposes, 
depending on who is asked. ‘[A] fundamental truth of our partnership [is that] the ultimate success 
of the alliance rests on the support of the people’, said Cohen in 2000.197 Rumsfeld echoed these 
comments in 2005, stating that the DOD would prefer to locate US forces ‘[w]here they are wanted, 
welcomed, and needed’.198 Janine Davidson added in 2013 that ‘where ally countries host our 
military forces, we must remain conscious of the fact that these are not our territories [emphasis 
added]’.199 Flynn points to past examples of domestic protests leading to the loss of US bases abroad 
when preventative, ‘burden-reducing’ measures were not implemented, including American bases in 
France in the 1960s, Spanish bases in the 1970s, and, more recently, the US Naval base in Subic Bay 
in the Philippines in 1992; in the case of Japan, however, he notes that the USM has taken extra 
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If you go to Yokohama, the US Army Depot is there within three minutes from […] 
Yokohama Station. Can you believe that? Can you [imagine] that in London or Paddington, 
within three minutes [from the station], a big, big depot of the US Army is there? And what 
is the base for? Well, in the ending phase of the Pacific War, Tokyo was nothing. It was in 
ruins. Bombarded. And all the railways and roads were closed. So only [the port at] 
Yokohama Bay was open for transportation of goods and services. And then the US had a 
huge depot and they still use it now. So the best place was eliminated and is still being used 
by the US military […] And Kadena is the same: huge noise [problems], but we cannot kick 
Kadena out of Okinawa. Kadena was originally used by the Japanese Imperial Navy. So you 
see? The best place is occupied by the US by force and they legitimately use these military 
facilities with the agreement of the Japanese government […] And policymakers in the city 
totally forget about what’s happened in the past. They look to the future. 
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precautions. ‘These include temporary curfews and restrictions of servicemembers to base, bans on 
alcohol consumption, and increased educational efforts in the areas of violence prevention and 
sexual assault’, he notes, adding: ‘military officials [also] routinely make public apologies for crimes 
and provide symbolic monetary payments to victims’.200 
These measures alone, however, are not enough to quell anti-base and anti-military feelings 
among residents. ‘There aren’t many US officials and service members who are able to build long-
lasting relationships with the local people on account of short-term, rotational assignments’, says 
Magleby. He suggests, like Gregson, improving what short-term contact exists by increasing, for 
example, the number of soldiers and civilians participating in English language educational 
activities.201 At the level of government officials in Tokyo and Washington, meanwhile, an MOD 
researcher points out that a recent issue has been ‘declining contact between parliamentarians’ on 
account of the US Congress increasingly turning its attention towards China. ‘It’s very important 
because both in Japan and United States, the Congress and the Diet play a very big role, a maybe 
increasing role, in foreign policy and security issues on top of trade and other areas where 
traditionally, the Congress and the Diet have a big role […] and that is exactly why exchanges [among 
parliamentarians] are becoming more important’. The researcher continues: ‘But the reality is 
almost the opposite—that the occasions for exchanges are declining, so that’s, I think, a very big 
problem’.202 
4.3. Division: cynicism towards the anti-base movement 
It is not just a lack of contact between parliamentarians and officials in both governments, 
however, that is to blame for the tense atmosphere around not only Futenma, but basing policies 
generally speaking. Rather, the limited number of actors whose arguments and interpretations 
around these policies are considered ‘legitimate’ and allowed into public and private debates on 
them is an important contributing factor. It is in large part due to this that the same narratives and 
frames are recycled and the PBD is reproduced; even when there are fractures or changes to them 
over the course of decades, the core belief in the necessity of the USM presence for regional stability 
largely remains in place.  
In maintaining this belief, therefore, there is an array of arguments and assertions which 
these actors have put forward in order to either invalidate or justify ignoring those of their 
purported opponents. ‘There are so many pressure groups in this situation’, says one MOD 
researcher. ‘For example, the tochiren, Ginowan-based landlords who make money from renting 
their land to the US military forces and who would lose business if Futenma were relocated to 
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Henoko’.203 The former Senate staffer agrees, remarking that after being briefed on the FRF plan by 
former Deputy Under SecDef for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Richard Lawless in 2005, the 
staffer’s first reaction was that the relocation served as a ‘land grab’ for Okinawan officials: ‘You 
know, we’re giving up some incredibly valuable land in the south part of Okinawa, we’re moving 
ourselves to the jungles up north, and the Okinawan people are gonna make a ton of money off 
this’. The staffer elaborates: 
204 
The staffer extends this assertion from Nakaima and prefectural officials and businesses to 
protesters as well, commenting that ‘as far as they’re concerned, they’ll go with whoever offers 
them the best deal. The Chinese offer them the best deal? Then “hell yeah, we’ll be pro-Chinese” […] 
I think a lot of [the protest against Futenma] was just fomented by Chinese influence trying to work 
the grassroots effort to remove the Americans from Okinawa’. While not stated in such explicit 
terms, Klingner similarly posits that much of the ABM is made up of off-island ‘professional 
protesters’, and thus questions what the ‘real’ views of the protesters are: ‘I mean I’ve talked to 
Okinawans and others on the island [and they’ve said], “oh yeah, this is what I believe, but any time 
any of the Okinawan media ask me, I say the opposite because I know that the Okinawan media is so 
anti-base and so anti-US that you don’t answer this way if they’re asking you”’.205 
The scepticism of these officials has led not only to the fomentation of a narrative in which 
protesters, officials, and residents in Okinawa are driven by specific ‘incentives’, but that, this being 
the case, these actors’ arguments can therefore be dismissed in favour of more ‘strategically 
important’ objectives (see Hayashi and Motojuku’s comments earlier in the chapter, for example). 
‘National security policy cannot be made in towns and villages’, remarked Lt. Gen. Keith J. Stalder, 
then-commander of USMC in the Paciﬁc after the election of Susumu Inamine, an anti-military base 
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So from my concern, this is not about the healthy alliance. This is about, you know, 
Okinawans putting pressure on Tokyo, on the central government, and saying, “hey, 
we’re tired of being the stepchild here, how about allowing us to grow economically 
by helping us move American forces out of Camp Foster, and Kinser, and some other 
locations where there’s pretty damn valuable property down there?” […] So from my 
perspective, the Okinawan governor [Nakaima]—yeah, he could talk all about, you 
know, the rights of indigenous peoples, the fact that “we feel oppressed”, [but the] 
bottom line is it’s all economic for him. He’s got contractors who wanted that work—
we’re talking $12, $15 billion dollars to do construction on Okinawa, so he’s getting 
fed by contractors who, you know, wanted the work. He just had to put on a brave 
face and sign the landfill permit. And he did it because he got a second runway at 
Naha [Airport] and $6 billion in the Okinawan economy. 
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mayor, in Nago in 2010.206 Takamizawa similarly warned Roos and Kurt Campbell, in a 2009 meeting 
not to be too flexible on environmental issues lest they ‘invite local demands for the U.S. side to 
permit greater access to bases and to shoulder mitigation costs for environmental damage’.207 In 
2007, DefMin Koike likewise told Maher that, regardless of the results of an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) which was being carried out for the FRF at the time: ‘there will be a different 
administration by 2009, so it doesn't matter what we've promised him [Governor Nakaima]’.208 That 
same year, MOFA North American Affairs Bureau DG Shinichi Nishimiya, in a meeting with Lt Gen 
John F. Goodman, Commander of USMC Pacific, suggested that, of two ‘key areas’ to focus on in the 
ongoing FRF discussions, ‘management of information, especially regarding Guam, is critical. Guam is 
increasingly attracting the attention of Okinawa media and politicians, who may use a visit to Guam 
to convey unhelpful messages [emphasis added] to the public’.209 
Beyond specific environmental or legal concessions which Okinawan actors might derive 
from the USG and GOJ, officials have also asserted that the protests are driven by a more basic anti-
military impetus. For example, Roos reported Yamaoka as having said, in a 2009 meeting: ‘As for the 
Nago mayoral election, regardless of the outcome, the government must stick to its plan to 
implement the realignment agreement. If Okinawa's will is respected, "nothing will ever happen." 
The issue of Okinawa politics, therefore, is not a big deal as long as the government's decision is 
made before the gubernatorial race’.210 Okamoto agreed: ‘These [Okinawa] reformists would prefer 
the status quo at U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as a way to maintain the political pressure 
necessary to rid Okinawa completely of any U.S. military presence, which is the reformists’ long-term 
goal’.211  
Following on from these, Klingner frames this situation, as fundamentally resulting from a 
‘big difference’ in the ‘local’ versus ‘strategic’ views (or ‘military’ versus ‘constituent’ concerns). 
‘When Okinawa sort of tried to put the US in between Okinawa and Tokyo as a negotiator, we’ve 
[the US] said: “look, this is a Japanese issue. We have signed an agreement with Japan. You’re part of 
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Japan; you have to deal with your national government. We don’t negotiate with a local 
neighbourhood association [emphasis added]”’.212 He expands on this analogy: 
 
What this analogising of Okinawa to a ‘neighbourhood’ and the bases to a ‘fire station’ implies, then, 
is that – like the residents of the neighbourhood – Okinawans who are anti-base are also not seeing 
the ‘bigger picture’ in terms of the importance of the USM presence to not only their own safety, but 
also national security. In denying them this ability to ‘see’ or ‘know’ what is in their best interest, 
Klingner and others thus undermine residents’ and local officials’ agency in terms of the negotiating 
and policymaking processes. 
4.4. Division: financial stability and institutional survival 
Where these officials have not been shy about discussing their theories behind the attitudes 
and funding sources of the anti-base resistance in Okinawa, there is more reticence in addressing 
the future financial stability of USM forces abroad and, specifically, the USMC, as a significant factor 
behind their argument in favour of maintaining a military presence in Okinawa. ‘The military here 
needs proponents back in the USG because it is always on the hunt—it always needs more funds’, 
remarks Yara. An MOD researcher posits that this ‘hunt’ may be motivated by the US’s recent 
defence budget cuts under sequestration, under which domestic bases have been targeted for 
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I think of it in terms of a neighbourhood. In a neighbourhood, there’s a fire station. 
The neighbours don’t like it: it’s noisy, the fire trucks come rushing out quickly, they 
have their sirens on […] occasionally the fire department runs over a curb and, you 
know, causes damage to a flower bed or whatever. So the local neighbourhood, they 
got together and said: “okay, we have voted and we want the fire station out”. And 
from their viewpoint, that’s all they care about […] Now, the [mayor] would say: “I’m 
sorry, we have a need for fire stations. Every neighbourhood doesn’t want it, but we 
need to deploy them at certain areas to respond to fires […] the neighbourhood 
doesn’t have authority over the city. And as the mayor, I have to take into account 
more than just the interest of any one neighbourhood or any one district. I have to 
think of the safety of the city. Therefore, I’m sorry, we’re gonna keep the fire 
department”[.] And then you go through things where the fire department won’t use 
their sirens after ten at night and try to drive slowly […] but for the neighbourhood, 
they can’t understand why [it’s] still there. For the mayor, it’s: “I have to look at bigger 
issues, and I’m sorry, but the neighbourhood is not the authority that trumps all. It is a 
subordinate district to the legal authority, which is the city”. So, you know, similarly, 
Okinawa is not a country. It is a subordinate prefecture to the national government, 
and the US has signed an agreement with the sovereign nation of Japan, not the 
sovereign nation of Okinawa. 
Grinberg 184 
 
closure.213 ‘Of course they don’t want to see their bases closed in their own constituencies. So how 
to keep foreign bases can never be a very popular topic for US politicians’.214  
One reason why it has not been a ‘popular topic’ among US officials are the often 
understated costs of maintaining overseas basing. The Pentagon officially spends as much as $170 
billion per year on these facilities, though, as Joseph Gerson notes, outside estimates ‘run as high as 
a trillion dollars. The Pentagon concedes that it cannot account for hundreds of billions of dollars’.215 
Partly in order to address this spending, the bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility 
and Reform was created by the Obama administration and charged with ‘identifying policies to 
improve the fiscal situation in the medium term and to achieve fiscal sustainability over the long 
run’.216 Among its recommendations was reducing military personnel and bases across Europe and 
Asia by one-third, thus potentially saving up to $80 billion in the long term.217  
Given that the costs of the realignment to Guam and the construction of the FRF alone, for 
example, are estimated at around $26 billion or more218, Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) proposed 
cancelling it altogether. He was joined by Senators Levin, Webb, and John McCain (R-AZ) in 2011, all 
of whom – expressing that the FRF and base expansion in Guam were ‘unrealistic’ and ‘simply 
unaffordable in today’s increasingly constrained fiscal environment’ – likewise suggested scrapping 
the plan.219 More candidly, US ASD for Acquisition Katrina McFarland was reported to have said at a 
conference in March 2014: ‘Right now the pivot [to the Asia Pacific] is being looked at again, because 
candidly it can’t happen [owing to budget pressures]’.220 
It is unlikely, however, that such arguments will prevail, says former US national security 
analyst Michael O’Hanlon, since the GOJ ‘foots much of the bill for operations and base needs’ 
through its HNS.221 This financial contribution in Okinawa, for example, ‘arguably saves the United 
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States several billion dollars a year, since the alternative to Kadena might well be a larger Navy 
aircraft carrier fleet expanded by three or four carrier battle groups’.222 Nye likewise points to HNS 
to say that the US need not withdraw its overseas forces because Japan and the ROK ‘want an 
insurance policy in a region faced with a rising China and a volatile North Korea’.223 Finally, USMC 
Commandant Amos also frames the USM presence in these terms, remarking of the USMC that ‘[f]or 
[less than] 8% of the entire DOD budget, America gets a 24-7 crisis response capability’.224  
Futenma’s ‘symbolic’ value is likewise tied to this financial value, particularly for the USMC. 
‘Outside of the United States there is only one other airbase in the world (also in Japan), which is 
exclusively under Marine command and they are reluctant to give this privilege up’, comments Paul 
Richardson225, and John Feffer similarly posits that although Kadena provides enough air power for 
the entire prefecture and surrounding regions, the FRF remains in play because ‘the [armed] services 
are always reluctant to give up anything for fear that they will lose even more when the inevitable 
belt-tightening begins’.226 This is also generally the case, says Davis, with the USM’s approach to 
maintaining or expanding its overseas bases in the places where they are already located: 
227 
Given that the influence of military commanders over their civilian counterparts in 
Washington has been increasing over a number of decades due to declining military experience 
among members of Congress and in the presidency, say Gibson and Snider, it is unlikely that 
overseas basing policy will change considerably even in the face of budget cuts. ‘When the 6-12 
                                                          
222 O’Hanlon 2008, p. 14. 
223 Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Right Way to Trim’, The New York Times, 4 August 2011, available online at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/opinion/the-right-way-to-trim-military-spending.html?_r=2&. The 
analogy of the USM presence as ‘house insurance’ goes back, says Hook, to the 1980s, when PM Nakasone 
used it to argue in favour of further ‘normalisation’: ‘With this metaphor the principle of keeping military 
expenditure below 1 per cent of GNP, which as we have seen earlier was supported by a majority at the mass 
level, could be challenged on the basis of a homely argument: supporters of the symbolic 1 per cent ceiling 
failed to recognize that, by moving 11 up in the world, Japan had incurred an obligation to pay adequately for 
security in the new neighbourhood’ (Hook 1996, pp. 145-146). 
224 Amos 2014. 
225 Richardson 2013. 
226 John Feffer, ‘The Sun Also Rises: Resisting Militarism in Japan’, Foreign Policy in Focus, 15 January 2014, 
available online at: http://fpif.org/sun-also-rises-resisting-militarism-japan/. 
227 Davis 2011, pp. 220-221. 
[…] the military is looking for base sites with pre-arranged permissions to train and 
deploy without negotiation. The problem is that other governments are becoming 
more reluctant to do this. Why would an allied government want to host a forward 
base that, by the Pentagon’s own admission, is no longer about defending the country 
in which it is placed, but is instead a site for training exercises (that raise the ire of 
people living adjacent to it) and a site for the projection of force (that the allied 
government is not going to be consulted about)? For instance, as popular protest 
forced the US to agree to reductions in their military presence in Okinawa the US 
approached Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Australia to host new bases and 
all four declined. 
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months that a key [civilian] position [in the DOD, such as at the undersecretary and ASD level,] often 
goes empty are added to the normal 3-4 month transition period for the new appointee, it is not 
surprising that military influence increases dramatically at the beginning of a new presidential 
administration’, they comment—and thus, this process helps to ensure continuity in security policy 
cutting across administrations of different party backgrounds.228  
Conclusion 
In discussing the closure or return of bases as being solely in the realm of possibility only in 
the case of the USG being in severe financial straits, actors in defence sites underrate or dismiss the 
agency of actors in other sites (especially ‘everyday’ ones) and their arguments as ineffectual 
compared to the potential dangers posed by sudden ‘exogenous shocks’ in the form of attacks from, 
for example, China or North Korea. However, what is also clear from the preceding sections is that 
this perspective also undermines their own agency. To this effect, John Christopher Barry writes: 
‘one avoids ever considering the enemy as a political subject with which one day one will make 
peace. There is no recognition of a collective subject with which one interacts, just a group of 
individuals, “evildoers”, who should be eliminated’.229 In this way, there is a demonstrated tendency 
among Japanese and US officials and ‘experts’ to characterise the ‘threats’ to both countries’ 
national security – whether they be China, North Korea, ‘uncertainty’, natural disasters, etc. – as a 
kind of ‘collective subject’ with whom peace or resolution is unlikely or impossible.  
The USG and GOJ’s continued reproduction of narratives which explicitly or implicitly call 
these countries antagonists, prop up the USM as natural protagonists and a ‘force for good’, and 
express a deep cynicism towards those who might argue for more nuanced takes on these black-
and-white roles has had a similar effect on alliance policy and how this policy is justified and framed 
to the public (see, for example, Klingner’s analogising of a base to a fire house). In doing so, 
however, the overall discourse becomes incoherent: on the one hand, the region is portrayed as 
being ‘still stuck in the Cold War’ and intrinsically unstable, and on the other, the USM is hailed as 
the only actor with the power to bring or maintain stability to/within it. Furthermore, in predicting 
continuity in these aspects, these actors discursively (re)create a self-fulfilling prophecy which gives 
both the public and themselves the impression that there is no way out but the alliance—and that 
there is thus little which anyone can do to effect change, including from within. 
This is most evident in the quotes taken from DOD officials’ speeches, which, although 
available online, were often given in exclusive environments (e.g. the Japan Press Club, international 
                                                          
228 Gibson and Snider 1999, pp. 200-202. 
229 John Christopher Barry, ‘Empire as a Gated Community: Politics of an American Strategic Metaphor’, Global 
Society, 25:3 (2011), 287-309, p. 293. 
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defence conferences) where members of the general public were not in attendance. The audiences 
of these speeches, therefore, are individuals and groups who already sit within the confines of the 
alliance institution and its associated organisations, or others who have access to them through 
knowing these ‘insiders’ (including international press and former/current government officials). 
Take, for example, Cohen’s 1998 speech at the Foreign Policy Association, in which he cited one of 
the benefits of the USM’s forward deployment in Asia as being the ability to ‘shap[e] people’s 
opinions – not only our friends' about our reliability and our resources, but also shaping people's 
opinions who are our adversaries, that they really don't want to challenge us in any given 
situation’—and thus openly discussing how the public can be influenced to accept the PBD in a 
detached, scientific manner in a ‘publicly available’ speech. 
What is also problematic, however, is the way in which the alliance’s role as a security 
‘guarantor’ for the region and the relevance of the USM presence have been presented in these 
texts. The employment of analogies to simplify these complex concepts gives, on the one hand, a 
degree of understanding to their audiences which the American and Japanese publics, being 
excluded from or unaware of these, may not. Therefore, while officials may stress that documents 
related to the FRF, the rebalance, and Okinawan bases are easily accessible and that this fact 
undermines the arguments forwarded by base opponents about the ‘secrecy’ of USJ negotiations, 
the exclusive nature of these speeches, meetings, and consultations weakens institutional efforts 
towards achieving not only greater transparency on this issue, but also fostering a more cooperative 
environment on the ground between the USM, the OPG, and Okinawan residents (which might lead 
to a speedier resolution of, for example, the Futenma relocation). They also tend to, as seen in this 
chapter, breed dismissiveness or even contempt for interpretations which differ from their own.  
For example, writing in 2011 in a private email chain with other colleagues released by 
Wikileaks on the FRF, Jose Mora, a defence analyst at the global intelligence company and DOD 
contractor STRATFOR, commented: ‘I figure that the Americans figured that the Japanese wouldn't 
come to an agreement any time soon on what to do. There's ongoing debate on whether to move 
the base to Henoko, to Guam, to not move it, to do environmental impact studies... It's all moving at 
the speed of democracy...’230 The framing of the issue as being one that has to be resolved between 
the ‘Americans’ and the ‘Japanese’ thus reveals not only a kind of cynicism towards the ability of 
‘democracy’ or the public will to effect change, but also a tendency to exclude the latter from the 
discussion altogether—a strategy which may, on the surface, make intergovernmental negotiations 
                                                          
230 Jose Mora, ‘Re: [Military] [EastAsia] JAPAN/US/MIL - U.S. Senate OKs budget cut for Okinawa Marines 
relocation to Guam’, Wikileaks, The Global Intelligence Files Email-ID:309891. 16 December 2011c. Available 
online at: http://wikileaks.wikimee.info/gifiles/docs/309891_re-military-japan-us-mil-u-s-senate-oks-budget-
cut-for.html.  
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easier to manage, but which does not (and cannot) realistically navigate the complex and difficult 
sociohistorical terrain surrounding Futenma, Okinawa, and the alliance. 
  
Grinberg 189 
 
Chapter 5. Sites of everyday exchange: ‘The war was just yesterday in Okinawa’ 
Introduction 
The war was just yesterday in Okinawa. 
- Alfred Magleby, former US Consul General in Naha 
 
What makes navigation of this terrain especially difficult is the distance between actors in 
diplomatic and defence sites from those in ‘everyday’ sites of exchange in terms of actually ‘feeling’ 
the physical, cultural, and political impacts of living next to bases. Thus, where for the former the 
FRF has largely been a ‘thorn in the side’ of alliance progress or symbolic of the lack of political will in 
Tokyo and Washington, the issue of Futenma has been tied more to Okinawan historical memory 
and individuals’ experience of social development (or the lack thereof) for the latter—or, as Magleby 
put it, their memory of WWII being ‘just yesterday’. There is also something to be said for the long-
time military presence on the island having legitimised to a certain extent the PBD among many of 
its residents (see section 3 for details). Given these dynamics, it is unsurprising that the PBD has thus 
far been remarkably consistent across a number of actors – including those within the diplomatic 
corps, defence corps, and ‘expert’ circles – where its counterpart, the anti-base discourse (ABD), has 
been more fluid since the USM first came to Okinawa.  
This is in part due to the fact that the opposition to the USM’s presence includes within it 
individuals from a much greater variety of professional and ideological backgrounds than those in 
the preceding chapters. From fishermen to university academics1 to businessmen – and from 
conservatives to pacifists – this opposition, which I will broadly call an anti-base movement (ABM) 
for the purpose of this chapter, has existed in one form or another dating back to the Battle of 
Okinawa. From its beginnings as a movement to regain lands taken by force by the GOJ and USM 
during the war, to its shift towards anti-colonial language as the prefecture sought reincorporation 
into the Japanese state, to its current manifestation in the post-Cold War period as a mixture of 
environmentalist, pacifist, feminist groups, and others, the ABM – and, as a result, the ABD more 
generally – serves as a prime example of the ‘everyday’ in action. Moreover, its membership has 
expanded beyond the confines of the prefecture to include not only residents living near bases, but 
                                                          
1 Academics (especially Japanese ones) have historically played a prominent role not only in documenting the 
history of Okinawa and the anti-base movement, but also within the movement itself as activists. In the latter 
role, their involvement includes founding anti-base groups (e.g. the Save the Dugong Campaign), being active 
members therein, or providing moral, media, and/or physical support to these groups. For more examples of 
their involvement, read about their roles in the pro-reversion movement in section 3.1.2, and for more details 
on this subject, please consult footnote 5 below. 
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also other individuals, mainland Japanese civil society groups, and international NGOs sympathetic 
to the ABM’s cause. 
The involvement of ‘everyday’ actors has been described as a ‘new style of political 
involvement in which people combine individual lifestyle choices and an at best latent interest in 
“party politics” with the capacity for very sharp and focused but at the same time discontinuous 
political activity’2 and is characterised by a social framework in which actors – often citizens, but 
never simply ‘passive receptors of politics’3 – are empowered to create their own definitions of 
issues without relying on the same ‘expert’ advice or knowledge that is drawn upon by 
policymakers.4 This is evident within the ABD in Okinawa, as residents and local officials alike cite 
their personal experiences (or ‘lived knowledge’) when explaining their involvement in the larger 
ABM versus the traditional regional security concerns cited by diplomatic and defence officials in the 
preceding chapters—and this difference is key in terms of broadening and deepening the 
sociohistorical context upon which the USJA is predicated and continues to exist. 
These personal experiences were reflected in nearly every article or book5 I encountered 
during the course of this research, most of which gave some kind of overview of the Futenma issue, 
or the base problem in general. In these, authors never failed to mention the following historical 
details: that Okinawa prefecture was once the independent Ryukyu Kingdom until its formal and 
forcible incorporation into the Japanese state in 18796; that prior to this incorporation, the kingdom 
was known for being a regional hub of trade, and its people characterised as having had a ‘gentle’ 
and/or ‘peaceful’ disposition7; that the prefecture was then used by the GOJ as a sute-ishi, or 
‘sacrificial stone’, in the final months of WWII as a means of keeping the USM from staging an even 
more devastating attack on mainland Japan8; and that Okinawa has continued to be ‘sacrificed’ time 
                                                          
2 Hajer 2003, p. 98. 
3 Simpson and Mayr 2010, p. 42. 
4 Drake 2010, p. 163. 
5 Many of the articles in this chapter come from the open-source journal The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 
with many of its contributors either implicitly or explicitly in support of the ABD; it has thus served not only as 
an important resource for this chapter, but also as a significant example of academic-activists’ involvement in 
the Okinawan ABM and their role in reproducing and evolving the discourse both in Japan and internationally. 
6 See, for example: McCormack, Norimatsu and Selden 2011; Feifer 2000; Souillac 2009. 
7 See, for example: Ian Buruma, ‘Bombs, flags and dollars in Okinawa’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 128:15 
(1985), pp. 53-55; Kurayoshi Takara, ‘The “Okinawa Base Problem” As Seen From History’ in Akikazu 
Hashimoto, Mike Mochizuki and Kurayoshi Takara, eds, The Okinawa Question: Futenma, the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance, and Regional Security (Washington, DC: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, 2013), pp. 3-12; Okinawa 
Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum (Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, 2014). 
8 See, for example: Ryukyu Shimpo et al, ‘Descent into Hell: The Battle of Okinawa’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 
12:48:4 (2014), available online at: www.japanfocus.org/-Ota-Masahide/4230/article.html; A Guide to Battle 
Sites and Military Bases in Okinawa City (Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa City Office, Entente and Gender Equality 
Section, 2012), available online at: 
http://www.city.okinawa.okinawa.jp/userfiles/files/page/about/1051/aguidetobattlesitesandmilitarybases.pdf
Grinberg 191 
 
and time again since the Battle—first as a USM colony in the post-war period where bases could be 
established and maintained without troubling mainlanders, and presently as a post-colonial territory 
whose residents are on the one hand Japanese citizens, but on the other are not treated as such 
politically-speaking.9  
A sense of history thus permeates and, in many cases, sustains the ABD in Okinawa and 
among its supporters both in mainland Japan and internationally. Furthermore, there is a driving 
narrative within the ABD of Okinawa’s ‘peaceful’ disposition (both historically and currently) and its 
pacifist-leaning local politics, within which the term ‘peace’ itself is defined and employed against 
the presence of USM forces – which obviously differs significantly from central government officials, 
whose conceptualisation of ‘peace’ is tied to this presence – though the incorporation of selective 
historical details into the ABD has sometimes been treated as mere artifice to gain economic 
benefits by actors in Tokyo and Washington. It is also clear, however, when reading this same 
literature, that it is almost impossible to separate this selective historical, pacifist narrative which 
constitutes the ABD from its accompanying narratives, including: redefining ‘security’ to address 
local issues such as noise pollution, crime, and environmental contamination; identifying Okinawans 
as separate from the mainland not only culturally, but also politically; and doubting both the political 
will of the Japanese state to defy the status quo course of base policy as well as its promises to ease 
the ‘burden’ of the bases.  
What these three narratives share is a penchant for characterising Okinawans as victims of 
USJ collusion over the base issue, and although this framing holds appeal on a local level, it has 
served as a barrier for the ABM (and, consequently, the ABD) to achieve its stated aims beyond the 
continued delay of the Futenma relocation. It has also been an obstacle in terms of the negotiations 
between the GOJ, USG, and OPG not only on Futenma, but on broader basing policy, as Okinawans’ 
unique historical experience – and their interpretation of that experience – is both difficult to convey 
to outside actors and to employ on the level of policymaking (where the end-goal is technical 
efficiency of institutions in the short-term, and consideration of socio-historical factors is limited as a 
result10). However, says Kurayoshi Takara, former professor at University of the Ryukyus and current 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
; Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2000). 
9 See, for example: Joseph Gerson, ‘Okinawans to Be Sacrificed Again on the Altars of US and Japanese 
Militarism’, Truthout, 3 January 2014, available online at: http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/20968-
okinawans-to-be-sacrificed-again-on-the-altars-of-us-and-japanese-militarism; Akikazu Hashimoto, ‘Okinawa’s 
Public Will and the Futenma Relocation Issue’ in Akikazu Hashimoto, Mike Mochizuki and Kurayoshi Takara, 
eds, The Okinawa Question: Futenma, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Regional Security (Washington, DC: Sigur 
Center for Asian Studies, 2013), pp. 13-31; Cynthia Cockburn, Anti-militarism: Political and Gender Dynamics of 
Peace Movements (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
10 Fischer 2003b, p. 223. 
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Vice Governor of Okinawa prefecture, it is impossible to discuss the bases in isolation from the 
alliance, in large part due to these differences in interpretation. He explains:  
11 
If, as Takara says, the ‘true nature’ of the ‘Okinawa base problem’ cannot be understood ‘without 
paying attention to the perspective of the Okinawan people’, then the salient point made in this 
chapter is that ‘everyday’ interpretations of history, ‘threat’, and ‘security’ can colour the course and 
outcome of national security policy in unexpectedly significant ways—including, say, by delaying the 
construction of a ‘key’ military facility. This chapter thus highlights these interpretations and 
narratives constitutive of the ABD and explores their interplay (or lack thereof) with those of actors 
from the previous two sites discussed. 
1. Historical memory and threat perception 
The US-Japan Security Treaty exists at the sacrifice of Okinawa. 
- Masahide Ota, former governor of Okinawa prefecture (1990-98) 
 
Prior to its subsuming into the Japanese state and the devastation wrought during WWII, 
Okinawa, as the Ryukyu Kingdom, is often characterised as having been called – among several 
descriptions – the ‘Venice of the East’, a ‘fairy island’, and the ‘Land of Constant Courtesy’ by Asian 
and Western travelers and world leaders alike.12 Authors stress the former period of independence 
as a sort of ‘golden age’ for the island wherein the Kingdom negotiated treaties with its neighbours, 
impressed international visitors with its ‘gentle’ and ‘enlightened’ residents, and acted as a bridge 
between Asian nations.13 This language has become so common, in fact, that when visiting the 
Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum in Mabuni, the first placard which greets visitors in 
one of the first exhibit rooms, ‘2F: Zone for Remembering History’, contains a poem which reads: 
                                                          
11 Takara 2013, p. 3. 
12 Buruma 1985, p. 53; Feifer 2000, pp. 33-34.  
13 McCormack, Norimatsu and Selden 2011; Gerson 2014.  
The “Okinawa base problem” is often seen as having two dimensions. On one hand, 
the “Okinawa base problem” is a Japanese domestic problem regarding how to think 
about the realities of national security; on the other hand, it is a problem of 
international politics concerning the structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the 
stability of the Asia-Pacific region. From the perspective of Okinawa's residents, 
however, there is in fact one more dimension to the above problem […] “Why does 
Okinawa continue to bear an excessive burden of hosting the majority of U.S. bases in 
Japan, and why does Okinawa continue to be treated like this?” To put it simply, the 
“Okinawa base problem” is an issue that deeply affects the identity of Okinawa's 
residents. Consequently, if one only contemplates how this issue relates to the U.S.-
Japan alliance and Japan's national security without paying attention to the 
perspective of the Okinawan people, one cannot comprehend the true nature of this 
problem. 
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14 
This foundational myth of the ‘peaceful’ Ryukyu Kingdom is usually presented in stark contrast to the 
incorporation of the Ryukyus into Japan during the nineteenth century, as scholars have described 
the process as one of ‘forced transformation’ (specifically in reference to the cultural assimilation of 
Okinawans through the Japanese language and education system), and ‘part of a wider and deeper 
history of racist domination in Japan [in which] […] [there is] systematic delegitimation not only of 
Ryukyuan but of any other self-proclaimed minority identity’.15  
This myth acts as a larger historical frame through which the audience(s) of these scholars, 
the ABM, and the OPG are encouraged to view (and interpret) not only the circumstances 
surrounding the Battle of Okinawa, but also post-war developments involving the USM presence and 
Okinawa’s treatment by the central GOJ (up to and including the current Futenma issue), as products 
of long-term discrimination against and victimisation of Okinawans. In fact, according to a June 2015 
opinion poll carried out by the Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Television Broadcasting, when 
respondents were asked ‘how the experiences of the war should be handed down to the next 
generation’, 22.8% answered that they wanted the local and national governments ‘to promote 
peace-related projects’.16 
This is not to say, however, that the ABD’s focus on these aspects of Okinawa’s historical 
relationship to the central GOJ and USG is without merit; indeed, as I illustrate in the succeeding 
sections, the Battle of Okinawa’s real, bloody impact on the prefecture’s population should not be 
underestimated, nor can the separation of the prefecture from the Japanese mainland in the post-
war period be dismissed as not having had a significant cultural and political impact which can still 
be felt there today. In the same poll cited earlier, ‘94.8 percent of respondents said they wanted the 
experiences of the war handed down to next generation by word of mouth, and 75.4 percent said 
they want this to happen more often than it does now’. Given the overwhelming body of data 
showing the impact of the war and the depth of public feeling in favour of preserving its memory, I 
                                                          
14 Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum 2014. 
15 Takara 2013, p. 5; Cockburn 2012, pp. 153-154. 
16 ‘Opinion poll: 95% want experiences of the Battle of Okinawa handed down’, The Ryukyu Shimpo, 3 June 
2015, available online at: http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2015/06/13/18886/. 
Prologue 
Long ago, our Ryukyuan ancestors,  
who cherished peace above all  
Crossed the ocean to engage in trade  
with countries of Asia.  
The ocean, the source of all life,  
and a bridge of peace and friendship,  
Still touches the heartstrings of Okinawan people. 
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will in no way seek to invalidate or judge the interpretation of these events within the ABD, but 
rather to present its origination, development, and my take on how its ‘insurgent narratives’ 
currently impacts upon USJ relations—for better or worse. 
1.1. Battleground Okinawa 
As previously stated, it is impossible to make an accurate representation of the ABD and its 
constitutive narratives and stories without discussing the impact of the Battle of Okinawa and 
immediate post-war events on Okinawans. As the Ryukyu Shimpo puts it in the foreword of the their 
book Descent Into Hell: Civilian Memories of the Battle of Okinawa, a collection of interviews with 
survivors of the battle: ‘It is important for English speaking readers who read Descent into Hell to 
understand that the origin of all current affairs is to be found in past history […] Today’s situation 
can be traced back firstly to the Battle of Okinawa and then to subsequent agreements between the 
governments of Japan and the United States’.17 At the same time, however, people’s experiences of 
the battle were so brutal that many Okinawans found it difficult to speak about them at all in the 
post-war period. ‘In no household do they talk of the war’, said Shoko Ahagon, an early leader in the 
movement against land confiscation in Iejima18 by US forces in the 1950s. ‘It was so painful that 
merely recalling it is enough to make you lose consciousness’.19  
What caused Ahagon to describe the battle in such stark terms were the bleak conditions on 
the battlefield before it, during it, and in its aftermath. Prior to the battle, over 100,000 Okinawan 
civilians ‘had been called up either drafted into the military or in service as the youth corps, nurses 
or laborers’.20 During the battle, Japanese soldiers routinely executed civilians for being ‘spies’ for 
the USM, forced civilians to commit mass suicides rather than surrender to the US, and members of 
the Japanese military and civilians alike were killed indiscriminately by hand grenades and 
flamethrowers while hiding from bombardment in caves.21 After the battle was over, rape of civilian 
women in Okinawa ‘was common, including in broad daylight, as Americans [soldiers] conducted 
“girl hunts” through the rows of tents’.22  
                                                          
17 Ryukyu Shimpo et al 2014. 
18 Iejima (or Ie Island) is a small island located off the coast of the Motobu Peninsula on Okinawa Island (the 
main island in the Ryukyus chain) and was the site of a four-day battle in April 1945 during which an estimated 
4,706 Japanese died, most of them civilians. Today, it is the site of a US Marines training facility. (See for more 
details: Stephen Mansfield, ‘War and peace on Okinawa’s Iejima Island’, The Japan Times, 6 June 2015, 
available online at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2015/06/06/travel/war-peace-okinawas-iejima-
island/#.VfbchhFViko)  
19 Shoko Ahagon and C. Douglas Lummis, ‘I Lost My Only Son in the War: Prelude to the Okinawan Anti-Base 
Movement’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 23:1:10 (2010), available online at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-
C__Douglas-Lummis/3369. 
20 Ryukyu Shimpo et al 2014. 
21 Buruma 1985, p. 53; A Guide to Battle Sites and Military Bases in Okinawa City 2012, p. 4. 
22 Ryukyu Shimpo et al 2014. 
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Previously agricultural in character, the economy and, to a large extent, the society of the 
prefecture was thus literally destroyed—first by the appropriation by the Japanese military of its 
arable land, and then by the battle. At the same time that the USM charged itself with the 
‘reconstitution’ of ‘a society as well as developing an institutional framework that could meet the 
basic needs of the populace for food, clothing, and shelter’23, however, recently declassified USM 
documents reveal that it was also planning, from as early as late 1945, to use the entire main island 
‘as a permanent site for its bases’.24 What this entailed, when the USG decided to develop military 
bases on the island in the late 1940s, was what is commonly-called the ‘bulldozers and bayonets’ 
campaign of forcible land acquisition.25 During this campaign, although landowners were paid for the 
confiscated land by the USM, these purchases in some cases ‘reportedly involved deception or 
outright coercion, using bulldozers and bayonets to evict unwilling residents’.26 Sometimes, 
however, land was taken without the residents ever being present to give consent at all, as in the 
case of Ahagon. ‘Unbeknownst to the farmers of Iejima, while we were away 63% of the island had 
been confiscated by the U.S. military for their use’, he said. ‘With this accomplished, now the U.S. 
military wanted to pay the farmers consolation money [in Japanese the ironic expression is 
namidakin: “tear money”] and use the rest of the land they had confiscated as a training area’.27  
It was in this way that many post-war towns and cities in Okinawa re-emerged in such close 
proximity to US bases built after the battle: returning to their previous places of residence and 
finding them destroyed or built over, many Okinawans became reliant on the bases for low-wage 
work, food, and shelter.28 For instance, Ginowan, now home to Futenma, had once been 
                                                          
23 Leonard Weiss, ‘U.S. Military Government on Okinawa’, Far Eastern Survey, 15:15 (1946), p. 234. 
24 ‘U.S. wanted to turn all of Okinawa Island into base site in 1945-46: documents’, The Japan Times, 9 
November 2012, available online at: http://aws.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/11/09/news/u-s-wanted-to-turn-
all-of-okinawa-island-into-base-site-in-1945-46-documents/. Then-Lieutenant General Simon Buckner Jr 
likewise stated in April 1945 his desire ‘to have exclusive control over Okinawa as a protectorate or by other 
suitable means’ as a buffer zone against the Soviet Union (Kunitoshi Sakurai, ‘Okinawa and US Power’, New 
Left Project, 31 January 2012, available online at: 
www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/okinawa_and_us_power). 
25 This campaign beginning after the USM put Ordinance No. 109 into place, which ‘stipulated procedures for 
compulsory acquisition of land to be used by the US military’ (A Guide to Battle Sites and Military Bases in 
Okinawa City 2012, p. 37). 
26 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, ‘The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base 
Controversy’, US Congress, Congressional Research Service, 14 August 2014, available online at: 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf, p. 6. 
27 Ahagon and Lummis 2010. 
28 Matthew R. Augustine, ‘Border-Crossers and Resistance to US Military Rule in the Ryukyus, 1945-1953’, The 
Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (2008), available online at: http://japanfocus.org/-Matthew_R_-
Augustine/2906/article.html.  
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Where Takara describes this process and the bases themselves as ‘a “foreign substance” forcibly 
thrust upon the land of Okinawa’30, however, McCormack, coordinator of the pro-ABM The Asia-
Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, frames this process as an arrangement between the USG and GOJ: ‘It 
was [Hirohito’s] suggestion, in a September 1947 letter to General MacArthur, that Okinawa be 
leased to the US on a “twenty-five, or fifty-year, or even longer basis” to facilitate US opposition to 
communism, that helped crystallize the US decision to opt for a separate peace with Japan and to 
retain Okinawa as its military colony’.31 Given this ‘lease’, the USM developed the island as a kind of 
‘rampart’, in the words of a 1952 report on the prefecture from The New York Times: 
32 
By 1954, in fact, Futenma’s runway had been extended from 2,400 to 2,700 metres, Nike 
missiles had been deployed onsite for air defence, and fighter-interceptor squadrons were being 
hosted there to supplement the larger Kadena Air Base.33 In the same year, the 3rd Marine Division 
was relocated from mainland Japan to Okinawa in part to ‘dampen local resentment about the U.S. 
military staying on even after Japan regained its independence and thereby keep in check the 
Japanese tendency at the time toward neutralism in the Cold War’—but also because ‘the financial 
                                                          
29 Mike Mochizuki, ‘Overcoming the Stalemate about Futenma’ in Akikazu Hashimoto, Mike Mochizuki and 
Kurayoshi Takara, eds, The Okinawa Question: Futenma, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and Regional Security 
(Washington, DC: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, 2013), pp. 33-51, p. 34. 
30 Takara 2013, p. 4. 
31 McCormack 2010. 
32 George Barrett, ‘Report on Okinawa: A Rampart We Built’, The New York Times, 21 September 1952. 
33 Mochizuki 2013, p. 34. 
a hilly area called Ginowan Village (now Ginowan City) consisting of Ginowan, 
Kamiyama, Aragusuku, Nakahara, and Maehara with a total population of nearly 
13,000 in 1944. It contained well-watered fields for sugar cane and sweet potato as 
well as public offices, stores, and an elementary school. Serving as a traffic junction 
between the northern and southern parts of the main Okinawa island, the area had a 
beautiful avenue lined with pine trees. Also located there was the Futenma Shrine 
which traced its history back to the 15th century, and the Ryukyu king and officials of 
the Ryukyu Kingdom made annual pilgrimages to this shrine.   
 
Okinawa, living down its G. I. reputation as an “outpost for the outcast”, is now a 
collection – almost a magical transplanting – of whole American communities, with 
several more still building, Some of these are already complete, even to schools, 
department stores, theatres and suburban housing developments boasting winding 
roads, flagstone walks and “picket” fences made of bamboo […] In its native 
meaning, the name given to the Ryukyus is “Floating Rope”, a title that neatly spells 
out the fluid use of them either as a defensive barrier or as a strangulating weapon. 
(Some of the other names given by the Japanese many years ago to Okinawa sites, 
and retained by American military authorities, still have perfect meanings; Futenma 
Airfield, for example, is best translated as the “airfield of the War God”.) 
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cost of maintaining a Marine presence in Okinawa would be much less compared to the main 
Japanese islands’.34 
1.2. Okinawa as a 'keystone for peace' 
Throughout this period of Okinawa’s redevelopment into a ‘rampart’, ‘military colony’, or 
‘supercarrier’, among various characterisations, Okinawans themselves had ‘no political authority or 
legal redress for crimes committed by service members’, and little for reclaiming any land taken 
under duress.35 It is this lack of formal channels for redress, posits Andrew Yeo, which ‘may lead local 
residents to take action through informal modes of contentious politics’ (such as an ABM) that 
emphasise, at various times, ‘frames of injustice evoking environmental or safety concerns’, or, 
alternatively, ‘sovereignty claims and protest against their own government for selling out to the 
United States’.36 In the case of Okinawa, the ABM arose from an initial division in the population over 
the latter framing strategy: where some residents received large payments for the use of their land 
and thus abided the development of the prefecture under US administration, others – who would 
later be referred to in local politics as ‘reformists’ – remained firmly opposed to the USM presence.37  
The efforts of these ‘reformists’ resulted in the ‘first wave’ of the ABM in Okinawa, known as 
the shimagurumi toso (whole island) campaign, in the 1950s. Reacting to the post-war campaign of 
land expropriation, landowners and other local residents ‘placed themselves in passive resistance in 
front of the trucks and bulldozers’, opposed lump-sum payments for land, demanded compensation 
for damages to said land, and illegally entered USM bases in protest.38 This coincided with the first 
large-scale reversion movement in the prefecture – the slogan of which was ‘We want to return to 
the country of the Peace Constitution’39 – and this combined opposition was enough to spur some 
initial reforms by USCAR, including the replacement of lump-sum with annual payments to 
Okinawan landowners.40 It was also during this period that the ABM’s predominant strategy of 
protest in Okinawa was first developed by Ahagon and others: a mixture of peaceful physical 
resistance and using the public sphere as a site of discursive legitimacy. For example, Ahagon 
remarked: ‘When they [the Americans] came to the island and spoke wildly about how they would 
kill us with poison gas or shoot us down with guns, we went directly to the newspaper office and had 
                                                          
34 Mochizuki 2013, p. 35. 
35 Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2014, p. 6. 
36 Andrew Yeo, ‘Local-National Dynamics and Framing in South Korean Anti-Base Movements’, Kasarinlan: 
Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, 21:2 (2006), pp. 34-69, pp. 36-38. 
37 Hashimoto 2013, p. 15. 
38 Cockburn 2012, p. 161; A Guide to Battle Sites and Military Bases in Okinawa City 2012, p. 37; ‘Chief justice 
labeled lower court ruling on U.S. base incident in 1950s 'a mistake'’, The Mainichi, 18 January 2013i, available 
online at: http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130118p2a00m0na010000c.html. 
39 Moriteru Arasaki, ‘The struggle against military bases in Okinawa – its history and current situation’, Inter-
Asia Cultural Studies, 2:1 (2001), pp. 101-108, p. 103. 
40 Baker 2004, p. 133. 
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their words published, making the devil's behavior public and bringing shame down on the US 
military’.41 
The use of shame or antagonistic language alone, however, was not enough to remove or 
even significantly reduce the USM presence in Okinawa—a presence which was significantly ramped 
up with the start of the Cold War and, in particular, the Vietnam War. Naha Port, in the prefecture’s 
capitol, ‘processed 75% of all supplies for the conflict - including fuel, food and ammunition’, while 
Kadena Air Base served as the USM’s ‘key transport hub’.42 At the same time, the prefecture’s 
economy – heavily dependent upon the bases – suffered in comparison to that of mainland 
Japan’s.43 Combined with a widespread discomfort among many residents that stationing US bases 
made them ‘accomplices’ in the activities of the USM in southeast Asia44, this situation culminated in 
the ‘second wave’ of the ABM in Okinawa: the pro-reversion movement. In response to decades of 
being politically and legally separated from the mainland, the movement ‘insisted on educating 
Okinawans to be Japanese […] The cultural fear of being swept away by American values to end up 
as a second-rate Hawaii made many intellectuals idealise Japan as a country of peace’ (harkening 
back to the 1950s reversion slogan of returning to the ‘country of the Peace Constitution’).45  
This movement, however, was not greeted with much enthusiasm by the USM. Doug 
Lummis, former professor at Tsuda College and also a former Marine, told me that ‘anti-base 
protesters were, as far as we know, part of the “fifth column” in the Japanese Communist Party. 
They weren’t local protests, but part of the international communist protests’.46 According to Steve 
Rabson, professor at Brown University and formerly stationed at the 137th USAR Ordnance Company 
(previously adjacent to Camp Schwab in Henoko), the Army likewise made clear its opposition: 
                                                          
41 Ahagon and Lummis 2010. 
42 Jon Mitchell, ‘Vietnam: Okinawa's Forgotten War’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 13:15:1 (2015), available online 
at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Jon-Mitchell/4308/article.html. 
43 Mitchell 2015. 
44 Arasaki 2001, p. 103; Defoliated Island: Agent Orange, Okinawa and The Vietnam War. Prod. Ryukyu Asahi 
Broadcasting. 2012. Available online at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQ0A-78Weyo.  
45 Buruma 1985, p. 54. It is interesting to note, furthermore, how this movement – in ‘insisting’ on ‘educating 
Okinawans to be Japanese’ – is echoed in the later comment by former DefMin Hayashi in Chapter 3 likening 
Okinawan officials to ‘children’ who must be taught to ‘understand the necessity of implementing all parts of 
the [relocation] package’. In both cases, the agency of actors within the ‘everyday’ realm is undermined by the 
implication that they do not hold ‘correct’ beliefs or interpretations of ‘reality’. 
46 Doug Lummis, personal interview, 10 April 2014, Grand Castle Hotel, Shuri, Okinawa, Japan.  
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Tensions boiled in the prefecture during this period to the point that on the night of 20 December, 
1970, anti-American riots broke out in Koza (now Okinawa City) during which USM cars were set 
afire, rioters tore down the fence surrounding Kadena, and the offices of Stars and Stripes 
newspaper were ‘razed’.48 Nonetheless, in 1972, Okinawa was officially ‘returned’ to Japanese 
administration by the Nixon administration (see further details in section 3.3). 
1.3. After reversion: the ‘third wave’ 
After reversion, about one-thirtieth of the bases were transferred to SDF use. This ‘resulted 
in stationing about 6,000 military personnel to defend the U.S. military bases and take part in joint 
operations’49, and the overall proportion of bases decreased by one-third on mainland Japan versus 
only ‘a few percent’ in Okinawa.50 Nuclear weapons continued to be stored on the island, 
furthermore, in direct contradiction of PM Sato’s promise that post-reversion Okinawa would exist 
under the same conditions as mainland Japan’s ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ (non-production, 
non-possession, and non-introduction).51  
Disappointed by the conditions of the reversion52, authors either involved in or sympathetic 
to the ABM, when discussing the aftermath, have characterised the following years (into the 
present) as Okinawa living under US ‘postcolonial rule’, on ‘occupied territory’, and that rather than 
providing more modes of redress to Okinawans, reversion actually ‘served to narrow the focus of 
                                                          
47 Steve Rabson, personal interview, 6 August 2014, University of Mary Washington, Fredericksburg, Virginia, 
USA. 
48 Jon Mitchell, ‘Ex-MP revists Okinawa's Koza Riot’, The Japan Times, 8 January 2011, available online at: 
http://theunpeople.blogspot.com/2011/01/ex-mp-revisits-okinawa-koza-riot.html.  
49 Sakurai 2012. 
50 Annmaria Shimabuku, ‘Transpacific Colonialism: An Intimate View of Transnational Activism in Okinawa’, CR: 
The New Centennial Review, 12:1 (2012), pp. 131-158, p. 133. 
51 Steve Rabson, ‘Okinawa's Henoko was a “Storage Location” for Nuclear Weapons: Published Accounts’, The 
Asia-Pacific Journal, 11:1:6 (2013), available online at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Steve-
Rabson/3884/article.html.  
52 A 1973 poll by the Asahi Shimbun, held on the first anniversary of the reversion, found that 63% of 
Okinawans felt ‘disappointed’ about the results of the prefecture’s incorporation into Japan (Hashimoto 2013, 
p. 16). 
[They] told us: “don’t associate with these people. They’re Communists. Don’t get 
caught in a protest, don’t get involved with them”. They [the protesters] would come 
up to the base and they’d hand out fliers, bilingual fliers in Japanese and English. 
That’s how I learned about the reversion movement in Okinawa and became very 
interested in it, because it reminded me a lot of the civil rights movement in the 
United States. People picketing, sit-ins, marches and rallies and, you know, protest 
songs, and, you know, chants—it was all going on […] And I learned that people in 
Okinawa, of course, they want to become part of Japan again, because they think 
that’s a very peaceful country, they’d be under a peace constitution, the bases would 
be reduced—which didn’t happen, but that’s what they believed because that’s what 
the Japanese government was saying. 
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activists’ claims, channeling the greater part of their energies into particular campaigns to end 
specific practices (e.g., bombing exercises that project ordnance across public roadways) or seek 
justice for specific acts (e.g., rape)’.53 What is evident in the use of such terms as ‘postcolonial’ or 
‘occupation’ is a discursive strategy which aims to connect the present state of Okinawa to not only 
its recent past (WWII and the subsequent USM administration), but also its historical antecedent 
(the incorporation of the Ryukyu Kingdom into the Japanese state). 
‘Narrowed’ focus or not, anti-base activities continued in the ensuing years prior to the 1995 
rape (which began the ‘third wave’ of the ABM), exemplifying the intervention or ‘insurgence’ of the 
‘everyday’ into the world of alliance politics and basing policies—even if not immediately obvious. 
Taku Suzuki discusses in detail, for example, how the practice of ‘peace guiding’ at Okinawa’s battle 
sites and peace memorials/museums for schoolchildren from mainland Japan began in the 1970s as 
a way ‘to reexamine the history of the Battle of Okinawa from the viewpoint of the Okinawan 
masses rather than of military commanders and government officials’.54 This effort continued into 
the late 1980s, when Okinawan educators, journalists, and scholars  
55 
In other words, these individuals’ goal was to create and promulgate a specific narrative about the 
Battle of Okinawa’s after-effects which would be relatable, accessible, and easily translatable to 
future generations. Furthermore, the struggle over land ownership rights also continued through the 
‘one-tsubo’56 movement in the 1980s, in which anti-base protesters – under the slogan ‘Military land 
back to us for use for our production and daily lives!’ – joined the anti-base landowners of earlier 
years by purchasing ‘small lots of base land from the original owners, bec[oming] their joint owners, 
and refus[ing] to renew lease contracts on their small patches of land’.57  
In another demonstration of protest against the perceived militarisation of the prefecture, 
Okinawa City passed City Ordinance No. 18 on 1 April 1993, Article 1 of which reads:  
                                                          
53 Alexander Cooley, ‘Politics Under the Pivot: Okinawa’s Triangular Base Relations Revisited’, presentation at 
Reexamining Japan in Global Context Forum, Okinawa, Japan, 6 June 2014, p. 2; Kosuke Takahashi, ‘Japan’s 
Persistent “Ameriphobia”’, The Diplomat, 18 May 2012, available online at: 
http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/japans-persistent-ameriphobia/; Kelly Dietz, ‘Demilitarizing Sovereignty: 
Self-Determination and Anti-Military Base Activism in Okinawa, Japan’ in Philip McMichael, ed, Contesting 
Development: Critical Struggles for Social Change (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 182-198, p. 189. 
54 Taku Suzuki, ‘Forming an “Activism Bubble” in Tourism: Peace Guiding at Okinawa's Battle Ruins’, Tourist 
Studies, 12 (2012), pp. 3-27, p. 9. 
55 Suzuki 2012, p. 9. 
56 Tsubo being a Japanese area unit equal to 3.3 square metres. 
57 Arasaki 2001, p. 105. 
organized an 8-month seminar series called “Training Course for Guiding Battle Ruins 
and Military Bases” that included lectures by historians and activists and field trips to 
the battle ruins and US military bases. The goal of the course was to educate the public 
about various related subjects in the hope of helping “as many people in Okinawa 
become storytellers [kataribe] of peace as possible”. 
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Echoing the framing of the ‘whole island’ campaign in the 1950s and the pro-reversion movement in 
the 1960s, the ordinance thus reproduces the ‘peace’ narrative within the ABD by emphasising the 
destructive impact of WWII, taking the Japanese ‘peace’ Constitution as its example, and 
establishing the foundation of local government upon human rights-related principles. 
In contrast to these, the 1995 rape created an unfortunate – but important – window of 
opportunity for the ABM to assert the ABD and present it as a viable and desirable alternative to the 
PBD on an international platform. Where before, for example, the argument for kengai isetsu – or 
moving the base facilities outside of Okinawa prefecture59 – had not been able to gain widespread 
support in the years following reversion, it quickly picked up steam after the rape. The reason for 
this, claims Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom President Kozue Akibayashi, was 
that the incident caused Okinawans to realise that ‘hosting U.S. military bases is actually the source 
of their insecurity of their lives’.60  
This argument was echoed first by the massive ‘Okinawa Prefectural People’s Rally’ on 21 
October 1995 (and attended by representatives of all the major political parties in Okinawa)61, and 
later by a referendum – the first prefectural referendum in Japanese history, in fact – on the removal 
of bases (in which over 90% of those who voted favoured the ‘consolidation and reduction’ of the 
bases, though only 60% of eligible voters in Okinawa turned out).62 Although the results of this 
referendum were non-binding, it was significant in that it posed, for the first time, a challenge ‘to the 
                                                          
58 A Guide to Battle Sites and Military Bases in Okinawa City 2012, p. 38. 
59 Shimabuku 2012, p. 139. 
60 Democracy Now, ‘Okinawa’s Revolt: Decades of Rape, Environmental Harm by U.S. Military Spur Residents 
to Rise Up’, 16 January 2014, online video clip, YouTube. Available online at: 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=HEv80BQ3Ezk.  
61 The rally, held ‘symbolically’ near Futenma, was ‘sponsored by eighteen key Okinawan labor and citizens’ 
organizations and attended by dozens of peace and women’s groups, as well as economic and lawyers’ 
associations’ and had over 80,000 people in attendance (Robert Eldridge, ‘Referendums on the U.S. Military 
Bases in Okinawa: Local Concerns Versus National Interests’ in Ofer Feldman, ed, Political Psychology in Japan: 
Behind the Nails that Sometimes Stick Out [and Get Hammered Down] [Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers 
Inc., 1999], pp. 149-169, pp. 153-154). 
62 Eldridge speculates that voter turnout was low for the following three reasons: ‘(1) the Okinawa referendum 
was the first prefectural referendum ever in Japan so there was little knowledge of “what” a referendum was 
and “how” to go about it; (2) the question on which the residents were voting was unclear and vague; (3) 
opponents to the referendum itself were building due to the potential political and economic impact of the 
removal of bases’ (1999, p. 160).  
The establishment of this ordinance is based on the consensus of our citizens who 
know that war is destruction; this was experienced firsthand at the sole land battle 
of Japan that was fought on this island and the subsequent separation from 
Japanese rule. We recognize and shall base city plans on the principles stated in The 
Constitution of Japan as well as The Declaration for the Abolishment of Nuclear 
Weapons and the Establishment of a World Peace City that all people have the right 
to live in peace and prosperity [emphasis added]. Therefore we hereby establish 
Citizens’ Peace Day in Okinawa City.  
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central government’s authority in a policy area that is politically and constitutionally recognized as 
being within its administrative jurisdiction, namely national defense and bilateral treaty/agreement 
obligations’.63 Furthermore, the review of the USJ-DG, originally scheduled for 1995, was delayed by 
a year in response.64 
1.4. ‘Instability’ and alliance continuity 
Nevertheless, scepticism abounds regarding any ‘progress’ that was achieved in terms of 
returning or removing base lands in the years following the rape and SACO agreement. The G-8 
Summit in Okinawa in 2000 and its accompanying influx of public funds into the prefecture, for 
example, has been presented by some as ‘compensation in advance’ from the GOJ to Nago City 
(near where the summit was hosted) so that it ‘could not refuse to accept a new base removed from 
the other part [Ginowan] of Okinawa’65 and as an attempt ‘to redeﬁne the social and economic 
purpose of the bases and their role in the maintenance of national security’.66 The result of such 
interpretations was that, at the time of the summit, over 25,000 Okinawans participated in a human 
chain surrounding Kadena to demand the withdrawal of US forces from the prefecture. The 
organiser of the action, Seishu Sakaihara, explained its motivation in terms of historical memory and 
the ABD’s anti-militarisation ethos: “‘Fifty-five years ago Okinawa was the only place in Japan to 
suffer a land battle […] If we permit the bases to stay we are allowing war”’.67 
Efforts by the USG and GOJ to convey that the security alliance is based on a set of ‘shared 
values’ since the end of the Cold War is viewed with equal incredulity. ‘You can have a “partnership”, 
you can have “friendship”, you can have lots of agreements,’ Doug Bandow, former special assistant 
to President Reagan told me, continuing:  
68 
                                                          
63 Eldridge 1999, p. 155. 
64 Arasaki 2001, p. 106. 
65 Takashi Yamazaki, ‘Is Japan Leaking? Globalisation, Reterritorialisation and Identity in the Asia-Pacific 
Context’, Geopolitics, 7:1 (2002), pp. 165-192, p. 184. 
66 Souillac 2009, p. 10. 
67 Sean Healy, ‘OKINAWA: Thousands protest against G8 summit’, Green Left Weekly, 26 July 2000, available 
online at: https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/21861. 
68 Doug Bandow, personal interview, 16 July 2014, Cato Institute, Washington, DC, USA. 
I mean, there are lots of things you can imagine trying to cooperate on in terms of 
humanitarian [work], whether it be natural disasters, or development, or refugees. It 
just strikes me that virtually none of it has to do with military assets. I mean, it’s not 
the Marines, it’s not aircrafts, it’s just not. So a Japanese-US alliance, if it makes sense 
on military grounds—it needs to be focused on the military. You can’t justify military 
stuff by [saying], “oh, look at all these other great things we can do”. Most of us don’t 
object to these great, good things, but it strikes me they have nothing to do with this 
stuff, which is really what’s important. That’s what you go to war over, that’s how 
people get killed. 
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What, then, do proponents of the ABD posit are the actual reasons for the US’s continued 
presence not only in Okinawa, but in Japan? In order to introduce their argument, the following 
anecdote from Morton Halperin, former US DASD (and involved in the reversion negotiations) from a 
pre-reversion visit to Okinawa is helpful: 
69 
Along the same vein, scholars and activists with whom I spoke on this issue – that of the structure of 
the alliance being one in which Okinawa itself ‘is the base’ – argue that the situation in which 
Okinawa, the US, and Japan now find themselves did not happen by accident. Rather, they claim, it is 
reflective of the US’s desire to maintain hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, and of Japan’s to have a more 
prominent international role by accommodating this hegemony (or ‘bandwagoning’, to borrow a 
term from the alliance literature70). ‘After the Cold War, who are the adversaries?’ asks Masaaki 
Gabe. ‘Now, maintaining the alliance is the goal of the alliance. And they’ll find something else to 
fight against when US-Sino relations improve’.71 Satoko Norimatsu, a peace activist who supports the 
ABM in Okinawa72, likewise told me that she sees the base presence in the prefecture as enabling 
the US to ‘stay and hold onto its influence [in the region] without a direct or concrete military threat 
even after the Cold War’.73 Echoing the government documents cited in previous chapters, Chalmers 
Johnson furthermore discusses the replacement of the communist threat in the post-Cold War era 
with ‘instability’, commenting: ‘[t]his new, exceedingly vague doctrine indirectly acknowledges that 
                                                          
69 Michiyo Yonamine, ‘Economic Crisis Shakes US Forces Overseas: The Price of Base Expansion in Okinawa and 
Guam’, trans. Rumi Sakamoto and Matthew Allen, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 9:9:2 (2011), available online at: 
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Yonamine-Michiyo/3494/article.html. 
70 See, for example: Randall K. Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In’, 
International Security, 19:1 (1994), pp. 72-107; G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, ‘Between balance of 
power and community: the future of multilateral security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific’, International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 2 (2002), pp. 69-94; Armacost and Okimoto 2004; Thomas S. Mowle and David H. 
Sacko, The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Aurelia George 
Mulgan, ‘Breaking the Mould: Japan’s Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest Minilateralism’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 30:1 (2008), pp. 52-72.  
71 Masaaki Gabe, personal interview, 28 April 2014, University of the Ryukyus, Okinawa, Japan. 
72 Norimatsu was, for example, a co-organiser of a 2014 Change.org petition demanding the cancellation of the 
reclamation permission given by Nakaima to Abe (see section 3.3 for more details). 
73 Satoko Norimatsu, personal interview, 27 March 2014, Richmond Hotels Naha Kumochi, Okinawa, Japan. 
“My impression of Okinawa was that it was ‘empty’ because residents were 
concentrated in small areas. The rest was all bases. I asked a high ranking Navy 
officer, ‘Why do we have bases in Okinawa?’ He answered, looking very serious, ‘You 
misunderstand. The military doesn’t have bases in Okinawa. The island itself is the 
base.’ It was no exaggeration; the military really did think of the whole island as a 
base. The military intended to maintain Okinawa until there were no more disputes 
in Asia – that is, they planned to keep the bases forever […] The US put bases on the 
mainland, too; but they were aware that it was Japanese territory. If they had an 
awareness that Okinawa was not a base but Japanese territory, they would have 
been able to ask themselves what sort of structure the base should have. But they 
are still not thinking about this seriously”. 
 
Grinberg 204 
 
the purpose of American forces in Japan is neither to defend nor to contain Japan but simply by their 
presence to prevent the assumed dangers of their absence’.74  
In the 2010 anti-base documentary Standing Army, many prominent American scholars, 
including Johnson, expound on this belief. Noam Chomsky, for instance, frames the continued 
presence of USM bases around the world in the post-Cold War era as the US’s means of maintaining 
its ‘empire’ overseas; Gore Vidal agrees, remarking that ‘[w]hat a worldwide network of bases 
means is that you have at your fingertips, if you are the emperor of the West, the means for 
perpetual war’.75 In addition, argues Catherine Lutz, bases – including those in Okinawa – are a part 
of the larger US ‘military-industrial complex’ which dictates that there be a ‘carry-on imperative’ 
based on accumulating profits for defence industries.76 Gerson extends this argument to his 
interpretation of the Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ to Asia as the US ‘ensuring its dominance 
through the 21st century’.77  
On the Japanese side, the reason for the reproduction of current base policy is framed as 
less purposeful and more as ‘going along’ with the US’s demands. ‘Japanese politicians don’t 
question the [alliance] framework’, remarks Yara. ‘It’s like a religion: believers are happy because 
they have no information’.78 Michael Penn, president of Shingetsu News Agency, similarly argues 
that most Japanese administrations have been ‘willing participants’ in the reproduction of the pro-
alliance discourse to the point that the US no longer has to ‘make threats’ (as during the Gulf War) 
that the GOJ share the ‘burden’ of defence—because ‘at this point it’s sort of like asking them to do 
what they really wanna do anyway’.79  
 
 
                                                          
74 Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), p. 
62. 
75 Standing Army. Dir. Thomas Fazi and Enrico Parenti. Effendemfilm, 2010. 
76 Lutz specifically points to Kadena Air Base as an example of this ‘imperative’, commenting: ‘When you see 
how much money’s at stake in the operations that go on every day, it’s phenomenal. The number of flights 
that take off from Kadena USAF Base every single day—just that one base, in that one country, on one day, will 
have involved thousands of gallons of jet fuel, repair and maintenance and parts for that aircraft.’ 
(Effendemfilm 2010). 
77 Mordecai Briemberg, ‘Leading scholars, artists oppose new military base in Okinawa’, 29 January 2014, 
Redeye Collective, Vancouver Cooperative Radio. Available online at: 
http://rabble.ca/podcasts/shows/redeye/2014/01/leading-scholars-artists-oppose-new-military-base-
okinawa. 
78 Yara 2014. 
79 Michael Penn, personal interview, 4 February 2014, Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, Tokyo, Japan. 
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2. Defining and redefining security 
There is a fear in the Japanese right wing of Okinawans bandwagoning with China against 
mainland Japan. But China and North Korea are not really a threat to Okinawans compared 
to their everyday security. 
- Kiichi Fujiwara, professor of international politics at the University of Tokyo 
 
Whether arguing that the reproduction of the alliance occurs through passive acceptance – 
the result of the ‘carry-on imperative’ in Japanese domestic politics and US foreign policy – or that it 
is actively performed in an effort to maintain US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, proponents of the 
ABD are clearly making the point that the aims and understanding of policymakers and officials in 
Tokyo and Washington are far removed from local concerns in Okinawa. As Fujiwara put it, this 
geographical, historical, and cultural separation has contributed to the ABD’s narrative that the 
definition of ‘security’ in Okinawa is not focused on the traditional ‘threats’ to regional stability, but 
instead emphasises such areas as the environment and general quality of life. In the case of 
Okinawa, both governments rely heavily upon the stability of the prefecture to continue the 
alliance’s daily security operations—and thus these ‘non-traditional’ threats to residents is an area 
on which they have increasingly focused. ‘I mean, growing up in Okinawa, base issues, whether 
you’re for bases or against them, it’s part of your life’, Hideki Yoshikawa, an anthropologist at Meio 
University and an anti-base activist specialising in environmental issues, told me.80 Suzuyo Takazato, 
co-director of the anti-base group Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, similarly 
‘characterizes the situation [in Okinawa] as “life surrounded by the U.S. military bases”’.81 
‘The everydayness of the effects of the bases normalizes their physical, psychological, and 
ecological toll as much as it normalizes the presence of the bases themselves’, says Kelly Dietz. ‘The 
fact is, no Okinawan younger than 65 years old knows or remembers Okinawa without the massive 
US military presence and odd jumble of American cultural influences’.82 This is evident in some of 
the English-language tourist information pamphlets I gathered from Okinawa. For example, Okinawa 
City’s tourist information map acknowledges the influence of the US presence on the area:  
                                                          
80 Hideki Yoshikawa, personal interview, 25 April 2014, University of the Ryukyus, Okinawa, Japan. 
81 Kozue Akibayashi, ‘Okinawa: Life on the Island of U.S. Military Bases’, Peace and Freedom, 70:2 (2010), pp. 
22-23, p. 22. 
82 Dietz 2010, pp. 151-152. 
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83 
The general Okinawa Travel Guide issued by the OPG’s Convention and Visitors’ Bureau likewise 
describes Okinawa City as having an ‘exotic air in the streets’ on account of its proximity to Kadena 
Air Base, and calls the central part of Okinawa, also close to many bases, an ‘Americanized town’.84 
  
Figure 3: Examples of American influence found in Okinawa 
The other side of this ‘Americanisation’, however, has been less cultural ‘stir-fry’ and more 
confrontation between US service members and the local population. ‘[A]lthough the U.S. military in 
Okinawa contributes to Japan's national security’, writes Hironobu Nakabayashi, an OPG research 
fellow, ‘it endangers the safety of citizens of the region, or say “the Human Security,” through some 
of its military activities, and crimes or problematic behavior by military personnel’.85 In placing the 
constitutive elements of this ‘human security’ at the foundation of their narrative about ‘security’ – 
namely integrating a focus on improving quality of life and following international human rights 
principles – proponents of the ABD thus shift the referent object of ‘security’ from ‘the state’ to 
individuals. By doing so, they also question the ‘“naturalness” of the territorial state’ (read: Japan, 
                                                          
83 Okinawa City Tourist Information Map: The Koza Map (Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa City Tourism Association, 
Culture and Tourism Division, 2014). 
84 Okinawa: Japan’s Tropical Side Travel Guide (Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa Prefecture and Okinawa Convention 
& Visitors Bureau, 2013), pp. 3-4. 
85 Hironobu Nakabayashi, ‘Regional Security: Perspective from Okinawa Prefecture’ in Rebalance to Asia, 
Refocus on Okinawa: Okinawa’s Role in an Evolving US-Japan Alliance (Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa Prefecture 
Executive Officer of the Governor, Regional Security Policy Division Research Section, 2013), pp. 145-166, p. 
157. 
It has flourished as the town next door to a U.S. military base, and even now, 36% of 
the region lies within the U.S. military base [Kadena]. Signs written in English line the 
street leading to the gate, and the foreign nationals lend a distinctive atmosphere to 
the area. The culture of the city is a stir-fry of Ryukyu culture passed down from our 
ancestors and foreign influences, particularly American. This style has spread to 
entertainment too, influencing Okinawan songs. Jazz, folk, and a wide range of music 
and entertainment, contribute to creating the new genre, Okinawan Rock. 
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and Okinawa’s place within it), its ability to provide for individual security, and expand the definition 
of ‘threats’ to include those which do not necessarily threaten their ‘human being’, but which 
nonetheless may have negative effects on their everyday lives.86   
The level of disaffection with the central government’s ability to deliver on its promises to 
address ‘everyday’ security concerns related to environmental pollution, noise pollution, sexual 
assault, crime, military accidents, etc. – and the perception that between Tokyo and Naha, there is 
no ‘middle ground’ on which the two parties can meet and take each other’s arguments and ideas 
seriously – has therefore resulted in an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and institutional stagnation (in 
the case of Futenma) that inspires little confidence for reconciliation between government/military 
actors and those in the ABM/local government.  
2.1. Everyday security in Okinawa 
In the case of Okinawa, writes Nakaima in a 2013 OPG publication, ‘there are three major 
issues that we are facing […] concerning the US bases. [The] [f]irst issue is regarding the land area 
[…] The second issue concerns the various challenges that stem from the bases […] The third issue is 
regarding the Status of Forces Agreement, or the SOFA’.87 Concerning the first issue – land area – 
what he is referring to is not only the well-publicised and oft-repeated fact that Okinawa, 
constituting only 0.6% of Japanese territory, hosts around 75% of all USM facilities in Japan88—but 
also that these bases take up around 10% of the land area in a prefecture with a population density 
of about 2,806 people per square mile.89 Compared to the proportion of land occupied by US forces 
in other prefectures on mainland Japan, says Kunitoshi Sakurai, former president of Okinawa 
University, environmental scientist, and a member of the Okinawa Environmental Network90, 
Okinawa bears a much more significant ‘burden’: ‘The second largest area of the US military facilities 
is in Aomori prefecture (24 sq. km; 7.69% of the prefectural land), third, Kanagawa (18 sq. km; 5. 
91%), and fourth, Tokyo (13 sq. km; 4.28%). None of these comes anywhere close to Okinawa’.91  
This combination of high concentration of military facilities with high population density 
(and with a growing population92) has thus been a cause of tension—as the bases, according to the 
local government, ‘present major obstacles in the economic growth of Okinawa’:  
                                                          
86 Darby 2006, pp. 458-459. 
87 Nakaima 2013, p. 53. 
88 See, for example: Cockburn 2012, pp. 152-153; Hook 2010.  
89 Johnson 2000, p. 37. 
90 The Okinawa Environmental Network, founded by Okinawa University professor Jun Ui, is a coalition of 
environmental NGOs in the prefecture.  
91 Sakurai 2008. 
92 In fact, Okinawa is one of the only prefectures in Japan that is increasing in population (Mike Mochizuki and 
Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Okinawa and the Future of U.S. Marines in the Pacific’ in Rebalance to Asia, Refocus on 
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93 
Naturally, the close proximity between US service members and residents in this situation has also 
led to other ‘various challenges’, as Nakaima put it—a notable one being military accidents like the 
2004 helicopter crash into OIU. However, there were many other prominent accidents prior to this. 
In June 1959, for example, an F-100 fighter jet plane crashed into Miyamori Elementary School in 
Uruma, killing eleven students and six neighbourhood residents and injuring another 210 people, 
156 of whom were also students.94 This incident, in addition to two others during the 1960s in which 
young girls were killed by a military trailer and crane, respectively, has led to a situation in which 
schools located close to US bases routinely hold emergency drills to ‘prepare students and teachers 
for the possibility of U.S. military aircraft crashing into their schools’.95 The OPG, furthermore, has 
stated that these incidents – and the possibility of future ones – have made base communities ‘live 
with the constant anxiety’.96  
In addition, crimes committed by US service members – including theft, assault, and rape – 
are also frequently raised as a point of contention. The local government estimated an average of 23 
incidents or accidents involving US service members every month in 201297, and, cumulatively 
speaking, over 5,500 crimes have been reported since reversion.98 While the estimated percentage 
of crimes committed per year by US service members (who constitute 3% of the islands’ population) 
is relatively low in relation to the general population at 1.3 - 1.599, the residual psychological effect 
they leave, say actors supporting and/or involved in the ABM, is markedly different than those 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Okinawa: Okinawa’s Role in an Evolving US-Japan Alliance [Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa Prefecture Executive 
Officer of the Governor, Regional Security Policy Division Research Section, 2013], pp. 2-15). 
93 US Military Base Issues in Okinawa (Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa Prefectural Government, Executive Office of 
the Governor, Regional Security Policy Division, 2012), pp. 2-3. 
94 ‘Okinawa school marks 50th year since deadly U.S. fighter crash’, The Japan Times, 1 July 2009a, available 
online at: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/news/2009/07/01/news/okinawa-school-marks-50th-year-since-
deadly-u-s-fighter-crash/#.VfgTIBFViko. 
95 Mitchell 2015; Akibayashi 2010, p. 22. 
96 US Military Base Issues in Okinawa 2012, p. 1. 
97 US Military Base Issues in Okinawa 2012, p. 4. 
98 Cooley 2014, pp. 3-4. 
99 Cooley 2014, pp. 3-4. 
- Okinawa Island bears the majority of US bases in Okinawa, taking up 18.4% of its 
total land area. 
- It is home to about 91% of the prefecture's population, and approximately 80% of 
the Island's population is concentrated in the southern half, where various industries 
are also located. 
- The US military bases located in densely populated and commercialized areas greatly 
restrict urban functions, traffic system and land usage.  
- […] There are 20 air spaces and 28 water areas surrounding Okinawa, designated for 
the exclusive use of the US Forces for their training purposes. Various restrictions are 
placed for commercial fishing activities and commercial flights in these areas. 
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committed by Okinawans. ‘Okinawan people do not think that the US is here to protect Okinawan 
people’, Yoichi Iha, the former mayor of Ginowan, remarks. ‘Rather, they think the US military is 
dangerous to the lives of Okinawans’.100  
Similarly, in a documentary featuring the Okinawan case – 2010 Okinawa – activists are 
highlighted for joining the ABM on account of their experiences with sexual assault. For instance, 
activist Hirotoshi Iha recounts:  
101 
During the Vietnam War, moreover, thousands of women in Okinawa were employed as prostitutes 
around the bases; while the number of assaults has seen a marked decrease since reversion102, 
Kensei Yoshida argues that ‘given the nature of sexual violence, in which victims often remain silent, 
this could be just the tip of the iceberg’.103  
Even without serious accidents or crimes, argue activists, the everyday nuisances caused by 
the bases from noise pollution by low-flying aircraft also pose a threat to ‘human security’ (see 
Figure 4 below). OIU, close to Futenma, recorded noise levels ‘in excess of 100 decibels’.104 Sakurai 
notes that the low frequency noise associated with helicopters ‘interferes with sleep and causes 
other health complications […] that can cause physical and psychological effects’ on nearby towns 
and villages.105 By December 2010, a lawsuit over this problem filed by residents living near Kadena 
                                                          
100 Yoichi Iha, personal interview, 9 April 2014, Ginowan, Okinawa, Japan. 
101 2010 Okinawa. Dir. Annabel Park. YouTube, 2010. Available online at: youtube.com/2010okinawa.  
102 According to statistics released by the Okinawa Prefectural Police, only one rape incident involving a US 
service member was reported in 2014, and the number of violent crimes only four (Matthew M. Burke and 
Chiyomi Sumida, ‘Number of SOFA personnel accused of crimes on Okinawa drops’, Stars and Stripes, 3 March 
2015, available online at: http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/number-of-sofa-personnel-accused-of-crimes-
on-okinawa-drops-1.332412).  
103 Kensei Yoshida, ‘US Bases, Japan and the Reality of Okinawa as a Military Colony’, trans. Rumi Sakamoto 
and Matt Allen, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2008, available online at: http://japanfocus.org/-yoshida-
kensei/2857/article.html. 
104 Gong 2012. 
105 Kunitoshi Sakurai, ‘Japan’s Illegal Environmental Impact Assessment of the Henoko Base,' trans. John 
Junkerman, The Asia Pacific Journal, 10:9:5 (2012), available online at: www.japanfocus.org/-John-
Junkerman/3701/article.html. These effects can include, according to Hokkaido University professor Toshihito 
Matsui, increased rates of heart attacks and strokes among residents living near bases like Kadena. 
Furthermore, a 2004 study by Kozo Hiramatsu et al found that aircraft noise measurements from Vietnam 
War-era Okinawa indicated that ‘noise exposure around Kadena Air Base was hazardous to hearing and is likely 
to have caused hearing loss to people living in its vicinity’ (‘Deaths from Kadena Air Base aircraft noise 
estimated at 4 people annually’, The Ryukyu Shimpo, 19 February 2016a, available online at: 
I’ve never been able to accept any soldiers to be stationed here. One of the reasons 
goes back to 1954 or ’55 when I was in 8th or 9th grade. I had a 5-year-old relative 
named Yumiko Nagayama. An American soldier kidnapped her in a Jeep in broad 
daylight. He took her to a field in Kadena and stripped her naked. Then he raped her, 
murdered her, and discarded her body. A 5th grade boy named Yamashiro witnessed 
the soldier kidnapping her. He was taken to Kadena base. In a lineup, he was able to 
identify the soldier. His body fluid matched what was found on her body. They 
arrested the soldier but they never told us what happened to him. Nothing.  
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had gathered over 20,000 plaintiffs.106 Similarly, environmental pollution from bases has not only 
objectively been a health and safety problem for Okinawans, but has also provided the ABM with 
one of its strongest framing devices in engaging non-Okinawans on the issue (see section 3.4 for 
more details). From forest fires caused by live firing exercises107, to hazardous chemicals such as 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and mercury stored on military sites contaminating 
groundwater108, to recent evidence pointing to the widespread use of Agent Orange in the 
prefecture during the Vietnam War109, decades of pollution have made many in the ABM question 
whether or not returned base land will even be usable—and whether the GOJ will take any 
responsibility for making it so if it is not.  
  
Figure 4: Aircraft from Futenma are shown as flying close overhead of an elementary school in 
Ginowan (left) and affecting schoolchildren (right) in the 2010 anti-base documentary Standing 
Army110 
 
This concern touches on the third point raised by Nakaima: the SOFA. As mentioned in 
earlier chapters, the SOFA has not only protected US service members from being prosecuted in 
Japanese courts for crimes committed in Okinawa, but has also posed an obstacle to local police 
conducting investigations on-base—and, to that point, kept other officials from the Ministry of 
Environment or local municipalities from entering bases to conduct any studies when allegations of 
environmental pollution arise. The ODB, rather than the USG, for example, ‘provides compensation 
for any damage caused by accidents or incidents within [their] administrative area due to illegal 
actions by the USF and its members etc. (soldiers, civilian employees)’.111 Likewise, the USM is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2016/02/24/24569/; Kozo Hiramatsu et al, ‘The Okinawa study: An estimation 
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at: http://fpif.org/gender_and_us_bases_in_asia-pacific/. 
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obligated ‘to return the land in its original condition when the bases are closed and returned to 
Japan’.112  
This legal separation, argues Kaori Sunagawa, a professor at OIU and expert in environmental 
law, has the effect of elevating ‘traditional’ security concerns for the USG especially, as it is not 
directly faced with the clean-up of their own facilities: 
113 
In making this argument, Sunagawa illustrates not only on how this legal separation reinforces the 
distance between how ‘security’ and ‘threat’ are defined within the PBD versus the ABD, but also 
relies on the historical narrative related to ‘everyday’ people’s suffering in the post-war era. By doing 
so, she ties the oft-used discursive strategy of connecting residents’ experiences of WWII and the 
post-war era to the present with the more recent narrative which re-imagines the meaning of 
‘security’ to include an environmental element—the latter of which, as will be discussed shortly, has 
proven to be successful in raising domestic and international awareness of the ‘Okinawa base issue’. 
2.2. National and local security concerns 
It thus follows that where the ill-effects of environmental contamination, violent crime, and 
noise pollution are cited in the ABD’s redefinition of what constitutes a ‘threat’ to security, other, 
more ‘traditional’ causes of insecurity – such as China’s military buildup – are often 
underemphasized or questioned outright by members and supporters of the ABM in Okinawa. ‘A lot 
of Okinawans say, “look: for centuries we traded with Japan, we traded with China”’, says Penn. 
‘“You know, we didn’t have any Chinese invasions. And we’re not really worried about the Chinese 
invasion”’.114 Penn and others115 have cited these historical links between the Ryukyu Kingdom as 
                                                          
112 Yoshida 2008. 
113 Kaori Sunagawa, personal interview, 25 April 2014, Okinawa International University, Ginowan, Okinawa, 
Japan. 
114 Penn 2014. 
115 Rabson 2014. See also: ‘Interactions with China Today’ in Rebalance to Asia, Refocus on Okinawa: 
Okinawa’s Role in an Evolving US-Japan Alliance (Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa Prefecture Executive Officer of the 
Governor, Regional Security Policy Division Research Section, 2013), p. 87; Kurayoshi Takara, ‘The Senkaku 
Islands Problem as Seen Through Okinawan History’ in Rebalance to Asia, Refocus on Okinawa: Okinawa’s Role 
If we talk about national security, it should include environmental. We have the right 
to live in peace and a quiet place, we have a right to live sustainably. When the 
government narrows the definition, they can make a line between what’s good for 
national security and what’s bad for national security. From the citizens’ side, at 
Henoko, people have the right to access the ocean, to enjoy the ocean, to pass natural 
resources on to the next generation. Because after World War Two, the Okinawan 
people relied on natural resources […] many people went to the ocean to collect clams 
and seaweed, sold this stuff at market, gained money, and raised [their] kids [on it]. 
Based on this kind of experience, natural resources are quite important for people’s 
security.   
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well as current Chinese tourism in Okinawa as a contributor to this apparent lack of concern as 
compared to policymakers in Tokyo.  
However, said Nakaima at a symposium in Washington, DC at which numerous USJ ‘experts’ 
and officials were in attendance, ‘China is a different country, because we're Japanese. We have 
absolutely no intention of becoming part of China’.116 Likewise, a 2013 poll conducted by the OPG 
showed not only that nearly 90% of Okinawans surveyed ‘have a somewhat unfavorable impression 
of China’, but also that ‘the current relationship between Okinawa and China does not appear to be 
particularly deep or strong, which shows that historical and cultural attributes currently do not have 
much leverage’.117 These results also undermine the arguments made by central government 
officials or ‘experts’ claiming that China’s influence is particularly strong on the ABM in Okinawa, or 
that Okinawans, on account of Chinese tourism, are inherently more pro-Chinese than other 
Japanese citizens.118 
On the other hand, notes Akio Takahara, in response to a question asking respondents 
whether they felt closer to China or the US, ‘more Okinawans than the respondents of the 
nationwide survey answered that they do not feel close to either’—and this, he comments, ‘reflects 
the problems that Okinawa faces with respect to U.S. military bases’.119 This lack of ‘closeness’ 
extends into the connotations made within the ABD regarding the nature of the GOJ and USG’s 
relationship. Activists and scholars have said, for example, that officials in the GOJ have been 
‘brainwashed’ into following the US and reproducing the alliance in the post-war period120; that 
Japanese politicians ‘are so accustomed to the presence of US military bases and forces that it’s like 
the air they breathe’ (calling back to the ‘oxygen’ analogy)121; or that these same officials and 
politicians suffer from ‘Ameriphobia’ which is ‘rooted in the devastation of the atomic bombs 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in an Evolving US-Japan Alliance (Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa Prefecture Executive Officer of the Governor, 
Regional Security Policy Division Research Section, 2013), pp. 94-107. 
116 ‘Summary of Symposium in Washington, D.C.’ in Rebalance to Asia, Refocus on Okinawa: Okinawa’s Role in 
an Evolving US-Japan Alliance (Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa Prefecture Executive Officer of the Governor, 
Regional Security Policy Division Research Section, 2013), pp. 111-143. 
117 Akio Takahara, ‘Comments Regarding the Survey Results on Okinawan’s Impression of China’ in Rebalance 
to Asia, Refocus on Okinawa: Okinawa’s Role in an Evolving US-Japan Alliance (Okinawa, Japan: Okinawa 
Prefecture Executive Officer of the Governor, Regional Security Policy Division Research Section, 2013), pp. 88-
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118 Eldridge, for example, implies in a 2015 Washington Times article that current Okinawa governor Takeshi 
Onaga ‘has been groomed for a long time by Chinese leaders’ (Robert Eldridge, ‘The other side to the Okinawa 
story’, The Washington Times, 31 May 2015, available online at: 
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119 Takahara 2013, p. 90. 
120 Norimatsu 2014. 
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dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki’ and continues to influence their decision to remain 
‘subservient’ to US foreign policy.122  
By contrast, Wesley Sasaki-Uemura posits that the current Abe administration (and previous 
LDP-led governments) has used this purported ‘pressure’ from the US to its own advantage by 
blaming the USG ‘for pushing it to the right when it wanted those changes all along’ (e.g. 
remilitarisation).123 In doing so, he echoes Penn’s comments that Japanese administrations have 
been ‘willing participants’ in the ‘deepening’ of the alliance, and thus insinuates that the 
reproduction of the alliance – as well as the continually fraught situation in Okinawa – is an 
intended, not coerced, product of Japanese policymaking. This pressure is viewed cynically even by 
US officials like Nye, who remarked (to quote him a second time) that ‘[s]ometimes Japanese 
officials quietly welcome gaiatsu, or foreign pressure, to help resolve their own bureaucratic 
deadlocks’.124  
2.3. Futenma: from referendums to sit-ins 
The suggestion that Japanese and American policymakers purposely or passively support the 
status quo in alliance and basing policy for whatever reason – whether it be maintaining American 
military hegemony or Japanese conservatives attempting to move the country to the right via 
remilitarisation – has also been present throughout the FRF conflict, though anger in Okinawa has 
largely been directed towards the central government in Tokyo over a perceived (and, on many 
occasions, actual) lack of consultation with local stakeholders. Initially, however, this did not seem to 
be the case. In the wake of the 1995 rape, for instance, the SACO negotiations appeared to be a 
concrete effort by the USG and GOJ towards resolving the issues surrounding Futenma (which Ota 
had told them at the time was the ‘biggest priority’ in terms of relocating or returning base areas125).  
The resulting agreement between the two to relocate Futenma to Henoko, however, ‘did 
not satisfy the Okinawans, nor did it their Governor, Ota Masahide, who wanted US bases on the 
island reduced, not just shifted around’.126 This was complicated, says Krauss, by the fact that at the 
same time, landowner leases for US bases were due to be renewed (which Ota explicitly opposed) 
and ‘northern Okinawan contractors who wanted any construction to be done only by themselves 
[…] exerted pressure on the Okinawan government to only come to an agreement if this were 
                                                          
122 Takahashi 2012; Bandow 2014. 
123 Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, personal interview, 26 August 2014, Skype, Washington, DC, USA. Sasaki-Uemura, 
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included’.127 A local referendum in Nago in 1997 followed this, though only a slim majority (52.9%) of 
eligible voters rejected the FRF plan. Nago City Assembly member (and instrumental in organising 
the 1997 Nago plebiscite against the relocation of Futenma to Henoko) Yasuhiro Miyagi and Miyume 
Tanji explain that this more evenly-divided result was due to many voters associating the 
construction of a new facility with badly-needed ‘economic rejuvenation’ in the area (see section 3.3 
for details).128 Ota, furthermore, was defeated in his re-election campaign the next year by the pro-
relocation, LDP-backed Keiichi Inamine, who was heavily supported both politically and financially by 
the central government.129  
In-between the referendum in 1997 and the sit-in campaign started by Henoko protesters in 
the early 2000s, however, the initial SACO plans underwent several changes. First, Inamine, 
appealing to the aforementioned local construction firms and long-term economy of northern 
Okinawa, suggested that the offshore FRF option be converted into a civilian-military airport and 
‘called for a 15-year limit on the use of this facility by the U.S. military’.130 Then, in 2000, the Naha 
District Court dismissed a lawsuit filed by Nago residents against the city for ‘disregarding’ the 
results of the 1997 referendum, as those results were non-binding.131 After further negotiations, in 
2002, the USG and GOJ settled on a facility ‘that incorporated much of Governor Inamine's thinking: 
a civilian-military joint use airport built on reclaimed land on the reef some distance from the shore 
so as to reduce flight noise over residential areas’.132  
However, this is not to say that the referendum(s) achieved nothing. ‘All in all, the 
movement for the Referendum against the relocation of the base to Henoko achieved two things’, 
argues Genevieve Souillac: 
133 
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First, it “brought the history of Okinawa’s social movements to a new height by 
forming … a broader public sphere of discussion about the US military” within Japan. 
Second, it transformed Okinawa’s political and social self-representation from that of 
“a poor, oppressed people” to “that of conﬁdent, afﬂuent ‘citizens’ of diverse 
backgrounds awakened to globally disseminated ideas about ecology, women’s issues, 
and peace”. 
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Sunagawa, who explained that her involvement in the ABM began after 1995, concurs that activists 
– including herself – learned how to effectively present their case on a global stage as a result of 
these events: 
134 
Partly as a consequence of this strategic learning process, when the ODB began to undertake 
construction work on the FRF in 2004 (according to the revised 2002 plan), its efforts were 
significantly curtailed by the activities of local protesters and, later, outside activists through physical 
obstruction (including sit-ins onshore, scaffolding erected offshore around survey sites, and divers; 
see Figure 5 below).135 These protests caused the official plans to once again be revised, and in 2006, 
the USG and GOJ agreed to the V-shaped facility which remains their preferred option today.  
  
Figure 5: Protesters in Oura Bay erect scaffolding (left) to prevent construction of the FRF and set up 
tents in Takae Village (right) to prevent the construction of helipads for FRF-related training136 
 
McCormack frames this process, however, as one that, with each succeeding revision, has 
increased the FRF in size. He argues that it has  
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136 Screenshots taken from: Umi ni suwaru: Henoko 600 nichi no tatakai. (Sit-in on the sea: The 600 days anti-
base struggle in Okinawa, Henoko). Prod. Ryukyu Asahi Broadcasting. 2006. Available online at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fy296RaZEa0; and Effendemfilm 2010. 
After the rape case, Japanese people started to become interested in the Okinawa 
issue, and my mentor, Professor Ue, became a kind of organiser of the environmental 
conference in Okinawa. It was held in 1997, and then after this conference, Professor 
Ue sent me as a delegate to the ASEAN +5 Summit in New York. I was the only person 
to participate [from Okinawa], but Professor Ue told me: “you shouldn’t be scared to 
present this problem at this international conference. That’s the starting point”. 
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137  
Later surveys by the ODB, having become familiar with the activists’ strategies, took greater care to 
ensure that they would not be hampered by protests: in 2007, by increasing the number of Coast 
Guard vessels around the offshore construction sites and sending survey divers at night to assess the 
areas; in 2008, by prosecuting fifteen protesters staging a sit-in in Takae village – the site of 
construction for six helipads – for ‘obstructing traffic’; and in 2011, according to reports, by hovering 
military helicopters close to the sit-in protesters’ tent in Takae, thus ‘blowing it down and damaging 
its contents’.138 
Further complicating the activities of the ABM was the signing of the Guam Treaty in 2009 by 
the Aso administration, which committed the GOJ not only to the Henoko plan, but also to paying $6 
billion in relocation-related expenses—a commitment, say journalist and filmmaker Asako Kageyama 
(who co-produced the anti-base documentary Marines Go Home!) and Philip Seaton, that the US 
‘interpret[ed] as binding Hatoyama’ when the DPJ took office the following year.139 However, the 
stance which Hatoyama initially took – that of supporting relocation outside of Okinawa – not only 
unnerved alliance ‘managers’, but also, by many accounts, re-energised the ABM. ‘Hatoyama’s 
proposition instantaneously thrust kengai isetsu as an intelligible political claim into public 
consciousness’, claims Annmaria Shimabuku. Furthermore, in his successive efforts to persuade 
other prefectures to accept more bases so as to lift their ‘burden’ from Okinawa, she argues that 
‘many citizens were forced to confront the reality of the [USJ-ST] from which they benefit’.140  
When, following intense negotiations with US officials, the Hatoyama administration 
returned to the original plan as agreed upon in 2009, proponents of the ABD framed this as resulting 
not only from Hatoyama’s lack of political ‘courage’, but also due to bureaucrats in Japan and US 
officials not supporting his proposals in the first place. ‘He was betrayed by his own defence agency 
officials, and by people in the embassy in Washington mainly’, argues Rabson. ‘And pressure, of 
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grown from a modest ‘helipad,’ as it was referred to in 1996, to a removable, 
offshore pontoon with a runway, initially 1,500 meters but gradually stretching to 
2,500 meters, between 1999 and 2006, to assume its current form of dual 1,800 
meter runways stretching out from Cape Henoko into Oura Bay, plus a deep sea 
naval port and other facilities, and a chain of helipads scattered through the forest—
a comprehensive air, land and sea base able to project force throughout Asia. 
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course, coming from the United States. That’s where they lack courage: they can’t say “no”’.141 
Bandow agrees: ‘The US clearly preferred the status quo. It certainly didn’t want a serious challenge 
[…] And I think, frankly, from that standpoint, Washington felt threatened, and they played the 
alliance card’.142  
Given the quotes from diplomatic cables and official documents in previous chapters of 
officials playing the ‘alliance card’ – such as the private complaints of several ‘Alliance hands’ to the 
US Embassy in Tokyo that ‘even the most senior government bureaucrats had been essentially cut 
out of the decision-making process’ – this interpretation is not without merit. It was, furthermore, 
reinforced when, in a 2011 interview with the Okinawa Times, Ryukyu Shimpo, and Kyodo News 
Agency, Hatoyama admitted that the reason he had given for his agreement to the original plan – 
that of Futenma’s deterrence value for regional security – was given merely as a ‘pretext’.143  
2.4. Futenma: a status quo problem? 
The reactions to this admission by Hatoyama in Okinawa ranged from appalled (Nago Mayor 
Susumu Inamine remarked ‘it is unforgiveable that a prime minister of a country makes such an 
utterance so lightly’) to accusatory (with the Ryukyu Shimpo running an editorial calling Hatoyama 
‘an amateur prime minister with no sense of politics’) to, most prominently among his critics, 
cynical.144 ‘Hatoyama honestly disclosed that he could not reverse the bureaucrats’ way of thinking, 
and made clear that “deterrence” had no meaning’, says Mie Kunimasa, leader of a women’s anti-
base group in Ginowan.145 This argument – that the concept of ‘deterrence’ itself is nothing but an 
empty signifier – is a common one among anti-base activists. ‘When you see how much money’s at 
stake in the operations that go on every day, it’s phenomenal’, observes Lutz, framing this money in 
the US basing structure in Okinawa as what actually keeps the USM there (as opposed to 
‘deterrence’). She continues: 
146 
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The number of flights that take off from Kadena Air Force Base every single day—just 
that one base, in that one country, on one day, will have involved thousands of 
gallons of jet fuel, repair and maintenance and parts for that aircraft. The rationale 
for these bases is that they’re continually practicing and training and using the 
equipment, and running the personnel through their paces, and feeding them, and so 
on, and that is an incredibly expensive operation. 
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Moreover, adds filmmaker John Junkerman, it is not just the institutionalised, operational value of 
the Okinawan bases which keeps them where they are, but also the fact that the Japanese 
government pays for their associated expenses: 
147 
Iha argues that the governments’ framing of the Marines as a deterrent force for Japan’s 
national security also does not add up, if only because ‘every year, for about half the year, Marines 
are absent from Okinawa because they go to Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Guam, and Korea in 
order to engage in bilateral security practices with each of these countries’.148 This is backed up by 
testimony from previous chapters, such as the Senate staffer’s comment that ‘the forces on Okinawa 
are not for the defence of Japan […] they’re for the forward protection of US national interests in 
that region’, or the 1998 GAO report framing the US forward presence as ‘a visible political 
commitment by the United States to peace and stability in the region’—not just in Japan. 
On the need for the continued concentration of US forces in Okinawa following this 
‘deterrence’ argument, activists and scholars also disagree with the central governments’ claims. ‘It 
violates strategic logic to put all the bases in Okinawa. Kyushu is closer to Beijing and North Korea, so 
it would make more strategic sense for the bases to be there’, says Lummis.149 ‘[A]s the U.S. Marine 
redeployment plans to Guam arid elsewhere suggest, maintaining a large garrison of Marines on 
Okinawa is not as essential’, continues Mochizuki. ‘Under the new vision of Marine deployments, 
Marine units can maintain a continuous presence in the Asia-Pacific through rotational deployments 
from bases in Guam, Hawaii, and even California as well as Okinawa’.150 Akikazu Hashimoto adds: 
‘Unless the United States pulls back to a location out of the range of the Chinese military (e.g., 
Darwin, Australia), U.S. military forces will be vulnerable to China's anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), 
submarines, and other new weapon systems’.151  
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The other thing about—that makes Okinawa appealing to the Americans is that the 
Japanese government covers nearly 100 percent of the costs of maintaining those 
bases in Japan—pays for the utilities, it pays all of the workers who live on the—who 
work on those bases, it pays for the cooks who cook the food, it pays for the golf 
courses and the swimming pools, maintains everything. So the U.S. burden to have 
those bases there is very, very slim. There’s hardly any financial burden whatsoever. 
So, they get a free ride. It’s the best situation for U.S. bases in any country in the 
entire world. 
 
Grinberg 219 
 
‘So the question is: why does the Japanese government still want to build this base in 
Henoko?’ Iha asks. ‘We believe it is Japan’s intention to ignore what Okinawa wishes, which is a 
violation of our human rights and individual property. So we believe that this situation happening 
today is caused by the indulgence or ignorance of the Japanese government, and the US seems to be 
a co-player in this’.152 As intimated earlier with regards to the alliance and the base situation in 
Okinawa overall, there is a strong narrative within the ABD which frames the Futenma issue as 
having been protracted on account of the USG’s and GOJ’s preference for the status quo. ‘Regarding 
the possibility of a change of government, if the question is how will Okinawa's security issues and 
relations with the U.S. military change, it doesn't really seem to change’, said Nakaima in 2013. 
Yonamine concurs, adding that ‘the US military’s pattern of extending bases in accordance simply 
with their perceived military and strategic value, without any understanding of local circumstances, 
history and culture, is precisely what is happening in Okinawa’.153 Meanwhile, Hashimoto criticises 
‘Japanese commentators’ in the media and in the political sphere for being unable to go ‘beyond 
thinking about the Futenma issue like a real estate transaction, fretting over whether the FRF should 
be within or outside Okinawa Prefecture or whether it should be Base A or Base B’.154 
Nakaima’s 2013 deal with Abe is similarly seen through this frame as a continuation of the 
central government’s ‘status quo’ relationship with the OPG in the sense that local officials can still 
be ‘bribed’ or ‘economically bullied’ into accepting Tokyo’s demands.155 For instance, other LDP 
members in the prefecture – prior to reversing their positions in favour of the FRF in 2013 – had 
reportedly expressed their willingness to do so ‘once public passions showed signs of cooling’.156 The 
resulting public outcry in Okinawa over Nakaima’s reversal – up to and including the replacement of 
Nakaima with the anti-base Takeshi Onaga as governor in 2014 – led a recent US Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report to concede: ‘Ultimately, the unwillingness of Tokyo and Washington to 
close Futenma without a replacement facility has fostered the perception that the two governments 
are discriminating against Okinawans’.157 
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3. Institutional and cultural identities 
There’s no fact-finding and no solution to this issue [the FRF] because of the way the 
different parties view the security situation here. For the Marines, it’s about survival. For the 
Japanese government, it’s a religion. And for Okinawans, it’s about life. 
- Tomohiro Yara, former editor of the Okinawa Times 
 
It is not enough to say that there is merely a ‘perception’ of discrimination against 
Okinawans, however, when discussing the identity-based narrative underlying the ABD. Rather, 
upon close reading of the literature and in my own interviews with supporters/members of the 
ABM, it is clear that political and cultural discrimination against Okinawans, particularly by the 
Japanese central government, is taken as self-evident. This includes not only the historical 
victimisation of Okinawa on the basis of ethnicity, language, and physical distance from mainland 
Japan, but also current economic and political marginalisation—the bases being presented as a 
prime example of this. ‘There is little attention or sympathy for Okinawa from mainland Japan’, 
remarks Fujiwara. ‘And legally, the local government doesn’t have much say in foreign policy’.158  
In much the same way, there are doubts that the USG has much ‘sympathy’ – or knowledge 
– about the ‘Okinawa problem’, and that, if anything, efforts to improve relations between the USM 
and local people only serves to normalise the presence of US forces. ‘Militarisation’, in this sense, is 
not only a ‘material’ process which includes ‘the gradual encroachment of the military institution 
into the civilian arena’ (such as the dependence of local economies on base-related revenues), but 
also an ‘ideological’ one in which ‘such developments are acceptable to the populace, and become 
seen as “common-sense” solutions to civil problems’.159  ‘Legitimation of US military presence is 
therefore not simply a state-driven process’, writes Dietz. ‘It is also simultaneously socially 
experienced and reproduced by Okinawans themselves, borne of a desire to make life livable and 
shaped by living alongside the bases all one’s life’.160 This legitimation, speculates Baker, may help 
explain the low voter turnout in the 1996 referendum in areas located near the bases, ‘where large 
numbers of people depended on the military for their jobs’.161 
There is, therefore, a notable resistance within the ABD to reproducing this legitimation, and 
this resistance is articulated by a variety of actors – ranging from anti-USJ-ST to women’s to 
environmental groups – through several discursive strategies. These include, but are not limited, to: 
stressing that Okinawans have ‘first-hand’ experience of ground warfare that distinguishes them 
from mainland Japanese residents (in that it both better enables them to understand the 
                                                          
158 Kiichi Fujiwara, personal interview, 19 February 2014, Tokyo University, Tokyo, Japan. 
159 Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarisation of Women’s Lives (London: South End Press, 
1983), pp. 9-10. 
160 Dietz 2010, p. 193. 
161 Baker 2004, p. 143. 
Grinberg 221 
 
consequences of remilitarisation as well as justifies their pacifism/continued opposition to the USM 
presence); emphasising the elite-led nature of alliance policymaking and the subsequent exclusion of 
Okinawan officials and local voices from base negotiations and investigations related to USM 
incidents and accidents; connecting the central government’s granting of base-related subsidies to 
the OPG (and contribution of funds towards pro-base candidates during municipal and prefectural 
elections) to the notion that it does so out of a lack of respect for local democratic will; and 
suggesting, as discussed earlier, that there is a deliberate effort on the part of the USG and GOJ to 
obfuscate their specific policies with regards to the base issue.  
Each of these strategies are designed in order to set up a unified political agenda not only for 
the ABM (which, as will be discussed in section 3.4, is often divided in its aims and methods), but 
also for the prefecture and its sympathisers both in mainland Japan and internationally. 
Furthermore, the stories they tell contribute to the creation of the larger narrative in which Okinawa 
is imagined as a ‘keystone for peace’ instead of an ‘armada’162—conditional on the reduction or 
removal of US forces from the prefecture.  
3.1. Mainland versus Okinawa 
In the same CRS report which acknowledges the impact that the ‘perception’ of 
discrimination against Okinawans has had on the base issue, its two authors also remark that ‘the 
controversy over bases is seen by many as largely a mainland Japan versus Okinawa issue’.163 They, 
along with others, have framed the relationship between the mainland and Okinawa as being 
contentious due not only to the historical and political factors discussed earlier, but also on account 
of Okinawans being ‘ethnically distinct’164 from Japanese. This is evident, to a certain extent, in the 
Ryukyu Shimpo poll cited earlier. For example, 87% of those surveyed agreed with the statement 
that ‘the right to self-determination for Okinawan people should be expanded’, and 54.2% 
responded that the central government has ‘not [given] sufficient consideration’ to Okinawa’s 
‘regional development and foreign policies during the past 70 years’.165 In making this distinction 
within the ABD, Okinawans are thus framed as not only physically separated from mainland 
Japanese by geographic distance, but also symbolically separated in the sense that their experiences 
– as ethnically and culturally unique from the rest of Japan – cannot ever be fully comprehended by 
mainlanders. ‘Maybe it’s useful to visit Okinawa’, one MOFA official tells me, ‘but sometimes, if they 
[Tokyo policymakers] only visit Okinawa once, they rather misunderstand it’.166  
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Why this official – and others with whom I spoke – make such comments is largely due to 
their own, personal interactions with proponents of the ABD. In these interactions (including my 
own with activists, officials, and scholars), it became clear that many Okinawans believe their first-
hand (or their families’) experiences of war are not only unique from those of mainland Japanese 
residents, but also provides a logical reason for their pacifism and adherence to the ABD. 
Furthermore, they believe that it makes their argument against the USM presence more impactful 
and powerful than the central governments’. ‘I would argue that among the various Japanese groups 
who experienced the war, only Okinawans have preserved war memories up to today as social and 
collective memories of a whole community’, argues Moriteru Arasaki. ‘The Okinawan war experience 
in this sense may be closer to that of the neighbouring Asian countries’.167  
Framing the post-war experience as the redevelopment of the mainland at the expense of 
continued Okinawan suffering and sacrifice, George Feifer adds: ‘And while the supreme 
commander's Tokyo headquarters dubbed the emperor “the first gentleman of Japan” and 
entertained members of the imperial household, starving, scavenging Okinawans lived in miserable 
poverty, many in areas ravaged by malaria, all in deep shock after the killing of roughly a third of 
their number’.168 Journalist and producer of the 2012 Defoliated Island documentary Jon Mitchell 
also suggests that the Vietnam War’s effects were far more destructive in Okinawa than on the 
mainland. ‘Due to Okinawa’s gray-zone status, base workers tasked with hazardous tasks were not 
safeguarded by American or Japanese labour regulations’, he writes. ‘These employees handled toxic 
chemicals without special training, protective equipment or warnings of the dangers. As a result, 
hundreds fell ill from exposure to substances including insecticides, hexavalent chromium and 
asbestos’.169 
Proponents of the ABD thus frame part of the disconnect between mainlanders and 
Okinawans on the base issue not only to a lack of historical knowledge on the part of everyday 
Japanese citizens, but also to a lack of empathy. Remarks Hashimoto: ‘Most mainland Japanese were 
oblivious to the fact that the peace and security of their daily lives was owed to the large number of 
U.S. military bases in Okinawa’.170 ‘Mainland people don’t realise it’s their tax dollars being spent to 
build a new base in Henoko’, says Ota; Yoshikawa agrees, adding:  
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171 
‘It’s quite difficult for Okinawan people to raise their voices, because most Japanese don’t know the 
issue and aren’t much interested in learning about the issue’, continues Sunagawa. ‘So this [anti-
base/environmental] programme and its concerns are not shared with people on the mainland, but 
we can share the same concerns with [people in] Korea and the Philippines, and even with people in 
the United States’.172  
Proponents of the ABD thus paint the USG and GOJ in an antagonistic light, in their 
interpretations, for actively reproducing this divide through their policies. ‘“The US and Japanese 
governments have deliberately and by stages shifted the major burden of the US bases to Okinawa 
in order to make it a non-issue in national politics, and in public consciousness”’, claims Ichiyo 
Muto.173 Continues Akira Arakawa, former editor-in-chief of the Okinawa Times: ‘[T]he Japanese 
people as a whole have no will to share in Okinawa’s pain, and it [the Japanese state] continues to 
cultivate its own economic prosperity in the shadow of it all’.174 Other prefectural governments are 
included in this criticism as well for failing to take ‘responsibility’ for hosting bases:  
175 
3.2. Of bases and buck-passing 
Addressing this reluctance of other prefectures to host bases, Narushige Michishita, a 
former official and researcher for the MOD, explains:  
176 
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I’m also an active member of the Save the Dugong Campaign Center with its main 
offices in Tokyo and Osaka. And the members there are really the ones working hard 
to convey these contradictions about, you know, “Article 9 and the bases are 
concentrated here in Okinawa, and we don’t wanna have a base in the mainland”. 
And they were having a hard time convincing many [mainland] Japanese of that. 
At the National Governor’s Conference held in May 2010, multiple constituencies 
declared that “national security is the country’s problem” and hence not their 
concern. Shizuoka Prefecture, which currently assumes 0.39 percent of the burden 
stated, “We basically oppose any increased burden.” The Governor of Nara 
Prefecture, where there are no bases, stated, “We have no room to accept bases.” 
If you put yourself in the position of mayors and governors of different prefectures 
and cities, it would be very hard for them to accept a deal to bring the bases and 
U.S. forces into their areas. Many municipalities in Japan are suffering from 
economic difficulties and aging problems, and while it might be a good idea 
economically for those municipalities to accept U.S. bases, if that results in 
accidents and incidents, who takes responsibility? 
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This question – who takes responsibility? – is one that has been raised frequently by various actors 
throughout this research, with US officials claiming that implementation of base-related policies is 
primarily the responsibility of the Japanese central government, and Japanese officials, by turn, both 
accepting this role and, at the same time, passing off responsibility for the actualisation of alliance 
policies at the local level to its prefectural officials in Okinawa.  
These local officials, in turn, have struggled to balance the demands from Tokyo and 
Washington for speedier implementation and concerns from Okinawan residents—all while having 
little say in the policymaking process. ‘In the past, security policies have been considered as policies 
that should be promoted under the initiative of the nation as a whole’, says Nakabayashi. 
‘Municipalities, society and individuals have been incorporated into policies developed by the 
nation, and have been requested to cooperate with them, but were never expected to acquire or 
expand on an individual outlook on security policy [emphasis added]’.177 Dietz remarks that the 
reason for this, in the case of the USJA, is due to the framework provided by the SOFA and USJ-ST: 
‘The treaty codifies the terms in which basing matters are problematized, which in turn locates 
decision-making power and “solutions” at the national and international levels’.178 This appears to 
be the case given testimony from previous chapters, such as one former MOFA official’s comment 
that ‘at the end of the day those [base] shapes and structures and sizes, they need to be negotiated 
between the two governments’. 
When it comes to the question of how to ‘deal’ with the ‘Okinawa base problem’, however, 
finding ‘solutions’ has not always been so easy when limited to these sites. In the case of Futenma, 
US and Japanese officials with whom I spoke repeatedly made the argument that if anti-base 
activists did not approve of the two governments’ relocation plan, they should suggest a viable 
alternative.179 Sunagawa, however, disagrees with this notion. ‘I think this is their [the governments’] 
problem. Because [Okinawan] people don’t need to be specialists, right?’ she asks. ‘So I think it’s 
important that they express their concerns so that policymakers and bureaucrats have to interpret 
them’.180  
Even when they express their concerns, however, members of the ABM complain that they 
are not always treated seriously or given satisfactory answers by these ‘policymakers and 
bureaucrats’, especially with regards to the EIAs conducted for the FRF. ‘Japanese government avoid 
to go through the proper channels, and has forced through environment research without hearing 
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opinion and comment from citizen and experts’, reads an English-language pamphlet published by 
the sit-in protesters at Henoko.181 Sakurai further cites the founding chairman of the Japan Society 
for Impact Assessment, Shimazu Yasuo, who called the 2010 Henoko EIA the ‘worst EIA in history’.182 
It earned this ignominious title, say Sakurai and others183, due to its initial exclusion of the 
deployment of Ospreys from the scoping and preliminary assessment phase, lack of recovery plans 
and habitat protection for endangered species in the neighbouring Yanbaru forest, and lack of data 
about how the USM would address possible issues including noise pollution, oil spills, and chemical 
contamination of groundwater.  
Yoshikawa, whose involvement with the Save the Dugong Campaign has involved many 
interactions with local and central government officials on the Henoko issue, describes his personal 
experience relating to the EIA: 
184 
It is not just a lack of ‘experts’ in environmental science and law, as Yoshikawa puts it, that 
makes the relationship between the ABM and local officials difficult—it is also a demonstrated 
incoherence in the communications between different levels of government. In a 2008 cable, for 
example, Maher reports that in response to a request from USM engineers about ‘what impact 
delays in environmental procedures would have on the land-based construction’ of the FRF,  
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182 Kunitoshi Sakurai, ‘Environmental Restoration of Former US Military Bases in Okinawa’, The Asia-Pacific 
Journal, 11:47:5 (2013), available online at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-sakurai-kunitoshi/4038/article.html. 
183 Sakurai 2012; Weston A. Watts Jr. and Kaori Sunagawa, ‘MV-22 Osprey Training and Environmental Impact 
Assessment in the United States and Okinawa, Japan’, Journal of Economics and Environmental Studies, 1 
(2011), pp. 31-44; Weston A. Watts Jr. and Kaori Sunagawa, ‘Environmental Impact Statements as Permit 
Applications for the Futenma Replacement Facility in Japan and the Keystone XL Pipeline in the United States’, 
Journal of Economics and Environmental Studies, 2 (2012), pp. 9-41. 
184 Yoshikawa 2014. 
Last year, December 2013, Governor Nakaima gave permission for land 
reclamation, right? And he said, “okay, there won’t be any impact on the 
environment when the base is built”. That was his comment. And he’s made that 
comment based upon [the findings of the] [Department of Civil Engineering and 
Construction]. […] So I went there [to the Department] and asked: “okay, you guys 
approved this land reclamation. I want to know the names of the experts. Who 
knows about the dugongs? Who knows about alien species? Who knows about 
corals?” And they said, “oh, we didn’t ask the experts”. So we know experts who are 
forthcoming—they are the ones who are opposing [the construction of the FRF]. 
But apparently we have some “experts” [laughs] who are not forthcoming but are 
saying there will be no impacts. But in this particular section, when I asked them: 
“who are the experts?” And they said, “we didn’t consult any experts. We decided. 
We judged it”. And I asked them if they studied alien species, and they kept their 
mouths shut. One guy said he studied chemistry. [laughs] That helps. So again … it’s 
just mind-boggling, this issue of experts. 
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3.3. Forms of historical and current victimisation of Okinawa 
This lack of transparency is often highlighted in the ABD as just one example among many 
political manifestations of discrimination against Okinawa going back decades. Nearly every major 
historical development from the post-war period to the present has an accompanying interpretation 
as it having victimised or in some way threatened the safety and security of Okinawan people to the 
benefit of the US and Japanese central governments (and mainland Japanese residents). Therefore, 
the alliance itself is portrayed within the discourse as having been reproduced while undermining 
Okinawan popular will and the GOJ’s and USG’s stated commitment to the ‘shared value’ of 
respecting democracy. In expressing this view, actors associated with the ABM thus often 
characterise Okinawa’s position as a ‘sacrifice’ for the sake of national or regional security as 
conceived by the two governments. This language appears in the literature (and in my interviews) in 
reference to everything from the prefecture’s role in the Battle of Okinawa (as a ‘sacrificial stone’), 
to its handover to USM administration in the post-war period, to the continued stationing of US 
forces in the prefecture after reversion.  
The first of these – Okinawa as the sute-ishi – arises from the widely-held belief that the 
prefecture was purposely used by the GOJ ‘to wound and exhaust the US army forces and prolong 
their stay in Okinawa as long as possible, so the mainland forces had time to prepare for an 
attack’.186 In addition to the prefecture’s land and resources, its people were likewise ‘sacrificed’: 
‘Rather than putting efforts into evacuation or the creation of a safe zone for civilians, the Okinawan 
people were used as a source of labor to build shelters, tunnels and other emplacements, to 
supplement combat units and to tend to wounded soldiers’.187 When the prefecture was then placed 
under US administration after the war, its role, says Hashimoto, graduated from ‘sacrificial stone’ to 
‘military cornerstone’, all while gaining little political influence or importance in the process.188 In 
                                                          
185 Kevin Maher, ‘Appeasement Strategy Behind Reputed FRF Environmental Procedures Delay?’, Wikileaks, 
Wikileaks cable:08NAHA25_a. 11 March 2008a. Available online at: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NAHA25_a.html.  
186 A Guide to Battle Sites and Military Bases in Okinawa City 2012, p. 2. 
187 Ryukyu Shimpo et al 2014. 
188 Hashimoto 2013, p. 29. 
Japanese officials from Tokyo initially insisted there would be no delay, as the EIS 
applies only to landfill, but Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB) participants said they 
expected the prefecture would "be sensitive" to construction. They admitted that 
they had not yet discussed with the Okinawa Prefectural Government (OPG) any 
construction that was unrelated to the EIS. Japanese participants insisted that work, 
including demolition scheduled to begin in April, must be kept under wraps due to 
“local sensitivities.” 
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highlighting this pattern in the language across the various sites of exchange189, Hashimoto’s remark 
also exemplifies a larger discursive strategy of the ABM which aims to show the callousness of 
central government officials in their referring to Okinawa as a ‘stone’ or ‘rock’—and thus feeding 
into the idea that the prefecture is merely a piece of real estate to be traded between nation-states. 
‘Hence, the price of “peace” in Japan after the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty was paid by 
exporting the violence of the U.S. military from Japan to Okinawa’, says Shimabuku190, with 
Kurayoshi Takara adding: ‘Compared with the change that occurred before the war, the U.S. 
occupation completely transformed Okinawa's landscape so that Okinawa bore little resemblance to 
its prewar self’.191 For example, Allen Nelson, Vietnam War veteran and pacifist activist, described 
his experience of Okinawan ‘culture’ during the war as one that was not so different from being back 
home in the US: 
192 
The pro-reversion movement, argues Sasaki-Uemura, was therefore driven by Okinawans’ 
becoming ‘tired of feeling like a US possession, and of US soldiers having been asked to maintain law 
and order because Japan had no military’.193 The resulting ‘return’ of the prefecture to the Japanese 
state, however, is hardly framed as a victory. In addition to the reversion being conditional on the 
continued stationing of US forces in Okinawa, the GOJ ‘secretly absorbed substantial costs of the 
reversion of Okinawa from US to Japanese rule in 1972, including $4 million to restore farmland 
requisitioned for bases’194 and defraying expenses related to removing American nuclear weapons 
from the prefecture.195 The language of ‘reversion’ itself, argues Arakawa, is problematic:  
                                                          
189 ‘Cornerstone’ in Chapter 3, ‘keystone’ in 4, and ‘sacrificial stone’ in this chapter. 
190 Shimabuku 2012, p. 132. 
191 Takara 2013, p. 7. 
192 Effendemfilm 2010. 
193 Sasaki-Uemura 2014. 
194 David McNeill, ‘Implausible Denial: Japanese Court Rules on Secret US-Japan Pact Over the Return of 
Okinawa’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 9:41:2 (2011), available online at: http://www.japanfocus.org/-David-
McNeill/3613/article.html. 
195 McCormack 2010; Rabson 2013. 
When I came here in 1966 to go to Vietnam, I don’t even remember Okinawan 
people. I don’t remember seeing them. They were the shadows walking around. 
What I do remember is the women, I remember the drinking, I remember the 
fighting. That’s what I remember. But in terms of, like, Okinawan culture? I didn’t eat 
their food; I ate cheeseburgers at the base, you know? I didn’t drink their alcohol; I 
drank Budweiser, you know, at the base. So this whole idea of “Americanism” stays 
within that base, it stays within the militarism of ourselves. 
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The central government’s HNS payments to the USG, which started a few years after 
Okinawa’s reversion in 1978, are interpreted in a similar light as ‘a peculiar form of “reverse rental” 
(by landlord to tenant) that came to be known as “omoiyari” (sympathy) payment in Japanese’.197 
This follows the characterization of the USG’s and GOJ’s view of Okinawa as a throwaway ‘stone’, 
reinforced, proponents say, by the fact that the GOJ provides more HNS to US bases stationed on its 
territory than do any other governments for bases on theirs—about $2 billion a year under the 2011-
15 agreement.198 Between 1978 and 2010, in fact, total HNS from the government for USFJ 
operations totalled $30 billion.199  
Activists and scholars frame Okinawa’s transformation into a ‘concrete island’ and its 
dependence on subsidies as the mirror image of the central government’s HNS in its benefits to 
mainland Japan. ‘The subsidy-oriented economy following 1972 prioritized short-term projects, 
especially construction of public buildings and infrastructure facilities, with Japanese companies the 
main beneficiaries’, writes Tanji, pointing out that even with these funds, ‘Okinawa remained Japan’s 
poorest prefecture in terms of income, unemployment, and other socio-economic standards’.200 
‘Unlike before reversion, hotels are largely owned by mainland companies, as are supermarkets, 
department stores, life-assurance companies, and so forth’, Ian Buruma reported in 1985.201 The 
central government’s funding of these ‘short-term’ construction projects, moreover, stood at around 
90 to 95% of total costs in Okinawa versus around 50% in other prefectures in 2010.202 Therefore, in 
responding to the argument made by the USG and GOJ that the construction of the FRF would be an 
economic boon to the prefecture, Johnson quotes former PM Morihito Hosokawa:  
                                                          
196 Arakawa 2013. 
197 McCormack 2010. 
198 Cooley 2014. To this effect, former PACOM Admiral Timothy Keating testified before the SASC in 2008 that 
‘“Japan . . . provides over $4 billion in host-nation support — the most generous of any U.S. ally”’ (Reiji 
Yoshida, ‘Basics of the U.S. military presence’, The Japan Times, 25 March 2008, available online at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/03/25/reference/basics-of-the-u-s-military-
presence/#.V2GwWvkrLIU).  
199 Shimoji 2010. 
200 Tanji 2009. 
201 Buruma 1985, p. 54. 
202 Yoshida 2010. 
Since the original meaning of the word fukki [reversion] is, according to the Kōjien, “to 
restore to an originary place, location, or condition, ‘to one’s native country’”, the 
transfer of administrative control over what was originally an independent Ryūkyū 
Kingdom – a region annexed in the shadow of threatened military force in 1879 (the 
Disposition of the Ryūkyūs) and under Japanese control for only a few decades before 
Japan’s defeat in 1945 – was nothing but an arbitrary act carried out to suit the 
purposes of the United States and Japan in 1972; thus, it cannot properly be called a 
“reversion” in the correct sense of the term. It is therefore not difficult to appreciate 
why so many harbor senses of hostility and discomfort toward this term. 
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203 
In the same way that proponents of this discourse tie the role of money to buying the 
cooperation of local people through subsidies, so do they connect it to the buying of political 
support from prefectural officials and businesses. For example, when Ota refused to renew leases 
for private lands on which US bases were located in the wake of the 1995 rape, the Japanese central 
government ‘pushed through a new law permanently transferring the renewal of Okinawans’ land 
leases to the Office of the Prime Minister’; later, when Ota likewise rejected Henoko as the 
relocation site for the FRF following the SACO negotiations, ‘the central government abruptly cut off 
all communications with the Okinawan government and postponed payment on the economic 
stimulus package it had promised Okinawa’s northern region. Only after Okinawans elected as 
governor a Tokyo-backed Okinawan businessman who was more amenable to the new base 
[Inamine] was the economic package reinstated’.204  
Within the narrative of victimization, these attempts to ‘purchase’ the understanding of the 
Okinawan people and their officials are explicitly linked to a fundamental misunderstanding of – or 
even disrespect for – Okinawa and its historical and present circumstances. ‘I began developing the 
impression that no one associated with the US military really cared about my colleagues’ or my 
students’ wellbeing’, says Peter Simpson, a professor at OIU and co-founding member of the 
Futenma-Henoko Action Network.205 In explaining how he developed this impression, he cited to me 
an incident in which III MEF Commanding General Earl B Hailston, in 2001, sent out an email to 
thirteen Marine officers calling Okinawan officials ‘all a bunch of nuts and wimps’ following an 
incident ‘where a Marine was arrested for lifting up the dress of an Okinawan schoolgirl’.206  
Moreover, at the time of the 2004 helicopter crash in Ginowan, then-PM Koizumi ‘was 
spending a two-week vacation in an upscale Tokyo hotel room watching the summer Olympics and 
                                                          
203 Johnson 2006, p. 63. 
204 Dietz 2010, p. 193; Eldridge 1999, p. 152; Sandars 2000, p. 175. 
205 The Futenma-Henoko Action Network, according to its website, is an international network founded by 
‘teachers, students and others working in the educational field’ for the purposes of ‘closing Futenma Air 
Station, a US base perilously located in the middle of Ginowan City, Okinawa (pop. 91,363) and preventing the 
destruction of Okinawa’s cherished Henoko Bay to make way for a new US military air base’. It originally 
emerged, the description continues, in response to the 2004 OIU helicopter crash and the JDA’s construction 
of the offshore drilling platforms in the same year (‘About Us’, Futenma-Henoko Action Network, available 
online at: http://www.fhan.org/aboutus.html).  
206 ‘Okinawa: Island of resentment’, BBC News, 6 February 2001, available online at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1156721.stm; Peter Simpson, personal interview, 25 April 2014, 
Okinawa International University, Ginowan, Okinawa, Japan. 
“It was after U.S. forces withdrew from Indochina and Thailand in the 1970s that 
economic growth in Southeast Asia gained momentum and economic relations with 
the United States began to expand. The economy of the Philippines took off after the 
U.S. forces left there in the 1990s. These experiences show that there is little or no 
relation between foreign military presence and economic growth”. 
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refused even to meet with Governor Inamine until he returned to work nor did he ever visit the crash 
site in Ginowan’.207 Using the narrative of the divide between the mainland and Okinawa, Johnson 
remarks: ‘Many commentators observed that had the crash occurred on the campus of Keio 
University in Tokyo – the Princeton of Japan – vacation or no, he would have been there in a flash’. 
More recently, in 2011, ODB DG Satoshi Tanaka was dismissed from his post when, after being asked 
in an unofficial meeting with reporters why the central government was delaying the release of an 
EIA report on the FRF, he allegedly replied: ‘“Would you say, ‘I will rape you,’ before you rape 
someone?”’208  
By the same token, any notion of ‘everyday’ security as conceptualised by Okinawans is said 
to be dismissed out of hand as reactionary ‘Not In My Backyard’ (NIMBY)-ism rather than a serious, 
alternative interpretation that could and should be integrated into the national concept of ‘security’. 
One example of this, writes Yoshikawa, is the ongoing lawsuit by several Okinawan and international 
environmental groups (among other plaintiffs) against the DOD over the danger from the FRF’s 
construction to the endangered dugong. Although in 2008 the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California San Francisco Division ruled that the dugong is protected under the US’s 
National Historical Preservation Act, in 2014 the DOD  
209 
The cause of this refusal to ‘take into account’ alternatives to the Henoko plan, however – as 
has been argued by these actors – is less due to ‘strategic’ considerations and more to political hard-
headedness. For instance, the CRS report admits that, in relation to the possibility of USM 
involvement in a Japan-China conflict over the Senkakus: ‘The potential role of U.S. Marines in 
defending and/or retaking uninhabited islands from a hypothetical invasion force is unclear’.210 OIU 
professor Manabu Sato argues that not only is such a ‘hypothetical invasion’ ‘improbable’ due to the 
depth of US-Chinese economic interdependence, but that even the suggestion of Marine 
                                                          
207 Johnson 2006, p. 198. 
208 ‘Okinawa defense chief fired over rape remark’, The Asahi Shimbun, 29 November 2011, available online at: 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201111290050. 
209 Hideki Yoshikawa, ‘An Appeal from Okinawa to the US Congress: Futenma Marine Base Relocation and its 
Environmental Impact: U.S. Responsibility’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 12: 39: 4 (2014), available online at: 
www.japanfocus.org/-Hideki-YOSHIKAWA/4194/article.html. 
210 Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2014, p. 4. 
unexpectedly […] notified the Court and the plaintiffs that it had completed the “take 
into account” process […] [and] concluded that the FRF would have no significant 
adverse impact on the dugong. This conclusion apparently enabled the Japanese 
government to start the construction phase of the Henoko plan. Prior to this notice, 
according to a press conference held by the plaintiffs in Japan on August 2014, the 
plaintiffs were not informed that the DoD was engaging in the “take into account” 
process. The DoD has not made public the related documents, or its translations and 
analysis of the Japanese EIA documents. 
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involvement in such a conflict is made out of the service’s ‘self-preservation’ instinct. ‘Obama has 
declared that the United States will no longer engage in large-scale ground combat, and the Marine 
Corps, along with the Army, will be targeted for large reductions’, he says. ‘The Marine Corps, the 
superfluous ground combat force, wants to hang onto Okinawa, its vested interest, by all means and 
induce the Japanese government to expend more money for them. This is why they are flying the 
Ospreys all over Japan, pretending to be preparing for war in the Senkakus’.211  
Given all of this testimony that is contrary to that which has been given by USG and GOJ 
officials and ‘experts’ in explaining their support for the FRF plan, the policy continuity between 
administrations in both countries has been interpreted in this narrative as further evidence of 
ingrained discrimination against Okinawa. For example, notes O’Shea: ‘Given that the United States 
clearly refused to countenance the proposed relocation of Futenma, it is interesting to note that the 
Obama administration publicly agreed to “discuss” and even to “review” the issue—on the private 
understanding that the discussions would not change the outcome beyond the question of where to 
put the electricity lines’.212 The 2013 deal between Abe and Nakaima is included as another example 
of this, as it is framed as yet another Okinawan official caving to ‘unprecedented pressure and 
inducements’ from Tokyo and Washington.213 A 2014 Change.org petition to cancel the reclamation 
permission given by Nakaima, for instance, reads: ‘We the undersigned oppose the deal made at the 
end of 2013 between PM Abe and Governor of Okinawa Hirokazu Nakaima to deepen and extend 
the military colonization of Okinawa at the expense of the people and the environment […] Governor 
Nakaima’s reclamation approval does not reflect the popular will of the people of Okinawa’.214  
The language of ‘betrayal’ often pops up in reference to this deal: American University 
professor Peter Kuznick and co-organiser of the petition, for instance, remarked in a Russia Today 
interview that Nakaima ‘betrayed his electoral pledge to the people of Okinawa’.215 Lummis, in his 
article entitled ‘The Great Betrayal’, also writes that it is ‘an event that will be researched and 
debated for years by people who want to understand the mechanics of colonial domination’.216 It 
thus follows that when Nago mayor Inamine was asked during an interview if he believed Onaga 
would prove a more ‘honest’ politician than his predecessor in the governor’s office, he framed 
                                                          
211 Manabu Sato, ‘The Marines Will Not Defend the Senkakus’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 11:27:2 (2013), 
available online at: www.japanfocus.org/-Sato-Manabu/3964/article.html. 
212 O’Shea 2014, p. 449. 
213 Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2014, p. 9. 
214 ‘Cancel the plan to build a new U.S. military base in Henoko, Okinawa, and return Futenma to the people of 
Okinawa immediately’, Change.org, 28 January 2014, available online at: 
https://www.change.org/p/president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-cancel-the-plan-to-build-a-new-marine-
base-in-henoko-okinawa-and-return-futenma-base-without-relocating-to-anywhere-in-okinawa. 
215 RT, ‘[305] Wikipedia Bias, Deadly State of Fallujah, Kelly Thomas Injustice, US Dictatorship of Okinawa’, 14 
January 2014, online video clip, YouTube. Available online at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKc-XEr0V9c. 
216 C. Douglas Lummis, ‘The Great Betrayal’, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 13 January 2014, available online at: 
www.japanfocus.org/events/view/205. 
Grinberg 232 
 
support for him (both the public’s and his own) as dependent upon this factor: ‘So if you ask will Mr. 
Onaga tone down his opposition, you have to realize that he has put everything on the line. I have 
faith that Mr. Onaga will not betray our expectations’.217 
3.4. The anti-base movement: a plurality of voices 
While it may appear that the proponents of the ABD are fairly unified in their discursive 
strategies – whether through using the symbolic language of ‘sacrifice’ and ‘betrayal’, placing the 
Japanese state in the role of historical and current antagonist in a sustained and discriminatory 
campaign against Okinawa for its own benefit, or denying the validity of the USG’s and GOJ’s 
arguments because they are formed without the inclusion of ‘lived knowledge’ – in fact, the actors 
and groups within the ABM who have contributed to the development and reproduction of this 
discourse vary widely. The plurality of voices has led some officials to express their doubts about the 
strength and efficacy of the ABM. ‘We are always wondering how many people are actually against 
the US bases and how many people at least privately approve the presence of the US bases’, one 
MOFA official tells me. ‘We still cannot understand, you know, the nature of these two groups’.218  
Sunagawa, addressing this criticism, admits: ‘In Okinawa, we have a problem, but we don’t 
have a strategy for how to solve it’.219 Likewise, Yoshikawa speaks to the difficulty of recruiting new 
members not only to the environmental cause, but to the ABM in general, on account of challenges 
including: language barriers to interpreting scientific and legal documents; limited internet-based 
international outreach compared to other anti-base groups worldwide; reluctance on the part of 
sympathetic mainland Japanese scholars whose research, often funded by the GOJ, ‘cannot say 
much against, I think, the government’; difficulty in appealing to younger generations; and a 
tendency to become ‘consumed’ by the movement’s unique circumstances and strategies.220  
The lack of any one strategy can possibly be explained by the split in end goals among the 
different strains of the ABM today. ‘Fourteen years ago when I first came to Okinawa, the ABM here 
was more focused on total base abolishment’, Lummis observes. ‘Now it’s no longer just an anti-
base movement—it’s an anti-colonial movement. The [Okinawan] independence movement is also 
stronger now’.221 On the specific divisions in the movement, he identifies three: one, local 
                                                          
217 Shingetsu News Agency, ‘An Interview with Nago Mayor Susumu Inamine’, 15 November 2014a, online 
video clip, YouTube. Available online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FaI4rL0sOHE. 
218 Anonymous 2014c. 
219 Sunagawa 2014. 
220 Yoshikawa 2014. 
221 Lummis 2014. One of the prominent founding academics in the circle supporting independence (the 
Association of Comprehensive Studies for Independence of the Lew Chewans) he mentions is Masaki Tomochi, 
an associate professor of economics at OIU. In an interview with Eleni Psaltis of ABC News Radio Australia, 
Tomochi explains his motivation for creating the group: ‘Because we have had too much of military bases for a 
long time, and Okinawan people are thinking that we don’t want to be sacrificed by Japan and the US 
Grinberg 233 
 
government officials who oppose the bases (‘but only with regards to Henoko and the Futenma 
relocation’); two, the ‘traditional’ peace or anti-USJ-ST movement against all bases, including SDF 
bases (also known as kokugai isetsu, or ‘moving all bases outside of Japan’); and three, a number of 
women’s groups222 who favour the relocation of Futenma to mainland Japan, but do not believe it is 
‘realistic’ to abolish the USJ-ST.223 In addition to these ‘women’s groups’, there are also 
environment-centred organisations224 and other, smaller groups consisting of peace guides225, 
student activists both in Okinawa and mainland Japan226, and concerned citizens’ groups.227  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
anymore. And we want to decide something about Okinawa. You know, it’s Okinawan people’s ocean. It’s not 
the US people’s ocean, it’s not the Japanese people’s environment. It’s ours. We want to decide by ourselves. 
I’m trying to say: the importance of our self-determination’ (Eleni Psaltis, ‘Japan In Focus: The Okinawa 
Special’, 18 May 2015, Japan in Focus, ABC News Radio [AU]. Available online at: 
http://mpegmedia.abc.net.au/newsradio/audio/japaninfocus/201505/r1426167_20544381.mp3). 
222 Arising primarily in the wake of the 1995 rape incident and the Fourth Beijing International Women’s NGO 
Forum (in which 21 Okinawan women participated), the women’s ABM in Okinawa has specifically focused on 
the impact of militarisation on women’s lives, supported the revision of SOFA and Japanese law towards 
greater protection for victims of military and sexual violence, and providing trauma support for said victims. 
Prominent groups include, but are not limited to: Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence; 
Kamadugawa no Tsudoi, a Ginowan-based group; the Cooking Pots Gathering, also in Ginowan; and the 
Dugongs on the northwest coast (for more details on these, see: Akibayashi 2010; Cockburn 2012; Kirk 2008; 
Shimabuku 2011; Caroline Spencer, ‘Meeting of the Dugongs and the Cooking Pots: Anti-military Base Citizens' 
Groups on Okinawa’, Japanese Studies 23:2 [2003], pp. 125-140.) 
223 Lummis 2014. 
224 Specifically, environmental groups that formed in the wake of the SACO negotiations in 1996 are concerned 
not only with preserving the environment and wildlife (including dugongs, coral reefs, and other unique 
species of fish and sealife) in or around Oura Bay in Henoko, but also in the nearby Yanbaru forest. These 
groups include: Nago City, Kushi District’s Futami Ten Ward Committee (Juku no kai), which has employed the 
dugong as an organising symbol; the aforementioned Save the Dugong Campaign Center, which has previously 
successfully campaigned at international conferences, such as the International World Conservation Union, to 
adopt recommendations urging the US and Japanese governments to consider the threat the FRF may pose to 
the dugongs’ survival; the Conference Opposing Heliport Construction, whose volunteers keep watch over 
coral reef areas; No Helipad Takae, a Takae-based group protesting the construction of helipads in Yanbaru 
forest (which it argues would threaten the endangered Yanbaru Kuina [Okinawa rail] and Noguchi Gera 
[Okinawan woodpecker]); and a number of prominent individual activists, including Takuma Higashionna of 
Dugong Network Okinawa and Natsume Taira, both of whom have been featured in documentaries on the 
subject of the Henoko sit-in protest (for more details on these groups and individuals, see: Cockburn 2012; 
Development with Destruction. BBC World Earth Report. BBC, 2005; Spencer 2003; Jonathan Soble, ‘Dugong 
take on defence department’, Financial Times, 28 May 2010, available online at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e443c5fe-6a7c-11df-b282-00144feab49a.html; Ryukyu Asahi Broadcasting 2006; 
Voice of Takae [English] [Okinawa, Japan: No Helipad Takae, 2013], available online at: 
http://nohelipadtakae.org/files/VOT-english2013Oct.pdf). 
225 Trained by the Okinawa Peace Network, these peace guides, says Suzuki, ‘facilitate the two processes 
essential for experiential education and social movement participation: community-building and 
consciousness-raising’; furthermore, she argues, tourism to Okinawa itself ‘is an arena of struggle over not 
only the interpretation of the past war but also the vision of the future peace’, and ‘an act of antiwar pacifism 
against the authoritarian government’ (2012, pp. 18-19). 
226 I encountered a few of these groups during my time on fieldwork in Tokyo and Okinawa, including Waseda 
University’s Anti-War Action group and the Research Group of Okinawa Relations Issues at University of the 
Ryukyus. During my time there, they held numerous demonstrations and talks on campus, often distributing 
fliers with titles that included: ‘“Urgent Lecture”: Okinawa・Question about the construction of new US base 
in Henoko and Japan National Militarisation!’; ‘“Approval” consensus of Prime Minister Abe and Mayor 
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Figure 6: Examples of protesters’ use of symbolic spaces, including the site of the 2004 OKIU crash 
(left) and on the gates of Camp Schwab in Henoko (right) 
On a larger scale, the Okinawa Citizens Peace Network, with 33 ‘affiliated organisations and 
individual members’, likewise plays host to activists across a full spectrum of issues from anti-
militarism to human rights to world peace—a confluence of interests which is called kakushin kyotou 
in Japanese, or ‘co-struggle among progressive forces’.228 Thus, while there are some basic 
disagreements between these various groups about whether to move the bases out of Okinawa 
only, out of Japan entirely, or to go even further and demand the abolishment of the USJ-ST, they 
have developed a ‘keener sense of civic life in Okinawa’229 through their activities. They have 
likewise joined, to some extent, a transnational ABM which ‘offer[s] Okinawan NGOs a broader 
international platform to voice their concerns, but also provide a forum for activists to exchange 
ideas about media strategies and campaign tactics’ with their counterparts internationally (such as 
in the ROK and Guam).230 
The tactics which these groups and activists have employed – including everything from sit-
ins to petitions to lawsuits to human barricades – have generally adhered to common principles of 
nonviolent protest, with ‘social legitimacy’ provided by the presence of elderly residents in the 
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movement (see Figure 7 below).231 What to do with base land when it is reduced or returned to the 
prefecture, however, can be an equally tricky question—especially when the quality of those lands is 
suspect. The documentary Defoliated Island: Agent Orange, Okinawa and The Vietnam War, for 
example, showcases one instance in 2002 during which 187 barrels of an ‘unidentified substance’ 
were dug up in Chatan on returned base land; the USM ‘insisted the barrels did not belong to them, 
so the Japanese government initially postponed making a decision on how to proceed. Therefore, 
the Chatan municipal government itself had to cover the cost of collecting the barrels’.232  
  
Figure 7: Elderly residents protesting the relocation are heavily featured in anti-base documentaries, 
such as in 2006’s Umi ni suwaru: Henoko 600 nichi no tatakai (Sit-in on the sea: The 600 days’ anti-
base struggle in Okinawa, Henoko).233 
 
In the case of Chatan, the land was developed into the Mihama American Village, a large 
commercial shopping and entertainment complex. This type of development, however, is sometimes 
framed as problematic in and of itself. Linda Isako Angst, for example, argues that redevelopment 
plans for these returned lands often do not incorporate within them a concerted enough effort to 
protect small business owners, as ‘[m]uch of the development that has already occurred in Okinawa 
is by large, well-known Japanese corporations’.234 Cynthia Enloe also warns that tourism, while 
‘being touted as an alternative to the one-commodity dependency inherited from colonial rule’, can 
in fact lead to the undermining of Okinawan self-governance: ‘many government officials have used 
the expansion of tourism to secure the political loyalty of local elites. For instance, certain hotel 
licenses may win a politician more strategic allies today than a mere civil-service appointment’.235 
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Cancellation is a big blow to the pride of both the US and Japanese governments. It’s a 
defeat against the people’s will, the people’s resistance. They won’t want that to happen. 
They don’t want such a precedent, right? 
- Satoko Norimatsu, peace activist 
 
‘It’s really about the basic identity—what kind of Okinawa do we want to create?’ Penn concludes. 
‘Is it going to be like the shopping centre with all of the, you know, neon lights, or do we wanna 
make a giant park, or do we want industry there—what are we trying to do? And this is an internal 
Okinawan debate which is gonna go on for a long time’.236  
4. Discursive intersections and divisions 
This question posed by Penn – ‘what kind of Okinawa do we want to create?’ – lies at the 
crux of the ABM, regardless of its internal divisions over strategy and end goals. All parties 
promulgating the ABD agree at the very least, for example, that the USM presence should be 
reduced significantly. Even this aim, however, conflicts with current government policy, which still 
predominantly locates the USM presence in Okinawa prefecture. ‘[M]oving the Futenma base, 
although the centerpiece of recent Japanese-American promises to diminish the harassment of 
civilians, is largely a sop’, writes Feifer. ‘Kadena Air Base, which is mere miles away […] is three times 
larger’.237 Sato, however, disagrees, remarking (along the lines of Sunagawa’s opening comment) 
that ‘if the [FRF] is built and if the land it currently occupies is returned, then the Marine Corps 
doesn’t need to be here. The land of the Marines represents the majority of facilities in Okinawa, 
and its presence will be majorly reduced. That’s why it’s at the centre of the [ABM]’s strategy’.238 
Okinawan House of Councillors representative, well-known anti-base activist, and pacifist Shokichi 
Kina adds to this framing of the symbolic importance of Futenma’s return: “‘The Futenma issue is a 
real test for Japan. It’s just one base, but could be a giant leap for us”’.239 
 This is not to say, though, that there are no points of agreement between the ABM, the USG, 
and the GOJ. As has been demonstrated in earlier chapters, the language of the bases as a ‘burden’ 
on Okinawa is now commonplace even within the PBD, and there have been many suggestions made 
and steps taken by both governments to reduce this ‘burden’. These include: improving person-to-
person interactions between US forces and Okinawans in base communities; compensating victims 
of military crimes or accidents more promptly and with greater transparency in the legal process; 
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and helping develop Okinawa’s native industries through greater financial investment. Moreover, in 
recent years, the USG and GOJ have discussed the possibility of including more provisions in the 
SOFA to protect the local environment (see section 4.2 for details)—a development which is not 
likely to have occurred without sustained efforts by environmental groups in Okinawa.  
 There are, nonetheless, deep and lasting divisions between the ABD and PBD that go beyond 
simply the question of whether or not US forces should be concentrated in Okinawa (or there at all), 
and these have kept the two sides apart on the Futenma issue for nearly twenty years. The ABM’s 
framing of post-war Okinawan history and the antagonising roles played by the USG and GOJ 
represents one of these divisions, as does the development of a separate Okinawan identity from 
that of mainland Japan which encompasses within it a unique culture, language, and societal ethos. 
This ethos – known as nuchi du takara, or ‘life is precious’ – serves as a fundamental moral principle 
around which the ABM has organised itself in Okinawa, and provides the impetus for its heavy 
environmental activism (the phrase itself, being in the local Ryukyuan dialect, reaffirming the story 
of Okinawans’ uniqueness and the ABM’s determination to preserve this in all its aspects). At the 
same time that it has been a unifying tool for activists, however, it has also reproduced a clear 
separation between them, mainland Japanese citizens, and the USG and GOJ—and this has 
sometimes reinforced and deepened mistrust towards those groups.  
4.1. Intersection: communicating about history 
While activists may argue over the importance of Futenma relative to the larger goal of 
removing all bases from Okinawa (or from Japan itself), it would be difficult to dismiss the political 
impact that the ABD has had with relation to this issue. ‘It's not a choice between law and order and 
national security, they're both important’, comments Patrick Cronin. ‘The real problem we have on 
Futenma is so important because we have to have politically sustainable bases’.240 The need to have 
‘politically sustainable’ bases is one that has been articulated repeatedly with the most recent ‘pivot’ 
to Asia, although, as was discussed in earlier chapters, it has largely been used as a euphemistic 
device meaning only an improvement in civil-military and inter-state relations, as opposed to a 
reduction in force presence size and scope.  
Nonetheless, there have been tangible improvements. The 2002 Defense Policy Review 
Initiative launched by the USG and GOJ, for example, initiated an Aviation Training Relocation 
programme which ‘reduces noise pollution for local residents by having U.S. aircraft conduct training 
in Guam, away from crowded base areas’ and the USM ‘has increased access for local fisherman to 
the ocean training area known as “Hotel/Hotel” off the eastern coast of Okinawa’.241 The military has 
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also imposed curfews in Okinawa, with a recent one requiring service members to remain on-base 
between 1 and 5 a.m. and off-base drinking likewise restricted from midnight and 5 a.m. Moreover, 
before individual servicemen are allowed off-base and granted these ‘liberties’, they must ‘undergo 
sexual assault response and Japanese cultural training’.242  
Kurayoshi Takara has also urged, both prior to and in his current position as Okinawa’s vice 
governor, that the Okinawan people and OPG should have a vision for Okinawa in regional and 
international affairs which goes beyond the ‘victimisation’ narrative. ‘Okinawa needs to develop its 
own vision for the future of Japan's security rather than constantly criticizing the government 
regarding military bases’, he argues, continuing: ‘Based on this vision, Okinawa should state which 
bases located on the islands are excessively and unnecessarily burdensome, and it should negotiate 
to eliminate them’.243 He expanded on his critique of the ‘victim’ language in an interview with the 
Asahi Shimbun: ‘once you talk like that, discussion and dialogue will stop. Those accused of 
discrimination will shut up and there will be an emotional gap’.244 Bandow adds that the historical 
narrative raised in the ABD – using terms like the ‘Typhoon of Steel’, or comparing Okinawa to a 
‘sacrificial stone’ – ‘just doesn’t resonate’ with Tokyo policymakers, let alone USG officials.245 
Considering the financial difficulties facing even the implementation of the current 
relocation plan, however, making this narrative ‘resonate’ may not be as effective a strategy as is 
simply discussing (cheaper) alternatives. In 2011, for instance, then-US representatives Barney Frank 
(D-MA) and Ron Paul (R-TX) formed the Sustainable Defense Task Force and, with military experts, 
‘closely scrutinized military spending and concluded that it was possible to cut 1 trillion dollars in 
spending over the next 10 years by reducing US Forces stationed in Europe and Asia’.246 Frank went 
on to publicly comment on MSNBC: ‘“Most people, I think, that I talk to, thought the Marines left 
Okinawa when John Wayne died […] It’s unclear to me what they’re doing there”’.247 Ron Paul, 
discussing the FRF and ‘rebalance’ in an online interview, put the matter in even more succinct 
terms: ‘How in the world would the average American taxpayer get any benefit from pursuing this 
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and insisting we change these bases around? Instead of the very simple solution: just bring the 
troops home’.248  
4.2. Intersection: taking responsibility for the environment? 
If there has been some degree of resonance between the USG, GOJ, and Okinawa outside of 
a basic understanding of the historical or financial ‘burden’ of the bases, it has been on the issue of 
the environment. This is evident in the success of the dugong lawsuit in the US court system and of 
Okinawan environmental groups’ lobbying efforts at international organisations such as the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)249, but also, to some extent, at the policy 
level. In 2014, the USG and GOJ agreed on a new environmental accord to supplement the existing 
SOFA – called the ‘Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship Relating to 
the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan’ – which ‘will address the establishment and maintenance of 
procedures for Japanese authorities to have appropriate access to U.S. facilities and areas in two 
cases—when an environmental or spill incident occurs and when field surveys are needed, including 
cultural assets surveys, for the return of land to Japanese control.’250 USG officials have also privately 
expressed their willingness to work with the GOJ on this issue over the years. For example, Campbell 
and Deputy Assistant SecDef Michael Schiffer, in an October 2009 meeting with Parliamentary VM 
Akihisa Nagashima and a team of MOD and MOFA officials on the history of the FRF negotiations, 
said that ‘the U.S. Government, like the Japanese government, cared about environmental 
stewardship and energy efficiency’, and ‘offered to take back to the U.S. Government the Japanese 
recommendation to work together on environmental issues, an area in which "much good could be 
achieved”’.251 
Activists and researchers have nonetheless suggested further reforms to environment-
related policies, including: modifying Japan’s EIA law ‘to require disclosure according to the 
information access law so that the EIA law covers secret plans and proposals, clarify that each EIA 
must address how the proposal complies with or exceeds standards (e.g. noise standards), and how 
it may reduce local community access to protected cultural properties (e.g. natural monuments)’; 
revising the SOFA further to require the USM to provide land use data ‘a minimum of five years and 
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ideally ten years prior to return’; and ‘[f]or the Environment Subcommittee of the US-Japan Joint 
Committee to make clear what land use-related records are held by which US military units and in 
what form’.252 
As the law(s) currently stands, however, there are many doubts as to the central 
government’s ability to ensure even basic environmental protection standards with regards to not 
only the FRF, but also the eventual return of Futenma to Ginowan. Weston A. Watts Jr., a colleague 
of Sunagawa, comments: ‘a lot of times they’ll redevelop parts of the base, and some parts of the 
base they cannot return to civilian use for a long time because of unexploded ordnance or 
something like that. Or the contamination is too much—it’s too expensive to deal with, so some 
places on a base may be blocked off’.253 ‘They [central government officials] will say that 
environmental issues are very important, but do you wanna save the dugongs, or do you wanna save 
the nation? That’s the idea’, Yoshikawa remarks.254 This inflexibility in terms of how ‘security’ is 
defined at diplomatic and defence sites at the expense of environmental factors is evident in a 
December 2009 meeting between Schiffer and Japanese officials from the FRF Working Group, 
during which he told them: ‘Japan must first commit to implementing the realignment roadmap 
before the United States would be willing to discuss any details on an environmental agreement’.255 
4.3. Division: the 'heart' of Okinawa 
It is clear, then, that even in the few areas where actors on either side of the base issue can 
be reconciled, deep doubts and resistance remain and are actively reproduced. The consequence of 
this is that in the areas where there are already disagreements or differences in interpretation, any 
‘middle ground’ is difficult to find. This is because, says Iha, ‘at the very core, the government of 
Japan keeps saying that this Henoko proposal is to reduce the burden of Okinawa. They keep saying 
that. But to Okinawans, any new base does not mean reducing the burden at all’.256 This disconnect 
between activists and the governments on the actual meaning of ‘reducing the burden’ arises not 
only from the well-honed narrative by the former of a unique, pacifist ‘heart’ of Okinawa which 
rejects the presence of bases, but also from the way in which the bases are framed as a tool for 
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violence in the ABD. On the first point, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum’s ‘Basic 
Concept’ from 1975 explains:  
257 
Employing this concept in explaining her opposition to Futenma’s relocation to Henoko or 
even to other Japanese prefectures, activist Taeko Oshiro remarks: ‘Because we know the human 
cost of it, we cannot agree to relocate the base outside of Okinawa in, say, Osaka. We can never 
agree to it. This is the “Heart of Okinawa”’.258 Another prominent activist, Natsume Taira, 
commented in a 2005 BBC World Report documentary on the FRF, Development with Destruction: 
‘The post World War 2 history of Okinawa has seen the US use this island as a front base to attack 
from, during the Korean war, the Vietnam war, the Gulf was, the Afghani war and now the Iraqi war. 
We have been forced to be an aggressor in these wars. If this base is built, the environment will be 
destroyed and we will become more of an aggressor to the world. I do not wish to stand on the side 
of the killers’.259 Zenyu Shimabuku, an ex-landowner in Okinawa whose land was confiscated by the 
USM in the post-war period, echoes Taira and others: ‘In war people die, that’s obvious. I feel a great 
pain in my heart because our lands are being used to kill people. If a cook asks you for a knife, 
there’s nothing wrong in lending it to him. But if he asks you for a knife to murder someone, lending 
it to him would make you a murderer’.260  
The ‘heart of Okinawa’ is closely tied to another native expression: nuchi du takara, or ‘life is 
precious’. This phrase is mentioned repeatedly not only by actors involved in the ABM, but also in 
official prefectural documents, museum displays, and news media—thus appealing to as wide an 
audience both inside and outside of Japan as is possible with the carefully-curated framing of 
Okinawans as ‘model’261 peace-loving people deserving of international support. One prominent 
example is the Change.org petition, which, with 13,549 signatures (many of which come from 
prominent international peace and anti-militarist activists and scholars such as Noam Chomsky, 
Michael Moore, Oliver Stone, and Enloe), reads in part: 
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Under the most desperate and unimaginable circumstances, Okinawans directly 
experienced the absurdity of war and atrocities it inevitably brings about. This war 
experience is at the very core of what is popularly called the “Okinawan Heart,” a 
resilient, yet strong attitude to life that Okinawan people developed as they 
struggled against the pressures of many years of U.S. military control. The “Okinawan 
Heart” is a human response that respects personal dignity above all else, rejects any 
acts related to war, and truly cherishes culture, which is a supreme expression of 
humanity.  
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262 
This kind of statement has, no doubt, been influenced by the language used by the OPG over 
the years in important tourism sites around the main island. One of these, again, is the Prefectural 
Memorial Museum, the ‘Epilogue’ exhibition room of which contains the following poem: 
263 
In addition, the official English language tourist pamphlet advertising the Okinawa Peace Hall, 
located on the grounds of the Memorial Park, describes the impetus behind its construction: 
264 
The Himeyuri Peace Museum, another popular tourist site which was built on the remains of an all-
girls high school whose students served as nurses for the Japanese Imperial Army during the Battle 
(and many of whom died during it), similarly urges visitors in its official pamphlet to consider the 
horrors of war and reaffirms the historical Okinawan peace narrative:  
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Not unlike the 20th century U.S. Civil Rights struggle, Okinawans have non-violently 
pressed for the end to their military colonization. They tried to stop live-fire military 
drills that threatened their lives by entering the exercise zone in protest; they formed 
human chains around military bases to express their opposition; and about a hundred 
thousand people, one tenth of the population have turned out periodically for 
massive demonstrations. Octogenarians initiated the campaign to prevent the 
construction of the Henoko base with a sit-in that has been continuing for years. 
 
Whenever we look at the truth of the Battle of Okinawa  
we think there is nothing as brutal, nothing as  
dishonorable as war.  
In the face of this traumatic experience  
no one will be able to speak out for on idealize war.  
To be sure it is human beings who start wars.  
But more than that isn't it we human beings who must  
also prevent wars?  
Since the end of the war, we have abhorred all wars,  
long yearning to create a peaceful island.  
in our unwavering devotion to this principle,  
we have paid a heavy price. 
 
With the Okinawan people's intense wish of “No more war”, the Okinawa Peace Hall 
was opened on Oct. 1, 1978. The Hall stands on the Hill of Mabuni where history 
bears testimony to the futility of war and the value of peace. The Hall has a regular 
polygonal roof with septilateral pyramid, which expresses seven seas and the shape 
of hands joined in prayers. Transcending race, nationality, ideology and religion, the 
Hall has been sending peace messages all over the world. 
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265 
This anti-militarist frame is also used in the OPG’s official informational booklet US Military 
Base Issues in Okinawa under the bullet point ‘Our Vision’, which reads: ‘Establish the prefecture as 
a hub of exchange by taking advantage of our geographical location, to bridge people, goods, and 
information between mainland Japan and other Asian nations. It is our desire to actively promote 
international contributions and do our part for peace and advancement of the Asia-Pacific region’.266 
Okinawans could accomplish this vision, suggests Takara, by hosting a regular ‘Okinawa Forum on 
History Issues’ with other Asian countries (including the ROK and China) and by promoting peaceful 
resolution of regional problems, such as the complicated relationship between China and Taiwan.267 
Daqing Yang agrees: ‘Okinawans have offered a new way of commemorating all who died in the war 
regardless of nationality, thus transcending the use of memory to bolster national identity. Arguably, 
there is no better place to hold historical dialogue to overcome nationalism and make peace than 
Okinawa’.268  
What Yang is referring to is the ‘Cornerstone of Peace’, a monument sitting at the centre of 
the Prefectural Museum and Peace Memorial Park, which ‘was erected to commemorate the 50th 
anniversary of the end of the Pacific War and the Battle of Okinawa to convey the "spirit of peace" 
which has developed through Okinawa's history and culture to the people of Japan and throughout 
the world’, according to the OPG’s website (see Figure 8 below).269 Installed by Ota during his  
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About 40 years have passed since the Battle of Okinawa, and yet the indescribable 
tragedy we experienced and witnessed on the battlefield still haunts our memory. We 
will never forget the horror of the pre-World War II militaristic education, which drove 
us to the battlefield with no skepticism but rather with a willingness to serve. We 
strongly feel that we must continue to tell our stories of a war filled with insanity and 
brutality now that the post-war generations, who have no idea what war is, have 
formed the majority of our population and that the peace-threatening signs in both 
domestic and international politics cannot be ignored. 
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Figure 8: The Cornerstone of Peace (left) and view of the Okinawa Peace Memorial Park (right) 
governorship, this ‘cornerstone of peace’ – again inverting the meaning of the word ‘cornerstone’ 
from its usage by alliance ‘managers’ – is surrounded by a memorial site inscribed with ‘names of all 
those who lost their lives in the Battle of Okinawa, regardless of their nationality or military or 
civilian status […] as a prayer for world peace’. ‘The purpose or ‘concept’ of the monument, 
continues the website, is thus three-fold: 1) to ‘Remember Those Los[t] in the War, Pray for Peace’; 
2) to ‘Pass on the Lessons of War’; and 3) as ‘A Place for Meditation and Learning’. The collection of 
all these names, remarks Julia Yonetani, was not an insignificant feat, for it
270 
In this way, the monument not only reproduces the narrative of the unique ‘heart of Okinawa’ which 
disinclines it from involvement in military activities, but also reaffirms the focus within the ABD on 
individuals as the referent object of security. 
4.4. Division: self-determination and deep mistrust 
In order to achieve this status as a kind of independent peace broker in Asia, however, many 
proponents of the ABD argue that Okinawa must have a greater degree of self-determination. 
Arakawa, in fact, calls this ‘the fundamental premise that must undergird any thoughtful 
consideration of issues pertaining to the future of Okinawa’.271 However, there is little interest in 
outright independence from Japan; for instance, the 2015 Ryukyu Shimpo poll found that only 8.4% 
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marked the first time a large-scale investigation of the war dead had been carried 
out on the island. This was in line with Ota's perception of the "Okinawan heart," 
which in desiring peace challenged the Imperial Japanese Army, the United States 
military presence in Okinawa, and the notion of "national security" as in any way 
providing protection for the people. 
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of respondents answered in favour of this option for ‘Okinawa’s future’.272 Instead, the basis for 
greater self-determination, say activists as well as prefectural officials, lies in economic 
independence. ‘Okinawa's present economy is not as dependent on base-related revenue as before’, 
an official prefectural document states. ‘The return of bases located in the central and southern 
regions of Okinawa Island has resulted in positive economic effects of approximately 10 - 200 times 
in comparison to pre-return, and has had great impacts on the prefecture's economy and 
employment’.273  
Having an independent base of revenue apart from central government subsidies and the 
USM presence, however, might not be enough. ‘It’s the [John] Foster Dulles perspective274: 
Okinawan sovereignty undermines the state’, Simpson says. ‘The US and Japanese governments 
can’t be seen as giving in, which is one reason which explains the Futenma deadlock’.275 An elderly 
Ginowan resident quoted by Dietz, Yoshio Nakashima, also expresses resignation about the 
possibility of the US forces leaving at all. ‘“Will the bases go? No, I don’t think so. People protest and 
protest. I myself protested for years, for a very long time, but I realized I could spend the rest of my 
life protesting and the bases would probably still be here”’.276  
Moreover, even if both governments did make more concessions in terms of base land to 
the prefecture, there is still the possibility that US forces may simply be replaced by the SDF—a 
suggestion that provoked mixed reactions from my interviewees. ‘The US has been there for 70 
years, and Okinawans want to be free from the US military occupation’, says Norimatsu. ‘So now I 
think there is a sense that, oh, maybe the Japanese military will be a little better than the US 
military’.277 OIU professor Tetsumi Takara disagrees, arguing that the SDF would be no better 
because they are ‘an extension of central government power in Okinawa. The US government 
doesn’t have that kind of power by comparison’.278 Ota concurs, adding that the SDF ‘are supposed 
to protect US military bases, so if people were protesting, something terrible might happen 
reminiscent of the Battle of Okinawa with Japanese troops killing Okinawans’.279 
                                                          
272 Ryukyu Shimpo 2015. 
273 US Military Base Issues in Okinawa 2012, p. 5. 
274 Simpson is referring, here, to Dulles’s 1951 speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference in which he 
outlined the terms of the US-Japan peace treaty, Article 3 of which states that Japan would ‘retain residual 
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On the other hand, many activists, former policymakers, and scholars question how far the 
USG and GOJ are willing to push Okinawans on the base issue, particularly on Futenma. ‘“I don’t 
think the Henoko plan will happen because the people of Okinawa are already unified in saying ‘no,’ 
and it won’t be easy for the LDP to implement it no matter how hard it tries”’, Hatoyama remarked 
in a 2013 interview.280 Nakaima also previously argued that ‘[i]f the current plan to construct the FRF 
in Henoko were to be carried out against the will of the local citizens, possibilities of an irreparable 
rift cannot be denied in the relationship between the people of Okinawa and the U.S. Forces in the 
prefecture’.281  
This ‘irreparable rift’, as Nakaima put it, arises from the perception of the FRF’s construction 
constituting a denial of Okinawa’s popular will—and, more broadly, Japanese democracy itself. 
Watts and Sunagawa, for example, argue that ‘[f]orcing Okinawa to accept a proposal that has 
broadly unacceptable impacts undermines the purpose of the FRF agreement, as well as Japan's 
democratic legal system’.282 Richard Samuels, quoted by Yonamine, similarly remarks: ‘“Germany 
sometimes says no, and France always does; this does not end the alliance. This is an honest and 
healthy relationship. The US always demands and Japan always says ‘yes’. The US should realise that 
Japan has lost its sense of self-governance”’.283 Nonetheless, note Mochizuki and O’Hanlon, 
‘Japanese localities cannot be easily overridden by higher authorities even on matters of national 
security’, with the 2014 CRS report likewise stating that ‘[t]he ability and will of the Okinawan 
Prefectural Police to thwart determined anti-base protesters and enable smooth construction could 
be severely tested’.284 
Within Okinawa, the discursive space created through the ABD has allowed for local 
policymakers, business leaders, and residents of many political and ideological stripes to unite under 
what is now called the ‘All-Okinawa’ movement. ‘I have become a candidate in this gubernatorial 
election with the people’s All-Okinawa power behind me’, said current Okinawan governor Onaga 
during a campaign rally in November 2014. ‘I want to smash down the high US-Japan wall that 
surrounds the policy on military bases’.285 Onaga, the former mayor of Naha, was even endorsed by 
the JCP despite having previously been one of the city’s more well-known conservative council 
members. Explaining their support, lawmaker Seiken Akamine stated: ‘We are the Communist Party 
                                                          
280 Ito 2013. 
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282 Watts Jr and Sunagawa 2012, p. 39. 
283 Yonamine 2011. 
284 Mochizuki and O’Hanlon 2013, p. 8; Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart 2014, p. 3. 
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and Mr. Onaga is from the LDP. We have different views of the US-Japan security treaty. But we both 
firmly oppose construction of the Henoko base. So on that point we can work together’.286 
In terms of the performativity of the discourse in its impact on actual government policy, 
scholars and activists with whom I spoke presented an optimistic assessment. ‘What are the 
protesters achieving? They’re lowering morale’, argues Lummis.287 ‘I think the most important thing 
is that the Nago mayor and the Nago people continue to say “no”’, adds Sunagawa. ‘The mayor of 
Nago has received a lot of messages from people from all over the world, so it’s quite important for 
the local community to show their opposition. This is the starting point, and then we need to do 
whatever we can do’.288 Rabson echoes her, suggesting that those sympathetic to the ABM should 
‘question the military presence in Okinawa. And to support the people who are opposing it’.289 On 
the question of how ‘successful’ the ABD and the struggle over the FRF has been up to this point, 
Sasaki-Uemura refers back to the anti-USJ-ST (Anpo in Japanese) struggle of the 1960s, arguing that 
‘activists are more comfortable with unintended consequences than the Japanese government’: 
290 
Conclusion 
What is clear from this wide-ranging and ongoing discussion on the ‘Okinawa base problem’, 
as well as from my interviews with prominent scholars and activists who have contributed to this 
discussion, is that the ‘success’ of a discourse – in this case, its ability to create new or expand 
existing sites of exchange wherein it can be meaningfully interpreted as an impactful ‘argument’ 
rather than an anecdotal ‘opinion’ or purely emotional ‘sentiment’291 – relies upon its active 
                                                          
286 Shingetsu News Agency 2014b. 
287 Lummis 2014. 
288 Sunagawa 2014. 
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291 As discussed in Chapter 2, what separates ‘argument’ from ‘opinion’ or ‘sentiment’ is the widespread 
perception of the former’s legitimacy—this ‘legitimacy’ being based on the notion that the speaker of said 
argument can ‘claim authoritative knowledge or moral authority (or both) [and] should be more able to 
convince a skeptical public audience than actors who are suspected of promoting “private” interests’ (Risse 
2000, p. 22). With regards to government officials who claim this knowledge and authority, furthermore, 
Hansen notes that making arguments within discourses about ‘security’ ‘bestows a particular legitimacy on 
those handing the policies in question’, as ‘[s]ecurity questions allow governments and political leaders to 
“break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by”’ (2006, p. 35). 
The anti-Anpo protests in the 1960s were not really about Anpo—they were about 
how the Japanese state treats its citizens and about who it was trying to exclude from 
the policymaking process. For example, even though the Anpo protests were 
considered a ‘failure’ and the effects were not on the alleged target, did they change 
society? Did they change the people involved in the protests? Did they change the 
way the Japanese government handles protests against it? The answer is yes to all of 
these, and all the protests that happened after those wouldn’t have been possible 
without it. 
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reproduction by actors who support its internal narratives and who intend, by this reproduction, to 
ensure that its effects are felt in the public and policy spheres. While these effects may not be felt 
immediately or perceived as having been ‘successful’ by central government actors, without this 
kind of verbal or written commitment, the narratives and smaller stories of the ABD, for example, 
would not be translated nor transmitted to as wide of an audience as they have been in recent 
decades, nor would these voices of the everyday have been heard as clearly as they are now.  
From fishermen in Nago to landowners in Ginowan, these communicators of the ABD have 
helped to reveal to an international audience a much richer public sphere and civil society not only 
in Okinawa, but also in Japan, than was previously thought to exist. Therefore, it is not surprising to 
see so many academics who study Japan-US-Okinawa relations declare themselves explicitly in 
favour of the ABM and faithfully adhere to its main principles (nuchi du takara) and foundational 
myths (the Ryukyu Kingdom as a ‘bridge’ in Asia; Okinawa as the ‘sacrificial stone’) while either 
framing the USG and GOJ as acting in bad faith or, at the very least, creating the impression that they 
think so little of Okinawans to the point that the current Futenma stalemate exists as a result of pure 
status quo-ism.  
This ‘faithfulness’ to these principles and myths, however, is not without consequence. In 
doing so, proponents of the ABD ignore, underplay, cynically evaluate, or dismiss outright those 
Okinawans who are pro-relocation, pro-base, or apathetic in much the same way as actors in 
diplomatic and defence sites have done to the ABM over the years. When they are mentioned (if at 
all), they are usually framed as having ties to or being a part of the local business community which 
would profit from the construction of the FRF, or of otherwise being financially incentivised by the 
central government in Tokyo to accept it, as in the case of Nakaima. Given this framing, the 
arguments posed by these businesspeople and local officials in favour of the relocation – such as 
former mayor of Nago Yoshikazu Shimabukuro’s belief that relocating Futenma to Henoko would 
‘“eliminate the sense of stagnation prevailing in Nago” as well as help in the development of the 
city’292 – are regarded as evidence of compromised principles, and thus dismissed. 
In focusing (when they do) on pro-base individuals with more ‘influence’ on the 
policymaking process, they also exclude (and therefore silence) those who share their views on the 
level of the ‘everyday’. These include the Okinawan residents I met who gather on a regular basis, in 
collaboration with USMC servicemembers, to do a ‘fence cleaning’ of Futenma which involves taking 
down banners, ribbons, and tape put up by anti-base activists over the course of a week (see Figure 
9 below).  
                                                          
292 Faith Aquino, ‘Candidates for Nago mayor share pro-relocation views on Futenma base’, Japan Daily Press, 
1 November 2013, available online at: http://japandailypress.com/candidates-for-nago-mayor-share-pro-
relocation-views-on-futenma-base-0138898/.  
Grinberg 249 
 
  
Figure 9: The fences around Futenma before (left) and after (right) the cleaning 
 
Local landowners outside of those in the one-tsubo movement have also not necessarily been 
opposed to the continued USM presence, as Maher wrote in 2008:  
293 
Where these voices have been mentioned, they are characterised as having been 
‘militarised’ in the way Enloe and others have described to the extent that they can no longer ‘see’ 
the issue ‘correctly’, or that, in the case of younger generations of Okinawans who either support or 
are apathetic to the USM presence, they ‘are proud and comfortable of being Japanese, and it makes 
them “susceptible to conservative arguments”’.294 Employing these kinds of generalisations recalls 
similar strategies used by actors in diplomatic and defence sites in their characterisations of anti-
base Okinawans as being too ‘ideological’ or uninformed to have legitimate arguments about the 
FRF, bases, and the alliance. In using these types of strategies, actors from all sites of exchange 
covered – from the diplomatic to the ‘everyday’ – attempt to undermine the agency of someone else 
(and the validity of that someone else’s knowledge base) in order to ensure that their own 
arguments are more ‘successful’ and, therefore, ‘better’. 
                                                          
293 Kevin Maher, ‘Some Interest In, But No Local Demand For, Expanded Return Of Foster’, Wikileaks, Wikileaks 
cable:08NAHA8_a. 10 January 2008b. Available online at: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08NAHA8_a.html.  
294 Koshin Shisui, ‘Backlash against anti-U.S. military activists on rise in Okinawa’, Asahi Shimbun, 11 May 2014, 
available online at: http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201405110043.  
We spoke with the presidents of the Federation of Okinawa Prefecture Military Land 
Owners' Associations, Chatan Town Military Land Owners' Association (hosting 40.1% 
of Camp Foster), Kitanakagusuku Village Military Land Owners' Association (hosting 
32.8% of Camp Foster, including Awase Golf Course), Ginowan City Military Land 
Owners' Association (hosting 24.4%), and Okinawa City Military Land Owners' 
Association (hosting 2.7%). These associations represent the private owners of land 
on which Camp Foster is located, and who accept rent from the national government 
[…] The associations' leaders unanimously agreed that, for now, the majority of Camp 
Foster's landlords want to continue receiving rents from the Japanese government, 
and do not want their land returned to them. The original land owners are elderly, 
and some receive a large enough income stream from their rent to live on. They have 
no interest in stopping that stream. 
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Moreover, while ABD proponents have, on the one hand, explored in great detail the 
plurality of actors in Okinawa who have and continue to work against the USM presence, question 
the continued reproduction of the USJA, and thus contributed to the general understanding of base-
related issues, they have, on the other, not displayed the same kind of plurality in their own 
interpretations and communication of the basic socio-historical narratives which undergird the 
activities of the groups and individuals involved in the ABM. As Kurayoshi Takara pointed out earlier, 
the prevalent tendency in the ABD is to emphasise Okinawa’s victimhood, and although this 
discursive strategy has gained public appeal and success on some levels, it equally – by placing 
blame on the USG, GOJ, and the apathy of the mainland Japanese public – automatically triggers 
resentment and reactive policies from the very institutions (the alliance and the base presence) 
which it is trying to change or modify.  
Considering the fact that Okinawa does suffer from real socioeconomic problems stemming 
from the USM presence and its political separation from the Japanese mainland for almost thirty 
years – and that its residents continues to face threats to their everyday security on account of the 
proximity of the bases and the dangers of military accidents, incidents, or active combat (should a 
regional conflict arise) – the reproduction of narratives which have usually only been rewarded by 
short-term sympathy and long-term apathy runs the risk of undermining the goals of the ABM while 
reinforcing the PBD. The supporters of the latter have claimed that, because the PBD is based on 
current, rather than historical, issues, it is therefore more relevant to ‘national security’ than being 
purely ‘emotional’. Whether or not this is the reality of the situation matters little; instead, what 
matters is if the proponents of the ABD can present their case in such a way that the strategies they 
employ (such as describing the situation on the ground in Okinawa through their personal 
experiences with noise pollution, assault, and environmental contamination) are performative on 
the level of the policymakers themselves. 
In this sense, then, as solidarity among its proponents and a unity in strategy propels the 
‘success’ of any discourse, so does the inclusion of a wide variety of historical frames and political 
backgrounds broaden its appeal and strengthen its support from outside actors. The ‘All-Okinawa’ 
movement, therefore, appears to be a step in this direction with Onaga as its elected representative. 
In the months since he was elected to office, for instance, his vocal communication of the ABD from 
Tokyo to Washington, D.C. has caused waves in the news media and especially among Japanese 
policymakers, who were keen to put the Futenma relocation to bed after the 2013 deal between 
Abe and Nakaima. In June 2015, for example, the ‘All Okinawa Council’ ‘submitted a document to 
member states of the United Nations' top human rights body requesting that they urge the United 
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States to alleviate the military burden shouldered by Okinawa Prefecture’ after the Abe 
administration’s escalation of FRF implementation efforts in 2014.295  
While this movement has re-energised the ABM to a level not seen since Hatoyama’s rise 
and fall from 2009 to 2010, one of its biggest strengths – that it was started from within the 
prefecture and is supported by the top prefectural official – has also proven to be one of its more 
problematic aspects. This is because this movement, like its previous incarnations, has faced great 
difficulty in gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the Abe administration and the USG. The construction 
of the FRF, for example, is still being carried out by the GOJ with the full support of the USG behind 
it, and any legal or political challenges being posed by the OPG are promptly dismissed by officials in 
both governments as Onaga and his supporters ‘playing politics’ at the expense of national security 
and, ironically, the safety of the people of Ginowan.296 Likewise, when Susumu Inamine, the recently 
re-elected mayor of Nago City, maintained his firm stance opposing the FRF’s construction in 
Henoko, the central government has stopped giving the city a ‘“realignment subsidy,” which is 
granted to base-hosting municipalities’.297 After Onaga’s election as well, the central government cut 
the budget allocated to Okinawa’s ‘economic development’ by 4.6% for fiscal year 2015298, and 
though Onaga has challenged the suspension by the GOJ of his nullification of the land reclamation 
permit issued by Nakaima in court, his lawsuits have, thus far, been unsuccessful in lifting it.299 
Nonetheless, the notion which some of these officials hold – that the discourse they 
promote is performative purely by virtue of their positions of power, and that of the Okinawan 
prefecture’s less so because it cannot be immediately translated into policy – has been and 
continues to be their blind spot. The USG and GOJ cannot stop, for example, exogenous events from 
taking this power out of their hands (such as a severe military crash in Ginowan, or any other violent 
incident related to US forces in Okinawa)—nor can they prevent internal dissent over the 
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sustainability of current alliance policies in the light of ever-changing economic, social, and political 
circumstances from gradually changing the nature of their own discourse.
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Conclusion 
 
Encapsulated in Yoshikawa’s statement above is, like the quote in the Introduction to this 
thesis, an interpretation of ‘security’ which extends beyond the confines of the territorial nation-
state all the way down to the level of individual people—and, furthermore, an understanding that 
this level cannot be separated from concepts of ‘national’, ‘regional’, or even ‘global’ security. This is 
evident from the case of Futenma and USM bases in Okinawa generally speaking, as the seemingly 
‘narrow’ concerns of local residents about their environment, physical safety, and general quality of 
life have had a demonstrable impact on the ‘wider’ concerns of policymakers and other officials on 
the national and bilateral levels—not to mention an impact on the formulation and execution of the 
policies themselves. Rather than any specific division over history, ethnicity, or culture, then, the 
mutually-held belief that there is ‘no middle ground’ – which for proponents of the PBD has meant 
that they cannot (and will not) significantly alter the current Futenma relocation plan, and for 
proponents of the ABD that they will not accept anything less than the relocation of Futenma 
outside of Okinawa, if not a more substantial reduction in US forces altogether – is what has kept, 
and continues to keep, these two discourses apart.  
Given these circumstances, it is critical to recognise the practical impossibility of isolating the 
policy products of institutional negotiations from not only the individuals who perform and influence 
these processes, but also these same individuals’ personal experiences which inform their 
interpretations. It is these distinct, personal interpretations which decide, in the end, the purposes 
of political institutions like alliances, how they are created, how they change over time—and how 
they are reproduced.  
This concluding chapter therefore aims to synthesise the preceding analysis of such 
circumstances in the following four ways: 1) discussing the overall findings by analytical theme from 
the discourses identified in this thesis (the PBD and ABD) and their attendant myths, narratives, and 
stories; 2) addressing the central research questions outlined in the Introduction of the thesis; and 3) 
discussing the limitations and contributions of this research for future alliance studies, studies of the 
USJA, and the Okinawa base issue; and 4) providing suggestions for future research based on these. 
We’re stuck with our own views – human rights, our daily lives, our culture is 
important, our environment is really important, the base is a big problem – but the 
Japanese government keeps saying national security is really important and that 
Okinawa is playing an important role, and “we thank you, but please keep the bases 
there” […] Again, the numbers – 74 per cent of all US bases and facilities in Japan are 
concentrated in Okinawa, which accounts for 0.6 per cent [of Japanese land] – so the 
number itself is … for us, that’s just too much. That’s why we say there’s no “middle 
ground”. We already yielded to your demands and your policies this much. 
- Hideki Yoshikawa, International director of the Save the Dugong Campaign Center 
-  
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1. Overall findings (by theme) 
1.1. Historical memory and threat perception 
 It was generally difficult to structure the subsections under each theme so that they 
reflected one another across the three main sites of exchange under study. This was especially the 
case with this first theme, which encompassed the often vastly different historical experiences 
undergone by the actors surveyed in each site—not to mention the equally differing interpretations 
of those experiences. For example, alliance ‘managers’ in diplomatic and defence sites, by and large, 
interpret the renewal of the USJ-ST by the two governments as evidence of the existence of the 
continued ‘threats’ posed by states like China and North Korea to the region. This, in turn, means for 
them the continued relevance of the alliance, the continued utility of the USFJ and their facilities for 
‘deterrence’ in Okinawa, and guaranteed public acceptance of the alliance as a ‘cornerstone’ or 
‘keystone’ for ‘security’ in the region (not to mention public acceptance of the term ‘alliance’ itself).  
On the other hand, ‘everyday’ actors – citing their experiences during the Battle of Okinawa, 
the disenfranchisement of living under USM administration during the post-war period, and their 
scepticism of the efficacy of USM bases against the ‘threats’ as conceived by the GOJ and USG – 
portray this same renewal as one which reoccurs at the expense of their views being fully considered 
in the policymaking process. The same contrast can be observed into the more recent ‘rebalance’ 
strategy of the Obama administration and in the ways in which it has been interpreted by actors at 
these sites: as one that ‘ensures that our alliances are nimble and adaptive’, makes the US defence 
posture ‘operationally resilient, and politically sustainable’, or one that ‘ensures [the US’s] 
dominance through the 21st century’, to name but a few.1   
 However, given that this theme covers, in each subsection across each chapter, roughly the 
same time periods and the same officials and policies, it is natural that they should reflect one other 
in the language used by actors cutting across sites. ‘Cornerstone’, ‘keystone’, or its attendant 
terminology (such as the alliance as a ‘pillar’ or ‘linchpin’ for security in the region, for example) 
appear throughout the narratives within the PBD in diplomatic and defence sites. The actors 
repeating these words assume that their respective audiences understand their usage not only in the 
sense of the alliance serving as a literal ‘pillar’, but also – in cases where they are speaking 
with/reassuring each other – that they understand the symbolic importance of these words, as their 
usage has deep historical precedents. The same applies to their use of terms such as ‘instability’ or 
‘uncertainty’ as threats in the post-Cold War era. The audiences they target, however, appear to 
implicitly exclude ‘everyday’ actors, especially in Okinawa, as this same language has been 
interpreted – and performed – to fulfil a very different function in the propagation of the ABD (for 
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example, appropriating ‘cornerstone’ in terms of returning the prefecture to its mythic status as a 
‘cornerstone for peace’ in Asia, or by taking the concept of ‘instability’ as ‘threat’ to mean that no 
new adversaries could be found against which to justify the continued existence of the alliance—and 
therefore ‘maintaining the alliance is the goal of the alliance’2). 
 In outlining the specific language or devices historically constituting the PBD and ABD, 
therefore, this theme not only traced how ‘threats’ to the alliance specifically were conceptualised in 
the post-war era, but also how they were reproduced and inverted by actors across the three sites. 
This three-step process, moreover – creation, reproduction, inversion – very clearly juxtaposed the 
discursive interpretations offered at each site of exchange, and thus highlighted just as clearly the 
internal contradictions and tensions existing therein which can ‘hide or conceal other realities’.3 In 
terms of the PBD, its proponents’ framing of ‘threats’ based on historical precedent has effectively 
justified the status quo in terms of alliance continuity since WWII, though this has ‘concealed’, to a 
large extent, the ‘reality’ of a large USM presence (and its impacts) in Okinawa. For the ABD, its 
proponents’ challenging of this framing has led to a sustained and ongoing anti-base movement 
which relies heavily on a self-victimising interpretation of the same historical events.  
1.2. Defining and redefining security 
 This self-victimisation similarly colours the discursive interpretation of ‘security’ by 
‘everyday’ actors—including the way in which they understand what it means, who (or what) can 
provide it, and for whom (or what) it is provided. Drawing on both historical and current impacts 
related to living next to USM bases, such as pollution and crime, narratives within the ABD have 
consistently reproduced a notion of ‘everyday’ security as being one which is more concerned with 
‘human’ security: that is, the physical safety and quality of life of Okinawan residents. They 
distinguish such concerns from those of mainland Japanese residents and especially from those of 
USG officials, both of whose distance from base-related problems, according to these narratives, 
reduces their ability to fully comprehend the extent to which the USM presence has detrimentally 
affected Okinawa. At the same time, however, through the actions which members of the ABM have 
taken over the years in relation to the Futenma relocation issue – including staging protests and 
engaging in discussions with OPG, GOJ, and USMC officials – it is clear that these same actors have 
been and continue to actively attempt to enhance general awareness of this distance and its 
contribution to the ‘status quo’ not only on Futenma, but on alliance policy more generally. 
 By comparison, ‘security’ appears to be considered less empty signifier open to 
interpretation in diplomatic and defence sites, but one whose meaning is intrinsic to the concept 
                                                          
2 Gabe 2014. 
3 Fischer 2003a. 
Grinberg 256 
 
itself: that is, national and/or regional security in the form of ‘deterrence’ provided by the USM 
presence, especially in Okinawa. Within this interpretation, ‘local’ or ‘everyday’ security is not ruled 
out as an impossibility—rather, it is simply assumed that there can be no ‘everyday’ security without 
‘national’ security, and therefore distinguishing between the two on the level of national 
policymaking to a large degree is missing the point of the alliance’s purpose. It is in this way that 
certain frames have been accepted and even absorbed into the language used by supporters of the 
PBD – such as Okinawa’s base ‘burden’ or Futenma as being a fundamentally ‘dangerous’4 base (a 
‘ticking clock’5) – but with the caveat that any modifications made to policy in favour of improving 
this ‘burden’ or quality of life issues remain secondary to the primary goal of ‘securing’ the region 
from the aforementioned ‘threats’ covered in the first theme. In framing the ‘burden’ as a ‘lower-
order’ issue, therefore, actors in diplomatic and defence sites have been able to largely reproduce 
narratives which posit the inevitability of the FRF’s construction and the alliance’s continuation.  
These have translated directly into policy, as with the decades-long choice of Henoko 
specifically as the FRF site, but have also demonstrated performative power beyond paper—such as 
in the overwhelming pushback from both the USG and GOJ against proposals to relocate Futenma 
outside of Okinawa by the Hatoyama administration, leading, in part, to his early resignation. Based 
on just such events, this theme was thus essential in illustrating not only the discursive development 
of the concept of ‘security’ following on from historical precedents, but also how its ‘naturalness’ (in 
the context of ‘national’ or ‘regional’ security) has been challenged and has oftentimes failed to gain 
purchase at each ‘level’ of the alliance. 
1.3. Institutional and cultural identities 
 Likewise, identities have been equally difficult – if not more so – to translate and transmit 
across these ‘levels’. Being tied explicitly by the actors surveyed to their own experiences, their 
interpretations of others’ historical experiences, and their current conceptualisations of what or 
whom constitutes ‘threats’ or ‘security’, identities under this theme were shown to have a twofold 
purpose. First, they ‘secure a notion of “who we are”’; second, they define ‘who we are not’.6 In the 
first instance, actors in diplomatic and defence sites identified themselves as members of, by and 
large, the communities within which they were professionally socialised, such as the MOD, DOD, or 
MOFA. At the same time, however, they made distinctions not only between themselves and 
‘everyday’ actors, such as mainland Japanese citizens or Okinawans, but also between themselves 
and other officials or ‘experts’ at various tiers within their own organisations. For example, consider 
the discussions about the Ambassador in charge of Okinawan Affairs in MOFA, or the role of the ODB 
                                                          
4 Yamaguchi 2014. 
5 Anonymous 2014d. 
6 Stern 2006, pp. 187-188. 
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in Kadena. In both cases, although the individual or groups are formally subsumed within MOFA or 
MOD, respectively, their roles – essentially as ‘go-betweens’ for the GOJ and OPG/Okinawans – not 
only distinguishes them in terms of their influence on the policymaking process from those directly 
involved at ‘higher-level’ bilateral negotiations between the USG and GOJ, but also allows them a 
greater awareness and potentially clearer understanding of the ABD purely on account of reduced 
geographical distance.  
 In reproducing the insulation of their ‘managerial’ sites from individuals not only within the 
alliance, but also from those outside of it, actors in diplomatic and defence sites have contributed to 
an increased feeling of alienation among many Okinawans from the central government in Tokyo 
(and from Washington). As argued in the conclusion of Chapter 5, they employ this feeling in the 
form of their narrative of victimisation, though their focus on historical discrimination against 
Okinawa and its residents – especially in harking back to the suffering experienced during the Battle 
of Okinawa, and of the discrimination leading to the prefecture’s handover to USM administration – 
does little to appeal to people outside of Okinawa in terms of helping the ABD to ‘succeed’ or 
become more widespread, and certainly does not help the ABM’s case with central government 
officials.  
Nevertheless, it is obvious that in the latter’s attempt to downplay the bases and Futenma 
as a ‘side issue’ for decades in favour of reproducing the status quo with which it is familiar and 
identifies, it has festered and generated significant resentment across all sites of exchange. 
Furthermore, it has helped to perpetuate the very victim narrative which they argue so vigorously 
against—and with the perpetuation of this narrative, it has become increasingly difficult for the 
central governments, particularly the GOJ, to argue in favour of a unified national identity which can 
only be protected by the USM presence. 
1.4. Discursive intersections and divisions 
 Given the clear lines of difference drawn out between the discourses under the previous 
three themes, the challenge of the fourth was to identify and highlight areas of overlap or potential 
agreement—as well as those where such ideational ‘alliances’ are more difficult to establish. On 
discursive intersections, it became clear that, if we could measure at all the ‘success’ of a discourse 
in this research, one which could be considered is the widespread argument evidenced at every site 
that there should be a greater understanding of, and therefore sympathy towards, Okinawa’s unique 
history with both the USJA and the USM presence. While the depth of this argument is, indeed, 
contestable (as ‘everyday’ actors would claim that the use of such language as ‘burden’ or promises 
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to take action to alleviate said ‘burden’ represent merely empty political rhetoric7), its pervasiveness 
throughout the PBD should not be taken lightly. This is because other arguments related to it – such 
as those in favour of improving the ‘sustainability’ of the USM presence through increased 
environmental clean-up measures, or even of considering alternatives to the current Futenma 
relocation plan – may very well have been silenced or non-existent within diplomatic and defence 
sites without accepting, in the first instance, the bases as a physical and symbolic ‘burden’ on 
Okinawa and its residents. 
 On the other hand, where the bases as a ‘burden’ has become a widely-understood concept 
in theory, this has not necessarily always translated to the policy level beyond speeches by PMs and 
presidents. There remains a significant distance between the ways in which legislators and officials 
in diplomatic and defence sites interpret why the alliance is reproduced and what justifies the 
continued USM presence in Okinawa from ‘everyday’ actors. This is not only due to the differences 
in their experiences and recollections of historical events shaping the USJA and base presence, but 
also to their learning and re-learning of the discourses (re)produced by the communities and 
organisations within which they have been, and continue to be, socialised. In repeating narratives 
which have not been altered significantly in decades – whether they be ones that see the bases as a 
‘necessary’ burden, link the USMC’s survival as an organisation with their significant presence in 
Okinawa, or frame opposition to the USM presence as ‘the fringe’8 – they leave little room for 
argumentation and negotiation within the PBD over its constitutive concepts and myths.  
Likewise, the self-identification of many actors within the ABM as victims of discriminatory 
policies of the USG and GOJ breeds a certitude within the narratives they promulgate about the ill-
intent of actors within those sites. This ill-intent encompasses not only all of the historical injustices 
performed against Okinawa and its residents (whether they be in the form of the bases or lower 
socioeconomic development), but also the continued stationing of US forces there and the 
governments’ obstinacy with regards to altering the FRF plan. This certitude is only amplified when 
such concepts as the ‘heart’ of Okinawa or ‘nuchi du takara’ are cited as intrinsic elements of an 
Okinawan identity undergirding the ABD, since they are framed as being drawn from a historical 
precedent predating the alliance (the Ryukyu Kingdom). In framing them as arising from this 
historical source, they thus justify not only adopting a protest movement that calls for ‘peace’, but 
one within which this ‘peace’ is defined as an essentially anti-militarist concept—and, therefore, one 
with which a continued USM presence is fundamentally at odds. 
                                                          
7 Norimatsu 2011; McCormack, Norimatsu and Selden 2011. 
8 Forbes 2014. 
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2. Research questions and answers 
 While the themes outlined above are useful in illustrating the specific findings of the thesis 
as related to the USJA, the Okinawa base issue, and Futenma, it is also important to ‘zoom out’ and 
consider how these findings relate to the broader central research questions about alliances and 
how they function (as outlined in the Introduction). Although some of the specific findings from the 
case of Futenma and the USJA are not necessarily generalizable to other bilateral and multilateral 
alliances in terms of their sociohistorical developments, it nonetheless serves as a window through 
which observations can be made about the function of alliances within international relations, and 
the actors whom and processes which both constitute them and enable their reproduction.  
2.1. What is the role of alliances in international relations? 
 Given the increasingly critical analyses that have been made of alliance ‘persistence’ in the 
literature overviewed in Chapter 1, it follows that this thesis would thus make a basic inquiry into 
what, exactly, the purpose or role of alliances are in contemporary international relations. From that 
overview and in considering the case of the USJA, it is apparent that they do not only serve purely 
military-centred goals such as providing ‘deterrence’ against potential ‘threats’ or increasing joint 
interoperability of member states’ armed forces, but also provide HADR assistance on a regional or 
even global level, assist in PKOs, and act as institutional frameworks through which bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations take place over security, trade, energy, and other policy areas. 
Nonetheless, it is also apparent that in taking on these other functions, the utility of referring to 
these interstate relationships as ‘alliances’ – a term which primarily still relates to their military 
origins not only within IR studies, but also among the actors surveyed across all sites within this 
thesis – is increasingly questionable.  
2.1.1. How do they function? 
An alliance, therefore – in being created via treaty – must technically be renewed by its 
member states and discursively reproduced by their supporters in order to physically continue. 
Moreover, these same individuals must be able to successfully argue that an ‘alliance’, on the one 
hand, is able to assume responsibilities beyond just military-related ones, while on the other keeping 
the institution distinct from the broader, already existing interstate relationships between member 
states as one which is useful primarily in a defensive capacity. In containing this inherent 
contradiction, alliances such as the USJA which have ‘persisted’ past their ‘expiry date’, so to speak, 
have thus been the products of long-term negotiation and renegotiation between ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’ actors of the core beliefs constituting them. While the outcomes of these negotiations are 
often more evolutionary and gradual than revolutionary and sudden – with change being observed 
over years rather than days or months – they nonetheless illustrate the basic discursive processes 
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driving not only institutional reproduction, but also the day-to-day functioning of an alliance as a 
physical presence in the form of the individuals who ‘manage’ it.  
Beyond simply maintaining regular contact and reassuring each other, these ‘managers’ – 
including current and former central government officials, ‘experts’ at government-affiliated think 
tanks (or non-affiliated ones) and research institutes, and military officials – also make an alliance 
and its impacts deeply felt through their interaction, if limited, with the general publics of their 
member states. Although it has been argued by some scholars in Chapters 1 and 2 that the consent 
of the publics is not necessarily needed (or heeded) in terms of the reproduction of security alliances 
specifically (such as the arguments in favour of ‘path dependence’)9, it is clear that in cases where 
alliance-related policies have directly and negatively impacted upon some segments of these publics’ 
quality of life (or has the potential to do so), the latter’s ‘insurgent narratives’ are difficult to ignore 
or dismiss entirely.  
2.2. How do competing discourses about the current conditions and future of a security 
alliance interact? How do they influence one another? 
 
 It is difficult to ignore or dismiss them due to the impact that these narratives can have 
specifically in terms of their potential influence over the public—and thus the potential of the public 
to demand policy-level changes. These changes can directly challenge the modus operandi of an 
institutionalised alliance with regards to not only the core beliefs about ‘security’ or ‘threat’ 
undergirding its creation and current state, but also the discourse based on these which is employed 
to reproduce it (and the actual policies in which this discourse is articulated). Alliance ‘managers’ 
thus must directly or indirectly engage with the oppositional or ‘competitor’ discourse challenging 
status quo reproduction. In the process of argumentation and negotiation there is, naturally, the 
potential for their own discourse to be influenced by the language used by their ‘opponents’, 
whether that be in its coherence, style, or in the use of specific devices like euphemism and 
connotation.  
Proponents of an ‘oppositional’ discourse, in turn, can also experience this kind of gradual 
change within the language and strategies they employ through interaction. This change, however, 
does not just take place through active argumentation and negotiation over core beliefs and 
interpretations. Rather, due to the pervasiveness of the status quo, pro-alliance discourse within the 
public sphere, it follows that even its challengers, being conditioned to its existence and familiar 
with its constitutive narratives, could come to accept (in some aspects) its ‘naturalness’. This is 
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evident, for example, in the fact that the ABM – as covered in Chapter 5 – is divided in its aims in 
part due to the acceptance of the USJA’s ‘necessity’ by some of its constituent groups, not to 
mention the effects of militarisation on everyday life in Okinawa.10 
2.2.1. What is the process that determines the prevalence of certain discourses over others? 
 Given the inherent accessibility and availability of the pro-alliance discourse across all sites 
of discursive exchange, it should not come as a surprise that it often prevails over the opposition in 
terms of successful translation to policy. By contrast, an oppositional discourse – while it has the 
potential, depending on the content and strategic employment of its ‘insurgent narratives’, to have 
greater purchase with the general publics or even with government officials – is often created and 
reproduced with a much narrower audience, at least in its beginning stages. Due to the cultural and 
political influence which an institutionalised alliance may hold not only within governmental sites, 
but also public ones (especially after exposure to prolonged and repeated argumentation in favour 
of it), it can thus be incredibly difficult to counter effectively. This is especially the case when the 
focus of an oppositional discourse is on an aspect of the alliance and its related policies which 
affects, as in the case of military bases, only a small segment of the general population. In such 
cases, it is easier for supporters of the prevailing discourse – like the pro-alliance one – to dismiss 
this opposition as not seeing ‘the big picture’ and being too narrowly concerned with their own 
interests. This is easier still when the argument is over how to interpret concepts such as ‘threat’ and 
‘security’, which are often set apart from public debate in the first place. 
2.2.2. How do actors (both internal and external to the alliance) effect policy changes? 
 Even in sites where discourses are traditionally more easily translated into policy, however, 
actually enacting change within a set policy is not necessarily a straightforward process. Given the 
long-term reproduction of a prevailing discourse and its attendant narratives by actors across 
various sites within an alliance – these cutting across political and ideological divisions which might 
otherwise be the natural sources for change – it can be difficult to both argue for and actually effect 
changes to it. This difficulty can be enhanced, furthermore, when reproduction has been so 
successful that even actors ‘outside’ of the alliance’s institutional framework – such as the general 
public – support it and might oppose even internal challenges to it (see, for example, the Japanese 
public’s disillusionment with the Hatoyama administration when it proved unable to provide viable 
alternatives to the FRF plan).  
In such circumstances, even in cases where actors 1) have alternative ideas or suggestions to 
the status quo and 2) are ideally located in sites where they have an increased number of 
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opportunities and chance of success in promoting these, they have been so socialised within the 
alliance and conditioned to promote the discourse and narratives in support of it that they often do 
not publicly air their arguments or seek approval for them (see, for example, the interviewees cited 
in Chapters 3 and 4 who, while privately supporting alternative relocation sites to Henoko, expressed 
that these views would not be taken ‘seriously’ in public11). 
 The challenge to actors ‘outside’ of this institutional framework in effecting policy changes, 
then, is twofold: 1) it is a challenge in terms of these actors’ distance from policymaking sites (not 
only professionally, but also, in some cases, geographically); and thus 2) it is a challenge with regards 
to making a successful argument against this framework, as actors from sites of exchange close to 
the policymaking process also have traditionally greater access to and influence over the general 
publics. By contrast, these ‘outsider’ actors – in representing only a segment of the publics, and 
sometimes a very small one at that – must employ narratives and even physical strategies which may 
assume a confrontational style in order to garner media attention. In doing so, their oppositional 
discourse includes not only frames alliance supporters (especially in governmental sites) as 
antagonistic and reproducing policies with the explicit intention of marginalising ‘outsider’ or 
‘everyday’ actors, but also frames themselves as victims suffering from this marginalisation in both 
political and socioeconomic aspects (for example, the narrative within the ABD framing Okinawa as a 
‘sacrificial stone’). Although this confrontational style can provoke negative or dismissive reactions 
from alliance supporters – including those who might otherwise agree with certain ideas constituting 
the oppositional discourse – it can nonetheless also gain enough attention and support from actors 
at other sites to result in actual policy changes (as was the case with the original SACO agreement). 
 
2.2.3. What is the impact of analysing the issue of alliance reproduction from a top-down versus a 
bottom-up approach? 
 Considering their quite different discursive strategies and traditionally limited abilities in 
being able to successfully argue for and implement changes on the policy level, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the majority of alliance studies, in discussing ‘persistence’, exclude ‘outside’ actors 
and, therefore, a ‘bottom-up’ approach to this phenomenon. This is in part due to the basic labelling 
of this process as ‘persistence’ rather than ‘reproduction’, as discussed earlier—the former implying 
passivity, the latter activity. In doing so, the former largely relies on nonhuman mechanisms 
considered intrinsic properties of the institutional structure, such as ‘path dependence’ or ‘sunk 
costs’, to explain why an alliance is maintained. When collective or individual agency is considered as 
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a possible element in alliance ‘persistence’, the extent of its influence on this process is portrayed as 
dependent upon those endogenous, institutional factors. Furthermore, the agents which may exert 
this limited influence are circumscribed to those already within the confines of the alliance (the ‘top-
down’), as these are likewise assumed to be the only ones with any feasible proposals or correct 
‘knowledge’ upon which to base their arguments (for example, the ‘Japan hands’ within the USG, or 
‘Alliance hands’ within the GOJ). 
By contrast, reproduction – in taking this maintenance to be conditional upon active 
argumentation and negotiation between individuals in support of (‘top-down’) or challenging (and 
‘bottom-up’) its purpose – can investigate in more detail both how and for whom it is maintained. An 
analysis of alliance reproduction which thus integrates both of these approaches widens the range of 
actors whose interpretations may be seriously considered to those outside of traditional 
policymaking sites. In reassessing this phenomenon on the level of discourse across these levels, this 
inclusive approach also avoids the analytical pitfalls of looking at reproduction purely from the other 
side: the ‘bottom-up’. As outlined both in Chapters 1 and 5, many activist-academics’ tight focus on 
the ‘everyday’ or ‘outside’ actors in the case of the Okinawa base issue – while illuminating the 
arguments and narratives undergirding the oppositional discourse in great detail where they might 
otherwise not be heard – is often played out at the expense of discussing the influence of and 
potential for endogenous change within diplomatic and defence sites from whence the pro-alliance 
discourse is primarily reproduced.  
3. Implications for alliance studies 
3.1. Contributions of research 
Of course, as the MOD researcher highlighted at the beginning of this chapter points out, 
expanding the number of ‘levels’ or, as I have outlined in this thesis, ‘sites of exchange’ under 
analysis, clearly complicates what was previously a field of fairly straightforward, ‘top-down’ studies 
of alliance ‘persistence’ by integrating this ‘bottom-up’ perspective. This is not only in the sense that 
individuals in ‘everyday’ sites have been excluded in much of the alliance literature (and in the USJA 
literature as well), but also in that individuals within government or military-based sites whose views 
do not exactly agree with the overarching pro-alliance discourse have also been silenced or ignored. 
In bringing these voices back into the analysis, this thesis has highlighted both the role of active 
agency and the role of social interaction (or the lack thereof) in the reproduction of this discourse 
between and within these sites—not to mention how this reproduction is challenged. Moreover, in 
taking on this agent-centred approach which identifies individuals as the referent objects of security, 
even at the level of international institutions such as alliances, this research urges a transformational 
conceptualisation of the latter as much more than just ‘treaties’. Instead, they are carriers of 
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collective memories, constituted by a wide gamut of personal narratives, and, at their foundations, 
the products of human interaction. 
While it is clear that actors at each ‘level’ do have ‘very different motivations [and] very 
different ideas’, the interpretative approach embraced here fundamentally challenges the 
‘naturalness’ not only of the continued existence of alliances like the USJA in the post-Cold War 
world, but also that of the fundamental concepts which are held up as the key reasons for their 
existence. It does so in enhancing awareness of how actors from each site of exchange define such 
concepts as ‘threat’ and ‘security’ based on not only their own, individual experiences, recollections, 
or interpretations of historical events, but also on those that have become accepted within their 
communities or social/professional circles. This can be applied not only to the specific case of the 
Futenma relocation and the USJA, but also to other ‘institutionalised’ alliances to which there are 
attached decades (if not longer) of entrenched narratives and stories related to their historical 
creation and reasons for reproduction. Furthermore, in opening up these concepts to interpretations 
by a wide range of actors across diverse sites of exchange, this thesis has made the case for 
integrating lived experience and ‘local knowledge’ alike as serious evidence alongside the more 
traditionally considered ‘expert’ opinion or ‘scientific demonstration and verification’ provided by 
actors with direct access to policymaking sites. 
As has been evidenced by the case of the USJA and the controversial relocation of Futenma, 
continued attempts by actors from ‘managerial’ sites of exchange to insulate the alliance from the 
unpredictable ‘winds’ of popular opinion (and even the protests of local officials) contributes to an 
ever-increasing disconnect between the ‘everyday’ from those in power—and this resentment has 
already demonstrated an ability to disrupt and destabilise the USJA, let alone how it has affected 
and will continue to affect other institutionalised alliances like it.  By demonstrating the impact of 
the power of ‘insurgent’ everyday narratives on security-related policies – those usually portrayed as 
being ‘untouchable’ by officials and scholars alike – this research thus challenges not only the 
prevailing conceptualisation of alliances as being in a rarefied realm above ‘politics’, but also that 
well-defined notions of ‘national security’ and ‘threat’ are just as contestable and open to 
deliberation as the ‘security guarantee’ provided by these kinds of political institutions. 
3.2. Research limitations 
 While I have attempted, in this thesis, to undertake a comprehensive overview and 
dissection of the processes and individuals involved in reproducing alliances, there are nonetheless 
several caveats to address. These include: 
 Language barrier. All interviews in Japan were conducted in English and all materials 
collected for the purposes of this research, primary and secondary alike (with the exception of some 
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examples of visual discourse which are more easily translated, such as anti-base protest signs or 
one-page pamphlets), are also in English. Therefore, this dissertation suffers from a lack of Japanese-
language sources and the insights they could provide, especially with regards to domestic Japanese 
discussions regarding the alliance, its future, and public sentiments towards the base situation.  
Relatively weak focus on ‘everyday’ actors. This limitation arises largely from the first – the 
language barrier – in that the interviews conducted in Japan, being in English, excluded many of the 
‘everyday’ Okinawan members of civil society and/or prefectural officials who only speak Japanese. 
As there are significantly more current and former Japanese officials in Tokyo who speak English, it 
was much easier to secure interviews with them. Furthermore, the language barrier also prevents 
me from being able to do a full investigation into the online activity of anti-base groups, many of 
whose websites are solely in Japanese. As a result, the emphasis in this thesis was on more ‘elite’ 
sites of exchange and the actors within them (Chapters 3 and 4). 
Obfuscation of information on the part of interviewees. Given the fact that many of my 
interviewees with officials and/or activists were recorded, it is highly possible that whatever 
information given by them during the course of the interviews includes obfuscation or misdirection. 
However, as previously discussed, because this research focuses more on the specific discourses 
employed by project participants and the way (the ‘form’) in which they use them as opposed to 
trying to discover their motivations or why they chose to promote one discourse over another, this 
particular issue may not have actually been much of a limitation in practice. 
Focus on discourse at the expense of other variables. As discussed in this chapter and in 
Chapter 1, the majority of the previous approaches to alliance ‘persistence’ and, in particular, the 
USJA have posited any number of material, ideational, or hybrid variables in their explanations. 
Therefore, the tight focus on discourse and the process of reproduction means a lack of discussion 
regarding those specific explanatory factors (such as asset specificity or shared values) unless they 
are directly cited by the discourses under examination in this research.  
Thematic structure. Practically speaking, it is difficult to disentangle individuals’ 
interpretations of ‘security’, their historical memories, and self-representations (identities) from one 
another, and thus separating them out in the analysis as I have is not necessarily reflective of how 
these various concepts are, in reality, very much connected to one another. Moreover, in covering 
each of these concepts – rather than in focusing on one in particular as other studies might do, such 
as identity – this thesis could not delve into the smaller (but still important) details regarding their 
evolution (for example, a fuller discussion on the development of the native pro-independence 
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movement in Okinawa12, or of the ‘generation gap’ between young and old Okinawans in their 
attitudes towards base issues13). 
4. Suggestions for future research 
Because the situation with regards to Futenma and the future of the relocation remains 
fluid14, future studies of the ‘Okinawa base issue’ or the USJA generally speaking would be able to 
draw on this thesis as a reference point. Specifically, future incidents and accidents in the prefecture 
relating to the USM presence will continue to pose a challenge to the PBD and its proponents, as the 
former represents the physical manifestation of a ‘threat’ to ‘everyday’ security. Whether these 
incidents and accidents can raise public ire to the point that the relocation plan itself is cancelled 
completely is unclear, but the discourse(s) presented in this thesis will undoubtedly continue to 
evolve and influence one another to some degree regardless. In this process, furthermore, 
discussions of the broader purposes and future of the USJA – as has been demonstrated in the 
preceding chapters – will also inevitably be caught up. Given these circumstances, it is important to 
continue to conduct research on this issue that is agent-centred and sensitive to the interplay of 
language and meaning between individuals from various sites of exchange—not just to remain 
narrowly focused, as in previous studies, on the actions of ‘elites’ and their networks. 
This can apply not only to the Futenma relocation specifically, but also to other cases like it – 
such as that of a US Naval Base constructed on Jeju Island in South Korea15 – where the impact of 
                                                          
12 See, for example: Eiichiro Ishiyama, ‘Ryukyu pro-independence group quietly gathering momentum’, The 
Japan Times, 26 January 2015, available online at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/01/26/national/ryukyu-pro-independence-group-quietly-gathering-
momentum/#.V2LAkvkrLIU.  
13 See, for example: Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, ‘The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the 
Futenma Base Controversy’, US Congress, Congressional Research Service, 20 January 2016, available online at: 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf.  
14 Onaga, for example, has visited Washington several times since taking office and met personally with 
members of Congress. During these visits, he has appealed to them to ‘“listen directly to the voices from 
Okinawa”’. Moreover, a 2015 OPG survey – the first ever to ‘[canvas] local views on the [relocation] plan’ – 
found that 58.2% of respondents are ‘against’ the plan, with 25.5% in favour of it. (For more, see: ‘Onaga asks 
U.S. to listen to Okinawan residents over base issue’, The Japan Times, 19 March 2016a, available online at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/19/national/politics-diplomacy/onaga-asks-u-s-to-listen-directly-
to-the-voices-of-okinawan-residents-over-base-issue/#.V2LDLvkrLIU; ‘58% of Okinawa residents say ‘no’ to 
U.S. base relocation: survey’, The Japan Times, 31 March 2016b, available online at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/31/national/58-okinawa-residents-say-no-u-s-base-relocation-
survey/#.V2LDPfkrLIU).  
15 This base, constructed in the village of Gangjeong in southern Jeju, was completed in February 2016 for the 
purpose of ‘protect[ing] shipping lanes for South Korea’s export-driven economy, which is dependent on 
imported oil’, but also in order to ‘enable South Korea to respond quickly to a brewing territorial dispute with 
China over Socotra Rock, a submerged reef south of Jeju that the Koreans call Ieodo’, according to Sang-Hun 
Choe of The New York Times. Home to over ’20 warships, including submarines’, the base’s construction was 
delayed by local protests over environmental concerns that it ‘would harm the island’s ecology’ (‘Island’s Naval 
Base Stirs Opposition in South Korea’, The New York Times, 18 August 2011, available online at: 
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military installations, though deeply felt on a local level, has not necessarily been integrated into 
broader US-ROK alliance studies. Outside of the base issue, it would also be useful to study the 
discursive reproduction of the USJA through the lenses of other controversial issues in the two 
countries’ relationship, including trade (through, perhaps, the controversial Trans-Pacific 
Partnership16), nuclear energy (especially in light of the 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi power plant 
disaster, the ensuing anti-nuclear protests on mainland Japan, and in consideration of the strong 
anti-nuclear movement in Japan which has existed since WWII17), and increasing military 
interoperability between the USM and SDF (a topic which was touched on in this thesis, but which 
may be expanded upon significantly in future studies with regards to SDF involvement in USM 
missions overseas), among others.  
The same can be said of many other of the US’s long-standing bilateral and multilateral 
alliances –the US-UK ‘special relationship’, NATO, or US-Philippines, just to name a few – which all 
produce policies that directly impact upon the ‘everyday’. Whether in the form of sending soldiers 
overseas in the face of public opposition to support US combat operations (such as the UK’s 
involvement in the War on Terror), USM facilities forward-stationed in precarious locations (such as 
NATO’s new ground-based missile defence system in Romania, raising the Russian government’s 
hackles18), or agreements to build new ones in places where there has, in the past, been 
demonstrated public passions against their construction (such as the Philippines’ offer to host eight 
new US bases ‘amid rising tension with China over the South China Sea’19 and reopening the USN’s 
Subic Bay base, previously closed in the 1990s), it is undeniable that an alliance exists and is felt 
outside of the ‘elites’ and ‘experts’ which enable its continuation. In recognising this, then, it is 
critical that future research points out that the role of ‘elites’ in managing and reproducing an 
alliance is only half the story (if that), and the other half – constituted by the experiences and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/world/asia/19base.html?_r=0; ‘[Editorial] Jeju naval base’, The Korea 
Herald, 29 February 2016, available online at: http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160229001123).  
16 Mitsuru Obe reports, for example, that this agreement involves a ‘shakeup’ of Japan’s agriculture sector in 
that it introduces ‘easier access to Japan for products such as California rice, Canadian pork, Australian beef 
and New Zealand butter’. Obe warns that this development may mean that ‘many small Japanese farmers 
could be taken over by large enterprise operators’ (‘TPP Deal Expected to Shake Up Japan’s Agriculture Sector’, 
The Wall Street Journal, 6 October 2015, available online at: 
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2015/10/06/tpp-deal-expected-to-shake-up-japans-agriculture-sector/).  
17 For more, see: Satoko Norimatsu, ‘Fukushima and Okinawa – the “Abandoned People,” and Civic 
Empowerment’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 9:47:3 (2011), available online at: 
http://apjjf.org/2011/9/47/Satoko-Norimatsu/3651/article.html.  
18 For more, see: Ryan Browne, ‘U.S. launches long-awaited European missile defense shield’, CNN, 12 May 
2016, available online at: http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/11/politics/nato-missile-defense-romania-poland/.  
19 For more, see: ‘Philippines offers eight bases to U.S. under new military deal’, Reuters, 13 January 2016, 
available online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-usa-bases-idUSKCN0UR17K20160113; 
‘Philippines reopens Subic Bay as military base to cover South China Sea’, The Guardian, 15 July 2015, available 
online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/16/philippines-reopens-subic-bay-as-military-base-
to-cover-south-china-sea.   
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interpretations of individuals within and outside of this site, not to mention the interaction between 
the two – remains to be told. 
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Appendix 1. Additional resources and illustrated materials 
1. Map of U.S. military bases in Okinawa1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Okinawa Prefectural Government. Available online at: 
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/25185.html.  
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2. Map of training areas in Okinawa2 
 
3. Map of main bases and facilities under study3 
 
                                                          
2 Okinawa Prefectural Government. Available online at: 
http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/chijiko/kichitai/25185.html. 
3 ‘US welcomes start of base move on Japan's Okinawa’, BBC News, 15 August 2014, available online at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28799796.  
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Appendix 2. List of sites visited on fieldwork research 
1. Military facilities 
Name of site Location 
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma Ginowan, Okinawa 
United States Marine Corps Camp Foster Ginowan, Okinawa 
United States Air Force Kadena Air Base Kadena, Okinawa 
United States Marine Corps Camp Schwab Nago, Okinawa 
United States Marine Corps Camp Kinser Urasoe, Okinawa 
United States Navy Fleet Activities Yokosuka Yokosuka, Japan 
Former site of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Yomitan, Okinawa 
 
2. Sites of cultural/historical importance 
Name of site Location 
Wajii Cliffs and caves Ie Jima, Okinawa 
Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum Itoman, Okinawa 
Himeyuri Monument and Peace Museum Itoman, Okinawa 
Yasukuni Shrine Tokyo, Japan 
Yushukan (Museum at Yasukuni) Tokyo, Japan 
Japanese battleship Mikasa Yokosuka, Japan 
 
3. Interview sites 
3a. Japan 
Name of site Location 
Waseda University Tokyo 
University of Tokyo Tokyo 
Ministry of Defense Tokyo 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tokyo 
Keio University Tokyo 
The Japan Institute of International Affairs Tokyo 
The Canon Institute for Global Studies Tokyo 
Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan Tokyo 
Institute for International Strategy Tokyo 
The Tokyo Foundation Tokyo 
University of the Ryukyus Senbaru, Okinawa 
Okinawa Prefectural Office Naha, Okinawa 
Okinawa Prefectural University of Arts Naha, Okinawa 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Okinawa Liaison Office Naha, Okinawa 
U.S. Consulate General Naha Naha, Okinawa 
Okinawa Peace Assistance Center Naha, Okinawa 
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Okinawa Defense Bureau Kadena, Okinawa 
Okinawa International University Ginowan, Okinawa 
 
3b. US 
Name of site Location 
Boston University Boston, MA 
Harvard University Boston, MA 
Cato Institute Washington, D.C. 
The Mike and Maureen Mansfield Foundation Washington, D.C. 
Johns Hopkins University Washington, D.C. 
Congressional Research Service Washington, D.C. 
The National Bureau of Asian Research Washington, D.C. 
US House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 
Avascent International Washington, D.C. 
The Heritage Foundation Washington, D.C. 
George Washington University Washington, D.C. 
American University Washington, D.C. 
NMV Consulting Washington, D.C. 
Washington College Washington, D.C. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington, D.C. 
Center for Strategic & International Studies Washington, D.C. 
Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. 
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Appendix 3. List of sample interview questions 
 The following is a sample list of questions I asked interviewees in the US and Japan during 
fieldwork. Please note that questions asked varied widely and were largely dependent upon the 
occupation and experiences of each individual interviewed. 
1. The US-Japan alliance 
1. The implications of the word ‘alliance’ have evolved significantly since its appearance in a 
1981 joint communique issued after a meeting between Pres. Reagan and PM Zenko 
resulted in then-FM Sonoda resigning due to the term’s militaristic connotations. Today, 
however, alliances such as NATO encompass many more functions, including peacekeeping, 
economic cooperation and disaster preparedness. In the case of the US and Japan, has the 
term ‘alliance’ evolved in the same way? Or is the US-Japan relationship still one that mainly 
concerns itself with more traditional security issues? 
2. To what extent is the US-Japan alliance institutionalised along the lines of a larger regional 
alliance, such as NATO?  
a. If it is not deeply institutionalised to the NATO-level, then should it be?  
b. What might be some of the benefits/drawbacks of deepening the alliance? 
3. Does the Obama administration’s on-going ‘rebalance’ to Asia represent a significant change 
in the US’s approach to the region?  
4. What is the future of the USFJ presence in Japan given the last few decades of Japan slowly 
modernising its military?  
a. If Japan amends its constitution, would this mean a reduction in the US presence?  
5. What is the (or is there a) role of (for) public deliberation in alliance policymaking?  
2. Okinawa 
1. Officials in Washington and Tokyo often cite the militarisation of China and the DPRK’s 
unstable leadership as reasons for the US’s continued military presence in Japan. To what 
extent do Okinawans (officials and civilians) share these concerns about the wider regional 
threats? 
a. Do they prioritise other security issues above these? If so, which ones? 
2. What is the security value of the American bases to Okinawans?  
a. Would it be different if they were JSDF bases? 
3. How have the protests against the bases in Okinawa affected (or not) the official messaging 
on them (re: their necessity) and on the broader alliance from Washington and Tokyo?  
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a. For example, when former PM Yukio Hatoyama began discussing the possibility of 
relocating Futenma out of Okinawa altogether, he was rebuked quite strongly by the 
State Department under Secretary Clinton. Was this surprising, given the more 
cooperative diplomacy advocated initially by the Obama administration? 
4. How has the official response to the anti-base protests changed the messaging of the ABM 
in Okinawa? In Ginowan and Henoko?  
a. Has it radicalised the movement? Or tempered it? 
5. Can the ‘Okinawa problem’ be resolved through reducing land use by the US military?  
a. If no, what are some of the variables that complicate the final resolution of this 
issue? (E.g. historical animosity between Okinawa and mainland Japan) 
6. To what extent are Okinawan officials involved in the discussions over US bases—not only 
relocation/reduction/return, but also in the overall discussions of alliance policy/its future? 
3. Futenma 
1. There’s been some disagreement over the years as to how the relocation plans should 
proceed in the face of protests. Were the new plans that arose out of these disagreements 
promoted more by the US or by the Japanese? Or both equally? 
2. How does the US military intend to contend with the possible detrimental effects on the 
environment in Oura Bay should Futenma be relocated there?  
3. Alternative sites to Henoko outside of Okinawa prefecture been discussed, such as Hawaii or 
Guam (to which thousands of Marines are already being moved). However, these have not 
seemed to gain much traction. Why have these not been pursued further? 
a. What obstacles exist to relocating the Marines to these areas? 
4. At times the Futenma issue has been characterised as a ‘roadblock’ or simply ‘delaying the 
inevitable’. Why this choice of language?  
a. Does the government believe that the anti-base movement in Okinawa will reduce 
in size/disappear altogether if the current relocation plan prevails?  
5. Do the protests against Futenma’s relocation present an opportunity for ‘policy learning’ for 
government and military officials?  
a. How entrenched is the idea that the current plan must be maintained? 
6. What information from on-going negotiations over the base relocation does the public have 
the right to know?  
